

Dwight Eisenhower's Soviet Friend

The following article was issued on Jan. 1 by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., U.S. Labor Party chairman.

The current issue of the East German soldiers' newspaper, *Volksarmee* features — to most significant effect — a republication of a Moscow *Literaturnaya Gazeta* 1974 article on Soviet Marshal Zhukov's leadership of the battle against Japanese forces in the East at the onset of World War II. This republication of that 1974 article has a threefold significance which every U.S. general and field-grade officer — and responsible political figure — ought to grasp most profoundly.

The First Aspect

First, the Warsaw Pact forces have specific crucial, interrelated potential qualitative advantage. Subjectively, the kernel of Soviet military leadership is the combined forces of the Soviet officer corps and of the scientific community gathered around the modern representatives of the Leningrad-centered task-force headed up by Academician Vernadski (1). This intellectual force rests upon an economic basis most suitable to rapid qualitative advances in warfare capabilities

The longstanding, deeply-ingrained commitment to high-technology-oriented rates of capital formation is the optimal climate, the essential climate for realizing and otherwise nourishing high rates of basic-research advances in physics and related fields. Given a highly cultured and politically powerful officer corps, that capability for scientific progress will tend to shape the most effective warfare capabilities.

Despite the weakening influence of "systems analysis" and related British influences in Warsaw Pact political command, the indicated Soviet warfare capabilities have been realized to the indicated effect and that nation is moving past the edge of a wide range of qualitative further advances.

Pitted against the British-evolved modern, rewarmed versions of 18th century "cabinet warfare" doctrines ("limited nuclear wars"), this Warsaw Pact force has a marginal war-winning advantage for the total, intercontinental thermonuclear war which "office boy" commanders such as Alexander Haig would find themselves actually fighting.

Responsible commanders understand and broadly concur with that estimate. Despite the doctrine of strategic "madness" which the British-influenced Rand Corporation prints out, and the strategic weapon of "madness" Henry Kissinger began proposing after his indoctrination at London's Tavistock Institute, every qualified professional knows by learning and instinct of

command that no competent commander will stake the political future of his nation on less than the total deployable capability. There is no doubt that Soviet commanders are in full agreement with Machiavelli's principles of warfare on this account.

The responsible U.S. commander is confronted with a twofold strategic problem vis-à-vis Soviet capabilities as such. First, objectively, he knows that the only sane comparison of Warsaw Pact versus U.S. forces is based on the assumption of total thermonuclear war as the context within which the continuing deployment of ground forces must occur. Second, he knows that even if U.S. led forces possess strategic parity with Warsaw Pact forces by that objective standard, such objective parity locates the decision in the relative subjective qualities of command and forces in depth. Most crucial in respect of the subjective component is the strategic doctrine which shapes the development of and governs the deployment of forces.

Broadly, responsible U.S. commanders reject the approach to strategic estimates associated with Robert S. McNamara. They had their bellies full of that sort of nonsense in Vietnam. Weapons-system individually matched against weapons-system is the budgetary estimate of accountants who have no conception of actual warfare. Even within existing, wretched strategic estimates, one would loudly complain of the point that Warsaw Pact doctrine for armored vehicles stresses personnel security for conditions of maximum ABC battlefield and line-of-march contamination — a tank or armored personnel carrier filled with dead or demoralized troops is a nullification of its other capabilities.

In general, the shaping of forces-development and forces-deployment policy in depth for NATO forces is based on the doctrines of "limited war" from the command-level downward. This means that the probable military response of NATO forces will be significantly below its objective capabilities because of the misuse of those forces in a kind of "cabinet war" doctrine ingrained with the aid of misconceived "war games" and "war games" simulations. The commander who has assimilated the "limited war" doctrine is profoundly disabled under conditions of actual, total war. This point was proven during the American Revolution, in the Carnot Reforms (2) of the French army, and in the U.S. Civil War. The commander who rejects those and the many related lessons of principles is one who is prepared to lead his forces to disaster.

Outstanding Warsaw Pact commanders are profoundly sensible of the indicated defects in the NATO command posture. Like General Dwight Eisenhower's

friend, Marshal Zhukov (3), the best Warsaw Pact commanders place a quality of emphasis on political and other subjective aspects of force capability which is not matched on the NATO side. Put to war (either by attack or on the initiative of the Warsaw Pact political command) the heirs of Marshal Zhukov will fight as Zhukov would have them fight. They would exploit the cited and related subjective points of Warsaw Pact potential advantage to the utmost in search of war-winning decision.

The significance of the republication of the cited article is that it most efficiently articulates the thinking now being broadly reflected in current patterns of behavior of the Warsaw Pact command. The article has a double significance behind its immediate point, the immediate point of emphasizing Zhukov.

