

ANALYSIS: THE FOLLY OF PAUL NITZE

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Provided we survive Nelson Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger's current desperate attempts to trigger a thermonuclear showdown, the top "patrician" layers in this country's ruling class who are currently making not inconsiderable efforts to curb the Rockefeller faction's influence and drive will be attempting to adopt a thermonuclear "Maginot Line" strategic posture — a posture which ought to be properly christened the "Nitze Line."

The effort to redefine America's strategic doctrine is not proceeding in the light of day, say, in the style of a "Great Debate" like the one the U.S. Labor Party proposed in the spring and summer months of 1975, nor in a fashion that one might imagine becomes the high pretensions of a two-hundred-year-old democracy. It is being conducted as a clandestine, behind-the-scenes struggle which, among other things, has involved the purge of former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, the ferocious battles around the defense budget, purges and counter-purges in the Defense and State Departments, intelligence leaks through such outlets as Aviation Week magazine, and more grandiose efforts such as the launching of Hilex-75 itself.

In this broader context, Mr. Nitze's remarkable lead article in the current issue of the Council of Foreign Relations' journal, *Foreign Affairs*, is the first item in this factional brawl that does not belong to the cloak-and-dagger genre.

The article, entitled "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente," was made available to the broader public on the same week as that public was made dimly aware of the Soviet Union's broad and yet-unknown laser, graser and related capabilities and these capabilities' military applications. In point of fact, the relative superiority of Soviet science policy, especially since 1960, is the crucial point to be made in regard to the now-shifting U.S. strategic posture. And this special superiority, in turn, is merely an important aspect of certain unique, mostly implicit, epistemological commitments that have compelled the Soviet leadership to adopt what Mr. Nitze describes as a "War-Winning" posture vis-a-vis thermonuclear war, rather than a mere "Mutual Assured Destruction" posture which is at the root of all "deterrence" approaches to thermonuclear war.

The Nitze Line

For military and political experts, the Nitze article is of importance because of what it says as well as what it leaves unsaid — primarily in the domain of Soviet scientific superiority and marginal technological advantage — as well, of course, as the fact that these things are said or left unsaid by none other than Paul H. Nitze and in no less a publication than the reputable *Foreign Affairs* of New York's Council on Foreign Relations.

Mr. Nitze happens to be one of the more lasting fixtures in the Eastern financial-military establishment. A banker on his own right, Nitze was a member of John F. Kennedy's Executive Committee which managed the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962; he was Secretary of the Navy in 1963-67; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1967-69; member of the U.S. SALT delegation from 1969 to 1974 (he resigned from the SALT delegation last year for reasons amply explained in his *Foreign Affairs* article); Mr. Nitze also headed the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey team that studied the effects of the atomic bombs dropped at Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

In the *Foreign Affairs* article Mr. Nitze finally spells out what the Labor Committees and the U.S. Labor Party have been warning against since the publication of USLP Presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche's first Strategic Studies document, "Rockefeller's Fascism With a Democratic Face," in the fall of 1974: the so-called Schlesinger doctrine of controlled, graduated tactical nuclear war is pure insanity. Paul Nitze demonstrates precisely this point for the benefit of his capitalist policy-making peers:

"... the Soviet Union will continue to pursue a nuclear superiority that is not merely quantitative but designed to produce a theoretical war-winning capability. Further, there is a major risk that, if such a condition were achieved, the Soviet Union would adjust its policies and actions in ways that would undermine the present detente situation with results that could only resurrect the danger of nuclear confrontation, or alternatively, increase the prospect of Soviet expansion through other means of pressure."

We are suggesting here that the fact

that Mr. Nitze and the Council of Foreign Relations decided to go ahead with this article is itself sufficient evidence that **according to their own estimates and perceptions**, "such a condition," i.e. a Soviet war-winning capability, is either already achieved or nearly achieved. The significance of this perception is not to be underestimated for its political implications.

