The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has entered the seventh week of a renewed faction fight, whose central underlying issue has escaped the view of the professional “China watchers:” the collapse of Mao Tsetung’s foreign policy. Since 1971, Mao has been able to sustain his fanatic anti-Sovietism solely on the basis of China’s alternative alliance with the U.S. and NATO and its role within that alliance of leading the Third World against the Soviet Union.

Last year, the basis for that alliance fell apart. The Rockefeller-controlled U.S.-NATO apparatus lost the political and economic control over the world it had enjoyed since 1945. It has not been able to follow through on promises made to Mao about joint anti-Soviet action. China has also lost the support and good will of Third World nations because of its virulent anti-Sovietism and the lack of Chinese industrial-economic growth initiatives toward the underdeveloped world.

The critical factional issues of educational and economic policy, widely reported in the press, are significant only in the context of the overall collapse of Mao’s “Chinese way” internationally.

The discrediting of Mao’s foreign policy has given his numerous opponents considerable factional ammunition with which to undercut his influence within China. Mao’s current campaign is an attempt to politically salvage his faction, and through it maintain his anti-Sovietism as hegemonic policy beyond his own death. In this fight the Maoists’ only weapons are ones of crude psychological warfare. They are now moving to exacerbate differences within the Chinese population and are stepping-up the brainwashing propaganda assault on the general population.

The Maoists

The Maoist campaign is led by individuals who date their rise to power from the 1966-68 Cultural Revolution. The key factioneers are Politburo members Chiang Ching, (Mao’s wife), Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wen-yuan. This grouping has neither a sizeable social base outside Shanghai (the home of Chang, Wang and Yao), nor a substantial power base within the CCP itself. The faction and its party followers owes its political existence to the personal protection of Mao.

The Maoists’ charges against the faction led by Teng Hsiao-ping openly reveal that the primary issue in the fight is a naked power grab by the Maoists. In Chinese press accounts partially blacked out by the Western press, the Tengists are accused of blocking the advancement of young Maoists whose sole qualification is their ability to verbally assault “revisionists” — i.e. the economic bureaucrats. A long front page article in Peking’s People’s Daily on February 29 accused Teng of denouncing young leading cadres as “those who have moved upward in helicopters” and of insisting that cadres only be appointed “step by step” based on experience. The Tengists are accused of reinstating old, once-purged cadres instead of promoting Maoist youths to responsible positions.

While attempting to infiltrate the CCP, the Maoists are trying to create a loyal social base by exploiting divisions within China’s general population stemming from the nation’s poverty. Maoist economic and educational policy has led the least advantaged against the slightly more advantaged layers by championing the lowering of all educational and living standards down to the lowest common denominator: This policy has succeeded in eliminating educational preparation and intellectual achievement as criteria for university admittance, and have substituted for them the criterion of Maoist slogan-mongering, with predictable catastrophic effects on the quality of intellectual-theoretical work nationally. The purpose of the policy has been to create an ersatz “intelligentsia” of incompetent graduates beholden to the Maoists.

The Maoists have pushed for the retraction of wage increases and bonuses from the majority of workers as a ploy to gain the support of lower-paid contract and temporary workers. They have attacked the Tengists for “putting profits in command” and supporting “material incentives” for increased worker productivity. The Tengists are further attacked for maintaining so-called bourgeois rights in the countryside. This line refers to the right of the peasants to maintain tiny private vegetable plots and to sell their produce at market. In this regard, the Maoists continually champion the “poor and lower middle peasants” in their claims against the slightly better off “rich peasants.” These divisions are due to the incomplete social and economic transformation of the countryside which Mao has energetically obstructed since the 1960’s.

The Maoists are pushing no policy except the maintenance of China as a peasant society. Only by maintaining China’s backwardness do they see a possibility of manipulating the population to their factional advantage — this is their sole policy objective.

The Tengists

Teng-Hsiao-ping, Mao’s chief target, has inherited the loose faction led by the late Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Chou’s base was the key layers of economic administrators who have run the economy since the early 1950’s. Teng has also taken over the remains of the Party bureaucracy he headed before his 1967 purge. Teng’s base has been in de facto coalition with Chou’s faction since the early 1960’s.

The Teng-Chouist faction is most clearly distinguished by its abhorrence of Maoism. The factional differences have arisen not out of principle, but are due to the hideous negative
consequences of Maoist policy for the economy. Chou held
the economy together after both the Great Leap Forward
disaster of 1958-60 and the Cultural Revolution. He later
moved to consolidate factional support for his policies after
the dumping and murder of former Defense Minister Lin
Piao in 1971. Chou succeeded in forcing Mao to agree to the
rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping in 1973, and to almost every
other purgee of the post-1965 period. At the Fifth National
People's Congress in January 1975, he succeeded in gaining
institutional approval for his 25-year long-range plan to
modernize China's economy, and his 10-year perspective for
intensive economic growth. At the same Congress, Chou
managed to exclude China's four top Maoists from all
positions on the NPC Permanent Standing Committee.
Helpless to prevent acceptance of Chou's program, Mao
was so incensed at the Congress proceedings that he
boycotted the entire session. Immediately thereafter, Mao
launched the "anti-bourgeois rights" campaign, and the
campaign against the novel "Water Margin" in September,
to state his case against Chou.

