

The State Department added pressure on Carter to go this route by issuing a report last week on adherence to the original 1974 SALT. The report confirmed that the Soviets have never cheated on the SALT agreement, and that the several times their activities were challenged by the U.S. they were rapidly corrected or shown to be no violation. *The New York Times* — whose board until recently included Cyrus Vance—joined in with a recent editorial: “Zbigniew Brzezinski has gone a dangerous step further...This is a degree of linkage that Mr. Vance strongly opposes...To make SALT talks hostage to Soviet adventurism is a visceral reaction, understandable but mistaken.”

Kissinger Steps in to Brainwash Congress

Because Brzezinski's semantic efforts to wreck SALT are being effectively held in check through Vance and Warnke's efforts, Brzezinski's tutor — the man who first invented the linkage game — Henry Kissinger, is running a much more direct operation to wreck a SALT accord. In the same way that Kissinger used knee-jerk anti-communism to brainwash former President Nixon, Kissinger is now telling conservative Republicans that this Administration's SALT accord would be “giving in to the commies.” Howard Baker, Senate Majority leader and Presidential hopeful who regards Kissinger as one of the Republicans' foreign policy lights, mouthed Kissinger's cold war policy on television's Issues and Answers inter-

view show March 6. Clearly hysterical about SALT, Baker could not even pause when asked if Soviet withdrawal from the Horn would be an act of good faith.

Two days later, on March 8, Kissinger met with the Republican Policy Committee behind closed doors, beguiling members to believe that there is a policy vacuum in the Administration which the Soviets are taking advantage of, urging the Republicans to speak out. Specifically, he said he hates the Administration's SALT proposals and is against the Administration's Africa policy. Senator Laxalt (R) of Ronald Reagan, declared after the meeting, “Kissinger is completely with us.” Also following Kissinger's cue, Senator Dole (R-Kan.) issued a statement of support for the internal settlement for Rhodesia.

The actions of Vance and others, however, have set the stage for Carter to act in the national interest and in the words of an ACDA official, “go for a SALT agreement and worry about Congress later.” Competent Administration officials are gearing up to convince Carter to ignore claims by Brzezinski and Kissinger that the Senate will refuse a SALT agreement now. In fact, the Senate “is much more favorable to a SALT agreement than to the Panama Treaty,” according to one Senate aide intimately connected with the SALT debate — a sentiment known to be widespread on Capitol Hill.

—Barbara Dreyfuss

'The SALT Dilemma and the Horn'

New York Times, editorial, March 8:

...There is no disagreement over the fact, as Secretary of State Vance has put it, that Soviet behavior in the Horn of Africa will complicate the already difficult task of winning Senate ratification of the projected SALT treaty. But President Carter's security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has gone a dangerous step further to warn Moscow that its activities in Africa would “inevitably complicate” the negotiations themselves. This is a degree of “linkage” that Mr. Vance strongly opposes.... To make the SALT talks hostage to Soviet adventurism is a visceral reaction, understandable but mistaken....

... The danger of yielding to the temptation is that there is no logical stopping point. In the end, a SALT agreement would be made contingent on first resolving every other Soviet-American dispute. The tactic cannot work as intended, but it can destroy the fragile arms control framework. The Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, showed his understanding of this danger when he signed the first SALT treaty with President Nixon in 1972 despite the intensified American bombing and blockade of North Vietnam....

Recent American efforts to obtain terms that would satisfy the Senate appear to have been sympathetically understood in Moscow... But a slowdown in the negotiations now, ostensibly over Ethiopia, would be quite another matter. It could arouse deep suspicions in the Kremlin that the United States is seeking unilateral advantages in the nuclear arms race. It could endanger the SALT I agreement on offensive arms, which has been extended informally since its expiration last October....

The central military issues in SALT II were settled more than three years ago at Vladivostock by Mr. Brezhnev and President Ford. But in 1976, an election year, after Soviet-Cuban military intervention in Angola, completion of the treaty was delayed by Mr. Ford, to his subsequent regret.

Warnke versus Nitze

U.S. News and World Report recently published a debate between U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency head Paul Warnke and Committee on the Present Danger spokesman Paul Nitze on whether or not a SALT II treaty is in the strategic interest of the United States. The debate demonstrates, to a certain degree, the differences in thinking between sane elements of the Carter Administration and CPD types in the Administration and in Congress like former CPD founding member James Schlesinger and Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash), the chairman of the Senate subcommittee which handles SALT.

