

BOOKS

Rockefeller As 'Unindicted Co-conspirator'

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Feb. 1, 1976

Wall Street and The Rise of Hitler by Anthony Sutton

There is no serious dispute among informed historians that Adolf Hitler's principal sponsors of the 1933-1936 period (in particular) were not native German industrialist strata, but U.S. Wall Street power-brokers, with a significant portion of the Jewish financial groups consciously implicated. Nor is there any competent dispute that John D. Rockefeller II and some of his sons, notably Nelson A. Rockefeller, were up to their oily ears in this unwholesome business.

The technical problem confronting the scholar on this account is that the number of massively-implicated accomplices in the Hitler affair includes almost the entire range of Wall Street and also certain "multi-national" industrial corporate interests. As Professor Sutton, among others, demonstrates, Edsel Ford, the top executives of General Electric, General Motors forces, Warburg, and many others, as well as the U.S.-dominated I.G. Farben apparatus and I.T. and T., are all indictable offenders. Among all such choices of principal targets for scholarly indictments, which are in fact the principals, and which those generally merely fellow-accomplices? Broadly, Professor Sutton chooses Morgan as among the principal accomplices, awarding the Rockefellers the implied status of principal "unindicted co-conspirators."

This has the makings of an intriguing potential debate. We do not underrate the role of the Morgan interests in these and other matters, but we have demonstrated elsewhere that Rockefeller is the principal accomplice and Morgan (and others) plunging in competitively for whatever financial proceeds the Versailles Treaty and its aftermath offered as the "main chance" activities of that period. Shall we then debate Professor Sutton over the issue of whether Morgan or Rockefeller is to be viewed as the principal culprit? We reject such an approach to the issue as *academic* and *politically impotent*, sterile.

There are two broad methodological problems associated with Professor Sutton's otherwise useful presentation of facts. The first of these is more immediately apparent, but of lesser importance. He identifies himself, more or less accurately, with the branch-line of conservative scholarship traced from Carroll Quigley by

way of *None Dare Call It Conspiracy*. It is too tempting to Professor Sutton, among others, to run up the blind alley of attempting to link Wall Street to the accredited U.S. state adversary, the Soviet Union, and to make Stalin, Hitler, and Roosevelt ultimately all of a common bastard political parentage. That superimposed interpretation of Professor Sutton's fortunately appears only as a kind of contrapuntal (might one say, *canonical*) afterthought throughout the text, and does not unduly contaminate the other, useful material to which the text is principally devoted. It is more fruitful to give our attention here to the more serious methodological problem.

Negatively Considered

As we have developed the point elsewhere, the mainstream of U.S. conservatism is by no means a "reactionary" current, the liberal press and Mr. William Buckley's cronies notwithstanding. Its historical and contemporary roots are a deep, organic commitment to the specific commitments of the American Revolution as most efficiently identified by Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Tom Paine, Henry Clay and Abraham Lincoln. Mainstream conservatism expresses the deep, organic commitment of industrialist, agriculturalist and blue-collar worker to the principle of technological progress, and to the notion of the republican form of constitutional government as the suitable instrument for realizing industrial progress.

The immediate shaping of conservative institutions and semi-institutions today has two principal post-Versailles sources: the Republican Party of the 1920s and the second administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the latter the most relevant for the present period. The included significance of those institutional features is that conservatism is deeply imbued with the psychology of defeatism. Franklin D. Roosevelt, a conscious fascist, not only grabbed the presidency through Wall Street backing, but the credulous majority of the U.S. population has bought, hook-line-and-sinker, the liberal Roosevelt myth. In 1960, Wall Street deserted the Eisenhower machine, arranging an election fraud by which the Rockefeller puppet, lunatic John F. Kennedy, was permitted to buy his way into the White House, and emerge as a martyred companion of F.D.R. in the liberal myth's pantheon of "sacred American figures." The conservative revolt of 1964 was given a humiliating defeat. Then, there was the liberals' vast conspiracy now

sanctified by the widespread myth of "Watergate." Understandably, if wrongly, these unhappy experiences have inculcated the habits of thought of the "professional loser" among most conservative strata.

This has been altered for the better through the 1976 activities of the U.S. Labor Party. The national image of the small, bumptious U.S. Labor Party reaching to pull effectively at the Carter campaign's "short hairs" has aroused conservatives to the wakeful perception that if the U.S. Labor Party's "march of the 10,000" could pull off such a coup against Mr. Rockefeller's "Persian Empire," perhaps there is opportunity for the larger forces of "Alexander the Great." In consequence, U.S. mainstream conservatism has begun to move away from ideologized post-war conservatism toward the Federalist outlook of Benjamin Franklin et al. There is, happily, the beginnings of an arousal of conservative forces against the immediate *fascist* threat of the Trilateraloid Carter administration.

