

From Detente To Entente

A U.S. Policy For The SALT Talks

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The New York Times report of Dec. 11 that President Carter and his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, are seriously considering the adoption of yet more stringent restrictions on the export of U.S. technologies of possible strategic importance underscores the u

defeating U.S. policy on technology "proliferation." According to the *Times*, Carter and Brzezinski have had under study for several months a near-completed inter-agency document recommending adoption of the "no know-how" formula devised for The Pentagon's Defense Science (Advisory) Board by its director, J. Fred Bucy, a vice president of Texas Instruments.

The Bucy doctrine simply argues that the U.S. shouldn't sell any product to a potential military or business competitor who might look inside the device and figure out the technology — i.e., "the know-how" that was used to produce it — and then go out and produce it. Presumably, therefore, only impenetrable or "self-destruct" devices would be suitable as high-technology export items. In characteristic fashion, Brzezinski has hinted that if the policy were to go into effect, the Soviets might be allowed to receive exports of more non-strategic goods and even some restricted "hot" items if they behave themselves politically.

The core conception operating on the U.S. side in the SALT negotiations is built on the notion that retardation of the technological research behind weapons development is the key to arms-control and, hence, to stable strategic accords between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This notion is unfortunately still very much identified with Brzezinski's factional opponent and the architect of the Carter Administration's Middle East peace policy, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. In the relatively more realistic Vance formulation, however, it is at least recognized that the problem is the generation of new weapons technology by the Soviet's own strategic research efforts, which they will hardly abandon for any nonstrategic consideration such as more "finished" U.S. goods. Thus, Mr. Vance on Dec. 7 told his fellow NATO Foreign Ministers at a meeting in Brussels that a successful SALT treaty was no guarantee of stability, but "there is no possibility of stability without it."

Nevertheless, the Vance faction's fundamental misconception on the ways and means of securing an enduring SALT agreement resulted this week in the close of the third round of the bilateral talks in Bern, Switzerland without substantive progress toward an accord. The Dec.

14 *New York Times* report on the meeting in fact indicates that chief U.S. arms negotiator Paul Warnke plans to use the fourth SALT session, opening in January, to further muddy the waters of U.S.-USSR communication on the arms limitation issue by pressing for a technological moratorium. Warnke, reported the *Times*, is revealing over the possibility that Moscow's recent announcement that the Soviet Union would agree to halt peaceful use of nuclear explosions for construction projects might open the door to accords limiting technological research for weapons development.

It is important to state the plain reality that the Vance way of looking at SALT prevents a constructive solution, precisely because it seeks to discourage the very factor whose encouragement would make it possible to move from an unstable detente to a progressively stronger U.S.-Soviet entente. *That factor is massive scientific and technological collaboration in the most economically strategic areas of research.*

This critical point is perhaps better grasped when one appreciates the significance of the recent simultaneous disclosure of the latest Soviet laser fusion results and concepts and the offer of expanded joint U.S.-Soviet collaboration on fusion research by Soviet Academician Nikolai Basov. Basov made the offer in Fort Lauderdale, Florida in early November on the occasion of a conference whose political objective was to mobilize U.S. scientists on behalf of a nuclear-based energy policy. Basov is not important only because he is the head of the Soviet laser fusion effort, and a Nobel Laureate for codevelopment of the laser. He is also very likely one of the leading scientific planners and directors of Soviet military research and development.

The Basov proposal — which Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger cannot hide, by pretending as he did at a recent press conference that it is unimportant because it was not delivered "officially" — illustrates the crucial point. Precisely the areas of research which are most important to advanced weapons technology: fusion and aerospace and their subsumed research branches, also define the areas of potentially most fruitful collaboration between the NATO-OECD and Comecon CMEA nations to solve mutual problems of energy, resources, and production technology facing both those blocs and the rest of the human species right now.

The Basis for a SALT Agreement

If the present Schlesinger-oriented approach to SALT is maintained, competent debate on the parameters of a strategic arms limitation agreement and responsible U.S. discussion on defense weapons systems will be

destroyed. Unless a development-based war-avoidance perspective is adopted for U.S. arms negotiations, no perception of common U.S.-Soviet goals in arms limitation can be achieved at the SALT talks. Moreover, professional discussion of U.S. defense posture will devolve into absurdity — as witnessed by the Dec. 14 commentary of *New York Times* military analyst Drew Middleton — an absurdity in which no determination can be made as to which technological innovations to suppress lest they upset the strategic balance, and which others to develop as vital to the national security. Conceptually, this means a clean break with the “systems-analytic concept of stability” (exemplified in the Foreword of James R. Schlesinger’s *Defending America*) now underlying SALT, and its replacement with a policy of security through cooperative development.

