

SALT 'Debate' To Build Cold War Climate

On Dec. 14 the official Soviet daily *Pravda* issued harsh attacks on the Trilateral Commission and U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski by name for trying to sabotage the SALT arms limitation talks with the USSR. The charge was seconded by Nikolai Tarosov, the Soviet delegate to the European Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, who denounced NATO attempts to link the cruise missile and other SALT issues to the conclusion of the MBFR talks.

The Trilateral Commission is a supranational policy-generating body created by David Rockefeller. President Carter, Vice-other high Administration officials are former members of the Commission.

The Soviet charges came in the midst of a mounting campaign centered in London — a campaign in which Brzezinski, the Trilateral Commission's director before he took the National Security post, has played a prominent role — aimed at throwing the Soviets into a paranoid "Cold War" posture in which their ability to make their strategic decisions would be badly impaired. This is precisely the goal of a Dec. 16 *New York Times* article titled "Pentagon Told to Review Strategy for Nuclear War Against Soviet." The article reports that "White House sources" are saying that Brzezinski has for months sought and finally received a Defense Department consideration of his position that "the Pentagon's nuclear strike plan should be designed to exploit potential Soviet fears, such as bombing Moscow's food supply or making a target of Russian troops in the Far East so that the Soviet Union would be more vulnerable to attack from China. (see *Executive Intelligence Review* No. 51 for full text.)

While President Carter reported at his Dec. 15 press conference that "our relations with the Soviets are in general very good," most of the Eastern Establishment press has been feeding the Brzezinski confrontation thrust by portraying SALT and related arms control as the object of mounting U.S. opposition, and speculating heavily that when a treaty is signed it will not be approved by the Senate.

Thus the *Washington Post* of Dec. 22 reported that former President Gerald Ford "strongly hinted that he may oppose his successor on the new SALT agreement" but could provide little more substantiation for that view than a Ford statement that "I've not made a decision, but I'm going to take a long hard look at the treaty."

In the *Washington Star*, reporter Henry Bradsher, whose articles frequently reflect the viewpoint of the antitreaty forces in Paul Nitze's Committee on the Present Danger, headlined his Dec. 21 piece "Hope for an Early SALT Accord Has All But Vanished." Bradsher made much of a recent statement by Ralph Earle, deputy for chief arms negotiator Paul Warnke, suggesting that "next spring would be a reasonable but by no means certain" timetable for an agreement, and implied

that substantive difficulties in the talks were coming from the Soviet side.

On the same day, *New York Times* military reporter Drew Middleton played up a House Armed Services Committee study released by Rep. Samuel Stratton, which, said Middleton, "says that the United States' strategic nuclear position is deteriorating so rapidly that by 1980 it will not deter a first strike attack by the Soviet Union."

'Pro-SALT' Sabotage

Supposedly "pro-SALT" opinion-makers like columnist Mary McGrory have meanwhile been adopting the posture of equating the Administration with a small child with a toothpick trying to stop a powerful anti-SALT tank. "Only a handful of Congressmen are willing to step out and speak up for the agreements," mourned McGrory in her Dec. 19 column, all but ignoring the fact that most legislators are understandably wary of making ringing defenses of an agreement they have yet to see.

Even more problematic was a Dec. 21 *New York Times* editorial which, while proclaiming a SALT II agreement "indispensable," gave credence to the notion that "America's European allies" will face "Soviet political-military blackmail and the Finlandization of Western Europe" if the treaty is approved. The *Times's* solution introduce a whole new "deep cuts" debate around the issue of scrapping MIRV multiple warheads, currently possessed by both the U.S. and the USSR. This is exactly the kind of "quick switch" approach which backfired when the Carter Administration tried it on the Soviets in the first round of negotiations last Spring.

The Union of Concerned Scientists, a group linked to antinuclear crusader Ralph Nader, has meanwhile issued a statement demanding an immediate unilateral halt to the testing and deployment of new nuclear weapons, and complaining that arms-control efforts "should be focused to a greater extent on curbing technological advances," according to the *Times*. As the Soviets are well aware of efforts by Brzezinski and Co. to swindle them out of developing advanced technologies with applications outside the military sphere, that kind of "support for SALT" must also be viewed as having an intentionally counterproductive effect on the talks.

The most visible mark that both the "preparedness" and "arms control" sides are taking part in a "controlled debate" whose outlines have been shaped by Brzezinski is the complete lack of discussion in the press of the actual political-strategic conditions under which the USSR might shift from its current war-avoidance posture into a war-winning mode. Should the Soviets conclude that a SALT agreement, Middle East peace, and related interlinked foreign policy objectives on which it believed it had secured U.S. agreement at the time of the joint U.S.-Soviet communiqué on Geneva are not now possible, the consequences would go far beyond "cold war." The danger of general thermonuclear conflict would sharply escalate.

