

schema — reprocessed by the CPUSA and the likes of Barnet for a semblance of coherence with Soviet interests — highlights the inadequacy of Soviet “Marxism-Leninism” as a tool of political analysis.

It has been reliably reported that branches of Soviet intelligence are well aware of the disinformation cell located at the CPUSA. Nor can it be assumed that leading

Soviet politicians overlook the import of Arbatov’s warm relations with “the U.S. side” in exchanges of views, like the Dartmouth Conferences, in which he participates. Yet the USA Institute continues to function, with reason: with a certain slyness, Soviet leaders often prefer to leave agent channels in place and use them. Clever as this approach may be, it has done nothing at all to enhance the Soviet comprehension of U.S. politics.

## What The Soviets Said About SALT

The full text of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s March 31 press conference, quoted only piecemeal in most Western reports but comprehensively excerpted here, reveals the vehemence and precision with which Gromyko rebuffed the Carter Administration’s attempt to win restrictions on Soviet Research and Development programs on unequal terms. Several days later, Leonid Brezhnev spoke out for the first time since the collapse of Cyrus Vance’s SALT mission. His remarks were seized on by the Washington Post and other newspapers as suggesting that Brezhnev was leaving a door open to compromise where he had refused to last week.

SALT negotiator Paul Warnke gave astounding confirmation that the Administration is thinking in terms of wooing Brezhnev away from the present Soviet hard line,

when in reported April 7 comments he said of Gromyko’s press conference: “I can’t believe he meant it.”

Brezhnev’s remarks, brief but essentially echoing Gromyko’s, give the lie to Warnke’s pretense. Brezhnev, Gromyko and Prime Minister Kosygin conferred at length with Fidel Castro this week, following Castro’s tour of the African continent and stopover in the German Democratic Republic. Castro’s visit to Moscow coincided with that of Palestinian Liberation Organization head Yassir Arafat (with whom he met there) and Tunisian Foreign Minister Nouira. The latter pressed the Soviet Union to make no separation between the cause of peace and that of a new world economic order, for which, he said, the USSR bears “great responsibility to humanity.” Castro’s speech in Berlin, excerpted here, was pointed along the same lines.

## Gromyko: ‘Dubious, Not To Say Cheap’

*The press conference given by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Moscow March 31, in which he explained the reasons for the Soviet rejection of U.S. Secretary of State Vance’s strategic arms limitation proposals, was heavily censored in U.S. press coverage. Excerpts from the press conference follow:*

...As you know, there were quite a few reports — both official and semi-official — that after Vladivostok (1974 meeting between President Ford and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev-ed) forward motion was achieved. There were also more restrained reports. But in general forward steps really were taken. The possibility existed of bringing the matter to conclusion. However this did not occur. Suddenly the question of the so-called cruise missiles arose. Now what was this? There is no need to take up the technical aspect. We began to be told that supposedly the Vladivostok agreement did not concern the cruise missiles, that these missiles are altogether free from any limitations and that the Vladivostok agreement only concerns ballistic missiles. We resolutely opposed this policy...

It had seemed that everything was clear, that all that remained was to sign the agreement... At first things moved forward. But suddenly a wall rose up, and the

whole thing was frozen. Evidently some influential forces in the U.S. were not pleased by all this. And, as you know, great difficulties arose, and these difficulties were not overcome. To speak frankly, these difficulties have increased in the recent period...

We are told, and were told in the most recent period, during the talks in Moscow, that one obstacle is the existence in the Soviet Union of a certain type of bomber (called “Backfire” in the U.S.) which, they say, can be used as a strategic weapon, and that this plane must be counted in the agreement. We categorically rejected and continue to reject such endeavors... Evidently there are some who are compelled to create an additional obstacle through this... We consider that this question is being artificially introduced in order to complicate the conclusion of an agreement.

... L.I. Brezhnev in various public statements has presented the policy of the Soviet Union... stressing its readiness to achieve this agreement. It was stressed that the agreement corresponds to the interests not only of the United States and the Soviet Union, but also to the interests of the whole world.