Middleton’s column indicates that another, more dangerous, factor is involved behind the scenes of bogus strategic debates generated by the Brzezinski-Schlesinger SALT approach. Clearly, there is a school of “quiet Utopians” moving ahead with plans to build up an unassailable U.S. deterrent in the form of a massive nuclear submarine fleet, equipped with state-of-the-art micro-electronic “chips” as the basis for sophisticated high-accuracy missile guidance systems. Some independent military analysts are gravely worried that such a buildup will substantially lower the threshold for a Soviet preemptive nuclear strike against North America.

Under such circumstances arms control negotiations actually become the prelude to full-scale confrontation. Historically, the League of Nations-sponsored disarmament and arms limitations talks and even agreements of the 1920s and 30s provide ample evidence to this effect. Not only were they ineffective, they had an actually destabilizing impact on the European political situation. The same thing can be said of the more immediate precursor of SALT of the 1970s: the 1946-47 discussions in the United Nations Security Council of the so-called Baruch Plan for the international control of nuclear weapons.

The conceptual framework for the realization of proper policy objectives is indicated by President Eisenhower’s “atoms for peace” proposal of the early 1950s, which gave the first significant impetus to international nuclear energy development. That policy is more imperative now not only from the standpoint of providing a focal point for a war-avoidance policy, but also because today that immediate political imperative converges on the necessity for humanity as a whole to deploy a continuum of nuclear and plasma-based technologies to begin to redefine the resource base here on Earth and to initiate extraterrestrial colonization and transformation of other planets by the end of this century. (See Campaigner Special Report No. 7, “Nuclear Power: Core of U.S. and World Energy Policy,” and “U.S. Labor Party Space Program,” *New Solidarity*, Vol. 8, No. 81, Dec. 13, 1977. 1977).

Atoms for Peace

The international nuclear energy development strategy proposed here in analogy to Eisenhower’s “atoms for peace” proceeds from two interrelated assumptions:

First, that the most likely cause for the outbreak of open conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is not tension among the nations or military blocs of Central Europe nor any irreconcilable ideological conflict between the two powers themselves. The most likely flashpoints which could spark rapid escalation to thomonuclear confrontation between the “superpowers” are located in Third World regions such as the Middle East, South Africa, etc. In these regions, a combination of growing economic impoverishment and deeply entrenched ideological positions has created a highly explosive mix that could blow up (or, for that matter, be willfully detonated) at virtually any time. Our second assumption is that such dangerous developing sector conditions will necessarily be exacerbated by the domestic U.S. policies of economic retrenchment promoted by Vice President Mondale and Senator Humphrey, including not only “energy conservation” but the entire range of Malthusian and neo-Malthusian principles from conversion to more labor-intensive production methods to zero and even negative population growth. Saddled with an economic policy of retrenchment at home, the U.S. has only two basic international policy options and will most likely vacillate dangerously between them:

a) Isolationism, i.e., withdrawal to a closer defense perimeter with no significant assurance of enhanced security, but, in a world of increasing economic interdependence, the certainty of increasing economic misery of the domestic population;

b) The attempt to secure present national interests in the Third World via an expanded network of military treaty organizations, establishing closer military links and mutual defense obligations between the U.S. and NATO on one hand and certain strategically crucial Third World nations on the other. Proposals for the creation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) and recent attempts to revive the CENTO pact fall into this category.

The second alternative is the immediately more dangerous one, but neither is capable of assuring long-range stability. Both policy alternatives proceed from notions of “control” and “containment” and fatally ignore the fact that there can be no stability in a world of ever-decreasing overall productive economic output, a world coming to resemble more and more the proverbial “shrinking pie.”

Our contemporary equivalent of “atoms for peace” is designed to confront the problem of dwindling world resources head on. The Labor Party has proposed that the United States, the European Economic Community and Comecon sector countries, and Japan immediately begin to gear up their national economies to reach a common production goal of 250 nuclear power plants with a combined power output of 250 GW (gigawatts) annually by the year 1985. These plants are intended about two-thirds for domestic installation and one-third for export into Third World nations. Such a construction program, which reflects roughly a tripling of existing advanced sector production capacity over a seven-year period, would be based on low-cost national and international development credits extended in the U.S. through the Export-Import Bank, exclusively for the construction program outlined. This credit flow would bypass the

enormous internal and external indebtedness problems of most of the developing sector countries and several advanced sector nations. The program must be supplemented by a significant expansion in present research and development efforts in fast breeder technology and controlled thermonuclear fusion, as well as in the international space program. In all of these R and D areas, we can build on already existing bilateral exchange programs between the Soviet Union and the United States, France, and Japan. The U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz joint space flights are a prototype for cooperation in space exploration.

