‘Koreagate’ - Taking The ‘K’ Out Of The KCIA

Several weeks ago in off-the-record comments at the Rockefeller-founded Asia Society, the head of the South Korean opposition New Democratic Party delivered an interesting threat — on behalf of the regime of President Park Chung Hee, to be sure. Lee Chul-seung told a shocked audience of bankers, businessmen, academics, and assorted spooks that whatever the United States could turn up concerning the activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in this country was “chickenshit” compared to the activities of the U.S. CIA inside South Korea. Lee, whose command of English vernacular was impressive, made it quite clear that if the KCIA scandal in Washington continues, plenty of other trees in the forest could fall.

Lee was not bluffing. Similar threats to expose the U.S. CIA funding of the Korean dissident movement have been made by aides of President Park. But such revelations, even including the likely case of U.S. backing for the student uprising that overthrew the regime of South Korea’s first President, Syngman Rhee, in 1960, would not be the true story.

The real story of the Korea scandal, and in particular the alleged dirty deeds of the KCIA — widespread influence-peddling on Capital Hill to influence Congressional votes on military and economic support for South Korea — is that most of those dirty deeds were carried out by that segment of the KCIA controlled and operated by U.S. intelligence agencies. This can be factually demonstrated.

However, why the Trilateral Commission-controlled Carter Administration is pursuing the Korea “scandal” in concert with other attacks on South Korea, including those against Park Chung Hee for his “human rights” stance and the threatened withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea, is a question that must first be answered.

Behind the “Koreagate” stands David Rockefeller’s “watergating” machine and its attempt to further the process begun by the two “corruption” scandals that have shaken Japan in recent years: the scandal that toppled Japanese Prime Minister K. Tanaka in 1974 and the more recent Lockheed scandal, as well as the “corruption” scandals have paralyzed the pro-development forces in Indonesia grouped around that country’s state oil company, Pertamina. The aim of those scandals was to sabotage the efforts of independent industrial and political circles to acquire sources of raw materials, especially oil, free of the control of Rockefeller family’s multinational companies, and related efforts to promote widespread high-technology development. This independent “resource diplomacy,” spearheaded by the “Shigenha” (resource) faction of Japan under the direction of former Premier Tanaka, was well documented in the June and July 1976 issues of the Japanese magazine Chuo Koron.

One of the targets of the “Koreagate” is indeed the regime of Park Chung Hee, which was participating from at least 1973 in this “resource diplomacy,” largely under the influence of an independent faction in Korean ruling circles led by former Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil. Kim, who was the key organizer of the military coup that put Park in power in 1961, is known to have close ties with the non-Rockefeller Gulf Oil Company that pre-dated the military coup, and has historically been the major proponent of independent industrialization for Korea.

In opposition to the efforts of Kim Jong Pil lies the network of the top U.S. CIA operative in Korea, former KCIA chief Lee Hu Rak. Lee is very closely associated with the Rockefeller oil multi Caltex, and was a key agent in numerous Rockefeller efforts — before the “Koreagate” — to sabotage the “resource diplomacy” of the Kim Jong Pil faction.

To this day, Park has continued to steer Korea along the resource diplomacy, high-technology growth course (including expanding ties with the Arab countries) advocated by the Kim Jong Pil faction. From the time of the 1961 military coup (a coup which all available evidence makes clear U.S. authorities did not know about in advance, although certain circles may have), Park has been middleman between the Kim Jong Pil faction and the anti-Kim factions dominated by Caltex’s Lee Hu Rak. Support for Park has come from the United States only in direct proportion to Park’s willingness to bestow favor on the more pro-U.S., less independent factions within the country’s ruling circles. Park’s 1973 alliance with the Kim faction in Korea and the Shigenha faction in Japan is the root of the “Koreagate.”

It is in the interplay of military and other ruling factions in Korea that the real story of the KCIA — the removal of the K — can be found.

Just as importantly, the “Koreagate” provides the Trilateral Commission with ammunition capable of doing more than simply overthrowing Park Chung Hee. The scandal is also to be used against the Shigenha faction, which was only wounded by previous slanderous attacks.

