

Who Rules The New China

Exclusive to NSIPS

The leadership of China's Government and Communist Party issued four top level policy documents in succession during the last week of December which will alter China's course as drastically as did the launching of the disastrous Great Leap Forward almost 20 years ago, this time in the opposite direction.*

The Western press has primarily reported aspects of secondary significance in these documents and blacked out over 80 per cent of their contents.

Worse, President-elect Carter's National Security Advisor-designate Zbigniew Brzezinski revealed views on China last April to *London Daily Telegraph* correspondent Stephen Barber that he reportedly still holds. Ignoring the changes in Chinese policy, Brzezinski said that "The Chinese have a big stake in a confident and credible United States," an image which he said would be damaged in Chinese eyes were the U.S. to pull out of Taiwan, and he advocated basing U.S. policy toward China on China's presumed continued hostility toward the Soviet Union and support for a hardline anti-Soviet policy in the United States.

However, China has embarked on a fundamentally new course in domestic affairs, one which carries dramatic implications for foreign policy. With the passing of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung, the personnel occupying the highest positions of power are virtual unknowns in the West, except to a handful of so far silent scholars.

Rationality and Science To Replace Maoism

The four documents released by China's new ruling group two weeks ago form a systematic statement of policy to root out every trace of Maoist thinking and practice in the country. They go well beyond the piecemeal measures and statements that have emerged since the Oct. 7 purge of the so-called "gang of four," the four Politburo members closest to Mao before his death. The documents promise to the Party ranks and the general population a new deal based on rationality, legal procedure, and the rule of reason. Economic growth, a focus on science, technology, education and modernization, freedom of private thought and limited freedom of speech, and a rising standard of living, are the new national nostrums.

The new deal promised to the Chinese people can only be appreciated when contrasted with the psychological tyranny that the Chinese nation was subjected to under Mao. Ego-stripping, forced self-confessions of meaningless "errors," forced denunciations of colleagues and family, reinforced by a contentless information media which closed off all access to the outside world, were aimed at creating a nation of 800

million "Maoists." The promise to end these practices, now in implementation phase, is the new government's assurance to the population that the Maoism is at an end.

The speech by Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng on Dec. 25 was the "keynote" of the four. Hua opened by making a direct appeal to the entire population to give the Communist Party a chance to regain popular confidence on the basis of future performance. Conceding in effect that public credibility has been largely destroyed in the wake of two decades of mismanagement and irrationality under Mao's leadership, and that the scientists and intellectuals needed for economic development have been demoralized by post-1965 developments, Hua said: "We must do our best to mobilize all positive factors, both inside and outside the party, both at home and abroad, both direct and indirect, and build China into a powerful socialist country." Hua called for forming a united front with the intellectuals and other non-Party people, and invited them to take an active part in national life free from the fear of arbitrary reprisals and persecutions. The New Year's Day editorial a week later called for reinstating the policy of "let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend in science and culture," a policy last pushed by Chou En-Lai in 1956-57 but aborted in practice by Mao, who turned it into an attack on the Communist Party.

Hua then detailed how the irrational, "subjective," and "idealist" mode of thought that has dominated the country since the Cultural Revolution, and the direct sabotage of theoretical and even of competent practical scientific work, will be rooted out. Hua identified this task as the next on the national agenda following the largely completed first step of blocking and exposing the plot of the "gang of four" to seize power. Hua said that with the Maoists, "metaphysics ran wild and idealism went rampant," and called on everyone "to refute the gang theoretically from the angle of philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism." He appealed to all Party cadres to "strive to raise the theoretical level" of newspapers and journals, and "clear up the political and ideological confusion caused by the gang of four." Summing up the same point at the conclusion of his speech, Politburo member Chen Yung-kuai spelled out that science is to be the basis of the new theory in his call to "understand more of Marxism-Leninism, natural science and, in a nutshell, the laws governing the objective world, and commit fewer subjectivist errors." Hua characterized the style of writing in China's press in recent years as "vulgarized and debased by the gang of four."

