

sch, who had come to the U.S. to discuss Carter's intentions on the bomb. Burt's article preempting Carter's negotiations, also made exaggerated claims that the Germans particularly want to see production of the bomb at some point.

Many Europeans, particularly in Belgium and West Germany, have opposed the bomb, fearing it would make nuclear war more likely and an intense debate is raging in Europe on this issue. Because the Federal Republic of Germany is in a delicate position as a frontline state, officials there have left the decision about production of the bomb officially up to the U.S., indicating that they would then decide about its deployment on their territory.

As a result of Burt's article, the neutron bomb issue became a major topic at White House press briefings throughout the week, and was a major theme in the east coast press. Burt declared on April 5 that he had been successful in getting Carter to reverse his decision. In

another *New York Times* story, Burt wrote that "Carter is reported reconsidering a ban on the neutron bomb." Bernard Gwertzman, also a *New York Times* reporter praised Burt for making Carter's decision very difficult. In a companion piece appearing under Burt's April 5 article, Gwertzman gloated, "Even under the best of circumstances, decisions on the way such an announcement should be made and what it should say, would be difficult. But the Administration's problems were compounded by an article in the *New York Times* today reporting that Mr. Carter had decided against the neutron bomb."

The *Washington Post* was even more blunt in congratulating Burt's efforts to reverse Carter's policy. An article by Walter Pincus April 5 declared, "Proponents of the weapons within the Administration tried to get Carter to reverse his latest position. Disclosure by The New York Times of Carter's decision may have accomplished that. Yesterday, the decision was described as still not final."

The Carter Trip:

Brzezinski's Quest For A 'Missile Crisis'

The net result of the just-concluded four-nation tour by President Carter is that Zbigniew Brzezinski came dangerously close to engineering a "geopolitical axis" that would have led the United States straight into a new Cuban missile crisis faceoff with the Soviet Union. Only last-minute resistance from the Obasanjo government in Nigeria and from circles associated with U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance fended off a complete foreign policy triumph by the National Security Council Advisor in his quest for a superpower "incident" over Cuban involvement in Africa.

As developments now stand, however, Brzezinski has dramatically improved his position in the ongoing battle within the Administration for control over U.S. foreign policy and over the President himself.

Brzezinski's primary objective on every stop of the tour — Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria and Liberia — was to create the sort of anti-Cuban hysteria that would give a veil of legitimacy for confrontation with Moscow. On the Latin American leg of the trip, Brzezinski was successful, as evidenced by significant anti-Cuban foreign policy shifts in both Caracas and Brasilia. Analysis of the communiqués, Carter's speeches, and principal press coverage shows that during this half of the tour, Brzezinski was in almost complete control of U.S. foreign policy.

Brzezinski's biggest problems were encountered in Nigeria. Carter arrived in Lagos reading from the same National Security Council (NSC) guidelines he followed in South America regarding U.S. "concern" over Cuba's presence in Ethiopia. The Obasanjo regime, however, simply refused to play along, telling Carter that it is up to the sovereign Ethiopian government to decide to whom it will turn for military aid. It was also in Nigeria that

Andrew Young was able to regain the President's ear to a certain extent, as Carter denounced the British-authored "internal solution" for Rhodesia — a scheme that would heighten tensions throughout the southern portion of the continent — as "illegal".

Nonetheless, such steps merely stall the Brzezinski strategy. As long as Vance and Young fail to articulate a positive, global development policy for Africa, while Brzezinski and his allies remain in office, the imminent danger of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation remains.

The front page editorial in the semi-official Brazilian daily *O Globo* on April 3 is a clear sign that Brzezinski intends to step up the pressure against Cuba regardless of Nigeria's refusal to endorse his aims. If not in Africa, then in Latin America — particularly as a counter to Mexico's prodevelopment influence.

"Soviet expansionism in Africa," *O Globo* said, "puts the Atlantic coast of South America under the gun." Signalling a complete turnaround in Brazilian foreign policy, the editorial went on to suggest breaking relations with Angola and embarking on an "intensive joint effort with the other Latin American foreign ministries and with indispensable U.S. participation to find common ways and means of confronting and deterring the latent menace.... Tomorrow, the Americans will be in danger."

Cuba was first fingered as the prime Brzezinski target behind the Carter tour in an article in London's *Daily Telegraph* on March 27, the day before Carter arrived in Caracas. Under the heading "The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1978," Robert Moss wrote that "Soviet strategic missiles" are being "smuggled back to Cuba," and directly goaded Carter by suggesting the Soviets rightly doubt his "will to respond" to the USSR's "notable strategic advances in Africa." (For fuller excerpts, see below.)