The planned withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea has provided the United States with the needed leverage to push for the remilitarization of Japan on an explicitly anti-Soviet basis. This was the real meaning of President Carter’s calls for Japan to assume “a greater role in Asia” during the recent trip to Washington by the Trilateral Commission’s top towel-boy in Japan, Premier Takeo Fukuda. One key to this will be the signing of a Japan-China Friendship Treaty, with the inclusion of the infamous “anti-hegemony” clause against the Soviet Union. Fukuda is presently pursuing such a treaty, undoubtedly following a gameplan worked out during his Washington visit. Such a treaty with China would all but eliminate the potential success of ongoing talks for economic cooperation between Japanese industrialists and the Soviet Union.

Finally, there is every possibility that the extensive money and other ties between factions of Japan’s ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Park regime will become part of the "Koreagate," a scandal that would dwarf the "Lockheed scandal" in terms of devastating impact on the party’s domestic popularity. Such a scandal could destroy the single most important political institution, the LDP, through which Japan’s industrialists have operated in the post-war period. Thus if the "Koreagate" is allowed to run its course, it could have perhaps fatal impact on the pro-development forces in the Asian region. The key to diffusing the scandal — the publication and widespread dissemination of the facts of the U.S. CIA infiltration of the KCIA, and the purpose of the scandal — is outlined in this article.

However, it is believed that Kim Jong Pil recently stopped over in Miami, following an extensive diplomatic tour throughout Latin America, where he chaired a meeting held to reorganize the activities of the KCIA in the United States. If this reorganization of the KCIA leads to a follow-through on the threats of Lee Chul-seung, the full details of the real story of the KCIA scandal, including the Rockefeller-Caltex efforts to sabotage "resource diplomacy," will quickly come to the fore.

**The Rise of Tanaka**

The rise of K. Tanaka to the Japanese Prime Ministership in the summer of 1972 marked a major turning point for Japanese-Korean relations, and for the Park regime as well. With Tanaka in power, virtually all of the major Zaibatsu planned huge heavy industry investments in South Korea, as that country was to play a major role in the Shigenha drive for independent sources of oil. The major investment emphasis was to be building up Korea’s petrochemical and oil refinery capacity. Mitsui, Teijin, and Mitsubishi all planned the construction of oil refineries in South Korea. The government planned the guidelines set by the official headquarters of the Shigenha, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. These investment plans were made formal at the March 1973 Japan-Korean Economic Cooperation conference, which then followed up by visits of several delegations from the big-business federation Keidanren, which included Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and other companies.

For Park the move toward Tanaka and the Shigenha faction was a significant (though not total) break with the U.S. CIA controlled groupings and other pro-U.S. factions within the country’s ruling circles. At the time, the United States went to tremendous efforts to sabotage these growing Park-Tanaka ties, and pull Park back into line.

The most important of these efforts was the famous 1973 "Kim Dae Jung Affair," in which then-South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, who was living in exile in Japan, was kidnapped from his Tokyo hotel room and brought back to Korea. As planned, the Kim kidnapping threw relations between Japan and Korea into a crisis within days, as the KCIA was almost universally held responsible for the Entebbe-style action.
Perhaps more than any other example, the “Kim Dae Jung Affair” illustrates the extensive U.S. CIA infiltration of the KCIA.

Park had been foolishly pulled into backing (and probably funding) the 1972 campaign of Fukuda to succeed E. Sato as Prime Minister. (Park’s being duped into backing Fukuda was undoubtedly partially a result of faulty intelligence provided by then-KCIA chief Lee Hu Rak.) When Tanaka beat Fukuda in the campaign and became Prime Minister, Park is said to have been “in an awkward position,” and launched attempts to establish direct ties with the new Premier. Park assigned Minister Without Portfolio for Political Affairs Lee Byung Hui this task.

Lee was the former KCIA station chief for Seoul and is very friendly with Kim Jong Pil. He was a member of the famous “Eighth Graduating Class” of the Korean Military Academy, whose members played a key role in the coup and still make up the heart of Kim Jong Pil’s power base in the country. Working with LDP “elder” Etsuburo Shina, Lee established the Japan-ROK Friendship Association as a direct counter to Kishi’s “Friendship Society,” and in addition set up the Japan-ROK Parliamentarians League. Kim Jong Pil is presently the Chairman of the League from the Korean side. Shina’s ties with the Park regime reportedly became so close that the ROK knew Shina would “choose” Takeo Miki to succeed Tanaka in 1974 two days before most informed Japanese. (The setting up of this Park-Tanaka network was well documented by Keicho Nomura in the January 1977 issue of the Japanese magazine Sekai.)

