

The gist of the matter is this. If those Soviet forces endorsing the U.S. Labor Party strategic analysis prevail in time, the Soviet leadership will move to establish a new treaty relationship with the USA, NATO, Japan and other countries. This new Soviet policy will be based on the stated principle that the nations of the world have a common fundamental interest in global technological progress, in rapid expansion of industrial and agricultural production, and in cooperation for rapid development of fission and fusion technologies in particular.

Such a Soviet posture would provide the positive basis for political security and economic-cooperation agreements through which the adversary relationship between the USA-NATO and Warsaw Pact nations could be rapidly defused and ultimately ended.

If such a shift in Soviet outlook were introduced to such locations as the forthcoming Belgrade conference, it would provide trade-union, industrialist and farmer forces in the USA and other OECD nations with the kinds of options they require to check the brinkmanship of the Rockefeller-led forces. The Rockefeller forces are painfully aware of this.

The key problem for the Soviet leadership is that they have never understood the United States, and have no competent knowledge of the American Revolution and its deep-rooted traditional influences among the majority of trade-unionists, industrialists and technology-oriented

farmers. For this reason, the present, wide-spread circulation of U.S. Labor Party analysis of The American Revolution and its continuing impact on internal life within the present-day U.S. is an eye-opener to all top-level Soviet and Eastern European circles seeking to discover a political way out of the war-danger.

For this reason, Richard Barnet and his associates have launched a major propaganda campaign against George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, and the pre-Lincoln American Whigs, feeding this Rockefeller line into top Soviet circles through the agents of influence of the "American Faction." Since Whig economist Henry Carey, the major influence on Abraham Lincoln's economic thought, was criticised by Karl Marx — partially rightly, but in the main wrongly, because of Marx's own ignorance of the American Revolution and early 19th century USA— Barnet and his friends have chosen a public attack on Henry Carey, the leading U.S. anti-slavery economist, as the present leading feature of their efforts to prove that U.S. industrialists have "always been reactionary."

The grave practical danger in this situation is that unless the Soviet leadership makes an immediate and effective proposal to the pro-industrialist interests of the advanced-capitalist countries, there are very few remaining efficient options for the rest of us to stop the presently accelerating count-down toward intercontinental thermonuclear war.

Non-Proliferation—Inducing The Soviets To Oppose Energy Development

Scarcely two months ago, *Newsweek* fabricated a report that the Soviet Union was prepared to back Jimmy Carter's curbs on nuclear technology exports, then freshly announced, and would do so at the April 28 meeting of the London Club of nuclear exporters. Items in the Soviet press, notably condemnations of West Germany's nuclear technology sales to Brazil, were adduced by Administration experts and advisors to support the prediction.

Nothing of the sort took place. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference on the spread of nuclear energy, held this month in Salzburg, Austria, the Soviet delegation reportedly cheered U.S. delegates who firmly *opposed* Carter's intention to ban plutonium and the development of plutonium-generating fast breeder reactors. In the wake of Western summit talks in London, where the Europeans said "no thank you" to Carter's plans, Britain's energy minister Wedgewood Benn flew to Moscow to discuss exchanges of off-shore oil know-how for advice on thermonuclear fusion development from the USSR. The Soviet ambassador in Bonn raised the prospect of reviving the stalled Soviet-West German Kaliningrad nuclear power station deal. And Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda hinted at Soviet inclusion in the nuclear matters "study group" Europe agreed to form as a sop to Carter.

1977 is not the first year in which politicians and specialists representing Rockefeller financial interests have proclaimed that they and the Soviet Union have a common interest in curbing dissemination of nuclear technology. Rockefeller-linked journalists in the mid-1960s, a Johns Hopkins survey in 1970, and the U.S. Nations Association earlier this decade pointed to this supposed convergence. In papers prepared for a 1971 conference of the respective U.S. and USSR U.N. associations, a U.S. team, of which present State Department Soviet desk head Marshal Shulman was a member, concluded that Moscow was more opposed to nuclear technology and fuel transfer than the U.S., in cases where non-signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were on the receiving end.

In reality, there is not, nor could there be, a common interest against nuclear energy development between the Soviet leaders, whose primary concern is growth of the Soviet economy through technological advance, and the Rockefellers, bent on deindustrialization. Any appearances to that effect are a result of Zbigniew Brzezinski's "convergence theory" in action: the convergence is between the Rockefellers' policies and the Soviets' manipulated fears. In the major case of nuclear energy, the Rockefeller interests have played on the Soviet leadership's horror of some U.S. client state let-

ting loose (or "breaking away," as some scenarios for Israeli action in the Middle East have the script) with a nuclear weapons capability.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is an inaccurate catch-phrase, invented largely for the purpose of making Soviet policy bend to the Rockefellers' urgent need to prevent other Western powers, not to mention the third World, from getting their own nuclear power facilities or weapons not under control of Rockefeller agencies. Like the notorious "momentum of the arms race," it suggests an inexorable danger which nations should rise to combat. The fact that the danger of war always stems from the assertion by ruling institutions of an economic and political course intolerable to someone else, tends to be shunted to the side in "non-proliferation" debates.