Hua then addressed himself to demoralization in the Party caused since 1965 by the pervasive purges,

* The four documents are: a speech by Politburo member Chen Yung-kuai to 5,000 member Tachai Agricultural Conference in Peking, delivered Dec. 24; a speech by Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng to Tachai Conference Dec. 25; first official release of

"Ten Major Relationships" speech given April 25, 1956 by Mao Tse-tung; and a New Year's Day editorial appearing concurrently in People's Daily, Liberation Army Daily, and Red Flag.

persecution of Party members, violation of Party regulations for entry and promotion, denial of intra-party democracy, and the forced "confessions" of "errors." He said that the Maoists brought in and promoted their followers in violation of the Party Constitution, which was "highly corrosive to our Party's organism and corruptive of the minds of our party's members...and was most harmful to the Party's fighting power and its relations with the masses." He added, "We must improve the democratic life inside the Party and among the people...and let people air their views, let people criticize, and allow the minority to reserve their differing views." He called for people's congresses during 1977 to elect new, popular-based revolutionary committees in provinces and municipalities.

Concerning questions of the economy, both Hua and Chen expanded in detail on previously indicated measures to end Maoist sabotage of production, get the economy moving again, and realize the program of Chou En-lai for making the country a major industrial power by the end of the century. Hua minced no words in stating the new policy orientation: "Revolution means liberating the productive forces...It is one of the fundamental tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat to develop the socialist economy energetically." Hua indicated that industrial anarchy and incompetent management must cease, that the country had to "systematize rational rules and regulations and improve and strengthen socialist economic management," and stated that "management itself is a matter of socialist education." These prescriptions echoed the proposals of Teng Hsiao-ping in the summer of 1975.

Hua also said that while the importance of developing and mechanizing agriculture must not be downgraded, "we must do a good job...in heavy industries that produce fuel, electricity, petro-chemicals, iron and steel and other raw and semi-finished materials, so as to ensure the smooth operation of industry as a whole." The necessity of developing heavy industry has not been officially noted in this explicit fashion for years. As for developing the countryside, Chen criticized the post-1958 policy of deemphasizing large-scale capital projects, and called for "unremitting efforts" in larger projects that will free large areas from living at the mercy of floods and droughts.

The corpus of new policies constitutes, in sum, a turning of the clock back to 1956-57. The new policies agree to the letter with the 1956 Communist Party Constitution which was written by Teng-Hsiao-ping and others, sponsored by Liu Shao-chi, and scrapped by Mao in the Cultural Revolution. With the exception of two items, one on relations with the Soviet Union, the other on the primacy of heavy industry over agriculture, the new program largely nullifies the Maoist 1973 Constitution. The thorough going expungement of the Maoist orientation on every question refutes the Western observation that the anti-Maoist purge was largely personal revenge-seeking and a mere power-play; it is grounded in fundamental principles.

Why The Army Led The Purge

It is a truism in the West that "the army" was the decisive factor in the purge of the top Maoists on Oct. 7 and in the continuing purge of their followers. However,

a close analysis reveals which faction of army (and some Party) leaders, whose past records and policies are known and whose likely future policies can therefore be predicted with substantial confidence, is really running the purge. Identification of those persons is based largely on the reemergence to public prominence since Oct. 7 of many leaders of known anti-Maoist proclivities, and the emplacement of many more such leaders in strategic posts since 1971.

The real power in China is held by a unified grouping composed of senior military men, and longstanding Party members led by Teng Hsiao-ping. This group is momentarily sharing power with a loose assortment of other military and Party leaders who rose to prominence during or after the Cultural Revolution. The members of this latter group lack the extensive networks of personal and party connections of those in the first grouping and were in various degrees of political association with the purged Maoist leaders or the late former Defense Minister, Lin Piao. A substantial plurality are in jeopardy of being purged soon themselves.

The members of the first group are to a man veterans of the Long March (1933-35) and the Civil War, during which period political and military questions merged into one and commanders, political commissars, and Party leaders were frequently interchanged. They thus have never represented fundamentally distinct "military" or "civilian" viewpoints, and today share a unified perspective for post-Mao China. They are fully united in putting China firmly on the course of socialist development for which they fought a 20-year revolutionary war. The main significance of the preponderance of military men in the new ruling group is that their control of most of China's troops was essential for purging the Maoists and preventing civil war.

The core of the anti-Maoist faction was composed of the entire Peking-based central military establishment, and the commands of about half of China's 11 military regions. The power of these leaders derived from the fact that most of them were too militarily powerful to be purged during the Cultural Revolution, and they were able to further extend that power after the purge of Lin Piao in 1971. With Lin's fall, no Maoists except Mao himself who had any military power or background remained on the Military Affairs Commission (MAC), the highest military body. MAC controlled the main force units, the best trained, most heavily armed troops organized in armies of three divisions scattered throughout the country. Lin's fall also weakened Maoist power in the military regions (MR). The MRs are run by commanders and their paired commissars, who have control of second level troops, less armed but still formidable, stationed in their regions — these troops saw extensive use in the Cultural Revolution. Below them are province troops commands, the weakest units, and the urban militia, built up by the Maoists since 1971 as a potential counter to the army.