Such happier developments in process are just that, and hence must contend against previously acquired habits of the "loser mentality." Professor Sutton's text predominantly reflects the ideology of the conservative "loser mentality." It emphasizes *moral indignation*, rather than the outlook of the strategist projecting the analysis of an adversary's profile to the purpose of winning a war.

To become embroiled in a formal dispute respecting the relatively greater guilt of Morgan or Rockefeller would be to play into the ideology of the "loser mentality." Frankly, as a matter of moral indignation we could not care less how much Edsel Ford, Gerard Swope, et al. variously contributed to the rise and consolidation of the Hitler regime. Such facts are of concern to us only as they perform an essential analytical function in respect to developing a war-winning capability against the Rockefellers today. Granted, the Nuremburg Trials were a travesty of "selective justice"; what would be accomplished by correcting that error today. Shall we dig John D. Rockefeller II out of his grave, and hang his corpse at Spandau? Similarly, Gerard Swope and scores others? Shall we correct, similarly, the error of leniency of Nuremburg judges concerning Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht and Alfred Speer? What would be accomplished by that? Would it not amount to a *diversionary* propitiating of the conscience? Shall we forever try the past, leaving present criminals to do their evil, pending some future Nuremburg Trials?

Adolf Hitler is dead. So is Swope, so is John D. Rockefeller II. Never again will the I.G: Farben of the 1920s and 1930s reproduce precisely the pattern by which Hitler came to power, and so forth. History never precisely repeats itself. Just as the evil of the last inter-war period was morally illumined for popular judgment only after the fact, an excessively narrow preoccupation with precedents in detail distracts us today from the new specific evil now afoot, and so disarms us. The function of examining the post-Versailles period is to mobilize oneself and others to act against the Trilateraloids now with the ruthless energy lacking during Wall Street's earlier creation of Adolf Hitler.

The function of history is not to contemplate the battles of the past, but to win the wars of the present and future.

It is the distinction between the two, opposing outlooks so defined which leads inevitably to corresponding differences in method.

Riemann and Cantor As Historians

It is not a secret today that the extraordinary potency of the U.S. Labor Party and Labor Committees is formally based in this writer's application of crucial implications of the work of the physicist Riemann and the mathematician Cantor to eliminate potentially devastating errors in the method and economic-theoretical accomplishments of Karl Marx. The broader effect of this was to resituate Marx's actual accomplishments in a coherently conceptualized main line of development of European humanist thought and practice in the sequence typified by Averroes, the Ghibellines, Roger Bacon, Dante Alighieri, Marsilio Ficino, Thomas Gresham, Cromwell, Milton, Colbert, Descartes, Spinoza and our nation's own Federalists, Franklin, Hamilton, Paine, et al., just as Marx himself properly associated himself with that American Federalist expression of humanism in respect to Abraham Lincoln. By this informed, fresh overview of European culture's progress since the twelfth century, it was possible to definitively situate the correlatives of philosophical thought and social practice in respect to the central issue of technological progress.

The associated benefit of this approach was that of situating the principal achievements of Riemann and Cantor to the effect of definitively discrediting the blundering misconception of relativity associated with Einstein and Weyl and a sweeping exposure of the incompetence of the Vienna "energeticists" and their "Copenhagen" offshoots. The demonstration of the immediately reciprocal connection between the lawful ordering of historical development and a Riemannian relativistic physics properly conceived has had a useful consequence for contemporary theoretical physics as well as permitting a comprehensive breakthrough in the specialist domain of historiography.

The new conceptions of political economy derived and conclusively proven in this way have provided a coherent advancement in the practice of strategic analysis. This, of course, is no mere assertion, no promissory note; the decisive catalytic influence of the U.S. Labor Party and Labor Committees in contributing to the shaping of the recent several years developments, and Wall Street's increasingly hysterical respect for the U.S. Labor Party as an adversary has established the special potency of those new methods of strategic analysis and related practice as fact.

In consequence of the considerations just summarily identified, it is more than merely legitimate that we criticize the methodological errors of Professor Sutton's book from such a vantage point. The implication is not that of attacking Professor Sutton for failing to master the Labor Party's methodological apparatus, but to show him — among others — how that method must be employed to take him — and others — beyond the limitations under which they have previously labored.

We shall promptly see how this methodological point bears most directly upon the apparent problem of the Morgan-Rockefeller greater-culpability.

The notorious methodological problem of the so-called inductive sciences is that the undeniable existence of the ordering-principle underlying sequences of events in scientific practice could not be formally adduced from the experimental facts themselves. If the physical-scientific community had been competently educated in the past twenty-five hundred years of the history of European culture, the nature of the problem would have been recognized well before the turn of the present century.