Really, what are we to do if everything positive that has been achieved in relations with other countries is crossed out when a new leadership comes to power in one

country or another? What kind of stability in relations with other countries can there be in this case? What stability can there be in relations between the USA and USSR in this case?...

Presently in the U.S. the story is being put out that some sort of broad disarmament program was advanced by U.S. representatives in Moscow, and that the Soviet leadership did not accept that program. I must say that this version does not correspond to reality. This version is false to the core. Nobody proposed such a program to us.

Let me mention a few facts from which you, most probably, will draw certain conclusions yourselves. It is now being proposed to us, for example, to cut the total number of strategic weapons launchers to 2,000 or even 1,800, and missiles with Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) to 1,200-1,100. Furthermore, at the same time it is being proposed that we liquidate half of those of our missiles that some in the United States simply do not like. They are called various things: sometimes "too heavy," "too effective." They don't like these missiles — and so the Soviet Union must eliminate half of such weapons. One asks oneself, can such a one-sided formulation of the question be the way to an agreement?... What has changed since Vladivostok? Nothing, absolutely nothing has changed...

Further, in the negotiations with C. Vance it was proposed that we reconsider the point which is part of the presently operating agreement, as well as the Vladivostok accord, on the right of both sides to modernize existing rockets. This had been considered self-evident. No problems had arisen here at all. But no, now it is proposed to break the accord in this section too, and to do it in such a way that the United States gains advantages from it, and the Soviet Union ends up in a worse position. It is clear that we are not about to renounce the principle of equality in this regard either. And to put forward such a demand is a dubious, not to say cheap, device.

Another fact. It was proposed to us that we include an article in the agreement banning the creation of new types of weapons. At first glance there would seem to be nothing wrong with that. But I would like to remind you that the Soviet Union itself long ago put forward a proposal on banning the production of new types and new systems of mass destruction. Furthermore, we submitted a proposal to the UN for a corresponding international treaty. And what happened? Did the U.S. government support the treaty? No. They gave not a word of support to the treaty. And then at the talks in Moscow only generalities were spoken about, including an article in the agreement that would be tied to, or as they say, in a 'packet,' with other clearly unacceptable proposals. All of this left an extremely dubious impression... At the beginning, when we posed the question of banning new types of weapons, they asked us: what do you have in mind? How could it be possible to think of something even newer than nuclear weapons? When we introduced the relevant facts — and they are known not just to us, but to scientists of other countries too — their attitude toward our proposal changed somewhat. For this reason I cannot say that our proposal met with a negative response from all other states. No. But the major states, including the U.S., unfortunately did not support it.

Let us speak frankly. If both our countries are for banning new types of weapons of mass destruction, then let us discuss the draft treaty. If you have amendments to the Soviet draft, bring them in. Let's discuss these amendments. If there are no amendments — let us accept the treaty. I repeat — our draft treaty is in the hands of the U.S. government. And is it not better concretely to answer the question: is the U.S. government prepared to sign such a treaty, or is it not? But to tie up this idea with other questions, and to propose looking at all of this in one 'packet' means to bury both the 'packet' and the idea along with it... It seems to us that in general in international affairs, including in relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, it would be better to take up corresponding problems on a more realistic, an honest basis. The more games are played in these matters, the more attempts, so to speak, to step on the feet of one's partner, the greater the difficulties...

It is proposed that the cruise missiles and the Soviet "Backfire" bomber — which, as I already mentioned, is not strategic — be set aside. It's as if a concession were being made to us, but the concession is strange in the highest degree. They give to us what does not belong to the United States in the first place. They call a non-strategic plane strategic, and then say: we are now ready to exclude this bomber from the agreement if the Soviet Union agrees to give the green light for production and deployment of the American cruise missiles...

We do not intend to minimize the substantial differences which now exist between the positions of the USA and the Soviet Union. This was openly stated to the Secretary of State. But does this mean that there are insurmountable obstacles? No, it does not. We would like to express the hope that the leadership of the United States will take a more realistic position, and will take into account to a greater degree the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies, and will not strive to achieve one-sided advantages....

