

To Sabotage SALT

# Mr. Kissinger Sends Mr. Brzezinski To Peking

Reports that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had made progress toward a strategic arms limitation accord with the Soviet Union were met this week with overt attempts at sabotage by the Administration grouping centered around National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Less than 48 hours after Vance's return from Moscow, Brzezinski emerged from a meeting of the Bilderberg Society attended by Henry Kissinger to announce that he will travel to Peking May 20-23 for "consultations" with the rabidly anti-Soviet leadership there.

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## FOREIGN POLICY

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So closely was Brzezinski following the instructions of his predecessor, Kissinger, the architect of the "playing the China card" policy against the Soviets, that the *Washington Post* openly speculated that Brzezinski might want to use his trip as National Security Advisor as Kissinger did after his 1971 trip to Peking to gain overall ascendancy over U.S. foreign policy. (see below.)

The same *Washington Post* coverage revealed that Brzezinski will discuss "geopolitics" with the Chinese in the manner of Kissinger's talks with Chou En-lai. The underlying notion of "geopolitics" as publicly enunciated in recent months is the strategic isolation of the Soviet Union, and is most closely associated with the official foreign policy of Great Britain. The intermediate goal of this doctrine is a U.S.-China anti-Soviet alliance — the long-range British intention is a U.S.-Soviet Pacific theatre confrontation.

However, it is well known that any concrete steps toward a U.S.-China alliance will effectively sabotage any possibility of detente and propel the Soviet Union into a dangerously hardline posture. It was to minimize the effect of Brzezinski's announcement in this direction that Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Richard Holbrooke attempted to downplay the importance of the May visit. "This is not a normalization trip," Holbrooke said, referring to the normalization of U.S.-Peking relations that remains stalemated over the question of U.S. recognition for the regime on Taiwan.

However, Holbrooke's disclaimer merely served to highlight the real purpose of Brzezinski's trip: to discuss with the Chinese leaders the mutual concern of the Peking fanatics and Brzezinski to force the U.S. Administration to jettison the SALT talks.

Brzezinski's trip will only cap a campaign for U.S.-

China alliance led by Senator Henry Jackson. Jackson, who visited Peking in February, returned to argue that it was the United States' strategic interest to build up China's economic and military strength for "containment" of the Soviets (see excerpts below). More recently, Jackson argued on national television that the Vance approach to SALT was damaging U.S. relations with Peking and agreed with Chinese criticisms that the U.S. was, in effect, selling out to Moscow. Jackson is known to favor such hardline terms for a SALT agreement as to torpedo any hope of an agreement.

Jackson's public crusade has been supported by a series of unpublicized visits to Peking by leading members of the warhawk Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), actually laying the groundwork for Brzezinski's visit. CPD executive board member Paul Nitze recently returned from Peking, and his close colleague on the Committee, Richard Pipes of Harvard, visited in early April.

At the time that Brzezinski made his announcement, he was participating in the annual meeting of the London-dominated Bilderberg group, headed by the Rothschild family's Prince Bernhard of Holland. The focus of this Princeton April 22-23 meeting, according to the group's spokesman, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was "the threat of a Soviet military buildup in Central Europe." The Bilderberg Society dictates its strategic thrusts to the British Secret Intelligence Service, which communicates them to British agents and agents-of-influence throughout the West — for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

In attendance at the meeting, besides Brzezinski, were Council on Foreign Relations head William Bundy, David Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, and his protégé NATO Supreme Commander Alexander Haig. There is little doubt that the meeting also examined in depth how to push forward the Kissinger-Brzezinski China policy.

The fact that Britain, not the United States, is the source of the push for the sort of Western ties with China that are aimed against the Soviet Union was emphasized by the announcement recently that the British Chief of Staff Neil Cameron is now in Peking to carry on high-level consultations with the Chinese on their joint concern to oppose the Soviet Union. Simultaneously a high-level delegation from Britain's aerospace industry paid a call in order to sell the Chinese warplanes. London press coverage trumpeted the need for strengthening British-Chinese ties, and for finding a means to circumvent the State Department's opposition to such things as the warplane sale.

