

Labour Gov't White Paper Confirms Confrontation Stance

The British Labour government's publication of its Defense Policy White Paper for 1978 shows that the Callaghan government has dropped all pretense of a soft pro-Soviet line in its defense policy. While ultra right-wing Tories squawked that the government's defense expenditure did not go far enough towards meeting the Soviet threat, the Labor government's White Paper makes clear there is little difference between the Labourites and Tories.

The paper announced that Britain will follow the recommendation of NATO heads of state to increase defense expenditure by three percent, the Callaghan government laid out in stark detail its analysis of the current strategic balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.

Beyond Europe, recent developments in Africa, for example, have shown that the Soviet Union is ready and

able to deploy military resources rapidly in support of its political interests in the Third World; this demonstration of conventional capability is a further factor which must be taken into account. There is no sign that more recent developments in the field of détente are leading the Soviet Government to slacken the pace of its military effort.

As a consequence, the paper reports that:

The realities of today's world mean that, however high our hopes and desires, we cannot responsibly assume that our efforts for detente and disarmament will be enough on their own to ensure adequate security. A major defence effort is also needed and is indeed a precondition of successful political action. For effective deterrence the Alliance needs to convince any aggressor that the use of force, or the threat of its use for political ends, carries risks far outweighing any like advantage.

U.S. Leaning To British Rhodesia War 'Solution'

U.S. United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young's declaration Feb. 15 that the new "internal solution" to the Rhodesian crisis will create "no settlement" but will foment a "black on black" war is basically correct. The "solution" was worked out by Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and a group of Rhodesian blacks long associated with British intelligence networks and is backed by the British Foreign Office. However, since that time, it appears that the U.S. government policy has been swayed toward the British solution. A State Department statement by Undersecretary Hodding Carter, III on Feb. 22 does not differ substantially from previous statements by British Foreign Secretary David Owen on the internal solution. The United States is thus letting itself be propelled into a British-manipulated confrontation crisis with the Soviet Union, an approach also favored by Henry Kissinger, which would extend a string of hot spots from southern Africa through the Horn of eastern Africa to the Middle East.

Here is how U.S. policy on the Rhodesia crisis drifted within the last week:

At a United Nations conference Feb. 15, Young called the internal agreement no settlement, and said he hoped a way would be found to get the Patriotic Front into discussion with the internally based leaders, reported the *New York Times* the next day. "It does not address the issues that have some 40,000 people fighting." There is "evidence there would be a massive commitment of Soviet weapons" to the Patriotic Front, Young said. "What you have done is not a settlement but created a black-on-black war." Young also said, "There can only

be a settlement if the overwhelming majority of citizens of Rhodesia decide to support it rather than continuing to support the armed struggle," reported the *London Guardian* Feb. 16. Young saw little chance that an internal settlement would be recognized by, or get help from, the U.S. or others in the face of military opposition from the Patriotic Front (which has the backing of the region's five front line states bordering Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa).

The previous day *Washington Post* writer David Otaway revealed the factional line-up in the Carter Administration on the situation. "If Young's advice is taken, the U.S. will stay with the Anglo-American plan and the Patriotic Front and compete with the Soviets and Cubans for its favor. At the same time Washington will give no covert or overt backing to the Smith settlement scheme, even if London eventually does. If the Brzezinski outlook prevails, the Carter administration may well cast the American choice in the perspective of the U.S.-Soviet conflict and opt to support Smith's internal settlement."

On Feb. 17 former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a documented agent of the British Round Table, threw his considerable weight behind Britain's hopes for U.S.-USSR confrontation on the African continent. On NBC's Today Show, Kissinger announced that if he were still Secretary of State there would be no problem in Africa since he would have stopped the Soviets at Angola. Meanwhile, between Feb. 15 and Hodding Carter's statement Feb. 22, the U.S. government was silent on the issue, while on Feb. 17 President Carter, in a press conference, echoed the London press by declaring that