

Propaganda Rev Up for Cold War

London-linked press conduits have been working overtime churning out Cold War Propaganda aimed at whipping up anti-communist hysteria in the U.S. Examples of British psychological warfare press techniques follow:

New York Post, *lead editorial*, "Soviet-Cuban Adventurism," Feb. 27:

Are (the Soviets — ed.) prepared to torpedo the whole fragile structure of détente and the accompanying quest for SALT agreements? Are they arrogantly assuming that the President would shrink from drastic economic reprisals?....All these events have given new impetus to moves toward closer American accommodation with Moscow's dreaded ideological rival in Peking. Meanwhile, the time is not too distant when the President will face increasing pressure to sponsor both economic and diplomatic retaliation....

Washington Post, *syndicated column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*, "Africa: Will Carter Move Too Late?," Mar. 1:

President Carter's difficulty in ending months of studied inaction has encouraged communist belief that the United States will not move to prevent a Soviet takeover of the Horn of Africa, thereby duplicating the tragic misunderstandings preceding the Korean War.

U.S. inaction, born of the Vietnam syndrome hanging heavy on the shoulders of State Department policy-makers, now appears to be ending. Nevertheless, the end comes so late it may be beyond Carter's ability to stop Soviet penetration.

That would encourage further Soviet operations in volatile black Africa and could lead to military conflict: an echo of communist misunderstanding of American policy in 1950 that led to the Korean War....

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, understands the danger of stunning Soviet success against the backdrop of U.S. inaction. He also appreciates the impact of that contradiction on the rest of Africa — and the rest of the world.

But Brzezinski was thwarted by upper-level political appointees in the State Department when he started warning publicly about growing Cuban military activity in Angola last fall. He is being thwarted now by those same political appointees — U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Moose, among others. They are still afflicted by outmoded racial or Vietnam War syndromes that tend to reject essential great-power reactions and strong assertions of national will....

So, despite Brzezinski's bureaucratic struggle to block Soviet African operations, the administration seems

more worried about the political risks of strong action than the danger of following pollyanna advice of political ideologues in the State Department. They say: Give the Russians enough rope in Africa and they'll hang themselves.

Far from hanging, a continued free hand to the Russians will place offensive communist power on the border of Kenya, and Kenya happens to be the last pro-Western African state between Sudan in the north and South Africa on the tip. What will Carter do then?

Daily News, "It's Carter's move in the African chess game," by James Wieghart, Feb. 27:

Pressure is building on President Carter, to begin countering with U.S. military assistance to Somalia the massive Soviet and Cuban involvement on the side of Ethiopia. Thus far Carter, to his credit, has refused to panic over the Soviet and Cuban buildup and instead has followed a steady course of seeking to end the bloody fighting in the region and thereby the need for outside military intervention....

When coupled with the heavy Soviet-Cuban military presence in Angola on the western side of Africa, the Ethiopian beachhead could enable the Soviets to cut Africa in half and exert influence both to the north and to the south.

That's why Carter is now being pressed by some in the defense establishment, both at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, to begin building a U.S. counterweight to the Soviet push, first by supporting the Somalis and second by stepping up U.S. military aid to other nations in the area who oppose the Soviet and Cuban intervention. The suggestions range thus far from granting military assistance to Somalia, which the Somalis have requested but which Carter has steadfastly refused to do; to building up American naval forces in the Indian Ocean around the horn, which Carter has already begun to do on a modest scale....

Aside from pushing for a peaceful solution that would encourage the Ethiopians to dispense with foreign troops, about all Carter can do is make the Soviet and Cuban intervention as costly as possible. Two possibilities come readily to mind — a slowdown in the sale of American grain and technology to the Soviets and to stall the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

Another would be to pressure Turkey and other friendly nations that lie in the air and sea paths between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia to refuse to grant the Soviets air or sea rights to move troops or military hardware into that area. This would not only complicate and make more expensive the Soviet sealift and airlift, but it would also display in graphic terms to the Russians the vulnerability of their exposed position in Ethiopia.