



SPECIAL REPORT

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ICLC Strategic Studies

Critical Weaknesses in Soviet Policy Outlook

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

USLP Presidential Candidate

On the basis of the leading Comecon sector publications and some correlated facts, it must be judged that the Oblomovist tendencies within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) appear to have increased their influence again, and now exert virtual preponderant control over Comecon and Warsaw Pact institutions' policy-making. This involves a two-level problem. On the first level, immediate policy, the proposed shift in CPSU policy must be denounced as incompetent, even implicitly suicidal. On the second, deeper level, a mere return to the political tendencies dominant in the pre-November 1975 period would improve the situation significantly, but would not solve the problem of providing the USSR and Comecon with the kinds of policies urgently wanted for this period. This situation demands very clear characterizations, such that we can not indulge in a polite manner of argument which would have the effect of circumlocution.

It is now almost possible, if not certain, that negotiations between the Soviet leadership and the White House may succeed in preventing a RAND Corporation-designed Middle East scenario from leading into a general thermonuclear confrontation. That assumed in such terms, the danger of general thermonuclear war within the next 12 to 18 months will persist, becoming increasingly acute **as long as the debt-overhang of the capitalist sector is not eliminated by general debt moratoria**, especially emphasizing developing-sector indebtedness. The attempt to avoid debt moratoria by the capitalist sector will produce a combination of hyper-inflation and super-austerity, in forms which require police-state rule and rapidly emerging fascist forms throughout the capitalist sector and developing sector. Once such police-state and fascist rule is established — as must rapidly occur under austerity measures — the threat of general thermonuclear warfare rapidly converges upon certainty.

In contrast, on the condition that the developing sector debt — or at least a key portion of it — is suspended, the approximately \$800 billions of international monetary structures are threatened with a direct chain-reaction collapse from this triggering, such that the capitalist sector has no alternative but to go through "bankruptcy reorganization" toward the sort of alternatives identified by our "International Development Bank" arrangement. Under such circumstances — establishment of the IDB — the danger of general thermonuclear war ceases to persist.

It should be emphasized, however, that the repudiation of debt payments by key developing sector nations would not be the cause of the monetary collapse. The monetary collapse is inevitable in any case; the only practical question is whether

the collapse occurs before police states are established to preserve the debt or after the establishment of such police states. In the former case, the triggering of chain-reaction collapse forces "bankruptcy" proceedings along IDB lines; in the latter variant, not provoking the debt collapse causes the kind of political reaction leading directly toward general thermonuclear war.

It is clear that this distinction is not understood by a preponderance of political forces in the CPSU leadership. If such ignorance within the CPSU leadership can not be corrected, then general thermonuclear war is virtually inevitable — that war will be the "non-voluntarist" elaboration of "objective laws" so much admired by the Oblomovist-centrist currents within the CPSU leading strata. Nor should we be astonished to discover that the CPSU leadership includes persons of such monstrous ignorance concerning the capitalist sector. It is not irrelevant to such Oblomovism in the CPSU leading strata that there does not presently exist an actually Communist party of "official Communist" designation in any key nation of the industrialized capitalist sector. In other words, **CPSU policy concerning the fostering of "official Communist" parties in the capitalist sector is a matter of manifest bankruptcy!** It should not be astonishing that the CPSU has much to learn on this from the principal viable organized socialist cadre-formation within the industrialized capitalist sector, the Labor Committees.

It is irrelevant, in this present connection, to list the significant competences and accomplishments of the Comecon sectors and its leadership strata either generally or in respect to those currents we rightly recognize as most advanced on important issues. For present purposes, the achievements and competences are to be taken for granted; it is the critical weaknesses which should receive the full focus of our attention here. It is sufficient to emphasize that the achievements of the CPSU and other Comecon leaderships pertain most emphatically to the socialist sector. Outside that sector, the CPSU's manifest political competence rapidly attenuates toward incompetence in the following order: the developing sector, Western Europe, Japan, the USA and Canada. In respect to the USA, the CPSU's understanding continues to be essentially negative in quality; it would be much better if they assumed that they understood nothing, since what they profess to understand is generally not only mistaken but often dangerously wrong.