The Kim Dae Jung kidnapping was for Japanese-Korean relations precisely what the riots in Indonesia during Tanaka’s 1974 visit to Jakarta were for Japanese-Indonesian relations. Similar to the moves in Korea, Tanaka also attempted to establish independent ties with Indonesia, a particularly important country because of its oil production. In cooperation with Indonesian President Suharto and ex-Pertamina chief Sutowo, the Shigenha planned to organize a Japanese-Indonesian Oil company to deliver Indonesia crude to Japan, thus breaking the monopoly that Rockefeller’s Clatex subsidiary Nippon Oil had over Indonesian oil supplied to Japan. It is now public knowledge that then-Finance Minister Fukuda dispatched several of his agents from his faction inside the ruling LDP to help organize the unfriendly demonstrations that met Tanaka. The Fukuda-Kishi ties to Wall Street are so complete that Kishi’s Tokyo office is even located in the Tokyo Caltex office building.

While the full details of the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping are still the subject of considerable speculation, it is known that the gangster networks which Kishi and Fukuda hold much influence over were involved. In particular, Korean gangster Machii, who is closely associated with Fukuda’s current Minister of International Trade and Industry Tatsuo Tanaka (Tanaka is also a Fukuda faction member and believed by some to be Fukuda’s liaison to the ROK), played a direct role in the action. Machii owned the hotel from which Kim was kidnapped.

While the plan to disrupt Japanese-Korean ties through the kidnapping was partially successful, the story of the “KCIA’s” involvement was first carried several days after the event by the Japanese daily Yomiuri Shim bun, which got its information from an exclusive interview given their Soul bureau chief by none other than Kim Jong Pil. KCIA chief Lee Hu Rak was dumped in December 1973 for his role in the affair, which Park later told Jack Anderson was the act of “an extremist wing” of the KCIA. An anonymous anti-government Korean commentator, T.K., whose letters were published serially in Sekai beginning in January 1973, said in January of the following year, “At the moment Kim Jong Pil is bent on destroying Lee’s political base....After the Kim Dae Jung incident, Kim Jong Pil waited for some disturbance to provide an opportunity to oust Lee Hu Rak. Now Lee’s group is watching for another time of disorder to stage his comeback.”

Who is Lee Hu Rak?

To understand the “extremist wing” of the KCIA, and how the present KCIA scandal has been molded, it is crucial to understand the role of Lee Hu Rak as an inside man in the U.S. intelligence operations in Korea. Lee has been a key coordinator of U.S. CIA controlled networks in the ROK, and has effectively manipulated President Park to either play him against Kim Jong Pil — who has always been seen as a potential successor to Park — or to get Park to back Lee’s dangerous schemes. It is under Lee that the KCIA undertakes some of its more infamous operations, including the so-called bribery schemes, outside Korea, as well as escalated repression inside the country.

Lee Hu Rak had been arrested immediately after the 1961 coup as a suspected U.S. intelligence agent, but was released soon after and turns up as an official spokesman for the military junta. Lee’s agency stemmed from the key role he played during 1960 in helping coordinate with U.S. intelligence agencies the formation of a Korean CIA. (The existing KCIA, which was organized by Kim Jong Pil in 1961, is for the most part actually Korean. It was Lee Hu Rak’s KCIA, organized before the coup, that was U.S. CIA-controlled.) Prior to his role in forming the first KCIA, Lee served as military attaché in Korea’s Embassy in Washington. Lee was turned loose explicitly because of his connections with American intelligence circles.

Informed sources are divided on the exact reasoning for Lee’s release, with some saying the United States made one of its conditions for support of Park’s military government the release and high-ranking of Lee. Others say Park knew of Lee’s close U.S. CIA connections, and wanted a liaison to American intelligence circles. It is likely that both are true.

