

man Hua Kuo-feng personally informed top Japanese industrialist Toshio Doko, in China for trade talks, that China was ready to conclude long-term trade deals to exchange Chinese oil and coal for Japanese steel, machinery, and equipment. But China made it clear that they expected the treaty to be signed as an implicit part of the deal.

This stipulation is not supported by Japanese businessmen, who want trade with both China and the Soviets. The Fukuda and Chinese moves are in fact a squeeze play against both Fukuda's factional opponents within Japanese business and the Soviet Union. The Soviets wasted no time in responding to the provocation by almost literally kicking over the table in the sensitive fishery talks with the Japanese. It is an open secret in Japan that Fukuda's purpose is to break Japanese-Soviet business ties.

Should Carter's Fukuda gambit succeed, it would confront Moscow not only with a hostile China on its border, but with a hostile India-China-Japan-U.S. "rectangle" comprising the three greatest nations of Asia, a more formidable "second front" than weak China represents alone, and a configuration designed to elicit a paranoid Soviet "hardline" response, leading to war.

The new pro-Carter regime in India has already leaked that a "second front" is in store for China itself, belying any assurances of real friendship for China emanating from Washington. The ruling Janata Party sent a telegram to the United Nations asking for implementation of the dead-letter 1959 UN resolutions concerning Tibet. The revival of this long buried issue, by the same people who provoked the 1962 Sino-Indian War, augurs poorly for continued peace along the Himalyan border, and suggests that the recent stability in the region may soon die a premature death.

China's Leadership Remains Locked In Factional Battle

China's top leadership is deeply divided over the most basic questions that face China today. According to one analyst on the scene, *Le Monde's* Alain Jacob, the split is between what he terms the "continuity" faction and the "radicals of the right," and is so deep that a resort to use of the armed forces of the PLA, China's army, cannot be ruled out.

Direct recent proof of the persisting inability to resolve basic questions was provided April 5-7, the first anniversary of the anti-Maoist, pro-Teng Hsiao-ping demonstrations that shook the regime last year, and of the subsequent purging of then Deputy Premier Teng. Teng's failure to make an appearance confirms that his return to power is strongly opposed in powerful quarters, while Politburo-ordered prohibition of any kind of public manifestation on April 5, the traditional Ching Ming festival, reveals the regime's extreme fear that any spontaneous expression of popular sentiment would get out of hand.

Jacob's characterization of China's faction fight comes as close to the truth as the very meager presently available information permits. The "rightists," according to Jacob, seek a fundamental shift in China's basic orientation, away from the Maoist program of the last two decades, while the "continuity" group wants to maintain the aura of Mao and Maoism, and stop the process of reforms begun after the October purge of Mao's four closest Politburo allies.

The "radical" group is centered around Communist Party chairman Hua Kuo-feng, the "continuity faction" around Teng Hsiao-ping, who is said to be very active behind the scenes, and Hsu Shih-yu, his military protector and the commander of the Canton Military Region. The alignments of most of the other ten Politburo members are not known for certain, although Peking Mayor Wu Teh and secret police chief Wang Tung-hsing are definitely "continuator" while Defense Minister and

second ranking Party chief Yeh Chien-ying is known to be close to Teng. Jacob reported that there have been substantial troop movements in several parts of the country that appear to be more than just a response to the serious North China drought, and concluded by saying that for the moment the "continuity" group seems to have a slight upper hand. But the divisions are so profound that no compromise is possible, and the latter group — centered largely in the military — may resort to use of the army to change the power balance if needed, he added, raising the specter of civil war and general chaos.

Underlying the faction fight is the existence of the most profound crisis of Chinese society in the last half century. The "continuator" are those who owe their current positions to their obedience to Mao and his policies. The anti-Maoists are those who have opposed, blocked, or gone along only unwillingly with Mao. Mao's policies are the issue now. The continuation of many of these policies even after the purge of the Maoist "gang of four" ringleaders has turned the heady enthusiasm displayed in the streets last October into apathy, demoralization, weariness, unease, and redoubled cynicism about the entire regime and the Communist Party itself. Indefinite continuation of this situation will eventually threaten the very existence of the regime, not to mention its economic development program. The anti-Maoists know this.

Foreign Policy A Major Issue

Since foreign policy disputes are almost never revealed directly in China, the best gauge of foreign policy conflict is significant increases or decreases in the intensity of anti-Soviet vituperation. The last three weeks has seen a sudden escalation in this department, confirming that Mao's Soviet policy is a factional issue.