Like the "military-industrial complex," non-proliferation has continuously been urged on Moscow by Rockefeller agents working under left cover in and outside the Soviet Union.

The Pugwash Movement and the "Ban the Bomb" movement of Bertrand Russell did most to launch non-proliferation into international debate, beginning in the recession year of 1957. Nothing so blatant as the Baruch Plan of a decade earlier, which would have perpetuated the U.S. monopoly on nuclear technology, was possible. Britain's nuclear strike force and nuclear power industry were a fact — and a target for the Wall Street-backed efforts of Russell. There were long-term gains to be had vis-à-vis the Soviet Union: establish the Fabians as *somebody for the Soviets to ally with* in the West, *other than* the conservative politicians and industrial interests of Europe who continually represented a potential threat to Wall Street. Time and again from the 1950s down to today, proliferation of nuclear weapons, to West Germany in particular, has been waved around to dampen Soviet enthusiasm for these forces.

Soviet Nuclear Energy Policy in the 1950s

President Eisenhower's December 1953 proposal to the United Nations for an international facility for nuclear energy — what later became known as the "Atoms for Peace" policy — was viewed as ambiguous by the Soviet Union. The Soviets sniffed an intent to reinstate the Baruch Plan by taking a "privileged position" for the U.S. in the new institution, and in this way they had caught wind of what the Rockefellers indeed wanted. But the Soviets also took the official position that there could be a legitimate pro-development concern involved for the U.S. as well.

Nikita Khrushchev, then at the head of factions supporting heavy industry against Georgii Malenkov's intended radical shift of the Soviet economy in favor of the consumer sector, had high hopes for the atomic power in the Soviet Union. In June 1954 the first peaceful-use atomic power station in the world went into operation in the USSR. The journal *Atomnaya Energiya* began to be published, featuring positive coverage of research at Oak Ridge, Tennessee on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Khrushchev began to include international cooperation for nuclear power development in the Soviet disarmament packages of the day.

Although remaining wary, the Soviets communicated

with the U.S. on establishing the international facility Eisenhower had mentioned. The correspondence on this during 1954 initiated negotiations which led to the founding of the IAEA at the end of 1956.

Moscow was increasingly skeptical as 1955 began with the Western summit decision in Paris to rearm West Germany and the 1955-56 U.S. budget, dubbed "the atomic budget" after its weapons section. They suspected that the U.S. was out either to control the new agency or to render it a token effort, while the bulk of nuclear investment would be for arms. But peaceful use was put on the agenda for the July summit in Geneva, the first such meeting of the Big Four since the Potsdam conference. In January, the USSR decreed a policy of sharing its nuclear expertise for peaceful use and announced that nuclear technology and fissionable material would be supplied to several countries in the Soviet bloc.

At the Geneva summit, Khrushchev's elaborate proposals for general and complete disarmament were foiled when the U.S. delegation walked in with the "open skies" proposal to permit overflights of U.S. and Soviet territory for verification of disarmament agreements to be negotiated. The Soviets, inevitably, said no and the "open skies" idea was fixed in the role it played for the next seven years: the spoiler in any arms limitation negotiations.

Discussions on peaceful use, however, went ahead. The world's first international conference on the peaceful use of atomic energy was scheduled for Geneva approximately one month after the summit, but not before Moscow had succeeded in hosting a dramatic event: a special session of the Soviet Academy of Sciences devoted to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Scientists from the bloc countries, including China at that time, as well as India, Yugoslavia, Japan, Finland, Sweden, Egypt and Israel attended. They were given a tour of the Soviet atomic power plant, and Academy president Nesmeyanov delivered a speech citing the great Soviet Russian biologist Vernadskii on the potential of nuclear power to transform human practice. Nesmeyanov raised the "elusive and inspiring goal" of controlled thermonuclear fusion power. At the Geneva conference held August 8-20, 1955, the Soviet Union dominated as its delegates presented over 100 scientific papers on nuclear energy. Here, over two years before Sputnik, the shock of speedy Soviet scientific advance made itself felt. "They have caught up," cried more than one newspaper in the West.

Following the Geneva conference on energy, the Soviets kept up a high profile campaign for international cooperation on atomic energy research and development. Soviet scientists became important diplomats: it was as part of a Khrushchev-led government delegation to Britain under the tense circumstances of the Suez crisis' early stages, that the physicist I. Kurchatov travelled to England and delivered his famous speech at Harwell. Kurchatov revealed the Soviet fusion energy research program to a shocked scientific world — the U.S. had no research on fusion so advanced.

