

West Germany's authoritative position in NATO puts Chancellor Schmidt into the most favorable position for reducing the threat of nuclear war through serious disarmament efforts with the Warsaw Pact. Over the past week there have been certain indications that the Schmidt government is moving in the direction of discarding NATO's official "forward defense," "limited nuclear war" strategy in favor of one more in keeping with West Germany's actual defense needs.

In response to a question from the opposition parties about what the country would do in the event of a "surprise" Warsaw Pact attack, the government has stated that a complete surprise is impossible, since the imminence of war would first be signaled politically. In addition, instead of complying with General Haig's desire for massive arms build-ups in the North German plain, the government merely acknowledged the weakness of

NATO forces there. The West German forces therefore need a "certain level" of cooperation with NATO, while at the same time the government insists that the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna are useful and can help the continuation of detente.

This position was backed up by an article appearing in the Munich daily paper, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Military correspondent Franz Potyka explicitly attacked Christian Democratic defense "expert" Manfred Wörner for demanding an increase in the number of army reserves. Potyka correctly pointed out that the major real problem with the West German army is a lack of the kind of high-quality education which produces soldiers who can make intelligent decisions in the midst of unpredictable situations. The kind of "flexibility" Potyka is calling for is therefore completely alien to automated dolls required for the "flexible response" scenarios of Schlesinger, Brown, et al.

'I Can't Imagine Anything But Confrontation'

An attempted replay of the famous U-2 incident — this time with "Soviet dissidents" instead of a card-carrying spy in the featured role — appears to be on the agenda of the June 15 Belgrade meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Sources in and around the Carter Administration point to such an incident as a way to preempt European and East bloc initiatives for a Mediterranean peace zone and North-South development relations. The Soviets are to be provoked into walking out of the conference over the proposed "human rights basket," in particular, accusations of Soviet "political repression."

This strategy was described in interviews this week by a top CSCE staffer and, somewhat more guardedly, by a State Department official specializing in CSCE affairs.

CSCE Staffer: 'The Soviets Will Storm Off and Go Home'

Meg Donovan, assistant to the chairman of the CSCE, Rep. Dante Fascell, told the Executive Intelligence Review this week that a U.S.-Soviet confrontation at the conference is bound to occur.

EIR: What preparations are you making for the upcoming Belgrade conference?

Donovan: Rep. Fascell introduced into the Congressional Record today a strongly worded protest against the Soviet charge of treason against Anatoly Scharansky. The Commission will hold hearings June 3 on Soviet repression of the Orlov Helsinki group, set up to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki accords. The group was formed a year ago and since then, its members have been jailed or forced to emigrate. Our hearings will focus on the repression of this group. We will hear testimony from two members of the group who have been

forced to emigrate. We will also take testimony from Edward Bennett Williams, hired by (Alexander) Solzhenitsyn to defend another member of the group who is now in jail, Alex Ginzburg. Williams has been denied a visa by the USSR to defend his client. We will also release a report put out by the Orlov group in Moscow.

EIR: What are the prospects for the Belgrade conference?

Donovan: We don't want a confrontation, but I can't imagine anything else at this point. I just read a May 28 Pravda article in which Brezhnev lambasted the human rights campaign and stressed cooperation in trade and science. Given his statements, I imagine the Soviets will storm off and go home when we raise human rights compliance.

EIR: What is your view of Italian Prime Minister Andreotti's tour of Greece and Rumania to organize a consensus for a Mediterranean peace zone? Also, what do you think of the Andreotti-Ceausescu call for the Belgrade conference to set up a working group "to deal with the problem of security in its Mediterranean dimension."

Donovan: The Mediterranean peace zone will be the topic some people prefer, but it's of limited interest to us.

EIR: What of the Andreotti-Ceausescu agreement for mutual development and joint ventures in Asian and African development? What about Andreotti's declaration that the upcoming Belgrade conference is the proper forum for discussion of the new world economic order, and North-South relations? Since the recently concluded Paris North-South talks satisfied no one, will the U.S. support Andreotti's proposal?

Donovan: I really don't know anything about this. I don't think anyone here is working on North-South relations.

State Department: 'Italy and West Germany Will Go Along With Us'

An official at the CSCE Affairs desk of the U.S. State Department indicated that "human rights" issues will dominate the conference, and declared that the "Western states" will stand behind the U.S.

EIR: How is the U.S. responding to Andreotti and Schmidt's pre-Belgrade initiatives? How does the State Department view the Andreotti-Ceausescu call for discussion of the "Mediterranean dimension?" And will the U.S. agree to discuss development issues at Belgrade?

Madden: At the substantive meeting in the fall, there will be a review of Helsinki provisions relating to the Mediterranean. At that time there will be an opportunity to make new proposals. In general, however, our interest is in the East-West aspect of the final accord. The main focus of the U.S. and Western countries will be on family reunification and the free flow of information and ideas.

EIR: How will the East bloc respond to the U.S. emphasis on human rights?

Madden: It's difficult to say at this point. The Soviets are not terribly interested in those aspects of the negotiations which you mentioned. At the CSCE the Mediterranean issue was only a concern of a few states — Malta, Cyprus, Yugoslavia. The final result was a broadly worded section, representing the interests of only a few states.

The other states were willing to go along, but not terribly interested. I would expect this pattern to continue at Belgrade.

EIR: What about Western European nations like Italy and West Germany? They seem to be in favor now.

Madden: When it comes to the bottom line, they'll go along with the U.S. Basically, you'll have the Western states and the Eastern states and two groups of neutral states. The first group is countries which have the same interests as we do, such as Switzerland, Sweden, Austria. The second group are those like the Maltese and Cypriots, who have their own interests.

EIR: What about North-South relations?

Madden: That goes a great deal beyond CSCE. It's very unlikely there would be much support for opening up a whole new field — there are more appropriate arenas than the CSCE. It's difficult to see how you could open up a whole new field, even though you can put forth new provisions in the fall.

EIR: What implications does the Scharansky affair have for the Belgrade conference? Doesn't that indicate that the USSR will not agree to make the human rights issue the paramount subject of discussion?

Madden: First of all, all we have on the charges against Scharansky is press reports. We have no confirmation from the Soviets on that. What develops in the human rights field will be in the next four months no one can say at this point. Anything could happen.