"Existence is not a predicate" is one of the more famous observations to this effect. Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* and his outline of *universal perfection*, notions coherent with Descartes' initial, approximate solution to the notion of a true continuum in physical processes, underline the problem and its implied solution. The retrospective application of Georg Cantor's notion of a transfinite to the foundations afforded physics by the self-expanding n-dimensional relativistic continuum of Riemann provides the required formal reference point for a generalized solution to the problem — a perception fundamentally lacking in Einstein, Weyl and others.

The solution for physics qua physics has a direct correlative in historiography, and by no means merely a heuristic connection. The characteristic feature of human progress is that it is impossible to account for the development of technology or any other relevant feature of actual history by treating deeds and facts in relative isolation, as if they were self-evident facts. The pertinent fact of human history is the voluntary principle in human political and social behavior, precisely innovation. These innovations are not ordered as chance occurrences, but, rather, the realization of any innovation in practice determines the potential for subsequent acts of innovation. Not merely is subsequent innovation determined as such, but the epistemological ordering of advancing knowledge assumes the form of a self-elaborating progress through the mediating role of practical realization. Hence, just as lawful principles exist for physics, but *not as predicates* of physics observations, so the essential feature of history is the ordering principle expressed, but *not as a predicate*, in connection with the struggle for human progress.

This same point is the essential implication of both Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* and his notion of *universal perfection*. The included difficulty which underlies the incompetence of most modern philosophy texts and classroom instruction concerning Descartes' notions is twofold. First, the prevailing, Viennese-flavored mental disorders of contemporary U.S. academic philosophizing follows the evil Bertrand Russell in hysterically denying the existence of existence except as the mere opinions concerning phenomena of the late Mr. Russell and his ilk. Secondly, there is the most honorable failing of others, who can not rid themselves of the old Euclidean-Lagrangian prejudices concerning an arbitrary, linear space and time existing independently, a priori, with respect to a physical continuum. The strength of the "affine" microphysics delusion, along the lines of Weyl's *Space, Time, Matter*, reflects the latter problem. Descartes' notion of universal perfection can not conform to the evidence of either physics or historiography as long as "affine" delusions are not discarded. An

existent continuum must be a self-elaborating, hence, non-linear, negentropic self-subsisting basis; that is the only admissible relativistic conception for physics or historiography.

The fact that "non-linear effects" exist in energy-dense plasmas is only one, admittedly more impressive sort of crucial demonstration that the universe is primarily defined in terms of a non-linear "scaling" for a negentropic, self-subsisting relativistic basis. That demonstration for physics lends strength to a notion which ought to be already self-evident on the basis of historical evidence: that the essential features of historical processes are also "non-linear continua."

We have shown, employing the most extensive historical evidence for a conclusive proof of this point, that the consistent, determining feature of all European culture's history since Averroes has been the struggle of humanism, on the one side, against the continuous, contrary principle currently expressed as *monetarism*. That is the crucial fact concerning Wall Street's role in the Hitler affair and the essential feature of the current global crisis.

The alignments of particular elements of Wall Street and multinational corporate power during the post-Versailles period are merely predicated features of the overall process. If one attempts to explain Hitler from the standpoint of the specific guilt of specific persons and groups, the result must be essentially nonsensical from the standpoint of any present practical purpose.

Of course, one can not proceed very far toward competent conclusions without such facts. However, the facts must be judged as experimental facts, through which alternative hypotheses concerning the generality are proven. Furthermore, not merely any sort of generality will be properly tolerated for this purpose. The generalities employed must be limited to those which conform to a scientifically-competent historiographical method. Otherwise, one could write a book "explaining" Wall Street's connection to Hitler from the standpoint of astrological doctrines or the thesis that the Moon is made of green cheese.

Of course, Professor Sutton commits no such gross errors as to offer a "green cheese" interpretation of the facts he cites, but in principle he makes the sort of error belonging to the saner phase of the same general type of blunder. He starts from the fact of treason, and then arbitrarily applies a specific, wild bit of current conservative ideology (the common bastard political parentage of Stalin, Hitler, and Roosevelt), setting up the House of Morgan, among others, for a charge of "fatherhood."

In this connection, the lack of perception of the role of scientific method respecting the advancement of hypotheses is the pertinent point. As the "null hypothesis" gropes at emphasizing, no amount of ordinary experimental fact gathering can prove an hypothesis or prevent a specious absurdity from appearing plausible to the credulous. The origin of scientific knowledge is not experience per se, not aggregations of "fact," but the self-elaboration of a rigorous body of practice which sifts out wild hypotheses. An hypothesis is properly a necessary conclusion from the preexisting universal knowledge concerning facts, of the general

form "If...then....*must* be." The notion of "must" is crucial. Any conjecture which does not satisfy those conditions is rubbish, no matter what array of apparent facts may for a time seem to amuse the credulous.