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'No Hope for Early SALT Accord'

These excerpts come from Henry Bradsher's Dec. 21 article in the Washington Star.

President Carter said the other day that he has "gotten to know (the Soviets) and their attitudes much better than before on SALT" and other subjects.

Such greater understanding has caused the new administration to postpone once again hopes for the new strategic arms limitations treaty that the Ford administration had originally planned to sign in the summer of 1975.

Carter came into office hoping that Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev would make his repeatedly delayed visit to the United States for the treaty signing last summer. That slipped, but Carter said in October that "within a few weeks, we will have a SALT agreement that will be the pride of this country."

But one of his negotiators in Geneva said last week that "next spring would be reasonable, but by no means certain," for concluding an agreement. Then Carter made his remark about knowing Soviet attitudes better at a news conference last Thursday.

Carter came into office with hopes of getting a better SALT treaty than the one the Ford administration had been trying unsuccessfully to conclude.

The new president sought substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic weapons that had been tentatively agreed upon by Brezhnev and then-President Gerald R. Ford in Vladivostok in November 1974. Carter wanted cuts made in ways that would reduce the threat of huge Soviet land-based missiles to the Minuteman force of U.S. missiles poised underground across the Great Plains.

But there is now skepticism in the new administration about what can be agreed upon, written into a treaty and ratified.

Much of the skepticism has developed out of attitudes in the Pentagon that find a loud echo in some Capitol Hill offices. The most active office has been that of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., but enough other senators are concerned about the developing SALT II agreement to raise serious questions of a treaty's winning approval by two-thirds of the Senate.

A preliminary outline of the new treaty came out of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance's third round of SALT negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko last September. Although it was fairly close to the 1974 agreement, thus representing an administration retreat from many of its early hopes, it contained enough controversial points to raise warnings of opposition.

Despite those warnings, however, the administration has pushed ahead on the September outline. Work on it in Geneva provided the basis for optimistic headlines in last week's papers, based on a news conference by Carter's chief arms negotiator, Paul C. Warnke.

Warnke said he was "quite hopeful we can reach effective treaties" on SALT and two other arms control subjects: a nuclear explosion ban and limiting military forces in the Indian Ocean.

Such hopefulness has been repeatedly voiced by Warnke. He added a warning that "very serious

problems" remain in negotiating a SALT treaty, a warning that he has also routinely tacked onto his optimism.

But Warnke declined to answer reporters' questions about when a treaty seemed likely to be concluded. It was his deputy, Ralph Earle, who suggested next spring of later. . . .

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McGrory: SALT Backers Overwhelmed By Hawks

Here, part of syndicated columnist Mary McGrory's Dec. 19 column as it appeared in the Washington Star.

Members of the Arms Control Association, some of whom have grown old and gray trying to slow down the arms race, gathered glumly over the weekend.

"The other side," said one delegate from Ohio, "has the heat, the money and the simplicity."

"What we need," said an official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the little government bureau charged with trying to cool off the Pentagon, "is a Sadat, someone who can break through all the guff and say, 'Let's do it.'"

The presence at the White House of Israel's Prime Minister Menahem Begin, who had come to show Jimmy Carter the Middle East peace package, was a reminder to the ACA that anything is possible. But it also brought home to them how far away they are from such a dramatic turnaround in their own fortunes. . . .

The pro-disarmament group isn't as organized as the Committee for the Present Danger, the rich, hawkish outfit that fought the appointment of Paul Warnke as chief negotiator for the SALT talks and continues to warn of "the failure of nerve" they see reflected in "dangerous concessions" to the Soviets at Geneva.

The disarmers have no weapon comparable to the Committee for the Present Danger. They have no propaganda like "The Price of Peace and Freedom," a movie made by the American Security Council to show the impotence and inefficiency of America's nuclear arsenal. . . .

The ACA was hoping for far more support from Jimmy Carter, who announced the elimination of nuclear weapons as a goal in his inaugural address. But the White House has been too engrossed in the Panama Canal treaty and the energy program to do much about his dream. . . .

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New York Times Advocates Quick Switch

The text of the New York Times lead editorial of Dec. 21, "SALT Beyond Minuteman," reads as follows.

