

As in the United States, however, the neutron bomb issue is also being used to mobilize radical environmentalist and terrorist networks in West Germany. In an interview publicized by the *Baltimore Sun*, the Social Democratic Party's business manager Egon Bahr — a longtime sidekick of party Chairman Willy Brandt— has emotionally described the neutron bomb as “a symbol of perversion of the human mind.”

#### *The Schmidt-Andreotti Policy*

Andreotti will arrive in Washington July 26 for a follow-up summit with Carter, and by that time he must be prepared to present Rockefeller with the fait accompli of an emerging new monetary system. This is also the only course by which Giscard can be yanked under control; a major factor motivating France's turn toward fascism is the miserable state of its economy and the threat of a final collapse of the worthless French franc.

On July 19 Andreotti met with Giscard as part of a Mediterranean tour which will also take him to Saudi Arabia.

The results of this meeting demonstrate that Giscard's dramatic shift caught the Italian premier completely off guard. There was an immediate flurry of emergency consultations by Western European chiefs of state. Schmidt flew to Strasbourg the same day for his own meeting with Giscard and he apparently brought up international monetary problems related to the dollar. Schmidt also made a point of announcing that he would consult with British Prime Minister Callaghan by phone that same day, and according to press accounts, he is meeting Andreotti today for a similarly unscheduled consultation.

Italian and French press accounts of Andreotti's meeting with Giscard, meanwhile, are completely contradictory. French sources are asserting that the two heads of

state reached “complete agreement” on everything, while more reliable Italian sources assert that Andreotti immediately distanced himself from the contents of Giscard's attack on Carter.

Andreotti's defense of Carter from Giscard's attack is most revealing of the fear-ridden climate that has descended upon Europe. He is quoted as saying, “We have always been in favor of detente... I don't believe the U.S. is against it,” a flat lie.

#### *Soviet Smokescreen?*

For the past week Soviet editorial commentary on Western Europe has accurately noted the unprecedented low-point in Washington's relations with its European allies.

Although the entire U.S. press corps was mobilized last week to print the lie that all outstanding differences between West Germany and the U.S. were resolved at the Schmidt-Carter summit, the Soviets have scorned this claim. The Soviet party daily, *Pravda*, described Schmidt's conflict with Washington this week as going “beyond normal interimperialist rivalries,” while Czechoslovakia's *Rude Pravo* highlighted Schmidt as the leader of “a major industrial power, whose criticisms of Washington are very significant.”

Thus far, however, the Soviets have chosen to lump Giscard's restatements with Western Europe's efforts for detente. The German Democratic Republic's *Stimme der DDR* radio ran the *Newsweek* interview July 20 as its lead international item, following similarly positive coverage on Soviet radio.

The question remains open at this time whether the Soviets have put a diplomatic smokescreen over their relations to France or whether they have failed to take note of Giscard's drive for a fascist coup.

— Renée Sigerson

## Giscard: Carter 'Broke The Code Of Conduct Of Detente'

*The following are excerpts of an interview with French President Giscard d'Estaing by editor Arnaud de Borchgrave, published in the July 25 issue of Newsweek.*

**Q.** Why do you think President Leonid Brezhnev is so angry with President Carter's public approach to diplomacy? Did he tell you whether it was style or substance?

**A.** It's both. Mr. Brezhnev feels that some of President Carter's decisions have broken what I will call the code of conduct of détente. But beyond style, there is, of course, substance. Brezhnev does not understand the objective sought by breaking the code. The code, for example, calls for noninterference in the other's internal affairs, and you will never find in the Soviet press direct or personal attacks against the leaders of countries that

subscribe to détente. And in the matter of arms limitation, Mr. Brezhnev believes there is a tacit code that implies either a ceiling or a reduction, both limited and balanced. When they saw a proposal that was completely out of phase with these rules of conduct, they understandably wondered why the code had been broken and what the ulterior motive was.

**Q.** Why do you suppose Mr. Brezhnev is interested only in meeting Mr. Carter to sign a specific agreement, such as SALT II, and not to generally review their respective foreign policies as suggested by Mr. Carter?

**A.** I believe that Mr. Brezhnev is not interested in an exploratory summit but in a meeting that would confirm a certain orientation in Soviet-American relations. That means the general détente line and the code of conduct as

previously defined. He is not interested in redefining détente....

*Q.* What are your impressions of Mr. Carter's foreign policy and what worries you about it as you've seen it evolve?

*A.* I am not here to pass editorial judgment. That's your job. I am most gratified by the excellent relations I have established with President Carter. But what seems clear in Mr. Carter's foreign policy is that he has introduced a fresh ideological dimension. This undoubtedly met certain needs — such as nonproliferation, arms limitation and human rights — just as it met some of my own preoccupations, but it has compromised the process of détente. The question now arises whether or how new ideological themes can be applied without provoking negative reactions....

*Q.* Do you relate Soviet activities in Africa to Europe's sources of raw materials, and are these activities in your judgment part of a grand strategy?

*A.* In Africa, I think it is more a matter of targets of opportunity than a grand plan. When a vacuum is created, as was the case in Angola, they fill it. The same thing has just happened in Ethiopia. But when the vacuum was pre-empted by others, the Soviets did not persist. In the Indian Ocean, on the contrary, there is a grand strategy and here, of course, there is a link with their presence in certain parts of eastern Africa.

*Q.* When you speak of pre-empting a vacuum, you are referring to the intervention by France and Morocco in Zaire last April?

*A.* Correct.

*Q.* When you and the Moroccans intervened in Zaire, did you feel that the U.S. and West Europe had abdicated their geopolitical responsibilities in Africa and that somebody had to act?

*A.* I came to the conclusion that the U.S. and West Europe were absent in Africa at a very crucial moment and that it was necessary to act on our own to preserve the security and territorial integrity of a Western-oriented state — which, by definition, means the protection of Western interests....I have observed that the Soviet

presence in Africa is heavily concentrated in a few countries for reasons that are usually related to political instability. Where you have political stability, they have a low profile....

*Q.* Yet you have suggested a "Eurafrican" security pact to head off superpower confrontation in Africa and avoid a ruinous arms race for the Africans. Who would protect them?

*A.* The departure point should be the realization that they have objectives that are very similar to our own. There is an armaments race in Africa today because there is no common security code, as exists, for example, in Europe with détente between the Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact nations. In Africa, the only common security ground was respect for the old colonial frontiers, but even that principle is now being challenged — for example, between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Somalia, or in the Shaba affair in Zaire. So we must urgently think through new security arrangements that African countries would agree to abide by in a solemn declaration such as the one Western and Eastern nations subscribed to at the European Security Conference in Helsinki in 1975. This would have to include respect of borders and nonrecourse to force to settle disputes.

*Q.* Do you believe that if popular fronts come to power in France and in Italy, with Communists sharing power at the national level, NATO would, in effect, become a U.S.-West German military alliance and that the temptation would grow in Congress to pull U.S. troops out of Europe?

*A.* It's self-evident that such a situation would lead to a closing of military ranks between West Germany and America. That this situation would lead to Congressional pressures to bring U.S. troops back does not necessarily follow, but it is, of course, a danger. The economic chaos that popular fronts would unleash would also propel West Germany into a position of economic supremacy....

*Q.* What do you think will be the consequences of the Concorde SST ban in New York, should it become permanent?

*A.* ...All I can tell you is that our retaliation will be so designed as not to hurt the French economy. I am not brandishing any threats. But no country can accept passively what it regards as a violation of its rights.