The Arismendi Case

For the moment, we refer to the very worst aspects of current Comecon sector policy statements and practices. This does not signify that we overlook other tendencies, etc., but that those other tendencies can not be fruitful unless the identified, worst element is first extirpated. We identify that worst tendency by reference to the Rodney Arismendi lead item in the current (January, 1976) issue of **Problems of Peace and Socialism**, an item in which Arismendi, not in-

significantly, repudiates his earlier published views.

The kernel of dangerous error in Arismendi's argument is that he justifies a resumption of the blunders of the Allende period — this time on a global scale.

What happened in Chile during the period preceeding the right-wing coup? Through a "non-provocative" policy externally imposed upon the leadership of the Chile CP, the government of Allende was encouraged to follow policies which estranged the political potential of the Chilean peasantry and working class and aggravated the financial predicament under conditions of imperialist economic warfare against the government. Through this policy, the internal correlation of political forces in Chile was shifted in a way favorable to the coupist forces.

From a purely national standpoint — which is to say an impotent, wrongheaded standpoint — what should have been done was to pursue a ruthless land reform policy around programs of industrial-technology-oriented agricultural development. This would have consolidated the peasant base in support of the government and leading parties, and should have been accompanied by an arming of the pro-government forces as an organized national militia (not "irregular" guerrillista forces). In respect to the economic warfare directed against Chile by the imperialist (i.e., Rockefeller-linked) forces, the Allende government should have followed a class policy, openly stated, of imposing austerity penalties upon the bourgeois layers specifically in efforts to ameliorate the impact of such economic warfare against Chile, thus setting the marginal bourgeois and petit-bourgeois forces into opposition to the actions of the imperialists. Etc., etc.

The wrongheadedness of such a criticism advanced only by itself is demonstrated by the obvious fact that the Chilean situation existed within an international strategic context. The key strategic fact of the post-1967 period was that the capitalist world as a whole was already descending into the present breakdown crisis, a condition signalled by the rapid, chain-reaction succession of the November 1967 sterling devaluation and the February-March 1968 dollar crisis. This crisis caused a shift in the international monetary and trade situation, in which the rate of development generally was slowed and credit-restrictions tightened, with the most aggravated consequences immediately for the developing sector. Hence, it would have been politically impotent to deal with national-sector situations merely one at a time during that period; it was essential to have a global development policy openly articulated as an alternative to the effects of spiraling depression in process.

The problem was that under the Oblomovist interpretation of detente fostered through the mediation of the Botteghe Oscure and Atlanticist social-democratic mediators, the Comecon itself lacked a global strategic policy appropriate to the situation, and therefore the Comecon could not have offered the kind of global development policy which would have neutralized the isolation of Chile's Allende government in Latin America.

Nonetheless, the policy followed in the Allende case was brutally stupid insofar as it represented the Allende government as some sort of "new model" for peaceful socialist transformation over the long pull under circumstances of detente. If it is necessary to take a tactically conservative posture in a certain national situation, one must describe such a policy honestly. Representing a policy leading to inevitable bloody defeat as somehow a "new model" for tactical successes is a wretched bit of political insanity under all circumstances.

The resurrection of such "non-provocative" tactical postures in this present period would be absolutely fatal. "Non-provocative" means explicitly a Comecon policy of avoiding

implication in a developing-sector demand for debt moratoria. This fatal error did not begin with Dec. 1, 1975. It was already being made in September 1975, as at the United Nations Special Session, where Soviet representatives sat quietly with folded arms while Kissinger's hooligans attempted to terrorize developing sector forces into submission. It was this Soviet posture which indirectly caused a massive setback to the revolutionary process in Portugal, and which resulted in a major setback to the developing-sector situation between the high point of mid-October and early December. If the debt structures are confronted with the reality of the monetary situation, the rational capitalist forces of the industrialized sector are forced to consider the IDB — which, in fact, is **their only rational alternative for the current economic situation in any case!** If this necessity does not confront them, they will vacillate on the issue between themselves and the Rockefeller-led factions, in which case they will attempt to sustain the debt-structures by measures of combined paper-issuance and super-intensive Schachtian austerity measures.