The storm now brewing over the next Soviet-American strategic arms limitation treaty — SALT II — turns on something the technicians call "Minuteman survivability." It means quite simply that toward the end of the proposed eight-year agreement, the Soviet Union is expected to acquire the theoretical ability, in a first strike, to destroy most of America's 1,000 land-based Minuteman missiles. That would wipe out the most important and reliable arm of America's "triad" of retaliatory forces (bombers and submarine missiles are the others). The vulnerability of the Minuteman missiles

in their underground silos has been predicted repeatedly in the past without materializing. But, the experts now agree, the wolf is finally approaching the door.

Should the United States sign an agreement that fails to head off this Soviet ability? Critics, who say they will block Senate ratification unless the projected treaty is improved, are chiefly concerned about the reaction of America's European allies. Perceiving a shift in the nuclear balance in Moscow's favor, those allies may lose faith in Washington's guarantee of nuclear protection — the pledge to strike first with strategic nuclear weapons, if necessary, in the event of an all-out Soviet conventional attack. A fearful NATO, the critics believe, would invite Soviet political-military blackmail and the "Finlandization" of Western Europe. The Carter Administration argues that the Soviet threat would increase, not diminish, if SALT fails and an unrestricted arms race resumes. The pending deal would not only put a cap on the missile buildup but would, for the first time, both reduce missile numbers and slow down the qualitative arms race. It would buy time and commitment from both sides to negotiate more drastic curbs in SALT III.

Minuteman vulnerability, in any event, appears unavoidable ultimately, even though the projected agreement would limit both sides to the same total number of missiles and bombers and remove the Soviet numerical advantage conferred by SALT I. For the Russians are gradually replacing their single-warhead missiles with a new generation of more accurate missiles bearing multiple warheads (MIRV's). The United States invented the MIRV, then tested and deployed it, starting in 1968-70, despite warnings that the much larger Soviet missiles, once MIRVed, would ultimately threaten American security. This hawk is now coming home to roost.

In a single-warhead era, two Soviet missiles would have to be expended for high confidence of destroying one Minuteman — a price no attacker would want to pay. But MIRV permits two Soviet missiles — each carrying six to eight large hydrogen bombs aimed at widely separate targets — to destroy five or six Minutemen. On paper, therefore, a minor part of the Soviet strategic forces predicted for 1982-84 would be able to destroy 80 to 90 percent of the Minutemen. That would leave Moscow with great nuclear superiority and the United States, the nightmare goes, deterred from retaliating with its surviving Minutemen, bombers and submarine missiles. To head off this danger, President Carter's arms control proposals last March tried to constrain the number of MIRVed land missiles Russia could deploy and, meanwhile, severely limit their flight tests to slow down improvements in accuracy. Thus it was thought the "sur-

vivability" of Minuteman could be extended until at least the late 1980s. But that approach failed.

Some members of Congress argue that the Administration should stand fast on its March proposals. But the Pentagon has since come to doubt that even those limitations would be anywhere near drastic enough to extend the life of Minuteman significantly. In this circumstance, some critics are concentrating their fire on SALT II's projected limitations on three possible and less vulnerable Minuteman successors: mobile land missiles (such as the MX), the Trident II submarine missile and the long-range cruise missile.

The Administration replies that these limitations will only be in effect for three years, not the full eight years of the SALT treaty, and would not retard development and deployment schedules now planned. If, as is quite possible, subsequent negotiations fail by 1981 to promise diminution of the threat to Minuteman, all American options would be open.

A Pentagon study of these options is now under way. Minuteman could be defended by anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), or be put on wheels to eliminate the target, or be replaced by another mobile missile on land or sea, or be supplemented by one or more less vulnerable systems, such as the cruise missile. None of these options provide a perfect answer. Mobile land missiles would pose serious verification problems and ABMs would require agreed revision of SALT I. By far the most stable solution would be, by agreement, gradually to replace MIRV on both sides with single-warhead missiles, as has been suggested independently by two experts who usually disagree, Prof. Herbert York and Paul Nitze. The worst answer would be to match Russia's first-strike ability with the big, mobile MX land missile. The \$35-billion MX program would trigger a new round of warhead expansion on both sides and, more serious, push the world further toward "crisis instability." With a first-strike capability on both sides, the fear in a crisis that the other side was about to shoot first could precipitate disaster. The American aim should be not to match Russia's first-strike threat but to seek to eliminate it.

There is time for that, even if it should become necessary to live for a few years with a Minuteman that is, on paper, vulnerable. The difficulties of a first strike against 1,000 targets half a world away are so enormous that Moscow could hardly be confident of success or of avoiding massive retaliation.

Meanwhile, the SALT II agreement now emerging and the projected negotiations for more drastic cuts in SALT III are indispensable to curb the Soviet-American arms race and to maintain momentum toward a more stable relationship.