

# Arbatov's Institute: Rockefeller's Lobby In Moscow

The abrupt rebuff to Cyrus Vance's SALT negotiating team in Moscow last week is causing upset stomachs and sleepless nights at Moscow's Institute of USA and Canadian Studies (USA Institute), according to reports from the Soviet capital. The institute, run by Central Committee member Georgii Arbatov, has served for some years as the easiest channel for Rockefeller interests to insinuate their needs into Soviet policy making. It has labored since its inception in 1968 for that version of detente which was stopped dead during Vance's mission: a detente which would create constantly new opportunities for Lower Manhattan interests to blackmail the Soviet Union and arrange bilateral deals to the detriment not only of Soviet security, but of the Soviets' own better conceptions of pan-European or international cooperation programs.

The shape of U.S. detente policy, in the Kissinger and the Brzezinski version alike, was determined in no small part by the concern to prevent an alliance between the USSR and potentially consolidated Western European forces against the hegemony of the dollar and New York banking interests. To this end, initial Soviet sketches for pan-European security and cooperation, put forward in the lifetime of General DeGaulle, were countered (after their first setback from the 1968 Czechoslovakia operation and the inevitable Soviet intervention against it) with a series of diversions. Foremost of these were the bilateral detente approaches first of West German U.S. agent Willy Brandt and then Kissinger. By 1973, France's Gaullist Foreign Minister Michel Jobert would observe with alarm that Moscow was sacrificing the possibility of a pan-European alliance to the exigencies of bilateral negotiations with the Americans.

The job of Arbatov has been support work for Soviet-American detente, supplying Brezhnev's staff with pre-digested analysis of U.S. political trends.

The chief source of information for the USA Institute analysts is the Communist Party USA, locus of a nest of Rockefeller intelligence agents in place for four decades. Outside of unpublicized collaboration of CPUSA operatives with USA Institute staff, the largest portion of Institute published analyses is rehashed from the pages of the Daily World or New World Review. The visible input of the CPUSA — bylines included — to the Institute's monthly *USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology (USA)* is rivaled only by that of another core "left" Rockefeller agent, Richard Barnet and his Institute for Policy Studies.

On another level, the USA Institute staff has been involved in ongoing and undisguised consultations with top-ranking members of the Rockefeller faction. One forum where this has occurred is the Dartmouth Conference, a series of bilateral meetings of experts and "leading citizens," in the words of a sponsor's brochure. The Dartmouth Conferences were one of the Rockefellers' first as-says in detente; funded by the Ford Foundation, they were begun in 1960 for "off-the-record dialogue" in the interest of "preventing nuclear war." David Rockefeller personally does not miss a meeting. In this decade, the

Soviet delegations to the Dartmouth Conferences have regularly included half a dozen USA Institute staffers.

These hob-nobbing sessions serve for exchange of information and disinformation and for psychological profiling. At the Sixth Dartmouth Conference in 1971, for instance, when Arbatov was across the table from David Rockefeller and Senator Frank Church, the U.S. participants gave a briefing on how the U.S. advocates of East-West trade (such as Chase Manhattan) were struggling against the Cold War-vintage psychological blocks of American conservatives. Clearly this extremely disorienting schema is identical with the "military-industrial complex" vs. "realistically thinking forces" analysis handed out by the CPUSA and retailed in Moscow by Arbatov.

The next year, at the Seventh Dartmouth conference, held in the U.S., a heavily USA Institute delegation sat down with Rockefeller and this time Zbigniew Brzezinski and discovered "identity of views on the present stage of relations" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, according to USA's own report. This warm atmosphere gave the Rockefeller side the chance to bring up Soviet participation in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This fond Rockefeller dream, repeatedly rejected by the USSR, was discussed at this meeting.

Arbatov and his top associates such as USA editor V.M. Berezkhov make frequent individual trips to the U.S., to make the rounds of U.S. thinktanks and political luminaries. Berezkhov likes to call on veteran "Russian-handler" Averell Harriman, whose "accumulated wisdom" has been praised in USA. The USA Institute also backs tours for others; Foreign Minister Gromyko's son Anatolii Gromyko, for example, in 1973 contributed to USA his travel notes after visiting and discussing with "pro-detente" spokesman Henry Owen of the Brookings Institution and, again, Richard Barnet.

In the opposite flow of traffic, Cyrus Vance, Walter Mondale, and Marshall Shulman — to mention members of Carter's Administration — have been received at USA Institute headquarters in Moscow in recent years. Arbatov was certainly not expecting to find this group suddenly charged with trying "a dubious, if not cheap, ploy" in the SALT talks, as Andrei Gromyko said at his press conference!

