

Will Peking Go to War With Moscow?

The following analysis was released on May 14, 1978 by U.S. Labor Party Chairman Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

In the aftermath of British military commander Neil Cameron's proposal of war against the Soviet Union in Peking, the Chinese news agencies now blast out an order from Peking's Central Committee, instructing the People's Army to prepare for an "inevitable" war against the Soviet Union. Does this pattern mean what "Manchurian candidates" James R. Schlesinger, Henry A. Kissinger and Senator Henry Jackson argue it portends? Or, are these three and their fellow-dupes the biggest fools in the world?

Three points have to be made in assessing Peking's leaders. The first point is that of knowing what they believe and intend, which is often opposite to what they profess publicly to believe and intend. The second point is the incompetence of emotionally-inadequate personalities, such as Kissinger, Schlesinger and Jackson, for understanding the minds of Peking's leaders. The third point, the strategic setting for the whole business, is the current state of evolution of the British monarchy's geopolitical policy of the Eurasian "world-island."

We begin with the third point, the setting within which the two other points are situated.

British Geopolitical Doctrine

The British geopolitical doctrine which has caused two world wars during this century to date was formulated by a team headed by the Rothschild-linked Lord Alfred Milner at the beginning of this century. This team which included the Fabian Webbs and the famous Mackinder formulated the doctrine better known as the policy of Major-General Professor Karl Haushofer, the patron of Rudolf Hess and the actual author of the principal contents of Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.

The British doctrine has two principal elements. The first was the approach to what the doctrine defined as the Eurasian world-island. The British monarchy, which viewed the old colonial system of British flag-imperialism as doomed, aimed to establish a new instrument by which a relatively weak Britain could continue to dominate the world. This centered around the balkanizing of Russia, preventing the emergence of economic cooperation between Russia and Germany. The second element was the doctrine that Britain must rule the world through subverting the powerful "dumb giant," the United States. Aided by a successful British assassination of President William McKinley in 1902, the latter objective was, on balance, fairly accomplished

throughout the present century to date.

The initial implementation of the Eurasian world-island doctrine involved toppling Count Witte, the Russian finance minister, and France's Hanotaux, as well as breaking German ties to Boer leader Kruger. Through these and related means, Germany was turned from its natural partners and allies, France and Russia, into the course leading directly into the first world war.

The British object in sending Germany eastward in two world wars was to provide Germany "living-space" in Eastern Europe and the Ukraine in return for the break-up (Balkanization) of Russia and City of London domination of Germany's world-trade. In both instances, this British policy backfired on two main counts. In both cases, Germany's military and industrial forces refused to undertake a drive to the east without first smashing British military power in the west — so that on both occasions, Britain faced the unexpected westward German military thrust which obliged it to bring the "dumb giant" from across the Atlantic to Britain's aid. In both cases, the Russian side of the development took a far different turn than Churchill and his associates intended.

With the Soviet deployment of an operational H-bomb, beginning 1953, the possibility of repeating the central-European version of the Milner-Mackinder-Haushofer-Parvus geopolitical thrust against Russia evaporated. So, beginning with the Eisenhower Administration's slap against the British monarchy and its French puppet in the 1956 Suez crisis, British geopolitical policy from that point onward took a different principal course.

As George Marshall and Major-General Hurley discovered, painfully, during the immediate post-war period in China, the Mao Tse-tung leadership in China had been a London-linked element of the Communist International throughout its history. As we shall show, it is too simplified a version of the facts to term Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai British agents, but the special relationship between London and dominant elements of the CPC would be ordinarily the evidence for defining an agent-relationship but for the great power and associated interests Peking represents today. Just as London, through its agents on the financial side of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, frustrated Marshall's and Hurley's efforts at the end of the war, London was able to steer the process of the Sino-Soviet split from the 1956-1957 period onwards.

Since the 1956 Suez crisis, London's long-haul strategic orientation and commitment has been for a total war between China and the Soviet Union, China replacing the

role London assigned to Germany in the two preceding world wars of this century. The principal difference in London's intention for the new world war is that London intends to destroy Japan and sacrifice the "rim" power, the USA, in thermonuclear, Pacific-centered war with the Soviet Union. By hook or crook, London intends to extricate itself and sections of Europe from the brunt of war before the proverbial last moment. Once the Soviet Union, China, Japan and the United States have been eliminated as economic powers, London aims to rule what remains of the globe.

Recently, London has brought this post-1856 geopolitical doctrine out into the open. Naturally, Henry A. Kissinger, himself trained by British Secret Intelligence Service and an "in place" British agent within the USA policy-command, follows London's direction in this matter. As a byproduct of this development, the word "geopolitical" has resumed a conspicuous presence in the relevant sections of the press.