A moral mobilization in preparation for an increased expectancy of strategic confrontations is now under way, a development much accelerated by Soviet reactions to the break with Somalia. A posture of combative rage against the United States and West Germany is surging within various Warsaw Pact strata, including military strata.

Relevant elements of the Warsaw Pact command are refreshing their conceptions of how to fight war.

The second significance of the republication is classifiable as an overtone. However, as is usual with Soviet thinking, overtones are seldom very subtle. It contains a strong warning to the Soviet political leadership, that Warsaw Pact military force will be deployed according to what military commanders, as patriots, consider competent political strategic policy.

The Rage Against the United States

It is our information that Warsaw Pact political intelligence is being filtered through IMEMO and the allied USA-Canada Institute. Moreover, those filters have an iron grip on those channels of intelligence, to the point that IMEMO-Arbatovian policy perception of intelligence respecting Western Europe and North America is effectively under the control of British intelligence's agents-of-influence networks in the Warsaw Pact command.

This British intelligence penetration of Soviet leading circles has an ancient history and many threads, but among the most notable elements is British success in "doubling" two Special Intelligence Services agents, Maclean and Philby, and successfully peddling those two to the Soviets. This penetration became significant during the same period as sharp changes in Soviet policy, changes affecting the career and public standing of Marshal Zhukov.

As the recently resurrected case of George Blake (4) ought to refresh our memory, it has been repeated U.S. experience with British intelligence that this or that highly rated British agent proves to have been "doubled" to the Soviets — usually involving an accompanying delivery of masses of not British, but high-grade U.S. intelligence secrets. In some cases, as the cover stories have it, these persons sneak out of British prisons, are exchanged, or cleverly elude British security, and turn

up in the East, often later gaining trusted positions.

One ought not to be astonished that as such persons gain posts in the East, they lose none of their British ideology, but simply switch around a few slogans, in a manner appropriate to the prevailing doctrinal customs of their hosts.

One ought not to be astonished that individuals of this class, notably including Maclean and Philby, should use their positions in intelligence, nominally against the NATO countries, to influence Soviet intelligence perceptions to advantage of current British policy.

Our own Henry Kissinger, although not a "defector" from Britain, is currently, as during the 1950s, strongly reflecting the interests of current British policy — a reflection which is not unconnected to Henry's British intelligence indoctrination of the 1950s.

We ought not to be surprised that persons associated with the Humphrey and Kennedy factions of the Democratic Party, or of similarly pro-British ideological pedigree should, like Eizenstat, Mondale, Schlesinger, Brzezinski and Blumenthal be currently exerting their influence on U.S. policy-making to the disadvantage of the United States and to the decided advantage of the policies of Lazard Brothers and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. These persons of British ideological-factional pedigree not only act to wreck the value of the U.S. dollar — in the interest of London's current game — but Brzezinski, Mondale, and others nibble around the edges of State Department efforts and policies to the same effect.

Brzezinski and Mondale play close to the advantage of the London-linked Moshe Dayan against Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and U.S. Middle East interests. Brzezinski and London stir up atrocities of the wet and other varieties on Warsaw Pact home-ground, careful to leave the "CIA" label implied. Brzezinski stirs up the Cuba issue in a way calculated to enrage Moscow against the United States — and impel Moscow more deeply toward London's embrace.

Add to this the British intelligence network embedded within the Socialist International, and include such British operations in France as Francois Mitterrand and the sundry Basque, Breton, Corsican and Polisario terrorist gangs, and also add British intelligence proprietorship over the PFLP faction of the PLO and "Carlos," as well as the Baader-Meinhof gang and the hoodlum spawn of Benedetto Croce and Einaudi in Italy.

This adds up to a Soviet leadership currently running blind and misled on the most crucial points of intelligence concerning Western Europe and North America — as well as in the Middle East, the Mahgreb, and southern Africa. What the Soviet leadership "sees" is a staged falsification of the real "outside world." That leadership is not responding to reality, but to what — with British-intelligence staging — it foolishly believes is the outer-world reality. What the "Big Brothers" in Moscow believes very strongly, most of the "Little Brothers" of Eastern Europe and other regions tend to echo and even to believe.

It is for those and related reasons that usually anti-British, anti-Fabian Soviet and other Warsaw Pact hardliners are mobilizing in support of the scenario imported from London.

The Second Aspect

It must be emphasized that the actual Soviet reaction will not stay within the bounds of London's Royal Institute desires. Contrary to Henry Kissinger's obsessive admiration of Rothschild protégés Metternich and Bismarck, the only notable successful strategic operations British intelligence has arranged during the twentieth century are the damage it has arranged for Britain's allies. The British are tactically clever in psychological-warfare aspects of intelligence, but strategically imbeciles — as the case of two world wars during this century ought to have firmly proven.