## *Why Does It Work?*

The USA Institute was an offshoot of the Institute on World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), a larger thinktank also of the USSR Academy of Sciences. When IMEMO was established in the late 1950s, the Soviet leadership intended to create a political monitoring capability as counterpart to the proliferation of U.S. and West European thinktanks sifting through data on the Soviet Union. With the IMEMO and later the USA Institute, the Soviet leadership sought to acquire an improved and scientific reading on the rest of the world.

The USSR faced these projects, however, without a scientific method to base such research on. The ease with which USA bloated up with Rockefeller's own political

schema — reprocessed by the CPUSA and the likes of Barnet for a semblance of coherence with Soviet interests — highlights the inadequacy of Soviet “Marxism-Leninism” as a tool of political analysis.

It has been reliably reported that branches of Soviet intelligence are well aware of the disinformation cell located at the CPUSA. Nor can it be assumed that leading

Soviet politicians overlook the import of Arbatov’s warm relations with “the U.S. side” in exchanges of views, like the Dartmouth Conferences, in which he participates. Yet the USA Institute continues to function, with reason: with a certain slyness, Soviet leaders often prefer to leave agent channels in place and use them. Clever as this approach may be, it has done nothing at all to enhance the Soviet comprehension of U.S. politics.

## What The Soviets Said About SALT

The full text of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s March 31 press conference, quoted only piecemeal in most Western reports but comprehensively excerpted here, reveals the vehemence and precision with which Gromyko rebuffed the Carter Administration’s attempt to win restrictions on Soviet Research and Development programs on unequal terms. Several days later, Leonid Brezhnev spoke out for the first time since the collapse of Cyrus Vance’s SALT mission. His remarks were seized on by the Washington Post and other newspapers as suggesting that Brezhnev was leaving a door open to compromise where he had refused to last week.

SALT negotiator Paul Warnke gave astounding confirmation that the Administration is thinking in terms of wooing Brezhnev away from the present Soviet hard line,

when in reported April 7 comments he said of Gromyko’s press conference: “I can’t believe he meant it.”

Brezhnev’s remarks, brief but essentially echoing Gromyko’s, give the lie to Warnke’s pretense. Brezhnev, Gromyko and Prime Minister Kosygin conferred at length with Fidel Castro this week, following Castro’s tour of the African continent and stopover in the German Democratic Republic. Castro’s visit to Moscow coincided with that of Palestinian Liberation Organization head Yassir Arafat (with whom he met there) and Tunisian Foreign Minister Nouira. The latter pressed the Soviet Union to make no separation between the cause of peace and that of a new world economic order, for which, he said, the USSR bears “great responsibility to humanity.” Castro’s speech in Berlin, excerpted here, was pointed along the same lines.

## Gromyko: ‘Dubious, Not To Say Cheap’

*The press conference given by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Moscow March 31, in which he explained the reasons for the Soviet rejection of U.S. Secretary of State Vance’s strategic arms limitation proposals, was heavily censored in U.S. press coverage. Excerpts from the press conference follow:*

...As you know, there were quite a few reports — both official and semi-official — that after Vladivostok (1974 meeting between President Ford and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev-ed) forward motion was achieved. There were also more restrained reports. But in general forward steps really were taken. The possibility existed of bringing the matter to conclusion. However this did not occur. Suddenly the question of the so-called cruise missiles arose. Now what was this? There is no need to take up the technical aspect. We began to be told that supposedly the Vladivostok agreement did not concern the cruise missiles, that these missiles are altogether free from any limitations and that the Vladivostok agreement only concerns ballistic missiles. We resolutely opposed this policy...

It had seemed that everything was clear, that all that remained was to sign the agreement... At first things moved forward. But suddenly a wall rose up, and the

whole thing was frozen. Evidently some influential forces in the U.S. were not pleased by all this. And, as you know, great difficulties arose, and these difficulties were not overcome. To speak frankly, these difficulties have increased in the recent period...

We are told, and were told in the most recent period, during the talks in Moscow, that one obstacle is the existence in the Soviet Union of a certain type of bomber (called “Backfire” in the U.S.) which, they say, can be used as a strategic weapon, and that this plane must be counted in the agreement. We categorically rejected and continue to reject such endeavors... Evidently there are some who are compelled to create an additional obstacle through this... We consider that this question is being artificially introduced in order to complicate the conclusion of an agreement.

... L.I. Brezhnev in various public statements has presented the policy of the Soviet Union... stressing its readiness to achieve this agreement. It was stressed that the agreement corresponds to the interests not only of the United States and the Soviet Union, but also to the interests of the whole world.

Really, what are we to do if everything positive that has been achieved in relations with other countries is crossed out when a new leadership comes to power in one