Spinoffs of Nuclear Development

International nuclear energy development is uniquely capable of permanently redressing the shortages problem defined above — not only in the energy field as such, but also in agricultural production, where productivity depends largely on the availability of abundant and reasonably priced energy for irrigation and the production of chemical fertilizers. Through the development of breeder reactors (including fusion-fission hybrid reactors) we could increasingly close the nuclear fuel cycle and incur no new raw materials problems before the onset of commercialization of nuclear fusion reactors and thus the availability of virtually limitless energy supplies in the 1990s. Finally, it is a highly desirable by-product of in-depth nuclear energy development that it results in a secular tendency for *decreasing* energy prices (i.e., social costs) through increasing energy flux density and reactor temperature. Thus, the mere commitment to nuclear development will immediately create highly desirable pressures for increased fossil fuel production at lower prices. An added advantage lies in the fact that as a high-technology industry the nuclear power industry operates near the borderline between technological innovation and more fundamental scientific advances. As such, it represents the spearhead of an array of technological and scientific breakthroughs centered on the fusion torch which will once and for all lay to rest the ignorant or fraudulent arguments for zero or negative economic growth based on alleged absolute limits to natural resources.

In answer to the argument that broad-scale international nuclear development will lead to unacceptable levels of nuclear weapons proliferation, the following observation must here suffice: the pressure to obtain nuclear weapons as well as the temptation to use them will rise in direct proportion to the increase of political tensions among Third World nations, which must inevitably occur if the economic development problems of these nations remain unsolved. There is no question that there is a vastly greater likelihood for an actual use of nuclear weapons as the result of the failure to enact an adequate nuclear energy development program than as a consequence of the possibility of weapons proliferation.

Implications for SALT

The initial targets of an international nuclear energy development policy will be those Third World regions which can be characterized as “hot spots” of friction between the U.S. and the USSR, but simultaneously satisfy the minimal infrastructural and population-base requirements to make implementation of such a policy feasible. On both these counts, the Middle East region,

including Iran and the Sudan, and South Africa (roughly the entire region south of the Congo River) would provide plausible starting points. A Geneva Middle East peace conference, which limited itself to the redrawing of boundaries in the area without at least beginning to address the fundamental problems of the economic development of the region, would necessarily result in the early resumption of the present conflict.

The fact that quite apart from broader treaty arrangements, certain bona fide transactions in foreign policy areas of vital mutual strategic concern are crucial to progress in nuclear weapons negotiations was clearly demonstrated in the most recent SALT II phase. It is a near-certainty that the catalytic factor which unfroze the negotiations that had come to a complete standstill by early summer was not some minor concession regarding a given strategic weapons system, but the joint U.S.-USSR Middle East declaration, improving the hopes for peace in the area where both powers know that renewed conflict could lead to full-scale thermonuclear war.

In the political-strategic context of the step-by-step establishment of Third World nuclear energy-based economic development, a SALT agreement can maintain on both sides a credible war-fighting posture required for war-avoidance purposes, while at the same time creating the climate for conclusion of agreements for allocation of certain portions of defense budgets for support of domestic industrial and agricultural development projects required by the international codevelopment effort. This not only covers the potential reallocation of billions of dollars from defense to civilian uses, but includes the actual conversion of defense industry plant and equipment for civilian production. Since the defense industry tends to represent the technologically most advanced sectors of the national economy, such conversion will be of crucial importance to gear-up of high-technology exports which are at the heart of the projected global economic development policy.

The results to be expected from a gear-up on an international scale of integrated nuclear and aerospace development are merely exemplified by: fission-fusion technologies, new guidance and control systems for machine tools and terrestrial transportation, and fusion-powered spacecraft.

Most notably, with SALT subsumed under our “atoms for peace” proposal, there arises for the first time a coherent solution to the problem of the destabilizing effect of technological innovations upon strategic arms agreements. No clause attempting to curb technological progress in weapons development should be incorporated into any future SALT agreement. There exists, ultimately, no reliable method of distinguishing between “purely civilian” uses and military applications of basic scientific advances and technological breakthroughs. The development of the cruise missile, for example, has entailed the upgrading of guidance and control systems that can be widely applied in industry and transportation. The technology of the neutron bomb, had Defense Secretary Brown allowed its development to proceed quietly, could have been applied to the development of efficient inertial confinement systems and small nonpolluting fusion explosive devices for peaceful use. Instead, Brown’s wide-scale publicity of the neutron

bomb's deployment has had the effect of clouding the very issues now on the table for discussion at the SALT talks.