Following Chou's death January 8, 1976 the Maoists
dramatically stepped up the attack. A scheduled late January
5-day Central Committee meeting to select a new prime
minister and launch the new five year plan was broken up by
the Maoists. The session ended after only 2 days. The
selection of Hua Kuo-feng, not firmly in either faction, as
acting premier, was the first indication that the anticipated
successor to Chou, Teng Hsiao-ping, was himself under
heavy attack.

In any other country but China Chou's policies would ap­
pear as unexceptional, although generally competent,
programs for economic development. In contrast to Mao's
attempts to destroy China's population through his
deschooling and austerity policies, the Chou-Teng program is
a beam of light streaming into the darkness. It has the sup­
port of the vast majority of the Party, the majority of the
army which recognizes the military necessity of
technological development, and most of the population which
overwhelmingly recognizes that China's best interest lies in
increasing national wealth. The principal supporters of
Maoism are those opportunists who want to rise to power on
Mao's coattails.

Others support Maoism — in appearance only — under the
threat of a pervasive Gestapo apparatus run by Mao and
reinforced by "blockwatchers" and other policing and
spying operations run in behalf of Maoism.

A third tendency, unable to organize openly consists of
cadre within the CCP and the army who favor reconciliation
with the Soviet Union and China's reintegration into the
Soviet camp. This group includes many members of the Teng
faction. Once Mao dies and that roadblock to the total
elimination of Maoism is removed, this faction by the nature of
the Teng-Chou program and of the developing in­
ternational situation will rapidly gain hegemony.

Various anti-Soviet commentators have fearfully noted the
existence of this tendency while the Soviet press has com­
mented on it favorably. China's discrediting in the eyes of the
Third World over the last year, and the rapid increase of
Soviet influence there, will impel such a shift of expediency
on any non-Maoist regime.

**Political Gutlessness**

The actual strength of the anti-Maoists is overwhelming.
This raises the question of why they have not long since
eradicated Mao and Maoism from China's political life. The
answer is in fact the monstrous political gutlessness of all
Mao's antagonists since the late 1930's. Chou En-Lai, who
disagreed with Mao in economic policy continually for 25
years, could accurately be called Maoism's creator. Not­
withstanding bitter policy disagreements, Chou was loyal to
Mao, bailing him out of his disastrous messes, and deflecting
the efforts of others to unseat him at crucial moments. Chou,
Teng, the deposed former head of state, Lui Shao-chi, and
countless other leaders allowed Mao to create and widen the
original split with the Soviets — and worse, create the un­
bearably evil cult of Maoism.

Without attacking "Mao Tse-tung Thought" itself directly
as a fraud, all of Mao's opponents are forced on the defensive
and cannot wage an actual political fight against it or Mao.
They are forced, as they are accused by the Maoists to im­
potently "wave the red flag against the red flag." The anti­
Maoists now face the real threat that an open attack on
Maoism would ignite an uncontrolled popular explosion
which might destroy the regime.

This threat has allowed the Maoists to proceed this far in
trying to purge Teng again. Since Chou's funeral, neither
Teng, Li Hsien-nien, chief economic planner, or Yeh Chien­
ying, Defense Minister, has been seen in public. Li and Yeh
were very close colleagues of Chou En-lai. Similarly the
Education Minister, Chou Jung-hsin, who had come under
attack in December, may already have been purged, while
Yeh is rumored to have been replaced as Defense Minister by
Chen Hsi-lien, Peking Commander.

However, the accusations against Teng by the Maoists
reveal that he is waging a behind-the-scenes fight, though
this remains unreported in the Western press. Teng is ac­
cused of having told his rehabilitated followers not to be
afraid of attacks on them because they had already survived
being purged once. This indicates that he is organizing for a
long struggle. He and his cohorts are also accused, in the
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Feb. 29 the People's Daily, of working behind-the-scenes,
making speeches and appealing to the intellectuals for
support. Teng is accused of having circulated a "Reporting
Outline" to try to consolidate his faction within the univer­
sities and among scientists. He has repeatedly been attacked
during the last seven weeks for being entrenched and well­
supported throughout the party.