Venezuela and Brazil

Brzezinski heavily stressed the Cuba issue the following day in Caracas in his briefing to the U.S. press corps on the talks between Carter and Venezuela's President Carlos Andres Perez. Perez, under heavy pressure from Brzezinski-aligned forces internally, immediately showed the results of such arm-twisting by alluding to the "danger" of Cuba's Africa involvement, and by including a denunciation of "the presence of foreign forces in Africa" in the final joint communiqué.

In Brazil, Brzezinski was able to line up the Geisel government against Cuba by downplaying the touchy issues — human rights and nuclear technology transfers — that the Brazilians thought Carter would raise. Instead, Carter, under Brzezinski's instructions, flattered Brasilia's self-image as a nascent "big power" which has to be consulted by the U.S. on "global responsibilities" — such as Africa. This slightly refurbished resurrection of Henry Kissinger's "special relationship" with Brazil, first proposed in February 1976, so overwhelmed the flat-footed Brazilian officials that the lead headline of the *Correio Brasiliense* in Brasilia of March 30 read: "Jimmy Carter Arrived and Did Not Attack Us." As the *Christian Science Monitor* pointed out March 31, as soon as Carter sat down with Geisel for the first round of talks, the U.S. chief executive began "consulting" his counterpart on big-power global problems, which suddenly "changed the atmosphere." Carter went so far as to propose a "hot line" between Brasilia and the White House!

Whatever differences loomed prior to Carter's arrival were papered over. The human rights issue was quietly

filed away after Brzezinski reviewed Geisel's political reform program and deemed it "dynamic." As for the nuclear question, Carter simply explained that he was not opposed to Brazilian nuclear energy per se, only to the West German fuel cycle transfer. *O Estado de Sao Paulo* explained the following day that in light of Brazil's "new status as a great power," it must "share with the U.S....the grave responsibilities for the destiny of the West....(Therefore) collective interests temporarily take on the greatest weight." The hysterical anti-Cuban editorial in *O Globo* April 3 (see page 6) makes clear what these "interests" are.

Brzezinski's retreat of Henry Kissinger's policy of a "special relationship" with Brazil simultaneously reactivates moves toward a modified South Atlantic Treaty Organization-type pact, which would be able to undertake anticommunist police actions in that arena, "independent" of the U.S. The present version, like Kissinger's original, necessarily envisages Brazil as the center. However, there have been problems as to whom the other Latin American and African participants could be. Nationalist factions in Brazil represented by Foreign Minister Azerado da Silveira refused to consider an alliance with South Africa, Kissinger's first choice on the African side. The long historical rivalry between Brazil and Argentina created difficulties for pulling Buenos Aires into this arrangement, as well. Hence, the importance of Venezuela and Nigeria. A "Brazilianist" New York commented April 5 that a SATO axis based around these three countries is indeed a Brzezinski option.

The British View: 'Cuban Missile Crisis of 1978'

The following remarks by Conservative Party speechwriter and British intelligence stringer Robert Moss appeared in the March 27 Daily Telegraph, in his article, "The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1978":

The Russians are building a pen for their nuclear submarines in the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. This, according to senior Western military observers, is the evidence of recent American aerial surveillance.

There is a strong suspicion that Soviet strategic missiles have already been smuggled back to Cuba....

This time round, things are rather different. According to reliable sources in Washington, the Carter Administration has so far made no attempt to warn off the Russians.

Nor has it done anything about alerting the American public to what could easily develop into the Cuban missile crisis of 1978....

Similarly, the current Soviet leadership might have drawn the conclusion, after 15 months of confusion or inaction in American foreign policy, during which the Russians have been allowed to make notable strategic advances in Africa, that America's leader lacks the will to respond.

They are also well aware that they are in a much stronger strategic position than in 1962, and that Mr. Carter would need even stronger nerves than

President Kennedy to call their bluff.

Yet, American failure to resist such gross provocations as a new Soviet bid to install nuclear missiles just off the coast of Florida would amount to a damning admission of weakness...

It is in this context that President Carter's "cold war" speech in North Carolina on March 17 must be considered.

Mr. Carter's pledge that the United States will match Soviet military capabilities and will mobilize the forces to "counter any threats to our allies and vital interests" reassured many of America's friends who had been puzzled and disheartened by its failure to respond to Soviet aggression in Africa....