From 1963 to 1970 Lee functioned as “personal secretary” to Park. He was known even during this period for his pro-American feelings, and not surprisingly appears as a key leader of anti-Kim Jong Pil factions within ruling circles.

While it is difficult to definitively prove, there have been numerous press reports that Lee Hu Rak, together with Major General Yun Pil Yong, planned a coup against Park in the turning-point period of early 1973. Gen. Yun was at the time was chief of the Metropolitan Guards (capital area police), and had been the chief of the Tiger Division of South Korean soldiers sent to Vietnam. (The United States heavily pressured Park in 1965
to send Korean troops to fight in Vietnam, which enabled the U.S. to establish more intelligence networks in the Korean armed forces.) While Lee Hu Rak escaped unharmed from his alleged role in the coup plotting, Gen. Yun was given a long jail sentence. Further, numerous bureau chiefs of the KCIA involved in plotting, including Lee Hu Rak's nephew, were reportedly dropped from their posts.

It is interesting to note that the period of 1973-1974 also saw a milder version of the present United States public attacks on Park Chung Hee for "human rights" violations. The U.S. State Department's measure for "human rights" in South Korea seems to be the degree to which Park Chung Hee follows the U.S. gameplan.

It is not surprising that Lee Hu Rak is known to be a virtual employee of Caltex, which has significant interests in the oil business in Korea. Lee was an in-law of the recently deceased president of Honam Oil, Caltex's subsidiary in South Korea, and is related by marriage to Kim Chong Hi, who heads the Korean Hankuk business group. Hankuk runs Kyung-In Energy, a joint venture with another Rockefeller multi, Mobil. It was Lee Hu Rak, according to Korean sources, who personally carried out the extortion of payoffs from Gulf Oil in the late 1960s and early 1970s to finance Park's 1971 election campaign. These payoffs were later used to "watergate" Gulf in an investigation authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission and carried out by John J. Mccloy, a lawyer for Standard Oil, and at the time head of Chase Manhatten Bank. Some observers believe that these revelations weakened Kim Jong Pil, who resigned as Prime Minister in early 1975.

Gulf had defied the Rockefeller multis by moving into Korea after the 1961 coup and building a major refinery which supplies the country with a large portion of its oil needs. The Korean Oil company is a government joint venture with Gulf. Gulf had a close relationship with Premier Tanaka and was involved with the Japanese in a joint project with Russia to develop Siberia's vast oil and natural gas reserves.

Despite the intensive U.S. efforts to prevent it, the ties between Korea and the Arab countries that began to expand under Shigena influence during 1973 and 1974 have today evolved into extensive construction contracts with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, shipbuilding contracts for the Kuwait national tanker fleet, and other oil refinery and transport contracts with Iran. In late March, Korea was awarded its first construction contract with pro-Soviet Iraq, itself a good indication of how Korean relations with the Arab countries have developed. (The shipbuilding contracts with Kuwait are particularly interesting, as Gulf gets much of its oil from Kuwait.)

And much to the dismay of the Trilateral Commission, Korea's relations with the Arab countries are being directly coordinated with Japan. A recent meeting of the Japan-ROK Joint Economic Committee of Private Business publicly affirmed that the two countries should coordinate with each other their respective relations with the Arab countries. Further, the Korean Industrial Development Corporation, a joint Japanese-Korean investment consortium, plans to funnel huge investments in South Korea, following closely the plans originally worked out in 1973. Included in these investment plans is further Japanese participation in the ongoing construction of a huge oil refinery in the Yosu region of the ROK.

The "Koreagate" is the latest in the long list of attempts to prevent the further consolidation of just such cooperative ties.

The Park Regime: U.S. Puppet?

That the "U.S. puppet Park Chung Hee clique" is capable of such significant independent action should not come as a shock to anyone familiar with the actual history of the Park regime. The military junta that took power in 1961, after a year of rule by an unstable civilian government which followed the overthrow of the Rhee regime, combined many elements. However, its character was clearly that of a proto-Nasserite formation shaped by younger officer, especially its organizer Kim Jong Pil, intensely nationalistic and moved by a Confucian moralistic disgust with the perversion of Korean society and of the Korean military by the mores of American hedonism.