*Gromyko described the record of Soviet disarmament proposals, concluding with a recent Warsaw Pact appeal:*

Not long ago at the session of the Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest, the member states of the Warsaw Pact jointly introduced a proposal that all the countries that participated in the All-European Conference (in Helsinki in 1975 — ed.) take upon themselves the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. We ask, what was wrong with this proposal?...

However the NATO states, without any particular discussion — although it was said that differences in opinion existed — declared their negative attitude toward this proposal. We do not consider the discussion of this question finished. Maybe this question is not formally on the agenda of the NATO organization, but it remains alive, and it will be discussed until such a time as the problem of non-use of nuclear energy for military purposes has been solved....

(Another question) is the nuclear forward basing of American arms in Europe, around Europe, and in other regions from which Soviet territory is accessible. With

the conclusion of the first agreement on limitation of strategic armaments we made an official statement that we would have to return to this question. In Vladivostok, in the interests of reaching an agreement, we did not insist that an article be included on the liquidation of American nuclear forward bases. But now we look at this question differently in light of the recent U.S. proposals. This is a question of our security and the security of our allies. We have the right to pose the question of the liquidation of American nuclear forward bases. This means atomic submarines and bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers in the corresponding region of Europe (you know very well what region I mean). Call this what you will: a hardening of position, a change of position. But, I repeat, this question is before us now because of the recent American proposals....

We will never forgo our legitimate interests, our security. We can only do business on the basis of equality, including with the United States of America, equality which does not damage our legitimate interests. If the other side acts likewise, then I think that both sides can look into the future with optimism....

*Asked about President Carter's "human rights" campaign, Gromyko replied that it did not help the negotiations, and that the Soviet Union has no intention of allowing itself to be lectured to on its own internal affairs. He recalled how in 1933 President Roosevelt and Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov signed the documents establishing normal diplomatic relations between the two countries, which included a provision for non-interference in one another's internal affairs.*

The thesis of noninterference in the affairs of state is a component part of our general Leninist foreign policy. We will not abandon it. No kind of noise, squeal or screech addressed from abroad will detract us from this road. We will take our own road, and do not need any teachers....

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## Brezhnev: 'A One-Sided Stance'

*The following is excerpted from a speech delivered by Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev at a dinner for Fidel Castro:*

We greet the progressive role of the liberated countries, including the role of the nonaligned movement in international politics, since this strengthens the preconditions for a stable peace.

Our programmatic goal is to achieve a solution of one of the most important tasks of today — the task of limit-

ing and stopping the arms race, especially nuclear arms.

Objectively speaking, there would seem to be a good basis, in particular in Soviet-American relations, for practical steps in this direction. Of course, this must be strengthened and expanded. But, as recent contacts and negotiations have shown, our partners, instead of going forward, are losing a constructive approach and as of now are taking a one-sided stance.

A reasonable agreement is possible, but it is necessary that not only we, but the other side as well, fully recognize their responsibility in curtailing the arms race, and seek mutually acceptable solutions not just in words, but in deeds.

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## Castro: Peace Requires Social Transformation

*The following is excerpted from a speech by Fidel Castro given in East Germany April 3, just before his departure to Moscow.*

...I had the opportunity to speak with many people who are active in Africa....I observed (in Luanda) that our countrymen have become internationalists. The more we reflect on these problems, the more wonder we have for the cleverness, and extraordinary revolutionary character of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. (Prior to them, those who fought for justice in society were utopians.) It appeared to me that capitalist society was an entirely absurd affair, and so I began to read the Manifesto. At that time, I was still a utopian socialist, but became later a scientific socialist...The more I grew in my political consciousness, the more I admired Marx, for he saw the solution with heart and mind, with science and consciousness; at that time, he saw humanity as a single family which employs the natural wealth of the world in the service of all humanity....

In the course of the 1960s, the world progressed more than in centuries. Human society has come to know slavery, feudalism, capitalism, colonialism, imperialism. How very many crimes have been committed against humanity until the most recent period. Following the October Revolution, powerful changes occurred in the world. However, what still stands before us is indeed a great deal, and very complex. What humanity must do in the future is very much more than what it has done until now....We must continue to fight for a transformation of human society, for the revolutionary course, whereby we simultaneously secure peace....