It must be remembered — only an ignorant person or an informed fool could pretend to deny it today — that British intelligence and related circles developed Hitler, put him into power, controlled him during 1937-1938 as a virtual puppet, and continued to aid his maintenance of power in Germany — for eastward purposes — until the fall of France. It set forces into motion which, taking on a life of their own, became to Britain a Frankenstein's monster it must desperately hope to be able to destroy.

Once certain forces within the Warsaw Pact command are set into motion, that motion undergoes a lawful self-development which can no longer be controlled by the British influences employed to steer it into motion. The British are like the boy lighting the short fuse to a 100 pound charge of TNT. After lighting he smiles confidently, "You see, I control the match."

Once Soviet perception shifts from the illusion of ordinary politics to the realism of war postures, the internal geometry of the mind of the Soviet command shifts abruptly, adapting to the experience of World War II, which leading commanders embody and in which the officer corps as a whole is deeply indoctrinated. This is a force which has devoted twenty years of visible thought and preparation to the objective of being objectively and subjectively capable of winning a total, thermonuclear war.

This represents a viewpoint I can thoroughly comprehend, but which the British or the likes of Henry Kissinger or Alexander Haig could not possibly even begin to grasp.

In the case of confused minds as Kissinger's, Brzezinski's, Schlesinger's, Mondale's or the Royal Institute, they have not only incurred the cumulative brain damage of their "cabinet warfare" strategic doctrines, but those "cabinet warfare" approaches to "war games" and "limited nuclear war" spring from the axiomatic features of their mental processes and outlook. In war, and in the contemplation of war, they are like goldfish who, going from one side to the other of a bowl, prove, by this "war game", that they have mastered swimming the Atlantic of total war. The constraints these British fools imagine to operate, do not exist once the threshold of a "limited nuclear war" is reached.

This involves the second principal concern facing every responsible U.S. commanding officer. It involves a principle emphatically enunciated by Zhukov. It is in particular the strategic concern of every responsible commander, whether in the Pentagon, in training command, in theater-command, down to the officer responsible for patrol along the Korean DMZ. To trigger an engagement with the Warsaw Pact forces such that a

conflict may erupt between the two total forces which does not represent a *causus belli* in terms of the interests of either force.

The condition under which such a danger exists are those in which one or both of the forces' commanders believes in the existence of a nonexistent threat from the other force. The present condition, in which the Soviet command is running blind, under effective British control of its perception, and is thus developing accelerated rage against the United States, is one of the most dangerous patterns of the sort indicated. Accordingly, responsible commanders might strongly wish they had the means to bring Zbigniew Brzezinski and certain others before a court martial.

The Third Aspect

Two of the best communists I know are General Enrique Lister in person, and, by reading, Marshal Zhukov. My own perception of Zhukov illuminates my view of President Eisenhower's private exchanges with the Marshal. I am certain that there are many others belonging to the same categories as Lister and Zhukov, but I unfortunately lack the opportunity and means to vouch for them personally.

In the case of General Lister, I would not certify that I would agree with him on each of his policies. In fact, we differ on a few matters. However, I am always delighted to fight out such differences with him, because he is a person of principled integrity, who makes the world richer by his existence, from whom one can learn a few things of importance in a thrashing out of differences. He is truly a courageous man, who has been left relatively high and dry by Moscow, because of Moscow's wretched games with elements of the Socialist International and with that mass assassin and British agent Santiago Carrillo.

I learned something of importance from General Lister during our encounter of November 1975. This was the period of the British coup within the leadership of the Communist Party of France. Without a scintilla of cynicism, but with the quality of irony with which a commander objectively assesses a defeat within a continuing war, he set forth, piece-by-piece, the nature of the bought-and-paid-for corruption of the top leadership of the PCF, and also the pathetic state of ignorance and confusion within the general membership. In those few hours, I put together more of the past 40 years' history of the communist movement and that movement's internal character as a whole today, than I learned otherwise in decades of earlier study of that subject.

Although General Lister's service with the Soviet forces was limited to the war period, his political approach to the subjects we discussed is that which is reflected in the writing of the most effective military professional of various communist forces. General Giap comes to mind. So, although this side of the matter is not generally understood, does Portugal's Cunhal. Once the qualities I have associated with General Lister are understood, a new dimension of insight is gained into those Soviet military professionals exemplified by Marshal Zhukov. They are politically tough, and consequently bring to military science a political depth of comprehension of strategy altogether lacking in Clausewitz.

