

Vance Mission To Moscow:

Set Up New Cuban Missile Crisis

On the eve of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's journey to Moscow, the Carter Administration has pulled the rug out from under the SALT II disarmament negotiations Vance is ostensibly going to complete. A probable intended outcome of the Vance negotiations — as Evans and Novak advertised in a March 26 syndicated column titled "Vance in Moscow: Mission Impossible?" — is a new "Cuban missile crisis," a quick U.S. march to the brink of thermonuclear confrontation with the USSR.

The only alternative satisfactory to the White House, outlined by Carter himself in his March 24 press conference, and amplified by his associates in the press, is a Soviet agreement to "negotiate" for itself a series of swift international strategic defeats comparable in scale to last week's demise of the Gandhi government in India, and Soviet agreement in principle to adopt domestic policies which would speedily compromise the existence of the Soviet state itself.

Vance will tell the Soviets they must make this choice now; the Administration calculates that only rapid-fire Soviet capitulations, or a "breakdown" in negotiations which would provide the U.S. with the pretext for a full scale war mobilization, can provide the White House with the necessary leverage to overcome U.S., European and Third World opposition to its proposed multibillion dollar bailout of the New York banks by the time of the May economic summit in London.

The Carter gameplan became dramatically evident this week with Carter's reported comment on Brezhnev's anticipated "hardline" speech in response to continued U.S. provocations on human rights respecting the socialist bloc. "Some people are concerned every time Brezhnev sneezes," said Carter, and promised a continuation of the U.S. "human rights" campaign Brezhnev had characterized as interference in Soviet and East European internal affairs.

This calculated insult was followed by the March 25 presidential press conference at which Carter linked a SALT agreement to negotiated concessions from the USSR on Africa, the Middle East, "demilitarization of the Indian Ocean" etc. At the same time the U.S. press was reporting Administration "conditions" for SALT II including in effect, the renegotiation of the original SALT agreement, something the Soviets have publicly stated they would not consider. Sources close to the Administration spelled out related demands amounting to a 10 percent across the board Soviet reduction in general technological R and D development.

The Administration calculates, as one U.S. diplomat told the *Washington Post*, that the new demands will cause Brezhnev "to stomp and yell," producing "apoplexy," "dismay" and "venting of spleen" in the Kremlin, and which will "require the Russians to plunge into their own negotiations in the Politburo," perhaps even paralyze Soviet policy.

But, think the men around Carter, the Soviets will agree to "negotiate" away their military strategic posi-

tion because as a *New York Post* editorial put it March 25, "if the Vance mission fails...it may be impossible for the President to restrain forces in the U.S. that proclaim negotiation with Moscow is not only futile but dangerous, and insist that American safety lies with a 'first strike capability' dependent on weapons of annihilation."

Or as chief arms negotiator Paul Warnke put it, "we're making the Soviets an offer they can't refuse" — deal with "nice guys" Vance and Warnke, or the acknowledged U.S. "hardliners" — Zbigniew Brzezinski, James Schlesinger, and the Committee on the Present Danger — will be "unleashed."

Evans and Novak, well known in Moscow and elsewhere as mouthpieces for the CPD line, detailed the scenario in their column: "Some diplomats who publicly praise Carter's human rights crusade warn privately that Brezhnev will never accept it as a price for doing business with the U.S. Consequently they regard Vance's mission as a possible precursor of a major Soviet propaganda attack on the U.S. designed to test both the new President's will and the bonds between the U.S. and its European allies." Evans and Novak then reminded Brezhnev that "Khrushchev drastically underrated Kennedy and ultimately paid for it with his office when Kennedy forced him to back down in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis."

Carter personally invited Brezhnev to avoid this fate by hewing to the "détente is irreversible" negotiate-at-any-price line spouted by his spokesman Georgii Arbatov. We don't intend to overthrow the Soviet government," Carter pointedly noted in his press conference.

But the Soviet leadership will not respond according to the Carter Administration's psychological profile. That any Soviet leader, including Brezhnev, could long accede to the kind of deals being offered by the Carter forces is unthinkable; the Soviet military and party apparatus is politically stupid enough to allow Indias to occur, but not so stupid about military-strategic matters as to negotiate new Indias as a matter of policy. Moreover, a hardline Soviet "freakout," while anticipated by Brzezinski, Schlesinger, et al. and perhaps enabling them to whip the U.S. Congress, Europe, etc. into line on their confrontation and bailout policy, will not ultimately result in the step escalation to the "missile crisis" psychological warfare over the USSR they are banking on.

The faction fight inside the Politburo, contrary to the Carter belief, will produce either the political-economic offensive around the transfer ruble necessary to destroy Carter's "base," the New York banks, or a decision to go to war. Should the war option prevail in the Kremlin, any Soviet backdowns before or after a "missile crisis" will be purely cosmetic. One morning in Moscow, almost certainly before the end of 1977, a full Soviet thermonuclear first strike will be launched against U.S. military and population centers, and 160 million Americans will die in the first hour thereafter.