

Will The Soviets Fall For U.S.-Chinese Deception?

The American and British press playup of an eight-year-old charge against the Soviet Union alleging Soviet intent to bomb China in 1969, and a series of American hints that the U.S. may be tilting ever farther toward Peking, seem designed to heighten Sino-Soviet hostilities and to ensure that East and Southeast Asia become a

CHINA

Pandora's box of potential conflict between the two powers. The ever less thinly disguised threat of an anti-Soviet London-Washington-Peking axis is designed to provoke a Soviet "hardline" posture that plots all events in Asia on a "Chinese map," to the exclusion of the real potential for Soviet countermoves toward economic development in the region. China is obliging Western designs by rapidly moving into the region diplomatically, with approval from Washington and London.

Within a month or so, Chinese officials will have crisscrossed South and Southeast Asia, in a radical departure from recent Chinese practice. Chinese Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping visited Burma and Nepal in late January and early February. Chou En-lai's widow Teng Ying-Chou visited Cambodia in early January in a show of support for Cambodia against Vietnam. A visit to the Philippines and Bangladesh was recently announced for Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien. And Wang Ping-nan, a top associate of the late Chou En-lai, will visit all three major nations of the subcontinent, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, in the near future. China has already made several overtures to India, including holding out the prospect of substantial Chinese imports of Indian technology.

China's biggest coup to date was the Feb. 21 signing of a \$20-billion-dollar eight-year trade pact with Japan. China will receive steel mills large enough to increase China's overall steel output by 25 percent, and a large number of other complete factories, in exchange for oil and coking coal for Japan. The deal is also viewed in many circles as a prelude to the conclusion of the long-stalled Japan-China peace treaty, officially ending World War II and putting Sino-Japanese relations on a new level.

Kudos from the West

The new outward thrust of the People's Republic of China has been hailed in certain circles in the West,

particularly in London and Washington, as evidence of a new era of political stability in China following the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976. In the eyes of these Western Sinophiles, China is proving itself a more "reliable" partner, willing now to accept Western economic aid and available as a "moderating influence" in the region.

More to the point, China can now function as an effective bulwark against the Soviet Union in the region.

Encouragement for the Chinese moves into Asia is evident in Washington. A top official of the National Security Council approvingly described Teng Hsiao-ping's recent excursion as an attempt "to fill the void in the wake of what the Chinese perceive to be a diminished U.S. role in the region." This view is the one first introduced into U.S. policy considerations by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and has pervaded the Sinophile ranks in Washington ever since. According to this policy, the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam was to be linked with "granting" the Chinese a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia, including North Vietnam, to block Soviet influence. It was foiled at that time primarily by the total collapse of South Vietnam's puppet regime in 1975, and by North Vietnam's uncompromising support for the USSR.

Manipulating the Sino-Soviet Conflict

The huge press coverage given to former Nixon aide H.R. Haldeman's tired repetition of a charge that in 1969 the Soviet Union proposed launching a joint U.S.-Soviet attack on China, or at least asked U.S. permission to launch a "surgical strike" against Chinese nuclear installations, appears to be an attempt to repeat the aims of Kissinger's original actions at that time. The Kissingerian scenario on this account is a classic double deception, in which the U.S. makes the Soviets fear a U.S.-Chinese military alliance while making the Chinese believe that the Soviets really do intend a nuclear attack. The goal is heightened tensions between the Soviets and China, and the undermining of any factions in China or Russia that seek detente, while the U.S. picks up all the chips.

Washington Post columnist Victor Zorza, in a Feb. 23 column, presented what is very likely the real story that refutes the Haldeman interpretation. According to Zorza, what the Soviets actually proposed to the United States was an agreement on joint action against any third nuclear power which might threaten either nation. In the event either Washington or Moscow should learn of plans for "provocative" action or attack, they would take steps to block that action, or jointly retaliate if hostile

actions had already occurred. Far from being a desire for a preemptive strike against China, says Zorza, the Soviet proposal was in the context of SALT negotiations and stemmed from genuine Soviet fears of reckless Chinese actions in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, and the Chinese-provoked battles on the Ussuri River.