*The Great Poker Game:
London Versus Peking*

London has abundant evidence to convince itself that Peking's leaders are, on balance, British agents-of-influence in the tradition of the Sultan of Zanzibar from the days of William Pitt the Younger. The Communist Party of China leadership has an old British intelligence pedigree, and British leading circles have abundant evidence which suggests to them that Peking is disposed to continue the role of a rook in the chess-play of England's Queen. Certainly, all of the more inadequate mentalities of the British policy apparatus, such as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, James R. Schlesinger, et.al., tend toward that same judgment of the matter.

The most sensitive plotters in Britain are guided by a more sophisticated view of the matter. London and Peking are occupied in a political poker game with thermonuclear stakes. The issue is: Will London manipulate Peking into a Pacific-centered thermonuclear war, or will Peking set up London for an Atlantic-centered thermonuclear war?

That poker game, I have no doubt Peking would win. The image of a pathetic Henry Kissinger, Henry Jackson, or Zbigniew Brzezinski attempting to match wits with Peking's leaders is one which would provoke riotous laughter at such a farce, were the implications not so strategically grotesque.

To understand China's leaders, at least a lapsed-time overview of China's recent history is indispensable. In summarizing this necessary outlook within a few paragraphs here, I simplify the picture, but without introducing any distortion of significances respecting the issues under examination.

Like the leading forces of Japan's 1863 Meiji Revolution, I have a profound horror of the bestiality deeply embedded in Chinese cultural traditions. Since the building of the Great Wall — and the great book-burning — China has been conditioned ("brainwashed") into assimilating one of the most hideous cultures and philosophical outlooks the earth has witnessed in all recorded history. In Japan's own historical memory, there is painful evidence of the economic genocidal consequences of the corruption of Japan by imported neo-Confucian thought.

The substance of Chinese traditionalism is the thousands of years of accumulated bestiality of oriental rural life. The Chinese peasant lived like a beast, each generation repeating the wretched technology of its grandfathers and so forth, its behavior as unchanging — from the standpoint of life's experience — as that of some lower beast whose range of behavior is genetically determined.

This traditional Chinese, rural-centered antipathy against technological progress made China the victim of what is otherwise termed the yin-yang cycle. Less abstractly, yin-yang cycles are the cycles of what have been termed "oriental despotism." The stagnation in agricultural technology was characterized by a period of expansion of land in production and population, followed by an economic-genocidal collapse. Although this cyclical process was aggravated by the ruling, parasitical institutions of China, the rhythm of the agricultural base was the fundamental determinant, on which the ruling superstructure had only catalytic effect.

Over thousands of years, the densely populated regions of China served as the world's principal breeding-culture for the great pandemics which have afflicted the human species.

We of Mediterranean-centered civilizations have experienced similar forms of cultural decay. While the rise of European civilization has been accomplished through the influence of the city-builders' faction — the creators of urban-centered, science-oriented, technological progress — we too have experienced periods of domination by proponents of the Babylonian oligarchical model. The division between the morally degenerate oligarchist Hesiod and humanist Homer has been the characteristic conflict within the history of our civilization to the present day. The Guelph faction, and its continuation in the forces allied to the present-day British monarchy, have been the principal agents of bestiality, the zero-growthers. We too have suffered economic-genocidal and related consequences of the sort China has suffered, whenever we have tolerated too long the rule by forces with the world outlook of the British monarchy and such miserable creatures as Henry Kissinger.

The difference is that Mediterranean civilization has experienced such horrors of no longer than hundreds of years — the Roman Empire's decay, whereas this hideous experience was embedded in China over thousands of years, almost without interruption.

Through the example and moral influence of the Meiji Revolution in Japan, there developed in China the movement headed up by Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen was dedicated to accomplishing in China what the forces behind the Meiji Restoration had accomplished in Japan. Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Sun Yat-sen's forces entered into an alliance with the fledgling Communist Party of China, and with Lenin.

The British subverted both the Kuomintang (Sun Yat-sen's organization) and the Chinese Communist Party. Chiang Kai-shek, the putative heir of Sun Yat-sen, was steered by banking interests politically and financially linked to London, by way of the opium-based banks of Hong Kong and Shanghai. British agent within the Communist International, M. K. Roy performed a key role in British intelligence's takeover of leading influence

within the Communist Party. British-linked Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung represent the hegemony of the British game within the CPC of the 1930s.

Despite the bloody conflicts between the Kuomintang and CPC, the Chinese nationalists and Communists were played as virtual puppets by British interests. This continued into World War II, whose Chinese features were never competently understood by any of the honest Americans involved in the China-Burma-India theater.