Thus, a non-provocative policy on the debt issue leads inevitably into the establishment of reactionary police states allied with Rockefeller interests throughout both the industrialized capitalist sector and the developing sector. In such a development, as indicated, the political character of the capitalist sector ensures inevitable, unpreventable general thermonuclear war within 12 to 18 months. Police states becoming fascist regimes, confronted with super-austerity and hyper-inflationary crises, will absolutely launch general thermonuclear war at the earliest opportunity. That inevitability of war would be the consequence of continuing Arismendi's proposed policies through even the first two quarters of 1976.

The "White Communism" Angle

It is clear that the Oblomovist currents within the Comecon parties have no perception of the proposed alternative. They do not understand that a Comecon enunciation of a positive commitment to an IDB alternative will force the rational capitalist forces to the fore within the industrialized capitalist sector generally — even though the critical political developments of March through November 1975 leave no margin to doubt that this would be the case.

Such an ignorant blunder within the CPSU leadership is not accidental. The success of the CIA's "White Communism" operation is proof of this fact. It is clear that the criteria used by the Soviet and other key Comecon press for judging the quality of Communist parties' leaderships and policies are absolutely incompetent — and characterized by exactly the same points of hereditary incompetence otherwise exhibited in the Arismendi article of January 1976

For example, the case of the CPUSA. Since the middle of the 1960s, the CPUSA has been under top-down control by National Security Council agencies (e.g., CIA, FBI). This takeover has never been secret. Since that period, the CPUSA's domestic policies have been consistently subordinated to the policies of the RAND Corporation and conjoined with the "stability operations" of domestic counterinsurgency agencies, such as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Ford Foundation and so forth, as well as linked to the most nakedly Alinskyite factions of the top trade-union bureaucracy. Consider, then, the effect of this upon the Soviet diplomatic service representative or Soviet press agency personnel proceeding under the policy "Gus Hall (General Secretary of the CPUSA) is a personal friend of Comrade Brezhnev."

Since the Daily World has more or less consistently represented counterinsurgency projects as its heralded subjects of support, any individual Soviet diplomat or reporter who

honestly reported on counterinsurgency activities in the USA would have been thereby exposing the Daily World as a police organ! Not exposing the Daily World and CPUSA as de facto police agencies has in this way prevented responsible Soviet representatives in the USA from returning any competent report on the internal U.S. political situation to Moscow — lest he be thereby guilty of bucking the official line, that “Hall is a personal friend of comrade Brezhnev.” For this and related reasons, Soviet appropriation of the principal relevant features of the internal U.S. political situation has been absolutely incompetent, as shown by the Soviet and other Comecon sector press and by correlated activities from the same sources. Considering the importance of the USA, this is no small error, nor of secondary importance respecting Soviet policy as a whole.

The PCI situation is a somewhat different case, but has ultimately the same broad relevance. Both Giorgio Amendola and Enrico Berlinguer are second-generation British intelligence agents more recently transferred to U.S.-dominated control. Amendola's role as a CIA agent has even been of the most naked sort. Not only has Amendola (Like Sergio Segrè) been associated with a famous CIA-linked Rome think-tank, the International Affairs Institute, but PCI policies conduited through Amendola, et al. have originated through such locations as the Rockefeller brothers' estate at Bellagio and through such emissaries as Zbigniew Brzezinski! It was the PCI, through such German agents as Leo Bauer and Egon Bahr, which headed off an independent legalized KPD with the formation of the legalized DKP of West Germany behind the backs of the German Communists! The detente package was negotiated in part through these same atlanticist agent channels, while the CIA-linked agents in the PCI leadership systematically gutted the PCI's worker-cadre formations, as well as, more recently, playing a key part in assisting the CIA's “White Communist” coup d'etat in the PCF bureaucracy.

In this and similar ways — including the Craxi-Carrillo Italian Communist Party-Spanish Communist Party link-up — the CPSU leadership has watched the Comecon sector be deprived of co-thinker organizations throughout the industrialized capitalist sector, all the while apparently impotent to influence developments in a more favorable direction.

