

## The Press Reports the 'Team B' Flap

*Washington Post*, Jan. 2 "Carter to Inherit Intense Dispute on Soviet Intentions" by Murray Marder: President-elect Jimmy Carter will inherit an intense dispute over U.S. intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union's global strategy....

For the first time in 26 years, a special panel was commissioned to challenge the judgment of the official government analysts. The special group argued that the traditional estimators for years have been seriously miscalculating the basic intentions of the Kremlin, and understating the threat to the United States.

The result is a new, sterner National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union....

The validity of the new estimate is defended by George Bush, director of the Central Intelligence Agency and also government-wide director of central intelligence. In the latter role, Bush and Richard Pipes, professor of Russian history at Harvard University, jointly agreed on 10 specialists, including Pipes, who could add a new dimension to the annual, most critical National Intelligence Estimate by joining in sifting through the secret data.

Team A, which produced the official report, was headed by Howard Stoertz, CIA national intelligence officer on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. The CIA declined to list the members of the team. The official intelligence estimates are negotiated inside the intelligence community, which is comprised of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Treasury, Energy Research and Development Administration, and the FBI.

Team B, led by Pipes, former director of Harvard's Russian Research Center, worked on the intelligence estimates for about three months, starting in August. It included the following:

Daniel O. Graham, retired Army lieutenant general, who directed the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency until last January; Tomas Wolfe, Rand Corp. expert on Soviet military affairs, and retired Air Force colonel; John W. Vogt, Jr., retired Air Force general who commanded the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam and U.S. air forces in Europe; Paul H. Nitze, former deputy secretary of defense, a specialist on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear strategic arms limitation talks who helped form the new Committee on the Present Danger.

Also, William R. Van Cleave, professor of international relations, University of Southern California, who has served on the U.S. SALT delegation, and Foy D. Kohler, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, 1962-66, and now a professor at the University of Miami's Center for Advanced International Studies, with which Graham is

also associated.

Team B also included the following officials still on active government duty:

Air Force Brig. Gen. Jasper A. Welch, Jr., assistant chief of staff, studies and analysis, who has helped develop U.S. positions in the SALT talks; Seymour Weiss, who served as director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and was recently ambassador to the Bahamas and Paul D. Wolfowitz, deputy assistant director for planning in the verification and analysis bureau of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Among those who are pleased with the outcome of the Team A-Team B competition, the debate is variously described as "bloody, but healthy," or "constructive" and "long overdue." Critics call it a "bludgeoning" exercise, which further demoralized analysts in the battered CIA.

There is speculation that Bush's successor in the Carter administration, Theodore C. Sorensen, will now see the dispute as added reason for overhauling the intelligence evaluation structure....

The idea for an adversary team on intelligence originated with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, headed by Leo Cherne, New York economist and research specialist.

Pipes, when asked last week why his team was so "one-sided", said:

"There is no point in another, what you might call, optimistic view. In general there has been a disposition in Washington to underestimate the Soviet drive. The moderately optimistic line has prevailed... We have imposed very severe limitations on ourselves. The hope had been that all those steps would lead the Russians to slow down. They haven't."

Numerous sources on all sides agree that the "peer pressures" on the insiders, confronted by the prestigious names and reputations of the outside challengers, were great.

Graham was reported to have said to the CIA analysts at one stage that "I don't want to tell you guys you're going to lose your jobs, if you don't get on board, but that's the way it is."

Graham said last week, "Oh my God, I never said anything like that in my life; that's absolutely shabby; that's absurd."...

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*New York Times*, "Jan. 3 "Air Force's Ex-Intelligence Chief Fears Soviet Has Military Edge," by David Binder: The man who has played a central role in swinging the United States intelligence community

toward a more grim estimate of Soviet strategic objectives says he believes that the Soviet Union has already achieved military superiority over this country.

Major Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., who retired yesterday as the Air Force's chief of intelligence, said in an interview that he had reached this conclusion primarily as a result of recently acquired information. It involves, he said, a vast Soviet military and civil defense shelter program, stockpiling of foods and grains for war emergency and development of some 10 to 15 new ballistic missile systems the Russians will test in the next few years.