Teng has attempted to use the banality of Maoism to his
advantage. He is accused of walking out in the middle of
operas produced under the direction of Mao's wife in total
boredom, and of having said that tickets to them probably
could not be given away. Moreover, he is charged with
having been opposed to Mao's demand for incessant phrase­
mongering by asking: "How can we talk about class struggle
every day?" Teng has also fought charges of "revisionism" by arguing,
"How can bourgeois rights be restricted and eliminated
The attacks on him have harped on his faction’s argument that Mao’s educational policies have “hobbled modernization” and caused science and technology to be “stagnant, confused and paralyzed.”

Internal Line-Up

The Teng faction’s strength is most evident among the ranks of the provincial leaderships. A grid of provincial broadcasts up through March 1 reveals that only one province, Chekiang, and one city besides Peking, Shanghai, backs Mao to the hilt. The Maoists have forced strong attacks on the Teng faction in four or five other provinces in Manchuria, East and South China, but even these attacks hold back from total support for Peking. The campaign has been toned down drastically, parodied, or ignored in the remaining provinces, including strategic areas along the Soviet and Indian borders. An in several of the pro-Maoist provinces, including Chekiang, Maoist wall posters have appeared denouncing first party secretaries, indicating that even in these provinces Teng has high-level support.

The Army has been entirely excluded from the campaign suggesting minimal Maoist control of the military as well. While factional alliances of Chen Hsi-lien, the probable new Defense Minister, are not known for certain, he has long been a proponent of modernizing the Army and probably opposes Mao. The Army had been a key base of support for Mao during the Cultural Revolution. Teng, Li and other anti-Maoist leaders still apparently retain their party, government and army posts, even after six weeks of an insulting, vituperative campaign in the Maoist-controlled Peking press. Whether or not these individuals can continue to hold their posts in the short run, the inability of Mao and the Maoists to win a quick decision against them has reduced their credibility to near zero. As yet inconclusive reports that the Maoists have reversed an earlier position and are now saying that there is still time for Teng to repent suggest that Maoists may have backed off. This may signal an attempt at a face-saving deal involving a nominal “self-criticism” by Teng in return for an attenuation of the campaign.

The demise of the China-U.S.-NATO alliance fashioned by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and the collapse of the “American Century” make useless Mao’s traditional ace-in-the-hole anti-Sovietism as a factional weapon. No Chinese leader can fail to recognize that Mao’s foreign policy has been a total disaster. At this moment China’s strongest international ally is Chile. Anti-Sovietism has flopped throughout the Third World. What has unnerved Western anti-Soviet commentators, academics and diplomats is that regardless of day-to-day events in China from now on, Mao’s reliability as an anti-Soviet ally is irrevocably destroyed. Mao is capable of bringing only instability and economic dislocation to China. His opponents, even if they make no present indications of favoring a reconciliation with the Soviets will be pushed in that direction the moment Mao is out of the picture.

The following box identifies the major posts and factional alignments of China’s leaders. The Communist Party hierarchy at the national level includes a 250-man Central Committee, which meets rarely, and a 21-member Politburo, which actually runs the country. The politburo is headed by a Chairman, 5 vice-chairmen and a Standing Committee (chairman, vice-chairman and 3 others).

In the government hierarchy, the post of premier is the top, followed by 12 vice-premiers.

The real power, however, resides in the Party itself. Within the ruling Politburo, there is little democracy as Mao, through terror and manipulation, has often prevailed despite representing a minority. The reader is therefore cautioned that the actual strength of factions cannot be concluded from examinations of who holds what position alone. (see article):

MAO FACTION

Mao Tse-tung — Chairman of the Central Committee, CCP
Chang Chun-chiao — Standing Committee of the Politburo; Political Commissar of the Armed Forces
Wang Hung-wen — First Party Vice-Chairman
Yao Wen-yuan — Politburo member
Chiang Ching — Mao’s wife; Politburo member

TENG FACTION

Li Hsien-nien — Politburo member; Third Vice-Premier of the Government; Chief economic expert for the government
Teng Hsiao-ping — Second Party Vice-Chairman; First Vice-Premier of the Government; Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Yeh Chien-ying — Party Vice-Chairman; Defense Minister (unless replaced in January); extremely old and probably plays little role
Liu Pu-cheng — Standing Committee of the Politburo; paralyzed by stroke and may no longer be active
Chu Teh — Standing Committee of the Politburo; extremely old (87) and may play diminished role

ALLEGIANCE NOT CERTAIN

Hua Kuo-feng — Acting Premier; Politburo member; Minister for Public Security; appears to be going along with Mao, but previously known to favor Chou’s economic program
Chen Hsi-lien — Politburo member; Commander of the Peking Garrison; probably Defense Minister as of January; has always opposed Mao’s use of the Army as a political tool, favors modernization of Army