# The Press On British Peking Policy

*The Daily Telegraph* (London), "Defense Chief to Visit China," April 4:

The Chief of the Defence Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Neil Cameron, will visit Peking later this month to discuss world strategy with Chinese military leaders. But the Chinese will also seek Sir Neil's views on the more detailed problems concerning the planned modernization of their armed forces.

Additional point will be given to these discussions by the recent dramatic increase in tension along the 4,000-mile frontier between China and the Soviet Union caused largely by Mr. Brezhnev's current visit to the area....

The Chinese will also want to be briefed on NATO policy, since the West and China both benefit from the division of Russian strength between Europe and Asia. There is little doubt that Sir Neil's visit will help to improve relations between Peking and London. A senior officer said yesterday that he "believed a more cooperative approach to China would help to sustain the present situation" which was "highly desirable."

*The Observer* (London), April 16:

The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence are maintaining strict secrecy about moves to clinch a sale of Harrier jump-jets to China. Both said yesterday that they could not confirm a report that a high-level British Aerospace sales team was due to go to Peking next week. The source of the report was insistent, however. The visit would coincide with a visit to China on 27 April by the Chief of the Defence Staff, Marshal of the RAF Sir Neil Cameron.

Sir Neil is an enthusiast for vertical take-off development and for the Harrier in particular. It will be the first visit ever made by a British Chief of Defence Staff to the People's Republic. Two obstacles have impeded progress on the possible sale of the Harrier...The second is reported American insistence that China should not be offered any arms deal that Russia could construe as "favored treatment."

China's requirement has been stated to be for 300 planes, which would almost certainly involve setting up a local assembly line.

Sources close to China trade deals say that the Chinese government is growing increasingly impatient with the slowness of Britain's response to its interest in the Harrier. But it seems at least possible that there has been a misunderstanding. The British have been waiting for a formal request to present the aircraft technically and discuss possible terms, while the Chinese have been waiting for Britain to make a request.

## Jackson, the Senator from London

*Report by Henry Jackson to the Committee on Armed Services, "China and United States Policy," March, 1978:*

There is a new spirit in China today...On my return from China, I recommended to the President...that we

should immediately move toward increased and substantial consultation between the most senior officials of our government and those of China. These consultations at the highest level should take place on a frequent and continuing basis...For our part, we have a significant stake in the continued existence of a strong, independent China. We share with China a common interest in key strategic issues. We must not let the lack of normalization impede possible progress in areas where our concerns run parallel....

Despite such areas of differences as over Korea, the greater number of areas of parallel concern lead the Chinese to look to the United States to play a determined and active role in world affairs, both at the strategic level and in areas of local tension. Their present concern is that we are doing too little, rather than that we are doing too much. They are also concerned that at this time American leaders do not understand China's own contribution to the strategic balance.

*Washington Post*, April 27:

Presidential National Security Affairs Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski will make a mission to China next month, despite the reported opposition of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance...informed sources confirmed the essence of an account in the current issue of *The New Yorker* magazine that Vance "opposed the idea of the trip" and worked to thwart it through the policy process...

Brzezinski's forerunner as White House adviser on national security, Henry A. Kissinger, made his more sensational secret mission in July 1971 in Peking trip which reestablished U.S.-China relations after decades of hostility. The symbolism if not the substance of a Brzezinski trip to Peking is a matter of unusual interest among foreign policy watchers who have been waiting since January, 1977, for Brzezinski to develop into "another Kissinger." The *New Yorker* account by Elizabeth Drew described Brzezinski as wishing to use relations with China in Kissinger-like fashion "as a means of tweaking the Soviet Union; that is...to do what policymakers call 'playing the China card.' "...Officials described the likely topic for Brzezinski's talks in China May 20-23 as broad discussion of geopolitics, essentially the kind of summit seminar that Kissinger carried on to his delight with the late Premier Chou En-lai.