To drive the point home among his fellow capitalists, Mr. Nitze constructs the following hypothetical timetable:

"... if in 1970 the Soviets had attacked U.S. forces, their entire prewar advantage would have been eliminated, leaving the United States with substantial superiority at the end of the exchange. However, the situation began to be reversed in 1973, with the Soviets gaining the military capability to end an exchange with an advantage in their favor. Moreover, in 1976 the before and after curves of Table I cross, signifying that the Soviets could, by initiating such an exchange, increase the ratio of advantage they held at the start of the exchange. By 1977, after a Soviet-initiated counterforce strike against the United States to which the United States responded with a counterforce strike, the Soviet Union would have remaining forces sufficient to destroy Chinese and European NATO nuclear capability, attack U.S. population and conventional military targets, and still have a remaining force throw-weight in excess of that of the United States. And after 1977, the Soviet advantage after the assumed attack mounts rapidly."

Two important points are to be made regarding the just quoted passage — points that the military specialist will immediately recognize and the layman will be advised to take our word for it:

First of all, the substance of the argument that Mr. Nitze advances has nothing at all to do with throw-weight ratios and throw-weight differentials "before" and "after" an attack. These comparisons have been chosen deliberately to convince U.S. strategic "think tank"-type mentalities which, in a characteristically blocked way, can only perceive of comparative military

situations in quantitative "megadeath" terms. Otherwise, regardless of the means it employs, Paul Nitze's article proves two points which we of the Labor Committees had arrived at by an altogether different and independent path: First, the Soviets are committed to initiate a nuclear war first the very second the pro-Schlesinger Doctrine, i.e. the Rockefeller faction, emerges politically victorious in the United States and Western Europe; and second, the Soviets already possess or are about to possess that marginal qualitative technological advantage which will spell the difference between victory and defeat in a thermonuclear war.

On the first point, it is widely known that the official, published Soviet position is that war has commenced when the political party of war has prevailed over its opponents. Only recently, the Princeton University Center for International Studies journal *World Politics* ominously referenced *O mire i voine* (On Peace and War), a book by N.V. Pukhovskii published under the auspices of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, to the effect that as "Soviet writers assert, the war aims are picked by political parties which are representative only of their own particular constituencies." *World Politics* goes on to state that "Pukhovskii writes that war breaks out 'when the party desiring war is victorious in the struggle with its opponents — other political parties'."

On the second point of marginal technological advantage it must be emphasized that all the crucial strategic issues of substance of the post-1957 era converge to essentially prove that the United States bourgeoisie has already lost both any possible World War III and the emerging Socialist Revolution in this country.

Before we develop the important elements involved in this crucial issue, we shall point out that Mr. Nitze is in a position to fully recognize that this more or less is the world strategic situation. He ought to be commended for preferring a Maginot Line approach to his problem to Mr. Rockefeller's petulant insistence to blow up a world that no longer belongs to him.

The "Nitze Line" is based on the proposition that "the prospective Soviet advantage could be offset by measures to decrease the vulnerability of U.S. strategic nuclear forces . . . the system that would accomplish these ends would be a proliferation of low-cost (ICBM) shelters for what is called a multiple launch-point system. The essence of such a system would be to construct a large number of silo installations, so that the smaller number of actual missile launchers could be readily moved and deployed among these installations on a random pattern

deliberately varied at adequate intervals of time."

"The ingredients for such a system are, I believe," continues Mr. Nitze, "already in existence, notably through the availability of sufficiently large areas of western desert land now owned by the Department of Defense."

There is no question at this point that Mr. Nitze's proposed strategic outlook is no more meritorious than the posture of Henri Maginot. From the standpoint of the military professional, Mr. Nitze is already defeated. But the even more important issue to settle here is the fate of Mr. Nitze's debating opponents inside the U.S. military establishment.

Clausewitz vs. RAND Corporation

The debate in which Mr. Nitze finds himself has been going on since approximately the late 1930s when the "airpower" issue was being fought between two schools of thought loosely identified by various spokesmen as the "Utopian" and the "Traditionalist."

The so-called Utopians include in their ranks such spokesmen as Heinz Kissinger, Hermann Kahn, Edward Teller, James Schlesinger, Albert Wohlstetter, Nelson Rockefeller et al.