In general, these political qualities of the Soviet military professional are relatively lacking in the political side of the Soviet and other elements of the Warsaw Pact command. In matters of global political-economic strategy, in matters respecting the internal lawful processes of political movements, in political sophistication of intelligence practice, the Soviets are inferior in overall qualitative features of practice to the British. This is not a uniform quality from individual to individual, but is the general quality of the apparatus as a whole, which defines the parameters within which the more gifted individual member of the apparatus functions.

This is, of course, complicated by a doctrinal adherence to what they regard as "official Marxism-Leninism." That, however, is not the causal feature of the problem. It is the hardline "official Marxist Leninist" with whom matters can be settled in the best way. It is as the communist drifts away from the "official doctrine" that he loses his moorings and may drift into the most monstrous garbage. The problem is that they lack the criteria either to correct the errors of "official Marxism-Leninism," or to develop a viable alternative to the official doctrine.

Hence, the areas of the best Soviet thinking are those areas of task-oriented theoretical-practical work which demand the most rigorous and profoundly creative thinking and are outside the immediate province of "official Marxist-Leninist" political and social doctrines. Those areas are two: military science and physics. The point to be emphasized is that Soviet literature and corroborating crucial empirical indicators of Soviet force development shows that the "science" in Soviet military science is not a courtesy title for pragmatic doctrine.

Although the Soviet professional may curse like the cossack who discovers he has just been sold a three-legged horse, Soviet literature indicates that the officer corps emphasizes the highest levels and breadth of cultural development as policy. This clearly provides the basis in depth for developing leading officers qualified for undertaking a scientific approach to military-policy matters. Zhukov exemplifies this.

It is Soviet military cadre which reflect the qualities of Zhukov which must be considered a prominent part of the resources we have on the Soviet side for getting the world out of this deadly mess the British Royal Institute and its MI-5 and MI-6 hoodlums have created. I do not

envisage the military seizing the Soviet leadership, but the Soviet military is an essential and most valuable component of that combination of leading Soviet forces capable of recognizing the realities of interests in the current situation.

We must communicate to such a combination, a combination which will consult its military component on evaluation of our communications. We must be firm in outlining the nature and implication of our common, British foe, and must commit ourselves to a firm policy from our side. This situation demands abandoning all equivocations and vacillations. The Soviets will not shift policy unless they perceive a well-defined and resolute reference point in their "outside world," to which to attach a reorientation of their "outer world" policies.

FOOTNOTES

1. Academician V.I. Vernadski was one of the first scientists internationally to perceive the importance of radioactive radiation as a future energy source — for peacetime uses and for war. He served on a number of commissions and academic bodies during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s whose purpose was to investigate the atomic nucleus. From 1922-1934 he served as director of the State Radium Institute in Leningrad, where the first cyclotron in the Soviet Union was later built, in 1937. In 1939, Vernadski formed the Commission on Isotopes in Moscow, and in 1940 he served on the Special Committee for the Problems of Uranium, set up by the Academy of Sciences in Moscow to coordinate nuclear research. During World War II, Vernadski was one of a small group of academicians, including also A. I. Ioffe, V. G. Khlopin, and P. L. Kapitsa, on whom the Soviet government relied for the assessment that an intensive effort to develop an atomic bomb under the stringent conditions of wartime would be justified.

2) Lazare Carnot became Minister of War of France in 1793 and initiated the *Levée en masse*, a national system of conscription under which every citizen was required to fight in the service of the unity of the state.

3) Soviet Marshal G.K. Zhukov was one of the three generals who led the Allied armies to victory in 1945. He was the Soviet commander against Axis forces at the historic battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943), during which he maintained a close collaboration with General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander. Zhukov and Eisenhower met personally following the Allied victory; after Eisenhower's return to the United States and his election to the Presidency, Eisenhower maintained a years-long correspondence with the Soviet Marshal.

4) George Blake, a British Intelligence agent who carried out double-agent functioning for Great Britain and the Soviet Union (with the knowledge of the British) during the 1950s, is best known for his betrayal of the U.S. CIA's "Operation Gold" in Berlin in 1956. Operation Gold had accomplished the construction of an underground tunnel between West and East Berlin in 1953, allowing the CIA to tap the East Germans' major communication links into Moscow. When the three-year-old operation was revealed to the East German government by Blake in 1956, it became the pretext for a major Cold War destabilization of U.S.-USSR relations and remained a topic of front page headlines in both the East and West for months.

In 1961, Britain tried Blake as a Soviet Spy, and he was jailed in the Wormswood Scrub prison, a center of British intelligence operations. Blake escaped in mysterious circumstances in 1966 and is now in the Soviet Union.