

greater strategic flexibility, the present crisis provides no margin for success of methods borrowed from the middle of the nineteenth century's central European history. It was the attempt to continue the policies of Metternich and Bismarck into the twentieth century which most directly caused two world wars and must

tend to inevitably cause a third. In the final analysis, Kissinger's style, while comparing favorably to the lunacy of Brzezinski's, represents only a slower approach to the same general war which Brzezinski's methods would trigger immediately.

'Kissinger Is Very Available'

Kissinger is very available — that's the message a close associate of the former Secretary of State delivered in an interview this week which evidenced significant dissatisfaction with the Carter Administration's Belgrade policy.

Q: I have been getting some very varied background from different quarters regarding the upcoming Belgrade meeting and the Carter Administration's handling of foreign policy, especially with the Russians on the human rights issue. Some people whom you would associate with, say, the Harriman wing, are very worried that the Carter people are going to blow it for us if they push real hard at Belgrade. We will simply defeat our own purposes, they say, because the result will be to bolster the position of the so-called hardliners, and then we'd really be in trouble and so forth. What are your views?

A: Yes, you are right, there are serious disagreements on this. Let me inform you first off that I hold a number of important advisory posts outside of the official government per se but these have allowed me to have some significant input into the planning for the Belgrade meetings, especially with the Department of State.

I think the Russians will respond — that is unless the U.S. goes very very big on human rights, which is possible — pretty much the way they did on that televised debate the other night...Now, if we go all out, we are definitely back in a Cold War situation, which we are very close to. There's nothing wrong with Cold War, you see — it's not Hot War; no shooting — a battle of ideas, some tough debate, totalitarianism and so forth. But somehow there's a fine line that is drawn between this and being, shall we say, a Cold War extremist, which some people think Carter may tend to become and so they are, in that sense, justifiably worried.

I'm not saying Carter will go that far, we may have to wait on that judgment. So we must be very careful. If we go all out, some of the concerns you mentioned might occur. Also, the liberals and the Russians would accuse the U.S. of starting the Cold War again and the next question is how do you balance this with detente? We must be very careful.

Q: I understand you recently met with Henry Kissinger. Did you discuss these concerns?

A: Yes we did. Kissinger is watching this very carefully, but as you know he is not raising his voice in public very much at this time.

Q: Are you and Kissinger hopeful that Carter will deal with the situation adequately?

A: Well, I think, I hope Carter will say to the people going to Belgrade and to the State Department people that we need to walk in tandem. We need a unified approach despite disagreements. That we need to come out of this meeting with a set of formalized followup meetings and future conferences. I think he should tell Vance to stick to the agenda and keep it moderate. Meanwhile, Carter himself, not at the table, can continue to talk out on human rights.

Q: Aren't the Europeans likely to reject the U.S. approach and go their independent way, especially if we push hard?

A: Yes, this is something to definitely keep in mind and something I have been emphasizing in my discussions on this. *Europe does not want a real tough confrontation; they are worried about Carter; quite frankly they are more interested in the 'baskets' dealing with trade, travel, economic cooperation and so forth. The key thing to keep in mind is that it would be a mistake to think that we can force a quick breakthrough with the Russians, that we can have overnight results. It doesn't work that way. It's a long arduous process. What we should hope for is continued small progress.* (emphasis added)

Q: Is Kissinger concerned...

A: Oh yes...

Q: I mean about Carter and Brzezinski possibly getting us fouled up?

A: Well, let me put it this way. I think that Carter had not really thought the thing through, say the way Kissinger had. Carter kind of jumped right in there and started knocking it out with them right away and now we have to look at it.

But I asked Kissinger about this the other day and he said that even if you'd been in high level government posts for six years or more you still don't know everything you need to know, that any President would go through something like this. What, he's only been in there six months or so, eh?

I think what we have to do is establish a kind of national private consultant group, with people from law, ethnic groups, labor and so forth, make it representative but have people who are experienced in international negotiating, and advise the President, and maybe go public with hearings and so on, to make sure that the

President has a broad base of views around him and so forth. See I don't think we can just stop the human rights thing either, because that would really look bad and the Russians would know that a shift had taken place and they might have a field day.

Q: Considering the disagreements in policy circles on these matters do you...

A: Why there are splits even in the White House; even in Brzezinski's staff. There are softies there too...I consider myself a realist, neither a hardie or softie — but there's, as you say, essentially a three way split and the softies may turn around and work behind the scenes at least with the Europeans, like the Belgians and the Germans, to see to it that there's no blowup at Belgrade.

Q: Do you think Kissinger may decide to come back into the field?

A: Well, this is something we discussed too, you see, and I'll put it this way: There is a definite difference of style between say Carter and Brzezinski and Kissinger on the other hand. I think you should do a column on this side of it. Can you do that? I'd really like to see an intelligent column on this on the absolutely critical importance of style...can you do that for me? Anyway, I'd say that Henry is going to hold his water as long as he can, until he's called on. He would want to do it by getting a call-in from the President or Cy (Vance) or by Brzezinski, all of whom he knows. I don't think he wants to go in without that call-in, you see. Till then he'll try to hold his water as long as he can.

Q: What if the call never comes?

A: Well...I couldn't say...listen I have to be off now. I'll be going to London at the end of the month...to keep an eye on things. Bye.