It is not merely a matter of the CPSU press patiently puffing CIA-controlled antics in Communist party leaderships of the capitalist sector instead of denouncing such monstrous behavior. It is not a matter of Soviet direct intervention in such parties. The problem has been chiefly that the Comecon parties' publications have catered to the impotent sort of “objectivist” politics which make Communist parties a fertile ground for operations by CIA and related agencies' operatives. Until some recent Leninist polemics and theoretical works — of the genre now implicitly repudiated by Arismendi — there was nothing of current production issuing from the Comecon parties which would have been useful to inspire the development of qualified cadres. Insofar as the overall balance of Comecon sector publications are concerned, the net result is that the Comecon sector parties have failed to manifest understanding of the ABCs of building and leading Marxist cadre-formations within the capitalist sector.

This problem can be remedied. The Labor Committees, forced to develop from scratch by virtue of the lack of viability of organized socialist formations, have developed a proven model of effective socialist cadre-formation within less than a decade. Thus emulation of that experience, connected to the mass-based formations of genuine Communist cadres and left-wing social-democratic strata, provides the essential building basis for rapidly developing effective,

mass-based political workers' organizations throughout the capitalist sector. However, for the immediate moment, the U.S. Labor Party is the principal viable, mass-based political workers' organization within the industrialized capitalist sector, to the effect that what the Labor Committees and their mass-based allies in that sector can not presently undertake to accomplish is temporarily beyond the possibility of any combination of socialist forces in that sector. This simple reality the Oblomovs of the CPSU presently decline to face. If they did, their perception of the necessary policy would follow readily.

The specific features of this judgement on the CPSU leadership are our own. However, in broader terms, leading forces of the developing sector hold parallel or related views concerning the incompetence of apparent Soviet perception of the global political situation. If the debt is not suspended, then developing-sector nation's efforts to meet debt requirements will force them into genocidal (e.g., Brazilian) forms of austerity, leading inevitably to a homogeneous nightmare of police state to fascist regimes allied to imperialism throughout the capitalist sector, and the rapid collapse or crushing of socialist and pro-socialist regimes throughout the developing sector. Yet, faced with such inevitable consequences of a continued Oblomovist “non-provocative” policy on the debt question, the CPSU to this point clings to a policy which means only the rapid total isolation of the Comecon sector and a strategic correlation of global political forces extremely favorable to imperialist ventures into general thermonuclear war.

Instead of learning the obvious lessons from the experience of “White Communism,” the CPSU leadership has apparently retreated into Oblomovist isolation, behind an hysterical reaction-formation policy of “somehow, we in the bloc must hold together and depend upon our own internal abilities to resist imperialist threats.” It is apparent that they have for the moment ignored the reality that governs the special conjunctural desperation of imperialist forces and the circumstance of global hegemony over austerity-directed regimes in the industrial capitalist and developing sectors. The imperialists (e.g., Rockefeller, et al.) are given the optimum variant for undertaking a mobilization for general thermonuclear confrontation with the Warsaw Pact under the circumstances in which the imperialist forces would have the advantage of threatening to win an actual thermonuclear war.

Admittedly, such a war would not be to the advantage of anyone. If any CPSU leader depends upon an appeal to rationality in this connection, his own Oblomovism has reached the point of outright insanity. To the extent that the capitalist sector is committed to the principle of maintaining the integrity of debt-ridden monetary structures, imperialism persists as a raging beast determined to either conquer the world or destroy it — for that beast, considerations of rational alternatives do not exist. Only to the extent that the debt structure collapses or is wilfully collapsed, thus ending the imperialist political structures, does there exist a form of capitalism which is responsive to the kinds of self-interest on which the CPSU leadership presumes to base negotiations of peaceful coexistence.

The Alternative

The only rational Soviet policy is to support a Third World debt moratorium on the condition that the capitalist sector is simultaneously offered the rational alternative of the IDB. Any other policy is stupid and insane. It may be that some CPSU officials are irritated at being given policy directives from the small “upstart” Labor Committees. They will have to decide which they prefer to defend: their exaggerated self-estimations or the continuation of civilized humanity.

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