

### *Subjective Consequences*

An incident involving chemical, biological, or nuclear technologies would certainly have significant ramifications for local and higher level governmental officials. But it will be public reaction that would drive, to a great extent, these officials. Thus, it is important to at least place these subjective consequences in perspective with respect to threatened incidents prior to the first actual use of new technologies and the possible impact of that first incident upon subsequent events....

Once it is necessary to involve the entire community in countering threats of new-technology terrorism, the general fear level of the community will have been raised. Regardless of the outcome of that immediate threat, changes in society will have been wrought. Given the likely media coverage of a high-technology event, the effect of reacting on a community-wide basis would be experienced as a precedent by all local leaders involved with future threats, whether in the affected community or not. Equally as significant is the probability of an epidemic effect once it has been demonstrated that a threat resulted in a widespread reaction. As evidenced by event data on hijackings, bombings, and even kidnappings, often a rash of similar incidents or threats follows a widely publicized terrorist act.

Until a threat is actually carried out or a threat is permitted to impact on the community as a whole, it seems unlikely that any change in public fear will result. Although the nuclear safeguards debate has highlighted a full range of catastrophic dangers, there has been relatively little reaction from the public, including those communities in the vicinity of the 55 operational nuclear power plants. There is no evidence of a general exodus from plant areas nor even any sign of shrinking property values. Once an incident occurs, changes in public fear will be primarily a function of the damage, casualties, and societal psychological impact....

First, the local consequences of acts are far greater

than the nonlocal consequences. Particularly with respect to the overall level of concern and fear, locales impacted upon directly by events have reacted by taking preventive measures. Nonlocal populations have reacted with sympathy and even bitterness, but implementation of new measures has been limited. Second, it is unlikely that public fear will increase until after an event occurs. Threats have not resulted in significant societal changes....the communities subjected to new-technology terrorism will accept increased safeguards and the concomitant decrease in civil liberties. The paramount concern of society is to protect itself from known consequences. Society will seldom act until after some consequences have been demonstrated, particularly consequences of a local character, but society will be susceptible to changes in its norms, values, and structure once an event has been experienced.

### *Panic*

Of greatest importance to law enforcement and local authorities are those conditions that are most conducive to creating panic situations. Foremost, the threat must be sudden and unexpected, posing a danger that would be sufficient enough to cause immediate and intense fear. The threat must be direct and localized. Other factors contributing to panic include a population that believes there is a danger for which they are unprepared and which is beyond the capacity of normal behavior responses to adequately treat. Elements of novelty or incomprehensibility increase the tendency to panic. Confusion with respect to the general situation and specifics, such as escape, avoidance, and counteraction, directly impact on the likelihood of community panic. Finally, not only must the population be aware of their helpless situation — no escape routes, no information, bewildering uncertainty — but community leadership in the form of an authoritative, realistic response must be absent....

## 'We Have Not Had A Massive Well-Directed Onslaught, But It Must Come.'

*The following are highlights of a March 14 interview with Professor H. H. A. "Tony" Cooper, terrorist profiler and planner at American University Institute for Advanced Studies in Justice in Washington, D.C., who authored the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's March 2 "Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism." While the interview in many ways parallels the LEAA's report, the New York-based researcher who conducted the interview wanted to underline Cooper's personal disregard for the U.S. Constitution.*

*Professor Cooper, like many of the current terrorist*

*planners, profilers, and controllers in the U.S., is a British subject who has been granted covert Interpol responsibility for planning high-technology terrorism.*

*Q: Let me start with the recent LEAA report which I understand you took a part in.*

*A: Yes, I fear I was responsible for that.*

*Q: What are the key aspects of the report?*

*A: It depends on the audience you're addressing. If you're looking at this from the point of view of "responses to terrorism," which is what we were really*

trying to outline, the key recommendation is "preparedness." It's no time in the middle of an incident to find that you are likely to have command or jurisdictional conflicts. What we recommend is that this sort of thing be worked out before hand so that the operation can run smoothly...We recommend that studies be undertaken on a more systematic basis.