The clearest criteria by which to judge these outlooks, in our opinion, is represented in Mr. Warnke's appreciation of what the strategic realities of a non-SALT world would be, despite the general shortcomings of his views on military matters. In contrast, Mr. Nitze demonstrates a dangerously incompetent understanding of such a world, defined by his obsession with the numbers of missiles either side would have with and without SALT.

Q: Mr. Warnke, why would the strategic arms limitation

treaty you are negotiating with the Soviets enhance U.S. security?

W: Look at the alternative: Either continue under the SALT I agreement, or have no arms control agreement at all. Now the SALT I agreement gives the Soviets a numerical advantage in missiles which the SALT II treaty would eliminate. That in itself is a sufficient reason for wanting a SALT II treaty.

Q: And if there were no SALT treaty at all?

W: That would mean an unrestrained nuclear-arms competition. At the present point, the Soviets have a whole fifth generation of strategic weapons under development. They unquestionably would go ahead and deploy them. Under those circumstances, they would go up to something like 3,000 strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles.

...If the nuclear arms competition continues, strategic stability may be damaged. You could then have a situation in which one side or the other could feel that it was in its interests — maybe essential to its interests — to start a nuclear war at a time of crisis.

Q: Won't SALT II allow the USSR a great advantage in total throw weight of their missiles — and potentially in warheads?

W: That is not the result of SALT; that's the result of decisions made in the 1960s by our military planners, who decided to go the route of smaller, more accurate, more ready, solid fuel missiles. We could have built the same throw weight as the Soviet Union but we chose not to do so.

Q: If Minuteman is becoming vulnerable, does it make sense to accept limits on our freedom to develop a replacement — the MX mobile missile — in SALT?

W: The limit will not bar anything that we could do with regard to MX within the three-year period when such a constraint would apply. But it would affect the Soviets during that period of time.

Q: Why are we willing to accept limits on our freedom to exploit our cruise missile technology — allegedly at the expense of relations with our allies?

W: I've been in constant consultation with the allies, and I've been given no such concerns. I've found nothing but enthusiastic support for our efforts. I think that the allies recognize that we view their security as being indistinguishable from our own.

Now, as far as cruise missile technology is concerned, the protocol gives us a period of time in which we can explore with our allies where the net advantage lies. We can explore with them whether they are prepared to have cruise missiles go unrestrained, recognizing that if they

do, the Soviet Union unquestionably will develop cruise missiles, too.

Paul Nitze

Q: Mr. Nitze, why do you believe that a SALT II treaty will not enhance U.S. security?

N: This treaty will not, in my opinion, leave us in a position even of rough equality with the Soviet Union by 1982, or by 1985. Nor will it help us in maintaining a position of what is called "crisis stability" — a position where, in a crisis neither side could hope to gain by initiating the use of nuclear weapons.

Q: Why would the SALT II treaty, in your view, leave the Soviets with an advantage?

N: The proposed agreement sets a ceiling of 820 on the multiple independently targetted re-entry vehicles — or MIRVed ICBM launchers — each side can have. We today have 550 Minuteman IIIs, and there is nothing in our program which will add one MIRVed ICBM to our inventory by the expiration of the treaty in 1985.

We know the throw weight of those Minuteman IIIs, how many re-entry vehicles each one has and approximately the yield of those re-entry vehicles. We know the throw weight of the SS-17s, 18s, and 19s that the Soviets are deploying.... When you add the whole thing up together, it ends up with a differential of approximately 8 to 1 in favor of the Soviet Union in terms of prompt counterforce potential. That is a very big margin of difference.

Q: Specifically, how would it (the SALT treaty) affect the U.S.?

N: As a case in point, I believe that the agreement as it is now being negotiated would provide in the three-year protocol that mobile ICBMs — the MX — will be banned. It is true that we do not now plan to deploy a mobile missile during that period, but I can well imagine that the Russians will wish to have that provision continued beyond 1981 or 1982. And our negotiating position at that time will be inferior to our negotiating position today....

Q: And the SALT negotiations, in your view, will not help the United States to deal with these dangers?

N: That's right. Today almost no one says that the SALT agreement that we are negotiating will do much for us. They merely say it could be worse if we don't have an agreement and that you really have to look to SALT III.

But somehow or other they assume that while negotiating SALT III the U.S. negotiating position is going to have greater power behind it than now, so that we will be able to negotiate things that are not negotiable now. I don't see what is going to bring that about. As my Russian friends say, "we are not philanthropists."