An anonymous top official, in an interview attended by *New York Times* columnist William Safire, in mid-

March, said that there is no prospect of improved Sino-Soviet relations — a hardening of earlier positions. This was followed by an unprecedented for the record interview granted to the *London Times* editor in chief Denis Hamilton on March 27 by third-ranking Party official deputy prime minister Li Hsien-nien. Li expanded on the standard litany, accusing the Soviet Union of coveting control of the Cape of Good Hope, and said, "If the Russians try to expand anywhere in the world China will inevitably get involved..." Li also revealed Chinese support for Japanese rearmament — provided it is directed toward the Soviet Union.

Izvestia reported April 4 that China has been airing a long series of articles in the domestic mass media tracing the origins of Moscow's alleged "aggressiveness" from the dawn of Russian history, as a national character trait. Such propaganda barrages are always deliberate, provocative signals. And a member of a visiting Ethiopian delegation in Peking revealed to Reuters that the Chinese displayed "an almost obsessive preoccupation with Moscow's African diplomacy," revealing the extent to which China's entire policy toward the Third World is subordinated to their anti-Soviet campaign. Various news sources today reported that China is sending military aid to Zaire to help that country repel an anti-government rebellion in the area bordering pro-Soviet Angola. For the Chinese, this move is clearly thought to be a means to fight Soviet "imperialism."

The Soviet Union clearly perceives this intensification of anti-Sovietism. The Soviet government newspaper *Izvestia* carried the strongest Soviet attack on China since Mao's death on April 5. The article cited the recent statements made to Safire by an official of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and added "Not a day passes without new anti-Soviet and anti-Communist outpourings from the Peking press. Its material, as in the past, greatly distorts the foreign and internal policies of the USSR." Significantly, the article quite satirically attacks the recent public statements of Li Hsien-nien. "Yes the inventions of Peking propaganda regarding Soviet intentions are so absurd that even the 'friends' of the Maoist clan among the most shameless of imperialist circles feel somewhat awkward when they meet such concoctions."

Illusion and Reality

But the more immediate crisis is at home. The contrast between illusion and reality is nowhere as stark as in China today. Nothing said in the mass media or spoken by China's leaders has fundamental credibility within China. The entire population knows that Mao Tse-tung was responsible for the corpus of policies that has

recently been repudiated and is now called a violation of Mao's will wrought by the "gang of four." The population also knows that Mao was the author of continuing programs that are no less universally hated. Systematic lying is still the standard for the press, as under Mao, which continues to be a mind-deadening eternity of the same lifeless phrases and slogans, repeated by precise formula in every location, on every occasion. Only now the slogans have been changed to encourage economic work and education.

The population is still condemned to go through the motions of hailing Mao Tse-tung and his "Thought," denouncing the present villains, mouthing the approved catechism. But the conditioning is skin deep, as last April's demonstrations and the ones demanding Teng's return last January, demonstrated. The daily life of 90 percent or more of the Chinese people revolves around staying out of trouble, avoiding responsibility, shirking work when possible, and devoting oneself to promoting one's own and one's family's well-being as best as conditions allow.

The crisis is most immediate for the intellectuals. China has turned out very few educated people since 1966, and far fewer trained scientists. It is a stated goal of the current regime to end the stultifying policy of preventing serious intellectual or theoretical work, and to allow considerable freedom of thought so as to encourage better work. But judging from repeated exhortations in the press, the intellectuals appear reluctant to commit themselves. They are no doubt fearful that if they express any thoughts not approved by the Party, they will be chopped down as in the past — and there have been so few real changes of intellectual substance that they are not reassured. Moreover, since they can perceive the still unsettled factional situation, they do not want to "come out" until total stability is brought to the Party leadership.

With respect to the press, the front page of the *People's Daily* in January even announced that there would be a total change of style and content, and accurately described the press as dull, stereotyped, uninformative, and so forth, a state of affairs which it blamed on the "gang of four." But since that time, there have been no basic changes.

In the absence of more information, it appears that whether or not to change the present *modus operandi* of Chinese political and intellectual life is the central issue of the continuing factional war. While the outcome is not yet determined, it seems certain that if the residue of Maoism is not rapidly eliminated, China could still find itself facing internal breakdown, chaos, and civil war in the not too distant future.