The traditionalist school has had in its ranks individuals such as former Defense Secretary James Forrestal, Paul Nitze, General Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Adlai Stevenson, Averell Harriman.

At the root, the Utopians have distinguished themselves by an excessive, superstitious reliance in some very special supergadget which the magic of "Yankee ingenuity" would one day come up with to upset all strategic rules. This belief, common among paranoid mentalities like the Rockefellers, is not too qualitatively different from the suburban housewife's pathetic conviction that just one additional supergadget in her household will finally ensure her a ticket to everlasting domestic bliss. The other characteristic trait of the Utopians has been their equally magical notion that an enemy can be psychologically manipulated into defeat — much in the way an insane mother manipulates her children — by appropriate dosages of punishment, reward and the ever-present threat of a grand temper tantrum that is supposed to blow up the world.

By contrast, the traditionalist school of military thought has distinguished itself by a certain amount of healthy vacillation between this "mother's magic" approach to nuclear war and the long-established classical principles of warfare.

To determine the actual differences between the two schools of thought involved here, the layman as well as the specialist ought to review the evolution of positions between these two tendencies from at least 1945 onwards, in-

cluding such nodal points in the evolution of these "positions" as Utopian John Foster Dulles' 1954 "Doctrine of Massive Retaliation," the 1957 "Sputnik crisis" of the U.S. military and science establishment, the 1959 introduction of "Graduated Deterrent" in the Army and Navy, the Cuban Missile Crisis and President Kennedy's assassination one year later in 1963, and a number of policy transformations under McNamara as a result of the conduct of the Vietnam War (including the abdication of President Johnson).

The debate between the two wings did not always involve the same people, nor were the terms of reference always the same. Individuals often shifted factional alignment and on the whole, Nelson Rockefeller and RAND Corporation tended to ultimately control both sides of the debate.

In terms of substance, if one cuts through the thick talk and raging controversy in historical sequence from Preemptive Strike and Massive Retaliation, Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrent, Graduated Deterrent and Flexible Response, Flexible Response and Finite Deterrent, Finite Deterrent and Counterforce, Counterforce and Mutual and Assured Destruction, and Mutual and Assured Destruction and Tactical Nuclear War-fighting or the Schlesinger Doctrine, one discovers that the following had occurred in U.S. military thinking since the invention and introduction of thermouclear weapons:

Each time the Soviet Union improved its capacity to fight a nuclear war should one be imposed on it, U.S. financial-military circles renewed their debate on how far one should go using the threat of nuclear war in order to force the Soviets into political capitulations. In this sense, all that which for three decades has passed in the United States as thermonuclear strategic thinking and writing is, from the strictly military i.e. war-fighting standpoint, pure bunk! We are not original in making this assertion since the fact has already been recognized by competent military scientists within the U.S. armed forces.

All the so-called strategic discussion such as Kissinger's 1957 book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* or Hermann Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War* or the notorious Schlesinger Doctrine are attempts to deal, not with the actual issue of war-fighting, but with a perversely perceived psychological manipulation on the basis of the threat of nuclear war. No U.S. military thinker has in fact thought what happens if the threat of nuclear war is no longer a threat — i.e. if the opposing military side has accepted that eventuality and had made preparations for it.

This is probably the most momentous

issue that ever faced the human species. What is involved in terms of psychological processes is the ability of the human mind to **think the unthinkable**, as thermonuclear war has been properly termed, and on that basis to proceed making rational decisions for further action **after** the unthinkable has been already accepted!

There are, admittedly very few individuals who have fully and successfully absorbed the full impact of all that is involved in thus thinking and fully accepting the unthinkable in this sense. The Soviet political and military leadership, as Mr. Nitze correctly reports, belongs to this category. The leadership of the International Caucus of Labor Committees — for reasons and by means that are altogether unique, but nonetheless rationally comprehensible — also belongs to this category.