The Uncompleted Purge

The existing distribution of political and military power at the time of Mao's death on Sept. 9 of last year was the result of a purge of only one wing of the Maoist faction, carried out in 1971. The situation in 1971 was a very dangerous one. Mao had succeeded in purging

almost the entire Communist Party leadership in the Cultural Revolution in 1966-67 — of some 220 provincial party secretaries, over 180 were purged, including all but two first secretaries (out of 29), and almost all the central leadership — while failing to replace these leaders with new ones loyal to himself. With the Party wrecked, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) under Defense Minister Lin Piao had been forced to take over the reins of provincial and local government. Lin had promised to support Mao back in 1959, in return for being named Defense Minister, and had supported the Cultural Revolution. Mao had also promoted a handful of his followers, led by his wife Chiang Ching and the "Shanghai mafia" of Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, to top posts, and they worked closely with Lin. However, when Lin tried to consolidate personal control over the PLA by putting men loyal to himself in central and regional commands, he provoked the opposition not only of the anti-Maoist commanders, but of Mao himself, who refused to countenance a military dictatorship under Lin Piao.

Thus, in 1971, Mao was forced to make a deal with Chou En-lai and the anti-Lin regional commanders and senior Peking military men: in return for their support in purging Lin and his top followers, Mao would permit the "liberation" (rehabilitation) and appointment to top posts of most of the Party and PLA leaders purged in the Cultural Revolution. The return of Teng Hsiao-ping in 1973 and his rise to effective control of the rebuilt Party apparatus was probably specifically agreed to. Lin's faction was henceforth purged, and Lin himself killed in mysterious circumstances, in September 1971.

With the military half of the Maoist faction gone, the twilight period of the uneasy coalition between Mao's Party and army opponents, and his civilian followers led by Chiang Ching, the misnamed so-called "moderates" and "radicals," commenced. Between 1971 and 1976, the remaining Maoists attempted to limit the rehabilitations, purge whom they could, create general chaos to destabilize their opponents, and create their own military arm in the urban militias. The anti-Maoists liberated every cadre they could, asserted control over the central military apparatus, took over near-total control of the reconstituted provincial party machines, and bided their time until Mao's long-awaited death to finish the aborted purge.

Key in the anti-Maoist grouping during this period was a top general relatively unknown in the West but very well-known and respected in China, Liu Po-cheng. Liu was the commander of the 2nd Field Army during the Civil War, a brilliant general and lifelong opponent of Mao's military policies, who was placed on the Politburo in 1966.

His 2nd Field Army was one of five that constituted the Communist Party's military forces in 1949, and largely because of Liu's continuing influence, commanders who had been under him generally retained power throughout the Cultural Revolution, despite strong attacks from the Maoists. The long and personal associations between men who fought together during the 20-year revolutionary war forged bonds which in most cases have persisted to the present, and which played a major role in overthrowing Lin Piao. Four former 2nd FA

generals in command of military regions gave vital support to Liu Po-cheng and other anti-Lin forces in Peking in dumping Lin in 1971; the same grouping led the completion of the purge in 1976.

The four were Hsu Shih-yu, entrenched in the Nanking MR since 1954; Chen Hsi-lien, commander since 1959 of the strategic Shenyang MR along the sensitive Siberian border with the Soviet Union; Han Hsien-chu, commanding the Foochow MR facing Taiwan since 1960 and Yang Te-chih commander of the Tsinan MR since 1958. At the center in addition to Liu Po-cheng were Chu Teh, commander in chief during the Civil War and staunch anti-Maoist (died in June, 1976) Yeh Chien-ying, second in command in the Civil War and now the Defense Minister and top military leader in Peking; Nieh Jungchen, commander of the 5th FA, Hsu Hsiang-chien, deputy commander of the 2nd FA under Liu Po-cheng; and Su Yu, senior surviving military commander of the 3rd FA, which had worked close with the 2nd FA from 1937-49. All of these central figures, except Liu who is now blind and bedridden, have emerged since Oct. 7 as top leaders, along with Hsu Shih-yu and Chen Hsi-lien, the only two MR commanders on the Politburo.