Behind this very Korean face lay a determined circle, of which Kim Jong Pil is more representative than Park Chung Hee, which wanted to see the industrial development of Korea and looked to Korea's old colonial master, Japan, for aid in this process. Most of these officers, some of whom were trained under the Japanese when Korea was still a colony, could look back at the entire period following the end of the Korean war. What they saw was a Korea that in economic terms was completely backward, rural and almost totally undeveloped except for repair of war damage.

The U.S. charge d'affaires (the acting U.S. Ambassador) in Korea at the time, Marshall Green, together with the head of the United Nations Command, U.S. General Carter Magruder, quickly tried to organize the Korean General Staff to undertake a countercoup, until it became clear that the coup had wide backing, and they received work from Washington to cool their rather open efforts.

That Wall Street was not happy about the coup is demonstrated easily enough. The "insiders" Council on Foreign Affairs journal Foreign Affairs carried an article in October 1961 which lamented the coup, and concluded, "It should not be excluded that the United States work toward an early dissolution of the present military regime. Nor should it be accepted that we do not have either the means or the right to do so." This article, with its drippy "liberal" moaning over the supposed loss of liberties and the ruthlessness of the junta, would today hardly be recognized as a 16-year-old document.

As for the efforts of Green and Magruder, it is clear that they were working for the Wall Street circles whose opinions were expressed in this article. Magruder had a long association with Rockefeller lawyer and former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, having been a member of the famous Dulles delegation that visited Japan in 1950 (shortly before the outbreak of the Korean war). Green's skills were later applied in Indonesia, where he played a key role in organizing the 1965 overthrow of President Sukarno.

It was the threat of a combination of Japan and a more independent, and capitalist South Korea, both heading in the same direction — away from the United States — that made the Council on Foreign Relations stir. Seeing that they could not tackle Park head on, they...
moved to activate the extensive networks in the Korean military and elsewhere to control, and no doubt eventually remove, Park and his circle.

Park himself, the senior officer of the junta and its recognized central figure, was allied with Kim Jong Pil (in fact they are related by marriage), but from at least 1963 onwards he was willing to compromise with the significant anti-Kim Jong Pil sentiment within the junta and its circles. Although much of this sentiment represented little more than personality conflicts, the anti-Kim groups were from the beginning heavily infiltrated by agents tied to the U.S. CIA. Lee Hu Rak was the most prominent. Throughout the years, Park's shifting back and forth between the Kim and anti-Kim factions has been a pattern, and his willingness to do this has provided the U.S. CIA with an indispensable lever against the Kim Jong Pil faction.

Why was the United States so determined to prevent Kim Jong Pil from gaining the upper hand in the government? Sources close to the junta at the time report that Kim and his allies were the initial drafters of the junta's first five-year economic plan, and the draft was a very ambitious one, including provisions for widespread nationalization of industry as the best way to quickly accumulate desperately needed capital (a modified version of this original draft by Kim was adopted sometime later). It was also Kim Jong Pil who sponsored the famous debt moratorium measures for the Korean peasantry shortly after the coup. These sources report that especially the latter measure scared the U.S. Embassy in Seoul "half to death," as the Americans thought the coup leaders, especially Kim, were establishing a leftist government. Shortly thereafter, Time Magazine published a slanderous feature article on the coup in which, under prompting from the U.S. Embassy, Park was labeled a communist. (Time was subsequently banned from the country.)

For the United States Kim represented the same danger as did other nationalist "Bonapartist" Third World leaders, including Nasser of Egypt and Sukarno of Indonesia. He had joined the military in early 1949 following his graduation from Seoul National University. Seoul U. was set up in the early years of the U.S. occupation of Korea, and student groups there were sharply divided into the right faction — backed by the U.S. occupation authorities — and the left faction, which was associated with the South Korean Labor (Communist) Party. Kim was closely associated with the left faction. Many of Kim's student friends joined the military with him as a means of avoiding the vicious attacks on leftist sponsored by the U.S. authorities according to one source. Kim and his friends together made up the "Eight Graduating Class" of the Military Academy. (It is interesting to note that at the time of the coup several military officers refused their support because of alleged widespread communist influence among the coup leaders. While Park Chung Hee was probably included in this group accused of being "communists," the more likely targets were the ex-student leftists of the Eighth Graduating Class.) In his plans for the country Kim openly borrowed heavily from Sukarno and Nasser, as can be seen in his notion of "nationalistic democracy," and the more general plan for an elite to be the "guiding force" in the industrialization and cultural modernization of the country.