At the same time, says Zorza, the Soviets used several means to give the public appearance of threatening to attack China. This was designed to force China to negotiate the border dispute short of war, and it worked to this end, forcing Chou En-lai to invite Kosygin to Peking for brief but productive talks that resolved the second series of border confrontations in Sinkiang province.

However, Henry Kissinger succeeded in turning the Soviet good faith offer to his own aims, by publicly signaling the rejection of the nonexistent Soviet "offer" to bomb China. This undoubtedly infuriated the Soviets, but more importantly, as Zorza suggests, endeared Kissinger to the Chinese, paving the way for his later mission opening up relations in 1971. Another Kissinger "calling card" at the time was the widely known provision by Kissinger to the Chinese of U.S. intelligence on Soviet deployments, including reconnaissance photos of Soviet border forces.

Zorza suggests that the Haldeman revelations at this time are designed to undermine, again, what Zorza believes to be considerable factional impetus within China for reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union. That something of this sort may be true is further suggested by the vehemence and speed of Soviet rejection of the type of charge they usually prefer to ignore. The evidence that a pro-Soviet faction was undermined between 1969 and 1971 by the Kissinger moves is suggestive. It is known that Lin Piao, Mao's designated successor, opposed the U.S. turn.

The Problem of Soviet Policy Toward Peking

The Soviet Union's continued susceptibility to games of this sort is defined by Soviet policy-makers' inability to penetrate the deception operation and take the bold steps on their own part which would outflank both Chinese maneuvers and U.S. manipulations. Instead, the Soviets

see every development, such as the Japan-China trade deal, as a Western effort mediated through Japan to build up Chinese military capability against the Soviet Union. The Soviets, according to certain U.S. intelligence community sources, reacted with extreme displeasure to news of the Japanese deal, despite Soviet knowledge that the deal was not directed against them and that the leading Japanese forces behind it are strongly for close economic cooperation with Moscow as well.

This recrudescence of a profiled "hardline" stance undermines the Soviet leadership's ability to outflank actual Western efforts at encirclement.

For example, Japanese assistance to Chinese industry represents critical business for the economically strapped Japanese industrial sector. It also furthers Chinese industrialization, the only long-term antidote to the source of ingrained irrationality in China, its peasant masses.

A very effective strategy for the Soviets would be to encourage large-scale development and trade pacts throughout the region, centered on joint Japanese-Indian-Soviet (and American, under appropriate circumstances) industrialization of the Indian subcontinent and the nations of the ASEAN bloc. China would find itself encircled by a belt of sanity, and its attempted diplomatic deployments in the region would come to nought unless it scrapped its current war and deindustrialization orientation.

Until that Soviet awakening occurs, the U.S. and British cold warriors will have a field day. Soviet-hater Scoop Jackson has just returned from a warm visit to Peking with the proposal that Schlesinger's Energy Department immediately move to begin supplying China large amounts of energy extraction technology. This is calculated to excite every Soviet paranoid fear. The recent statements of U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown on the maintenance of a U.S. military posture in the Pacific, with increased Japanese effort, will likewise increase Soviet worries on that question.

— Peter Rush and Dan Sneider

New Wave Hits At British Hornets Nest

INDIA

India's national newsweekly New Wave followed up its earlier exposé on the British intelligence networks in India with an article entitled "UK spy network hots up African Horn" in its Feb. 12 issue. The following are excerpts from that article.

The British government, with its world-wide intelligence and agents-of-influence network, has launched a global black propaganda to resurrect cold war atmosphere, foment trouble among developing countries

and obstruct detente in Europe and elsewhere.

The *New Wave* exposure of how MI 5 and MI 6 sought to destroy the renewed efforts to put state to state India-US relations on an even keel has rattled British agents operating in this country....

The British-linked Anand Marg, whose terroristic activities were not without encouragement from CIA has responded to *New Wave* exposure by blaming the Indian intelligence and KGB for sabotage on the railways and some strategic power installations. To cover up its own involvement in Anand Marg terrorism, the Scotland Yard made a phony search of the Anand Marg hostel in Birmingham.

Faced with repeated exposure of its secret activities in