During the 1972-76 period, the influence of Liu and his regional allies was reflected as well in the stunning return of Teng Hsiao-ping from oblivion to be heir apparent to Premier Chou En-lai by 1975. Teng had been Liu Po-cheng's political commissar and close friend from 1937-49, and had a network of supporters throughout the 2nd FA and elsewhere in the PLA. Teng was well-suited to lead the rebuilt Communist Party because of his contacts going back to 1921, and his experience as Party secretary-general from 1954-66. Chou En-lai, whose kingpin role in dumping Lin and reconstituting the Party apparatus is well-known, also worked closely with the military leaders and Teng to bolster the anti-Maoist faction.

The purge of Lin was accompanied by the purge of three pro-Lin military region commanders, one in the crucial Peking MR, the second in the sensitive Sinkiang region bordering the Soviet Union, and the third the populous Chengtu MR, and their replacement by 2nd FA generals Li Teh-sheng, Yang Yung, and Chin Chi-wei respectively. Two generals from the 3rd FA, Wang Pi-cheng and Pi Ting-chun, were appointed in the Kunming and Lanchow MRs in 1971, and probably replaced Lin Piao people, but their immediate predecessors are not known.

With most of the MRs under firm control, the anti-Maoist military leaders, Chou En-lai, and after 1973 Teng Hsiao-ping, worked together to pack as many formerly purged anti-Maoists and other supporters into military posts in Peking and the provinces, and into provisional Party posts, as they could. They were limited only by the Maoist faction's ability to corral the mentally fading Mao to intervene into Party affairs on their behalf: direct contravention of Mao Tse-tung was the one step his opponents steadfastly refused to take, wishing to preserve the ability to use Mao's name after he died. The chart of the Central Military Command (see Table 1) reveals that by 1976, near total control was exercised by the anti-Maoists, except for the posts on the Military Affairs Commission of "Shanghai mafia" members Chang Chun-chiao and Wang Hung-wen and Chang's

Table 1

CENTRAL MILITARY COMMAND

<p>Military Affairs Commission</p> <p>Yeh Chien-ying Wang Hung-wen (purged Oct. 7) Chang Chun-chiao (purged Oct. 7) Hsu Hsiang-chien (2) Liu Po-cheng (2)</p> <p>Nieh Jung-chen (5) Chen Hsi-lien (2) Su Yu (3) Li Teh-sheng (2) Yang Cheng-wu (5) (L)</p>		<p>Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying</p>
<p>General Staff Department Dir.: vacant Dep. Dirs: Yang Cheng-wu (5) (L) Li Ta (2) (L)</p>	<p>General Logistics Department Dir.: Chang Tsung-hsun (1) 2</p>	<p>General Political Department Dir.: Chang Chun-chiao (purged Oct. 7) Dep. Dir.: Liang Pi-yeh (4) 1 (L)</p>
<p>Navy Cdr.: Hsiao Ching-kuang 4 Pol. Cmsr: Su Chen-hua (2) (L)</p>	<p>National Defense Scientific Commission Dir.: Chang Ai-ping (1) 3</p>	<p>Air Force Cdr: Ma Ning (2)</p>
<p>Artillery Corps Cdr. Chang Ta-chih (1) 3</p>		<p>Armored Corps Cdr.: Huang Hsin-ting (1) (L) 3</p>

<p>Key</p> <p>numbers in parenthesis indicate primary field army affiliations, (L) indicates rehabilitated cadres, <i>footnotes in italic.</i></p>	<p><i>footnotes:</i> 1— from Lin Paio's army, but opposed Lin 1966 and was purged. 2— long, close association with Teng Hsiao-ping. 3 — from 1st Field Army, which was decimated in Cultural Revolution; support anti-Maoists. 4 — held post since 1950, anti-Maoist</p>
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Table 2

COMMANDERS OF MILITARY REGIONS

- Hsu Shih-yu (2): 1954-73 Nanking MR; 73-, Canton MR
- Yang Te-chih (2): 1958-73, Tsinan MR; 73-, Wuhan MR
- Chen Hsi-lien (2): 1959-73, Shenyang MR; 73-, Peking MR
- Han Hsien-chu (2): 1960-73, Foochow MR; 73-, Lanchow MR
- Tseng Ssu-yu (4): 1967-73, Wuhan MR; 73-, Tsinan MR
- Ting Sheng (4): 1968-73, Canton MR; 73-, Nanking MR
- Wang Pi-chung (3): 1971-present, Kunming MR
- Pi Ting-chun (3): 1971-73, Lanchow MR; 73-76, Foochow MR 1
- Yang Yung (2) (L): 1971-present, Sinkiang MR
- Li Teh-sheng (2): 1971-5, Peking MR, 73-, Shenyang MR
- Liu Hsing-yuan (4): 1976-present, Chengtu MR 2