**Q:** How would you suggest that such studies be carried out and who would be asked to do these?

**A:** There are certain people who have done very respectable work in this area, like David Hubbard for instance. He's been in this business for a very long time. They've thought about these problems; they've refined their techniques, and research is a question of really asking the right questions. Putting the issues in perspective so that only then can you know the type of answers you're likely to receive.

**Q:** Is there any kind of actual proposal that you would bring for such a study, and to whom?

**A:** Let me put it this way. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has money...There should be some form of continuing government review...To a certain extent, the Task Force represents that, but work is never done by task forces as such; the Task Force only met one time, but the staff were held together and were able to do this in a continuing fashion. The existence of that type of capacity on an ongoing basis is very, very necessary because the type of incident that we faced recently is really comparatively innocuous. I'm sorry if I sound terribly like the prophet of doom, but the sort of thing that we're going to face in the future is going to be of a more frightening nature, and we've got to be prepared for it.

**Q:** What do you think the prospects are in the United States for getting the LEAA suggestions implemented?

**A:** Well, if we can't do it, nobody can. This country has the money; it has the expertise.... What it means is that somebody with executive capacity has got to say, "Right, it is a good thing; it shall be done," and that somebody at this stage would be the Attorney General.

**Q:** Now, the part of the report that deals with "emergency powers" raises certain ticklish questions...

**A:** Well, let me explain the philosophy. The philosophy really is mine, and it was accepted by the Task Force, so I'm going to tell you what really motivated me in this. Terrorism is essentially warfare, and when it reaches really serious proportions, the response will almost always be a military one. That I've always felt is a tragic thing. It is much better in these cases that the civilian appropriate authorities have the power, that they be given the responsibility to deal with the situation as it arises. One of the unfortunate things that I found, for example, is that police powers of arrest in certain situations are so limited and so proscribed by custom...

**Q:** Does that present a problem in terms of the U.S. Constitution?

**A:** No, we can do this within the Constitution, and it's simply a question of setting up a mechanism to do this.

**Q:** In the U.S., people would tend to compare these types of proposals with "Garden Plot," and there might be a reaction.

**A:** Yes...As far as ordinary law enforcement is concerned, the questions of search and seizure, curfews and this sort of thing, it is much better to have these controlled by the civilian executive authority, rather than have soldiers in the streets.

**Q:** What can we expect in the future?

**A:** Well, I am probably in the advance guard of the real prophets of doom. I foresee a number of very, very frightening possibilities that are going to be upon us in a very short while...I was present when we had the knocking out of the telephones in lower Manhattan...This was not a terrorist action; it could well have been so. When you consider how little it took to produce that effect, how little it would take to produce a total blackout of the whole of the Eastern seaboard, you see the type of possibilities open...this is the sort of experience that we lack in the United States. We have not had a massive well-directed onslaught, but it must come. We are the ultimate enemy.

**Q:** What terrorist groups would you see in these situations?

**A:** Well, I would see obviously the Puerto Ricans. I would see other Latin American groups. So much of this is a reflection of the distribution of power in the world and a reflection of world politics at any point in time. The situation, for example, in Mexico, is very doubtful at the moment. It could well be that we start to get Mexican terrorists who are trying to affect the United States-Mexican relations to start operating in the Southwest. I foresee tremendous problems with Canada. The separatist issue is far from resolved. Canada is in a deteriorating economic condition. It may well be that some...will start attracting the type of movement in the United States in order to broaden the scope of the struggle. In Europe a number of countries are very unstable. The fate of Yugoslavia depends very much on how long Marshall Tito is going to live and how well he has prepared his succession. The main thing about transnational terrorism in essence is that this is somebody fighting on your territory; they're making a pigsty out of your living room. We could well unwittingly be drawn into this without this being a direct involvement in the United States' interest.

There are two things here. Firstly, there is the vulnerability factor. Secondly, high-technology has another aspect. That is, the militarization of weaponry. I don't know if you've seen this recent book, *Electronic Battlefield*, written about conventional warfare. It deals with the type of weapons of the future which are obviously available to terrorist groups. The militarization, which is now possible, and the tremendous sophistication of weaponry, is what we would have to face in some of these incidents. The only example we've had to face in this is the letter bomb, but the really significant thing, if you look at our experience with terrorism, even world wide up til now, they are still in the dark ages. But if you apply a "future shock" principle to this, our progress doesn't depend on a mathematical progression. There's

this constant acceleration so that we could be catapulted into the atomic age over night. Look at our second appendix, the one that I had prepared by the BDM Corporation...What I do see is the possibility of maverick groups, the sort of group that we had with the Japanese Red Army a few years ago taking this up...