Included in the many U.S. efforts to maintain control of Korea was the push for a conclusion of the discussion between Japan and Korea for normalization of relations, especially in the 1964-65 period. While the U.S. did not want Kim Jong Pil to influence Korea's relations with Japan, it clearly wanted a rapprochement between the two countries, especially as part of the escalation of the U.S. intervention into Vietnam. The Wall Street-controlled Sato regime governing Japan at the time would be useful in establishing U.S. CIA-controlled "chains of command" into Korea. To "aid" the Japan-Korea negotiations, William Bundy, the former CIA official and present editor of Foreign Affairs, and Bobby Kennedy were sent to mediate.

Today, perhaps the most ironic testimony to the Park regime's willingness to buck the U.S. is its now-public efforts to establish diplomatic contact with the Soviet Union. Prominent American scholars favorable to the Park regime are being approached by Korean officials and asked to aid this effort.

Other CIA Connections

The Lee connection is only part of the CIA's operations against and within the KCIA. Intelligence community sources in this country say that the major activity of the U.S. intelligence agencies in South Korea has been to infiltrate the most important Korean intelligence agencies — KCIA, military intelligence (CIC), and several police forces. One source, who served in U.S. military intelligence during the 1967-68 period when North Korean guerrilla activity was at its height in the south, related that almost the entirety of his and his colleague's activity has nothing to do with the North — it focused on bribing, extorting, and otherwise "recruiting" agents, with the KCIA as the prime target. The same source further said that the number one aim of his operation's intelligence gathering was to get dirt on Kim Jong Pil, who at the time was known to be maneuvering to succeed Park. The U.S. intelligence agencies had thrown their weight behind Park as the lesser of two evils. (Lee Hu Rak, who had been Ambassador to Japan for a year, was called back to Korea specifically to organize the 1971 Presidential election. Park narrowly won — some say with massive fraud — over opposition leader Kim Dae Jung.)

Further evidence is provided by the Korea scandal itself. One early feature of the scandal which threw the Korean government into a fit was the revelation that information passed by the U.S. State Department (i.e., Henry Kissinger) to the Justice Department included information gained from bugging South Korea's presidential mansion.

A source says that the Koreans themselves believe that this could only have been carried out through the KCIA, or alternatively, that there was no bug at all and the information came from U.S. informers within the KCIA.

The U.S. intelligence connection to alleged KCIA bribery activity is even more intriguing. The Los Angeles Times reported last month that a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation of an outfit known as the Korean Research Institute revealed that the KRI was a funnel for money for an electronics company based in Texas called E-Systems, which is a contractor in South Korea and a CIA-organized and controlled firm that
part of the Air American network of CIA business fronts. The money paid E-Systems to the KRI never went to Korea — it was laundered through a bank in the Cayman Islands (a favorite CIA method) back into Washington, D.C., where it is believed to have been used for payoffs there.

Further, the *Executive Intelligence Review* has learned of two Korean ex-army officers who were among those with extensive dirty ties to the U.S. CIA: one was B.C. Lim (Lim died in September 1976), the other Lee Hyeong-geun. Both men held various high-level posts in the armed forces and Korean government. Most interesting however is the fact that both men were high officials in the World Anti-Communist League, an association directly controlled by the U.S. CIA. The WACL stems directly from the old “Moral Rearmament” networks set up by Rockefeller private intelligence agent Frank Buchman.

Lastly, the Unification Church of “Reverend” Sun Myung Moon — often cited as a “KCIA front” — is in fact a direct descendant of the “Moral Rearmament” networks. Moon’s operation is more Japanese than Korean, with much of its funds coming from such known U.S. agents as Japanese arch-rightist R. Sasagawa. It is no accident that *The Rising Tide*, a Moon publication published in the United States, was the first to print (before *Bungei Shunju*) the “facts” of former Prime Minister Tanaka’s “corruption,” the slanders that led to his downfall.