In fairness to the deceased Chiang Kai-shek, I would not argue, from evidence in hand, that he was a British agent in any more profound sense than, say, Senator Howard Baker. Chiang unquestionably understood political reality much more extensively and profoundly, in his own way, than Banker and others like him have demonstrated. The facts show that Chiang was essentially a "Realpolitiker," maneuvering within what he perceived as the realities. A better insight into Chiang will wait for the published studies of appropriate Japanese scholars, who are far better situated to understand such matters than U.S. students of the issue. Chiang was clearly a virtual pawn in the circumstances various forces created — by creating perceived as well as actual circumstances around Chiang, Chiang's Realpolitiking response to those circumstances tended to produce the effect the British desired. To the extent Chiang exhibited principled commitments underneath his Byzantine maneuverings, on balance he tended toward Sun Yat-sen's principles, toward agreement with the Japanese outlook. . . from a Chinese nationalist standpoint.

In speaking of Chiang, we are also speaking of three decades of Taiwan, an island-nation which was historically never part of China until the postwar arrangements by the victorious allies. Any fool who swallows the myth that Taiwan is historically part of China is incompetent in the study of China, Japan, or of that entire region of the Pacific, as incompetent as Vice-President Walter "Librium" Mondale exhibited himself in his babbling, anti-Japanese progression recently into Pacific and adjoining waters.

At the close of the war, Stalin agreed with the United States on China policy. To the consternation of General George C. Marshall and Major-General Hurley, Chiang Kai-shek sabotaged the efforts, and the consequent victory of the Mao Tse-tung forces ensued. What confused the Americans — and the evidence indicates that Marshall and Hurley were namely able as well as good Americans in the matter — was the refusal to see the British hand in the China affair. The postwar business concerning the IPR affair (1), the charge that certain Americans had aided in promoting a Chinese Communist victory, reflected the ingenuousness of U.S. military, intelligence and other circles, in failing to grasp the point that the Institute of Pacific Relations was a British secret intelligence arm, which, chased out of the United States, resituated itself in Canada.

Throughout the postwar period, British policy in Asia until 1973 was consistently to play the U.S. as a major, immediate danger to China — beginning with British rigging of the Korean War and British rigging of the Vietnam War. At the same time, Britain has used its channels of influence into Peking to catalyze conflict

between China and Moscow. Some British channels into Moscow have been used to assist that split.

What Britain accomplished by these means was to situate Peking in a controlled psychological environment, in which Britain played "soft cop" to Washington's "hard cop" in a Tavistockian Mutt-and-Jeff game. Peking, the more deeply it was separated from Moscow, played the game London offered it. Recognizing the powerful British subversive influence in Manhattan and Washington, Peking viewed itself as judoing London's Mutt-and-Jeff game to balance the "foreign devils." Peking's understanding of London was factually accurate. As long as London views Peking as London's prospective tool for the Pacific version of the Haushoferian geopolitical option, London will influence Washington and Europe to the purpose of strengthening Peking. By playing the part of the semi-willing tool in this game, Peking is able to judo London's policy to Peking's strategic advantage.

At bottom, Peking's policy continues to be "let the foreign devils destroy one another." In Peking's view this means the mutual destruction of the U.S., Western Europe and the Soviet Union in an Atlantic-centered thermonuclear war. Peking's current approach to realizing that objective is to appear to play the London game up to the point that London and the U.S. are irreversibly committed to war. At that point *Communist* Peking excuses itself from the war. It is strategic judo, the feeding of London's delusion, through the admittedly risky Chinese impetus toward the "inevitable war," which lures London and Washington into adopting a war-posture — fools confident of the China option. Once London and Washington have been so judoed into an irreversible posture, China withdraws, having accomplished its purpose.

The Poker Players

In pitting themselves against Peking's leaders, British representatives Kissinger, Brzezinski, Jackson, and Schlesinger are political Lilliputians bargaining with giants.

London and Kissinger overlook the vital element of perception in Peking's eyes. Peking's leaders have both hatred and contempt for the British, and they understand and despise miserable creatures such as Kissinger — they see through Kissinger immediately. London and Kissinger delude themselves that Peking's compliance with British policies signifies that London et. al. are the mental superiors of the heathen Chinese. In fact, Peking sees this aspect of the matter with exact correctness. To Peking, the problem has been and remains a matter of pure strategic power, a matter of the experiences dictated by configuration of power.

There is not a single Chinese leader whose perception of Britain is not shaped by hateful memories of the Opium Wars, a deep, silent and profound hatred which is without restraint. To Chinese, the British are not human — they are "foreign devils." That very quality which the British oligarchists admire in Chinese traditional culture, rural-rooted imbecile qualities of ethnic chauvinism frees most of Peking's leading forces of any consideration of compassion in their deeply-embedded racial hatred of the British. The same component of the influence of Chiang's *Communists* hostility to Moscow —

ethnic chauvinism — acts with double force in Peking's enmity toward everything British.