**Q:** The Christian Science Monitor laid out in detail many of the recent movements of terrorists. If intelligence agencies have that kind of reading, how can the public be made to understand that it is difficult to stop acts before they occur?

**A:** I am a very strong proponent of intelligence. I was the consultant for the National Wiretap Commission. I produced the international report on this, and I very strongly advocate improved intelligence services...There's an old Russian saying that if there are three men plotting a revolution, two are secret policemen and one is a fool. This is the situation as far as organized groups are concerned, but some groups are extremely difficult to penetrate by conventional intelligence methods, and the really frightening thing is that the type of group likely to break what I call the "high-technology barrier" is most likely to be a lone psychopath, and intelligence, however good, is not going to pick him up. Unfortunately, most of our responses to terrorism up to now have been reactive, but we can't afford to react when somebody puts a nuclear device in the World Trade Center. We have to know as much as we can about what is going on up to now. Unfortunately, there's a great deal of jealousy among the host of agencies. There is a marked lack of cooperation internationally, and one of the biggest problems is that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter...

**Q:** How can this be changed so that other countries would be brought more into this kind of work?

**A:** Well, I think we've got to forget about international cooperation. We've got to develop regional agreements. For example, cooperation with the RCMP is excellent. Cooperations with the RCMP is done on the basis of mutual interest with United States counterparts. If we can develop this with enough interested nations: for example, some nations now have tremendous sophistication in their response capability. Nations like West Germany for example, and we will just have to work to exchange information, ironing out some of the problems that arise out of lack of forethought...

By the way, the question of identity cards, for example, people say, "wouldn't it be a good thing if we had a single identity card in this country." Well, you'll never get it because the sentiment is against it, but nobody objects to carrying around a whole pocketful of interrelated credit cards, nobody objects to having a driving license with his picture, perhaps even his fingerprints on it, but this sort of sentiment is something we have to take into account.

**Q:** It's a pretty broad sentiment.

**A:** Francis what's her name of the Passport office has been pleading for years how much it would save, how cheap it would be to have a small, almost credit-size passport, but people are afraid of this, however much you try to convince people with rational arguments...

**Q:** I think the Nazi experience scared the hell out of a lot of people...

**A:** Well, it did, and yet it was badly misunderstood. It's the same as gun control. People have terrible misconceptions about that. Yet, these sentiments are so strong you might say they are atavistic. You can't get 'round them at all. I think it's useless to try. We have to work the best we can within the framework that the public sentiment will allow.

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## The Battle For Fusion Energy In Congress

The Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee will shortly vote to expand the laser fusion budget, a spokesman for the subcommittee announced today. Not only will the subcommittee — charged with jurisdiction over laser fusion because of its military applicability — reportedly vote to completely restore the \$20 million axed by Jimmy Carter from the President Ford-proposed budget but it will also recommend a token \$2.5 million (2 percent) increase. "We will take the bull by the horn and fight Carter," stated an aide to the subcommittee, chaired by long-time nuclear energy proponent Rep. Melvin Price (D-Ill).

While members of the Intelligence subcommittee threatened to "break ties with Carter" over nuclear energy policy, their colleagues on the House Science and Technology Committee have begun to waver — afraid of

a political confrontation with the Carter Administration. Fossil Fuels and Nuclear Energy subcommittee chairman Rep. Walter Flowers (D-Ala) announced that his subcommittee's mark-up (appropriation recommendations to the full House) will be postponed "at least until Tuesday" and perhaps until after President Carter announces his "comprehensive energy policy" on April 20. Flowers and others have justified this delay by nonsensically demanding a "clarification from the Administration on its nuclear stance" before taking a committee vote.

Indications are that if a vote is taken today in either the House Science and Technology Committee or the Senate Energy Committee — the two committees with overall jurisdiction for the nuclear energy budget — the outcome at best would be a "compromise" somewhere between