It is inadmissible to develop specialist hypotheses for isolated bodies of investigation. Any hermetic specialization is ipso facto quackery. A professed historian who is not a qualified political economist, grounded in a competent political-economic theory, is not a competent historian...and so forth. It is as foolish to mark out isolated patches of political history for special doctrines as to divide physics up into an hermetic set of fiefdoms, each claiming special laws for its domain, with no universal lawfulness superior to such localized assumptions.

The crucial feature of Versailles was that the German war reparations and the associated structuring of the financial relations among Europe and lower Manhattan established the primacy of the monetarist faction against (in particular) the industrial-capitalist commitments inherent in the American Revolution and its Constitution. This, however, did not sort itself neatly into fixed factions, the one monetarist, the other industrialist. For example, one must ask — as Sutton does not — how Henry Ford would have conducted himself if the industrialist faction had won at Versailles? Would Morgan have preferred the victory of the pro-industrialist faction?

Sutton comes close to the relevant sort of evidence in correctly emphasizing that it was American-dominated German firms, and not native German interests which put Hitler into power. The consistent thrust of German industrial self-interest to the present day is exemplified by the Rapallo Treaty and the collaboration of DeGaulle and Adenauer. This was especially notable as the endemic tendency among German industrialists enraged at their nation's looting by a foreign (lower Manhattan) power. Relative to the Hitler affair, their behavior, and that of numerous U.S. profit-seeking corporations was dictated by the outcome of the various struggles between monetarist and industrial interest.

Sutton does not appear to look inside the mind of President John Doe of the ABC Widget Manufacturing Corporation, a closely held industrial firm. John is probably a committed industrialist, anti-monetarist by experience, instinct, and whatever else you will. However, what does John do in a world in which the monetarists are determining what is and what is not to be profitable? John, who knows that losses mean his extinction as an industrial capitalist, adapts to the economic environment and opportunities the monetarists determine.

That sort of complication must be considered, not to mention those cases in which an American agent was acting in the role of a Nazi to such purposes as aiding lower Manhattan interests in looting their British allies of petroleum and other coveted assets. Naturally, one shoots the thief raiding one's house; however, in the broader work of eliminating thievery from society, the

particular thief becomes less important; one focuses on the determining processes behind the proliferation of thievery. Whether so-and-so was a Nazi, etc., has a similar significance. The prosecuting attorney and judges are properly concerned with such specific offenses. The historian, the strategist is concerned with the other problem, of defining and extirpating the determining forces which transform all sorts of people into Nazis and Nazi accomplices.

Facts Sutton Overlooks

Once it is understood that monetarism versus industrialism is the essential feature of the ugly business of the Hitler Affair, certain facts concerning the Rockefellers are placed in their proper, crucial importance.

The Rockefeller connection to Hitler antedates World War I, not first as a connection to Hitler, but to such figures as Colonel Nikolai, the pre-war and war-time predecessor of I.G. Farben's key intelligence operations. The Chilean interface of Rockefeller and Nikolai preceding World War I obliges one to begin situating the overall facts in the proper frame of reference.

Immediately, one is obliged to study the Russell Sage Foundation's role in U.S. intelligence during and following World War I, its key role in developing the career of Admiral Canaris through the protected status of the "Marine Transport Unit" under special terms of the Versailles Treaty and the Armistice Commission. Canaris's role — and Rockefeller's role — in the assassination of Rosa Luxemburg, in the *Freikorps* enterprise, and in the creation of the Nazi organization, Interpol, have a properly-emphasized relevance.

Morgan is extremely important, of course. The National Civic Federation, Lamont's role toward Mexico and other states, and so forth, are all key pieces of the picture. However, the question is not Rockefeller nor Morgan, but *monetarism*. Once a pro-industrial capitalist current recognizes that Milton Friedman is a lunatic incompetent, recognizes as the Federalists did, that the education, social services, and conditions of workplace and household life of the labor force are an indispensable basis for the development of the productive forces, whatever that current's past history, it will tend to function in the current world situation as a positive, anti-fascist force. Vis-à-vis the House of Morgan, Edsel Ford, et al. the historian must judge whether their complicity was a result of their stupidity respecting their own interests or whether their role coincided with the determining monetarist currents producing the Hitler phenomenon. Sutton's text asks no such questions, and thus his presentation of facts, while eminently useful overall as a contribution to the historian's collection, has an accidental quality — and so prevents him from constructing a useful analysis of the facts he presents.

He is not to be specially blamed for this; it is an endemic problem, which is overdue for general correction.

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