The Russians will not judge Mr. Carter by his words, but by his actions.

In the chancelleries of the world (and not least in Peking), assessments of what the Carter Administration really means will not be based on an occasional speech that may well be primarily directed at a section of domestic opinion but on how Mr. Carter and his advisers cope, or fail to cope, with the realities of power....

The Chinese will be watching the development of the Cuban missile crisis of 1978 as keenly as anyone in the West. As the Russians test Jimmy Carter, the questions get progressively tougher. Let us hope he can come up with the right answer to this one.

Nigeria Cool

With the Latin American side of his operation well sewn up, Brzezinski tried the same routine in Nigeria. Carter opened his four-day visit to Lagos with a Brzezinski-scripted speech that attacked Cuban presence in Africa as a "new form of domination or colonialism" and insinuated that the Cubans were Soviet "proxies." To soften this line a bit, Carter offered the Nigerians what the April 3 *Daily Telegraph* of London called a promise to apply "more pressure than ever" against the white minority regimes in southern Africa.

Lest such so-called concessions prove insufficient, Brzezinski's friends in London published a steady stream of classic horror stories in the press, as exemplified by the April 2 *Sunday Telegraph* article, "Angola: Land of Cuban Terror." "Children have been shipped to Havana," reported the *Telegraph* with typical British reserve, "possibly to be used as cheap labor on sugar plantations."

Brzezinski's ploy was not well received by the Nigerians, who appreciate Soviet military aid. The Soviets supported the Lagos government against the British-engineered Biafran secessionist operation. The U.S. and British media immediately picked up Obasanjo's displeasure, and the final joint communiqué omitted any reference to the issue.

The Nigerian position intersected with a growing

awareness among certain U.S. factions behind Vance and Young that continued Brzezinski control over the situation could lead to war. The hysterical outbursts against Young this week by British political figures and press indicated how seriously this potential threat to Brzezinski's British interests is being viewed.

Young took initial steps to take advantage of this potential by making a separate trip to Africa preceding Carter's, for the purpose of strengthening his hand against the British "internal solution" for Rhodesia. He also set up meetings between Vance and high-level representatives of the front-line states while in Lagos with Carter. In turn, Vance has announced that he will travel to Africa to meet separately with Patriotic Front leaders and with Rhodesia's Ian Smith, prior to his visit to Moscow later this month.

These measures, however, are mere preconditions. Granted, Vance and Young succeeded in convincing Carter to condemn the "internal solution." But veteran observers in Washington were pessimistic this week, pointing out that unless Washington and Moscow agree to a development policy for the continent, the present situation is heading for a sharp escalation of the fighting on all sides in the Rhodesian question, which in turn will strengthen Brzezinski's hand in convincing Carter to perceive African policy in "anti-Soviet" terms.

—Chris Allen

Venezuela

Carter Backs IMF, 'Gasahol'

Instead of the heralded announcement of a major U.S. policy shift towards the Third World, President Carter told the developing nations and his expectant Venezuelan hosts in Caracas that the U.S. considers its contributions to the International Monetary Fund to be its contribution to the demanded new world economic order. Carter then preached about "limited resources," the need for population control, and called for global conservation of energy!

In a speech delivered to the Venezuelan Congress, Carter stated that "in managing the international economy," the U.S. gives "particular importance to the expansion of the International Monetary Fund," promising that his Administration will "pressure to achieve the rapid approval by Congress of our own contribution to the supplementary means of financing recommended by Mr. Witteveen." He further chastised OPEC for not applying their "excess wealth" to bail out the developing nations' debt as well.

Carter also proposed the creation of an "american foundation for technological cooperation" to handle

increased transfers of technology, but gave the medieval Brazilian program of producing energy from sugar cane — so-called gasahol" — as an example of the "technologies" the U.S. would be offering: "We have begun to cooperate and plan for the judicious use of the earth's limited resources, such as food," Carter said, "and now we should do the same with energy." He then called for the world to "dedicate a larger part of our vast technological resources to world efforts to develop new energy sources, such as solar, and as some Latin American nations have shown us, even sugar and agricultural products."

While Carter made the token promise to supply the Brazilian nuclear program with enriched uranium when he arrived in that country, he immediately reiterated the U.S.'s adamant opposition to Brazil's agreement with West Germany for the construction of a reprocessing plant. Instead Carter pushed the as-yet undeveloped technology of thorium, a supposedly weapons-safe process, as an alternative program for Brazil — a pie-in-the-sky scheme that Brazilians have thus far refused to fall for.