Whatever passes today for political and military leadership of the United States capitalist class decidedly **does not** belong to this category. As a result, there exists in the United States no body of military or civilian leaders qualified to actually **fight** a nuclear war. What does exist, unfortunately, is a bunch of clinically insane individuals who would literally blow up the entire world in revenge for having already lost the world politically. This is the Rockefeller Family. Assisting them is another class of madmen who, believing their own little infantile bluff, refuse to understand what in fact makes the Soviet leadership morally and emotionally qualified to be willing to actually fight a thermonuclear war. These madmen, in whose ranks Kissinger and Schlesinger are of course included, will play their game of "chicken" — using the **threat** of thermonuclear war all the way to the bitter end — not because they are foolhardy, but because their own internal psychological constitution convinces them that people always **must** capitulate before the **threat** of the unthinkable. The one time that these people will be proven wrong will be too late for all of us.

This state of affairs demonstrates one extremely important feature of war-making, upon which the Prussian strategist Von Clausewitz particularly insisted:

War is always a very serious business. . . "Such is War; such is the Commander who conducts it; such the theory which rules it. But War is no

pastime; no mere passion for venturing and winning; no work of a free enthusiasm: it is a serious means for a serious object. All that appearance which it wears from the varying hues of fortune, all that it assimilates into itself of the oscillations of passion, of courage, of imagination, of enthusiasm, are only particular properties of this means."

This held true for the happy warrior clowns of the post-Napoleonic era and it holds true for the happy warriors of today.

Instead of this necessarily serious attitude toward war, the U.S. military under the sway of the Rockefeller faction's financial interests in the entire postwar period has acquired the characteristics of the impudent cowardice of a mugger: to the extent that the potential victim capitulates to the **threat** of violence, the impudent coward is victorious. If the victim knows how to and has the means to fight back the U.S. military, just like the mugger, will either capitulate or be defeated.

This state of affairs has been excellently portrayed in the Winter 1975 issue of Strategic Review by U.S. Army Colonel Richard L. Curl in his article "Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age." In the context of Mr. Nitze's folly, two items need be said here about this essay which otherwise merits special attention on its own right. First, Mr. Nitze must have known of the truly dismal state of affairs in the U.S. officers corps portrayed in that article — a knowledge which betrays to us the true political intentions of Mr. Nitze's Foreign Affairs article which we shall take up below.

Secondly, Mr. Nitze knows that Colonel Curl's essay raises the most crucial issue in all warfare and most especially, in the fighting of a modern war: the issue of the strategic leader as a human type!

One must directly quote in order to give the true flavor of a military man's anguish at the realization that he has been had!

"The military generalist, like the classical strategist, however, became the victim of the explosion of technology of the Atomic Era, and today's senior officers are increasingly specialists in technical and-or managerial functions. . . The study of strategy in the classical sense all but

disappeared to make way for more 'practical' and 'relevant' studies in the technical and managerial sciences. Unfortunately, when the service schools dropped military history courses from their curricula, they threw out the strategic baby with the historical wash water. . ."

Then, the conclusion:

"Thus far, however, a major American strategic thinker in the military-historic mode has not emerged."

The irony with Colonel Curl's fair appreciation of the situation is his sense of awe when he attempts to present the measure of what ought to be strategic leadership — the type of problem that should occupy Paul H. Nitze more than Colonel Curl:

"When our new Clausewitz does appear to lay down clear principles to guide the decision makers, he is likely to require a thorough understanding of the 'state-of-the-art' of weapons technology, of the political-social-economic factors out of which conflicts arise, of the psychology of conflict, and of the historical forces that have created today's world."

And further:

"My analysis thus far has indicated a return to — really a merging with — 'classical' concepts of strategy. It would seem logical then to postulate that the leadership of the new school of strategic thought will very much resemble the 'classical strategist' of the past in using a basic process of historical analysis and integrating new advances in technology and socio-political theory as the springboard for developing strategic concepts."

From this point on, the writer is overwhelmed by the magnitude of the mess before him and he vacillates between the classical military academy approach to developing such military leadership and the RAND type "think-tank" approach. Which brings us straight to the strategic core of the whole problem: epistemological method!

In the next installment:

*Failure of U.S. Science Policy.

*The terminal Crisis of non-Marxian Epistemology.

*Why Is Mr. Nitze Bluffing.