

Arbatov: Some Substance To Charges

Georgii Arbatov closed out a three-week U.S. tour April 27 with a speech before the American Association of Scientists in Washington, D.C. While during his trip he had retailed a version of the Carter Administration's fraudulent "sleeping giant" threat of a U.S. military-technological take-off should Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) completely fail (see EIR No. 16), Arbatov was apparently overcome with the realization that if Carter's provocative policy and the definitive Soviet response continue, he and his services on behalf of "détente" will be rendered superfluous. "Détente" is now "in danger," Arbatov announced, and U.S.-Soviet relations are moving into a "cold war pattern."

Concurrent reports that the Soviet Union is making it known through numerous channels that the USSR is unimpressed with the "sleeping giant" claim in particular suggest that Arbatov has come under strong pressure from Moscow as well. In his Washington speech, he stuck closely to the formulations of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in describing Carter's SALT packages as unacceptable. The arms proposals of Carter and Vance would have given the U.S. a unilateral advantage, he said.

Arbatov also followed the Soviet party line on the

"dissidents" question, where he stressed three points. First, that the Soviet "dissidents" are financed by powerful foreign institutions. Second that these institutions are working in collaboration with the U.S. government. And finally, that these activities are endorsed by the President of the United States.

Turning to potential "areas for agreement," Arbatov returned to his usual amiability vis-à-vis particular Carter proposals. Three areas for speedy agreement are a total test ban treaty, an Indian Ocean demilitarization plan, and a ban on development of new weapons systems, he said. Carter's Indian Ocean scheme has been denounced roundly in the Soviet military daily *Red Star* and the "no new weapons" proposal, although one version has been put forward by Soviet leader Brezhnev, has been the framework for the U.S. demanding curtailment of Soviet Research and Development.

Following his presentation, Arbatov was presented with a copy of "Open the Arbatov File," the exposé printed here. Professing his own innocence of its charges, Arbatov admitted that "there may be some substance" to what it has to say about Victor Perlo and Gus Hall of the Communist Party USA.

The Gullibility of the Soviet Union

Georgi Arbatov, who served on the board of the *World Marxist Review* from 1960 to 1962 played an instrumental role in helping disseminate the Kennedy-National Security Council line on the military industrial complex. So did many others whose careers were launched by Nikita Khrushchev's efforts to get the Soviet Union out of its isolation into the world arena. According to all available indications, up to the very end of his life Khrushchev retained that particular blind spot that never allowed him to see "whom he was dealing with." We have no reason to believe that Khrushchev solved the U-2 riddle, nor that he ever understood that Kennedy was nothing more than an instrument of Rockefeller interests; to the end Khrushchev believed that Kennedy meant well, that he wanted peace but he was pressured by certain "dark forces," perhaps the "military industrial complex," perhaps others.

The intelligence that Khrushchev was getting on the United States was downright lousy. However, much of this incompetence in Soviet intelligence was of his own making. His single biggest mistake was probably his purge of Marshal Georgi Zhukov in 1957. There is little doubt that Marshal Zhukov's personal friendship with General Eisenhower was the fruit of a keen Clausewitzian tradition in the Soviet General Staff, from Tukhachevsky, to Zhukov himself, to Admiral Gorshkov today. This tradition, embedded in a profound, humanist-scientific conception of national interest as it applies to the USSR and national interest in general, has identified the Rockefellers and the monetarist faction as their "probable adversary."

There should be no doubt at this time that the Soviet General Staff perceives as its enemy not the United States as a nation, but the Rockefellers as an international faction. This is crucial.

In the days of Khrushchev, however, the factional clout of this tendency in the Soviet leadership was under intense pressure. From the 20th Congress onward, Khrushchev was pushing intensely for a drastic de-emphasis of heavy industry in favor of the agricultural and chemical sector. His immediate opponents turned out to be those sophisticated political layers associated with the high-technology, capital-intensive industries related to defense production.

Contrary to naive opinion, the opposition of these layers to Khrushchev's perspectives was not the result of bureaucratic intradepartmental rivalries but rather of more sophisticated outlook of economic organization and international political realities imparted to them as a result of their special responsibilities. Their weakness was that their more viable public spokesmen tended to be from the military — a result of historical circumstances and also an indication of their weak political cohesion.

Khrushchev's most convenient expedient for curbing this opposition was to go after its most organized and numerically more limited core, the military. Marshal Zhukov's removal was followed by the Yuri Popov affair in the GRU, the Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. The exposure of Lieutenant Colonel Popov as a presumed CIA agent opened the GRU to a massive purge under Ivan Serov, a high KGB official whom Khrushchev had placed at the head of the GRU. The notorious Penkovsky Affair that preceded and followed