"Today, because of the civil defense measures in the U.S.S.R., I believe the United States is incapable of carrying out its assigned wartime retaliatory tasks of crippling the Soviet industrial economy, the essential civilian-military leadership, nuclear stockpiles and the basic fighting capacity of the U.S.S.R.," he said.

"By every criterion used to measure strategic balance — that is, damage expectancy, throw-weight, equivalent megatonnage or technology — I am unaware of a single important category in which the Soviets have not established a significant lead over the United States..."

"What it all means is that the Soviets believe they can survive a nuclear war, not without of course suffering a great deal of damage in the process."

This conclusion together with his assessment of newly developed Soviet offensive war capabilities, has led General Keegan to the estimate "that the greatest global conflict in history is likely to occur within the next decade or two unless there is a radical change in United States intelligence perceptions..."

Similarly, he said, past American intelligence estimates that in a superpower nuclear war, 10 Americans would die for every Russian, were also suppressed. General Keegan now believes the gap is even greater — that perhaps 35 to 40 Americans would be killed for every Russian.

He said the mistaken intelligence estimates of the past "raise serious questions about the character of arms control accords" with the Soviet Union, including the five-year treaty to limit strategic weapons which expires this year. To continue the present course of United States defense policy and strategic diplomacy, the general said, would be "inviting the very thing, the very condition which it is aimed at preventing — the gestation of global conflict."

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*Washington Post*, Jan. 3 "Study Says U.S. Showed Force 215 Times Since '45," by Don Oberdorfer: The United States deployed its military forces for political impact abroad at least 215 times in the three decades since the end of World War II, an extensive study by the Brookings Institution reported yesterday.

During the same period, the Soviet Union deployed its military units on at least 115 occasions, based on less

complete reporting, the study said.

"The United States "show of force" by ships, aircraft or troops was successful in most cases from the viewpoint of the policymakers who ordered it — but this usually "bought time" for further decisions, or actions without changing the situation in fundamental ways, according to the study by Brookings' Barry M. Blechman and Steven S. Kaplan. Their report was the product of two years research on a \$180,000 contract of the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency.

The Korean and Vietnam wars as well as routine military operations were excluded from the study, which focused on the use of military force to influence the behavior of another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence. In most cases, the action was limited to the threat of force, with no shots having been fired.

Blechman, who is serving as transition aide for the Carter Administration with the Office of Management and Budget, said in an interview that he was surprised at the large number of incidents in which U.S. "show of force" was employed....

U.S. strategic nuclear forces were deployed for political effect in 33 instances, mostly in the 1940s and 1950s, according to the report. The last instance of a nuclear threat listed in the study was the worldwide U.S. alert ordered during the October 1973 Middle East war in an effort to deter Soviet participation. This and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis were the only two "overt and explicit threats" of nuclear force directed at the Soviet Union, according to the report....

From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s was the most active period for U.S. political use of military forces abroad, according to the report. An average of 13.4 incidents per year took place during the presidency of John F. Kennedy, an average of 9.7 incidents yearly during the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, 7.3 incidents yearly during Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency but 5 or fewer incidents yearly under Harry S. Truman, Richard M. Nixon, and Gerald R. Ford....

An examination of Soviet use of armed forces for political impact abroad suggested that the Russians have been more active far from home after the achievement of rough strategic parity with the United States around 1969. The report said Soviet military personnel have participated in three conflicts since the late 1960s — the Egyptian "war of attrition" against Israel, the civil war in Sudan, and Iraq's war against the Kurds.

On the other hand, the Russians have almost never instigated crises in which they have intervened since 1968, the report said.

Even in the Middle East, where the Soviets have encouraged Arab hostility to Israel, tensions have grown more fundamentally out of local issues, according to the study. In general, Soviet use of military forces for political effect has been less provocative under party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev than in the Nikita Krushchev era, according to the study.