BREAKTHROUGH AT VLADIVOSTOCK?

Dec. 1 (IPS)--There is little in <u>published</u> accounts of this week's Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements in Vladivostock to justify U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's description of the accord as a "conceptual breakthrough" in nuclear arms control.

As Rockefeller depresses the standard of living of the advanced sector working class, the cabal must be assured of either the total impotence or actual aquiexcence of working class parties, particularly the Communist Parties of Western Europe. This in turn means the aquiescence of the Soviet Union. The "conceptual breakthrough," as originally proposed by former CIA chief and now Defense Secretary James Schelsinger, is a means of psychologically conditioning the Soviet leadership to respond to increasing encroachments of a military and political sort on its vital interests under the threat of thermonuclear holocaust. This conditioning involves a process of approximation by "limited nuclear exchanges" involving, first, proxy nations (such as Israel or Iran) and later, the U.S. against the Soviet Union itself.

So why would Kissinger use such a precise piece of Rocke-feller strategic terminology in describing the accords? Has the Soviet Union capitulated to its own suicide and agreed to any first approximation of the "conceptual breakthrough?"

An Incredible Story

The published accounts of the SALT accords fail to meet even the most minimal credibility criteria in strictly military much less political, terms. Specifically, the agreement calls for establishment of ceilings respecting nuclear weapon delivery systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles --ICBMs-and strategic bombers, such as the B-52) to be set at 2500 systems for each side. The agreement further sets a limit of 1300 MIRV's for each side. A MIRV (Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicle) delivery system allows a single missile to carry a pay-laod of severl nuclear warheads which disperse upon re-entry. Theoretically, a single MIRV could knock out several different targets.

The United States has already deployed MIRV's extensively. By 1977, it plans to have exactly 550 of such systems, with no more proposed built until the mid 1980's. Further, the U.S. proposes to have an addition 736 delivery systems of the MIRV type in the form of the submarine-launched Pseidon and Trident systems -- still under the MIRV 1300 ceiling established by the accord.

The Soviet Union has not yet even developed MIRV capability.

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Of further significance, the agreements do not cover the co-called Forward Based Systems (FBS)—those delivery systems located in territory outside the national borders of the two countries. In other words, neither the hundreds of nuclear—armed U.S. and NATO fighter—bombers based in Europe, nor the smaller "non-strategic" nuclear rockets with which NATO forces are largely equipped are touched by the new accords. Brezhnev apparently did not even raise the question of FBS's in Vladivoctock, although previously it had been a major negotiating issue for the Russiands.

The simple fact is that both the U.S. and Soviet Union now operate On the principle of mutually assured destruction (MAD), that one launches all one's missiles and bombers the first moment one knows the enemy has, thereby obliterating the enemy—and the rest of the world. Both countries have more megatonnage than necessary for mutually assured destruction—in fact, mutually assured destruction many times over. The accord simply limits the amount of future megatonnage at an absurdly higher level of mutually assured destruction. The SALT agreement, from a military standpoint, is imbecility, psywar, or a cover story—or a combination of these.

The tangible effect of the agreement appears to be economic, that is, one of forcing the Soviets to develop and deploy a MIRV system to maintain parity on this score with the U.S. As mentioned, the ceiling established on MIRV's permits the U.S. to continue with its present plan for MIRV production and deployment, compelling the Soviets to do likewise. This, however, would represent a deadly drain of the most advanced electonics and laser technological sector, and would impair Soviet development in other sectors. This opens the Soviet Union to the intervention of Rockefeller's economic plan for the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union, to finance the MIRV system, would have to accept increased trade and credit deals with the Rockefeller interests -- on Rockefeller's terms -- or face strategic inferiority.

What is most interesting about the SALT agreement is what it does not say about the two cornerstones of Rockefeller's "conceptual breakthrough": thermonuclear proliferation and the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Mideast.

It is incredible that the Soviet leadership would not have been well aware of the intelligence available to any reader of New Solidarity: the fact that Israel and Iran possess nuclear weapons. Further, every indication given to New Solidarity correspondents suggests that this proliferation is not limited to these two countries. These are facts which could not have escaped the attention of Soviet military intelligence. Given the fact that the Vladivostock meeting was held at the point when Israel was implicitly threatening to hurl a nuclear warhead at an Arab population center—a fact which even the CIA's Yasser Arafat noted—the absence of note of an actual "conceptual breakthrough"—type discussion is

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highly conspicuous.

As suggested by the Western European CP press, the agreement <u>could</u> represent a means by which Brezhnev can silence his left opposition, and divide certain military-technological sectors which have pushed for MIRV development. This would still mean a new "arms race" and profound problems for the Soviet Union. One thing is certain. Henry did not tell it all. And any Congressman with any sense had better find out just what did go on at Vladivostock.

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