The leaders of Peking observe that the U.S. is a dumb giant, manipulated by British influence. Peking judges: Britain is the policy-shaping power among the "imperialist foreign devils." Hence, Peking's Realpolitik addresses itself to the sources of U.S. foreign policy: London.

There are several principal forces of experience shaping the outlook and character of Peking's leaders. Peking's leaders may be philosophically impaired, incapable of a global humanist outlook, and so forth, but, London and its U.S. henchmen are personally no match for men and women who have been molded by the processes which selectively determine who rises to and holds leading power in Peking.

Externally, Peking has been shaped by a containment which is more brutal than that experienced in recent decades by Moscow. This containment may have been in part self-imposed, but if one cuts off one's own leg, it is no less an amputation than if other persons had performed the procedure. This has shaped Peking's leadership to the point of emphasizing in those persons the attitude of surviving in a surrounding hostile world, a world with the means to destroy China were that world to discover the will to do so.

In the long history of the CPC, over more than half a century, the leadership has been shaped by brutal civil war experiences, by surviving as hunted men and women, and by factional struggles within the nation and party in which factional conflicts of recent decades have operated on social bases of hundreds of millions of persons. The two dominant social tendencies within Chinese society affecting these factional struggles have been the mass of traditional Chinese backwardness expressed by rural culture and the massive, but relatively weaker social base of China's industrial-centered development.

It is the latter social conflict which shapes the great internal contradiction of China. The Communist impulse, the industrial impulse, is confronted with the need to avoid direct conflict with the overwhelming mass of China's rural population. It is the CPC's adaptation to the present peasant mentality, as exhibited symptomatically by recurring xenophobic manias for purely Chinese culture, which makes China a potential danger to world peace, and makes China a potential social bomb with respect to any existing political order in Peking.

If foolish persons were not deluded and obsessed with London's geopolitical doctrine of the "China option," this problem of China would have to be faced. We cannot in good conscience permit a nation representing approximately one-quarter of the world's population to fester in the conditions fostering traditional Chinese cultural imbecility. Our concern ought to be that of Sun Yat-sen, a determination to aid China in industrializing its economy as rapidly as possible, to reduce the required rural component of China's labor force to about 10 percent at as rapid a rate as is feasible.

In a decade or so, China's industrialized population will be of a nation as large as the United States. Although no modern nation requiring as much as 50 percent of its labor force in rural production can have autochthonously, high rates of economic growth, high rates of national social productivity, an industrial power of the magnitude China is coming to represent can also be a military power in the world. If that military potential is commanded by the bestial-reactionary outlooks flowing from traditional Chinese culture, a menace is afoot in world affairs.

To prevent that menace from appearing, the technological development of China, the uprooting of the last vestiges of the bestializing old culture, must be accomplished. China's technological progress and growth rates must be mediated from the outside.

Under conditions of containment, the effort of China to develop economically puts the urban population into deadly conflict with the rural, over the issue of aggravated rates of economic primitive-accumulation needed to maintain the industrial economy even in equilibrium. The effort to ameliorate this conflict, under circumstances of economic containment, brings to the surface the worst political tendencies in domestic and foreign policies. The bestial chauvinism is so reflected in Peking's policies.

Despite the demoralizing influence of the aversive circumstances cited, Peking's leaders are men and women of real substance respecting the equations of strategic interests of states. They are incompetent, morally incompetent, in matters of comprehending strategic approaches for solving the world's problems — since their chauvinism prevents them from accepting the premises involved in such problems. As a nation-state which views itself as situated in a Hobbesian world-order, as an individual state blind to the interests of other human beings, Peking's leaders are among the toughest breed of politicians in the world today.

The Game Will End

If the United States government is foolish enough to follow London's advice concerning the geopolitical "China option," Peking will succeed in winning the game through an Atlantic-centered total thermonuclear war which eliminates the United States as a functioning nation. Peking's game is to insist that NATO and France commit themselves irreversibly to a war against the USSR. Peking will provide troops for Africa or elsewhere to feed that process, if this is deemed necessary to the objective. Once France and NATO are irreversibly committed to war, Peking pulls out.

(1) *The PRI affair* refers to the early 1950s investigation of the Pacific Relations Institute, and the subsequent ouster of U.S. State Department officials accused of being "pro-Communist" during and after World War II. The Pacific Relations Institute was established in the U.S. by the British monarchy's Royal Institute of International Affairs, and pushed a pro-Mao Tse-tung line throughout the Chinese civil war, a line that was circulated by many of the State Department officials who were dismissed during this period.