Given this technological interlinking of civilian and military breakthroughs, the apparent stability gained by freezing weapons technology at a given level is in the last analysis antithetical to the legitimate demand of all nations for open-ended, progressive technological development, the necessary condition for a healthy economy of expanding industrial and agricultural production. Indeed, preoccupation in certain U.S. circles with outlawing technological innovations in the strategic arms field (although Secretary of Defense Brown, for example, has not shied from isolated *wunderwaffen* or increased spending per se) undoubtedly came after the decision for a no-growth "steady state" economy.

In 1946, it was the linkage between nuclear weapons control and the retardation of atomic energy development which led the Soviets to reject the Baruch Plan for international control. As Khrushchev put it in 1962: this plan has been designed "not to ban nuclear weapons or destroy them, but through an international agency to interfere in the economic life of nations." The U.S. "wanted to prevent the development of the atomic industry in other countries, leaving the monopoly of nuclear arms to the United States." The nature of such linkages when the Baruch Plan was first proposed and the related history of international and U.S. nuclear development is presently under investigation and need not be developed here.

What matters here is that stability in international relations actually depends on progressive economic and technological development. To prevent a "spill-over" of technological breakthroughs into areas where it would destroy the military strategic balance, the U.S. should not embark on the futile course of attempting to banish innovation from arms development. Instead, an international agreement (or a sequence of such agreements) for nuclear energy development should prominently contain a clause providing for far-reaching scientific collaboration, exchange of information, and actual joint research and development efforts especially in the various areas of fusion research.

Scientific advances in the fusion and aerospace fields are the most relevant to potential revolutionary developments in nuclear weapons as well as antiballistic missile defense systems, and close scientific collaboration in these fields would not just assure the early practical development of a virtually unlimited energy source, but would also make all but entirely impossible the secret achievement of a major unilateral advantage in military applications.

Such a policy would also resolve the endless controlled debate between the "arms control" and "preparedness" camps. The recent *New York Times Sunday Magazine* article by President Eisenhower's former Science Advisor, Dr. George Kistiakowsky of Harvard, attacking the "paranoid" mentality of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) types like Paul Nitze, for example, has the same glaring omission as General George Keegan's justified criticisms of unilateral U.S. gutting of advanced technology: no mention of the present global monetary and economic crises and their relationship to strategic options.

The gist of the argument and of our "atoms for peace" proposal then is this: there exists an intimate connection between collective international security and global energy policy. Future bilateral and multilateral strategic arms negotiations must be embedded in the broader framework of a war-avoidance foreign policy posture based upon international nuclear energy development as a precondition to Third World economic development.

The Political Prospect

What are the prospects for such a policy internationally? The constellation of forces is basically favorable, with West Germany, France, and to a lesser extent Japan, committed to it. Although West German Chancellor Schmidt has maintained publicly that the all-European mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks, which are an appropriate arena for East and West European steps in the direction indicated here, must take their cue from SALT, he stated on returning from his recent trip to Poland that he hoped Poland can develop relations with West Germany on the same level as those of France, indicating his appreciation that economic issues will determine the success of the arms negotiations.

In fact, America's OECD trading partners, leading with West Germany, France, and Japan, have already reshaped their foreign policy into a foreign trade policy, in the words of a leading BRD daily. This foreign trade policy is focused increasingly toward the Soviet Union and high-technology development deals with the Third World. The past few months have seen a variety of East-West, and advanced sector-developing sector nuclear accords, many including significant areas of Latin America, such as Brazil and Mexico, and the Middle East, especially Iran, though prominently including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as well. The recent call by a leading Israeli nuclear scientist prominently reported in the *Jerusalem Post* for construction of a joint Israeli-Egyptian reactor in the Sinai also exemplifies how rapidly advanced scientific cadre forces could be added to those of India once the Third World reaches the take-off point in nuclear technology.

Contrary to distortions and lies lately emanating from Harold Brown and the *New York Times*, the continental NATO allies of the U.S. are not primarily concerned that a U.S.-Soviet SALT agreement will freeze them out of cruise missile technology, but rather that such an agreement will sabotage nuclear technology transfer worldwide. The task for U.S. Secretary of State Vance, therefore, is not to sell an acceptable version of the Brzezinski-Brown-Schlesinger package to the Soviets and Western Europe, but rather to disabuse the Soviets of any policy inclinations based on the not totally implausible perception on their part that the U.S. is going to commit premeditated technological suicide.

Instead we must organize with the Soviets a massive "atoms and aerospace for peace" program which will permit linking up with the West Europeans and Japanese for conclusive progress toward peace in the Middle East and new SALT accords. Such a course of political action, premised on the policy of entente, of course presupposes the immediate abandonment of the Carter Administration's disastrous energy policy and its replacement by a hard-technology nuclear export and fusion development-based program.