Note: The above indicates the total control of anti-Maoists over the Central Military Command and the split within the military region commands. Four Second Field Army anti-Maoists with long seniority are the strongest figures; two people were put in by Lin Piao in 1967-68; four anti-Lin people were installed in 1976. The anti-Maoists totally predominate.

<p>Key</p> <p>numbers in parenthesis indicate primary field army affiliations, (L) indicates rehabilitated cadres, <i>footnotes in italic.</i></p>	<p><i>footnotes:</i> 1— Pi was probably assassinated by Maoist sabotage of his helicopter, in which he died in an "accident" summer 1976 2 — Replaced Chin Chi-wei (2) in 1976, reasons unknown.</p>
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appointment to head the General Political Department (which oversees the commissar system — in the Chinese military, every commander has a corresponding political commissar).

As for the Party structure, the table (Table 3) of first party secretaries (the highest provincial post) reveals the degree of anti-Maoist consolidation in the crucial populous regions of south, southwest and central China — most other provincial party organizations were also run by anti-Maoists except for Shanghai and Liaoning in southern Manchuria. The balance on the Politburo was not so favorable (see Table 4 — the four purged Maoists are not listed, but held positions no. 2, 4, 5, and 6) nor on the Central Committee, where nearly half were presumed Maoists.

Thus, it was real power, as reflected in control of the main army units, supported by the provincial party machines, that overrode nominal power in the Party's

central organs when the anti-Maoist purge began with the Oct. 7 arrest of the "gang of four." The only wrinkle in the anti-Maoists plans was the death of Chou before that of Mao. The longer Mao lived after Chou's death on Jan. 8, 1976, the more disruption and chaos the Maoists caused, and as Hua Kuo-feng has now confirmed, a danger of civil war did exist in September. The much-publicized accounts of violence in recent weeks do not indicate serious continuing threats to the regime, but the price of mopping up the pre-October pockets of Maoist strength and dealing with the results of a general crisis of public confidence and collapse of law and order.

Since October few changes in central personnel have been made official. Li Hsien-nien, long-time 2nd FA man, is acting as prime minister, and a life-long anti-Maoist and pro-Soviet in the 1960s, and former Politburo member, Tan Chen-lin, has surfaced to perform many public and diplomatic functions and will likely be on the next Politburo. Campaigns have also begun in the provinces to purge many of the Maoists on the Central Committee. These moves will eventually culminate in the selection of a new Central Committee and Politburo, but no dates have been set.

As for the remaining Politburo members other than the four already mentioned (Li Hsien-nien, Liu Po-cheng, Chen Hsi-lien and Hsu-Shih-yu), some may be allowed to stay on, others are almost certain to be dumped (see table 4). Hua Kuo-feng, who has become the public instrument of the anti-Maoist coup, and Chen Yung-kuei, the former peasant from the model Tachai Brigade, have

Table 3

**FIRST SECRETARIES OF SOME
PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEES
FROM SOUTH; SOUTHWEST
AND CENTRAL**

Kiangsi: Chiang Wei-ching (L), appointed by Teng, Jan. 1975

Fukien: Liao Chih-kao (L), appointed by Teng, Jan. 1975

Shantung: Pai Ju-ping (L), appointed by Teng, Jan. 1975

Hupei: Chao Hsin-chu (L), appointed by Teng, May 1975

Szechwan: Chao Tzu-yang (L), appointed by Teng, Dec. 1975

Yunnan: Chao Chi-yun (L), appointed by Teng, Dec. 1975

Kwangsi: An Ping-sheng (L), appointed by Teng, Dec. 1975

Hunan: Chang Ping-hua (L), appointed 1972, close to Li Hsien-nien

Chekiang: Tan Chi-lung (L), responsible for putting down Maoist riots in Hangchow city, 1975.