*Senator Henry Jackson, CBS-TV "Face the Nation," April 23:*

I can't support the proposed treaty (SALT), in protocol the way it stands now, and the reason is very simple. The Russians get more in the way of strategic arms than we would get. Now, that's going to create an imbalance, it's destabilizing, it's of grave concern to our allies, and certainly, I would make a special point as to the Chinese. The Chinese feel more and more that the U.S. is rather inept with the Russians.

(Q: Are We?)

Yes, we are, and I must say that is disturbing...."

## Scotty Reston Leads Press Sabotage of SALT

James "Scotty" Reston, who built his journalism career on conducting disinformation provided him by Henry Kissinger, has foredoomed the SALT negotiations even before Vance began his meetings. He and several other Anglophilic columnists are aiding Brzezinski's sabotage of the negotiations by claiming — on the authority of unnamed congressional sources — that Congress would never pass a SALT treaty. These columnists have manufactured congressional opposition to disarmament and filled pages with reports of Western European "concern" over the "weakness" of Carter in deferring production of the neutron bomb. These reports have been perfunctorily denied by spokesmen for the relevant governments.

The Meyer family's *Washington Post* is so desperate at the possibility of healthy relations with the USSR that it is seizing upon anything which it can turn into Cold War propaganda — including the transforming of the forced landing of a Korean Airlines jet into a case of Soviet "outlawry."

We excerpt Reston's column "the Senate and the Soviets" in the April 26 *New York Times*:

... The heated debate in the Senate over the Panama treaties, Mr. Byrd observed, was nothing compared to the "fire" he expects if the SALT II treaty comes up for ratification under present circumstances. A strategic arms agreement with Moscow, Mr. Byrd said, "goes to the vital interests of the United States. The Panama treaty did not." . . .

This is not a new controversy. Ever since Franklin Roosevelt negotiated with Stalin at Yalta there has been a fundamental disagreement here about how to negotiate with Moscow. The Soviets have always insisted on dealing with one issue at a time, particularly on matters that threaten war between the atomic powers, but never on the creation of a general order in the world. On that, they have demanded freedom of action to wage what they call "wars of national liberation" and what Washington calls "wars of Soviet domination." Moscow's consistent attitude has been: "What's ours is ours, and what's yours is negotiable." . . .

This is creating an internal dispute here which the Senate and many high officials of the Administration are determined to face before any arms treaty is negotiated. Nobody is saying here that nothing can be solved between Washington and Moscow unless everything is solved, but a lot of people are insisting that bricks without mortar are not very useful, and that the time has come to get the principles of détente straight.

There are two different approaches. One group is saying, yes, a treaty to control nuclear weapons is fundamental, and we must raise these other problems with the Soviets, but we would not confuse the Cubans with the atomic bomb.

Another group is saying that the creation of a Soviet foreign legion of mercenaries in Africa is unacceptable and must be removed before we sign a SALT II treaty. And besides, this group is pointing out, the treaty would probably be rejected by the Senate if Moscow insists on waging proxy wars for its political advantage.

This group wants to put the problem squarely to Moscow, saying, in effect, if you insist on your present policy in the sensitive areas, then we will do the same: meaning, increase our propaganda in Eastern Europe and among the restless nationality groups within the Soviet Union, and consider a policy of closer cooperation with China.

The Carter Administration has not resolved this conflict within its own ranks. Secretary Vance would like to try to solve it quietly. He fears that any public demand that the Cubans go home as a condition of a SALT treaty would be rejected and might even intensify the arms race.

But the Senate is clearly not satisfied with Mr. Vance's vague assurances that the "atmosphere" is better for reasons he thinks it prudent not to explain. It is even challenging the decision to sell advanced airplanes to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

In short the Senate is skeptical not only of the Soviets but of the Carter Administration these days. It wants substance and not "atmosphere" this time. It wants what it will probably never get, not brick-by-brick diplomacy but a secure wall against any more Soviet penetration.