Also in early 1956, further negotiations to establish the IAEA took place in Washington. The Soviets charged that the U.S. was seeking a weak IAEA that would not challenge the U.S. prerogative for its own bilateral deals

outside of IAEA controls — in other words continued domination of nuclear fuel supplies. Observing publicly that Britain shared the Soviet stand for an IAEA tied more closely to the U.N. — which reflected the interests of the British effort to build its nuclear program out of U.S. control — Moscow put forward a bold plan to the U.N. Economic Commission on Europe (ECE) for a European agency for peaceful use of the atom. It would be European in the sense of both sides of the “iron curtain” and only one side of the Atlantic!

Pan-Europeanism Foiled

This bold plan never got off paper. It was foiled by the formation of Euratom, the continental Western European facility linked to the European Economic Community (EEC) and aimed to make European nuclear energy dependent on U.S. reactor technology and fuel, to shut Great Britain (not then an EEC member) out of European nuclear programs, and certainly to preclude the glimmer of a move on the Soviets’ pan-European schemes. The question of Euratom’s privileges also became a stumbling block to formulating IAEA procedures.

The major Rockefeller policy initiatives launched in 1957 were aimed against the USSR and the troublesome Europeans — especially the British Conservatives, in the case of Russell’s Ban The Bomb movement. In their effect on Moscow, the prongs of the Rockefeller offensive worked in complement: the vociferous Fabians provided false “allies” for the Soviets’ disarmament and cooperation proposals, while the rapid consolidation of the EEC, NATO and Euratom under visible U.S. command got the Soviet guard up against the European conservatives. The release of the Rockefellers’ Mid-Century report, with Henry Kissinger’s section on “local wars” and “tactical nuclear warfare,” prompted immediate Soviet charges it was a Rockefeller brinkmanship policy. A spin-off effect of the “limited nuclear war” doctrine was to prepare the ground for “non-proliferation” in Soviet thinking: if Rockefeller policy was for smaller countries to begin wars, how much the more dangerous for smaller countries to have nuclear potential.

Bertrand Russell began a celebrated letter-writing campaign to Khrushchev in which Russell pushed the idea that science had made, “unrestricted national sovereignty” (which the Soviets were insisting the IAEA help *protect*) incompatible with human survival. Russell wired to a Moscow symposium on “Scientific Progress and International Relations” that the world had only two options: “one World Government or death” — again, a clever parody of the Soviets’ policy of making the IAEA, unlike Euratom, an effective international agency not controlled by the U.S. In early 1958, the gullible Khrush-

chev treated the world to the spectacle of the leader of the Soviet Union publishing open letters to organizations like the Fabian “Twickenham Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons,” in which fact (U.S. Kissingerite policy was a danger to the population of Europe) and fiction (the U.S. had *imposed* nuclear weapons on Britain) were dreadfully muddled.

In 1957, Russell’s Pugwash Conferences began, targeting nuclear scientists from the East and the West for recruitment to the Ban The Bomb movement. Their Fabian organizers aimed to create feelings of guilt in nuclear scientists, in particular, for having invented the bomb. The scientists were invited to collaborate “above politics” — for the Rockefellers’ political aims. The Soviet dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov is one of such Rockefeller successes.

The NPT

Non-proliferation established as an international issue, the 1960s saw years of negotiation towards an international treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was signed in 1968 and entered into force two years later, which established the IAEA as universal enforcer of “safeguards” on the nuclear program of nations without the bomb, if they signed the treaty. Throughout the process of negotiation, the issue of technology transfer and guaranteed nuclear fuel access for peaceful use was a constant concern of the Third World nations, and the Europeans, who feared landing in the position of blackmail victims in a reborn Baruch Plan some day. The USSR backed their aspirations for peaceful use, but never again put forward so comprehensive an international nuclear cooperation package as it had in 1955 and 1956. The Rockefellers had created an environment in which the Soviets could not conceive of one that would work.

In essentials, that is how Moscow stands today on nuclear power development. The Soviet Union and the socialist bloc economies are fully committed to developing fission power, including fast breeder technology. Their fusion effort is a matter of record. They are eager for technological collaboration, as with Italy on the breeder program, and happy to sell enriched uranium and plutonium to signatories of the NPT — doubly happy if the customer was turned away by Jimmy Carter. The USSR will not go along with Carter’s efforts to shut down nuclear power development. Whether it will move effectively against them, by a political and economic alliance on energy program with Carter’s U.S. and European foes, is a factional matter not yet resolved. How it breaks depends largely on the Soviets’ perception of the strength of those foes.

— Rachel Berthoff