Kiangsu: Peng Chung (3), strong anti-Maoist, now in day to day charge of Shanghai

Hopeh: Liu Tzu-hou (2), anti-Maoist

Kwangtung: Wei Kuo-ching (3), never toppled in Cultural Revolution, fierce anti-Maoist, only province head on Politburo

Honan: Liu Chein-hsun (2), only other province official not purged in Cultural Revolution, close to Liu Po-cheng

These provinces represent the areas where the anti-Maoists, largely under Teng, moved in to take control; not accidentally, they have therefore become the areas with the greatest amount of violence reported during 1976

Key

numbers in parenthesis indicate primary field army affiliations, (L) indicates rehabilitated cadres, *footnotes in italic*

Table 4

PARTY LEADERS

Politburo (in order of precedence)

Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman

Yeh Chien-ying

Li Hsien-nien (2)

Liu Po-cheng (2)

Chen Hsi-lien (2)

Hsu Shih-yu (2)

Chi Teng-kuei (??)

Wang Tung-hsing

Wu Teh

Chen Yung-kuei

Wei Kuo-ching (3)

Li Teh-sheng (2)

alternates

Su Chen-hua (2)

Saifudin

Ni Chih-fu

Wu Kuei-hsien

Key

numbers in parenthesis indicate primary field army affiliations, (L) indicates rehabilitated cadres, *footnotes in italic*.

both fully joined the anti-Maoists. Chi Teng-kuei rose on the Maoists' coattails but formerly supported the purged Liu Shao-chi and can probably save himself. Wang Tung-hsing, a long-time Maoist and head of Mao's bodyguard, spy and hit squad unit, the 8341 Corps, is a marked man soon to be purged. Wu Te, Peking mayor and former Maoist will probably be purged also. Wei Kuo-ching, the first secretary in Kwangtung province, massacred Maoists by the thousands in 1967-68 and still survived, and has been an important member of the anti-Maoist group all along. Li Teh-sheng, despite his 2nd FA background, was a junior officer before 1949 and rose under the Maoists, but will probably be allowed to stay on. Of the alternates, Su Chen-hua is an important anti-Maoist who was made first secretary in Shanghai in October, Saifudin is a life-long anti-Maoist, Ni Chih-fu is a formerly Maoist worker who has switched sides, and nothing is known of the only female member Wu-Kueih-sien except that she was promoted by the Maoists.

Three regional commands are held by probable former Lin Piaoists from Lin's 4th FA, Tseng Ssu-yu, Ting Sheng, and Liu Shsing-yuan (see Table 2). All three are probably in jeopardy of purge, and unconfirmed reports say that Ting Sheng has not been since Oct. 25, and that Tseng has been criticized by Peking, while reports of near civil war in Liu's Chengtu MR suggest he may be in trouble there. Liu replaced 2nd FA anti-Maoist Chin Chi-wei for unknown reasons early in 1976, possibly through Maoist pressure.

Thus, China is today ruled by a directorate of the Military Affairs Commission leaders, the leading Politburo anti-Maoists, the anti-Maoist MR commanders, and Teng-Hsiao-ping, soon to be rehabilitated and perhaps appointed prime minister. This group represents a *unified* leadership body, the first the Chinese Communist Party has had since 1927, and the first unified government China has had since the days of the Ching Dynasty. Its unity derives partly from the strong *personal* ties, still extremely important in China, which date back to the 1930s or even 1920s, and partly from the agreement on policy its members have shared over the same time span.

The bonds that tie Hsu Hsiang-chien, Chen Hsi-lien, Hsu Shih-yu, Li Hsien-nien and Tseng Shao-shan (Liaoning party first secretary) are exemplary. They all made a long march together in 1932-33, one no less heroic than Mao's, under Chang Kuo-tao, and two years later saved Mao and his forces from total destruction, only to have Mao double-cross them and later try to purge them in 1937. (Chang Kuo-tao, the unsung hero of the CCP, led 40,000 fresh troops to western Szechwan to rescue Mao's bedraggled 10,000 Long Marchers; after resting, Mao fled north leaving Chang and his troops trapped behind for a year. In 1937, Mao drove Chang out of the Party and tried to purge his generals. Hsu Shih-yu organized a revolt against Mao that failed, but did halt Mao's purge.) Their opposition to Mao dates back quite far. Another 2nd FA subgroup, the trio of Yang Yung, Su Chen-hua and Yang Teh-chih, worked closely together in eastern China during the Anti-Japanese War. Every member of the new leadership grouping has similar personal ties to other members.

Second, these leaders have always seen eye to eye on

all important military and political questions. They all favored and employed Soviet military methods — four, Liu Po-cheng, Yeh Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen and Li Ta, were trained in Moscow, the rest by Soviet instructors in China — and were at perpetual loggerheads for 20 years against Mao Tse-tung whose peasant guerrilla ideas would have gotten the communist forces wiped out several times over had they been employed except as subsidiary support tactics. In the 1950s, they opposed Mao's insistence on guerrilla defense tactics, and counterposed professionalizing and modernizing the armed forces. Their opposition to Maoism was solidified by the Cultural Revolution that wrecked the Party they had helped build for 40 years, sabotaged China's aid to Vietnam, and led to potentially disastrous, useless military clashes with the Soviet Union. In fact, Su Yu as head of the National Defense Industrial Office was responsible for preventing Red Guard sabotage of the defense industry, while Nieh Jung-chen, heading the National Science and Technology Commission, was in charge of preventing disruption of military Research and Development programs.

China's Future Foreign Policy

The foregoing establishes that the new leadership — excepting those slated for demotion or purge — represents a sociological formation analogous to the Bolshevik Party in the Soviet Union, especially after it was tempered in the Civil War and World War II — and much more unified. China is now ruled by socialists as it was not before; Mao was not a socialist. Beyond their military brilliance, the new leaders above all are based in China's socialized industry and collectivized agriculture, and are firmly committed to progress and development — along a modified but essentially Soviet-style model. As leaders of an underdeveloped nation in desperate need of technology, capital, and foreign trade, the new ruling group can be expected to chart a domestic and foreign course accordingly.


Their backgrounds and current policy pronouncements reveal that the new leaders have never entertained the slightest illusions concerning the wretchedness and irrationality of "Mao Tse-tung Thought." Despite Western hopes to the contrary, this clear perception of reality will permeate foreign policy as surely as it already has domestic, albeit more slowly. Any attempt in the West to base relations with China on the assumption of a continuation of any element of Mao's foreign policy will be as misguided as to wait for a comeback of the "gang of four."

What will China's foreign policy evolve toward? It will in short order begin to propel China into the forefront of progressive Third World nations fighting for the New International Economic Order. The contours of the new economic order in turn will strongly influence China, particularly the growing cooperation between OPEC, Europe and the Third World, Europe's piece by piece break with the dollar and with Carter, and the increasing Soviet-Comecon integration into this emerging order, exemplified by the new transfer ruble proposal. China's relations towards the Soviet Union and the United States — the only items of apparent interest in the West — will

be subsumed by these global considerations. While Soviet relations may dramatically improve as soon as the purge is completed at the top levels, the biggest pressure for change of Mao's anti-Soviet posture will come from the Third World and European efforts to forge world cooperative development, involving both countries in joint world endeavors. Similar considerations will define China's policy toward the United States: if Carter continues Kissinger's sabotage of the New International Economic Order, Chinese friendship for the U.S. will fast

evaporate; if Carter's push for war is not stopped, China will respond the way Europe is now, by hostility and opposition.

Hua Kuo-feng hinted at such an orientation in his exhortation printed above: "mobilize all positive factors...both at home and abroad...to build China into a powerful socialist country." Those who insist on using the past as a guideline as Brzezinski intends, will reap a harvest of errors and miscalculations, and will merely accelerate China's break with the past.



Japan's First Two Weeks Under Fukuda

Japan's new foreign minister Ichiro Hatoyama announced today that Japanese ambassador to Washington Fumihiko Togo was being recalled to Tokyo to discuss a proposed meeting between Japanese premier Takeo Fukuda and U.S. President-elect Jimmy Carter sometime in February or March. The meeting between the two men, proposed by Fukuda, will cement existing tight political alliance between the two governments which has already emerged after the Fukuda government's first two weeks in office.

Reflecting Washington's new hawkish policy, the Japanese Foreign Ministry told the Soviet Union on Nov.

29 that Foreign Minister Hatoyama was "too busy" to visit Moscow next month for regular Japan-USSR ministerial talks. The Moscow conference had been delayed because of the MIG-25 incident and the Japanese elections campaign. Fukuda's decision was a direct reversal of the policies of his predecessor Takeo Miki, who had made it known only a few weeks before Fukuda forced him out of power that he wished to visit Moscow personally.

The Fukuda government's anti-Soviet posture was reiterated by Tatsuo Tanaka, a Fukuda faction member who is the new head of Japan's powerful Ministry of