

The President of the United States desires friendly relations with a strong China. He is determined to join you in overcoming the remaining obstacles in the way to full normalization of our relations within the framework of the Shanghai Communique. The United States has made up its mind on this issue.

Teng Reveals Chinese View Of Brzezinski's Position

In an unpublished speech delivered July 20, 1977 to China's Central Committee plenum, Teng Hsiao-ping, vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, revealed the cynical manner in which China views the United States. The following excerpts are reprinted from a Chinese Information Service release of a version of the speech acquired in Taipei.

The focus of our diplomacy at the present stage is to firmly oppose the hegemonies of the Soviet Union and the United States. However, we must not assume that in the world today whoever opposes the Soviet Union and the United States is our friend, for at best, they could only be a friend for the time being. We must mobilize all positive and favorable factors internationally that can be used to check and resist the foremost danger of the moment—mainly, the danger of another world war. The eruption of World War III is inevitable. However, if the time of its eruption can be delayed after the turn of this century, we would then be able to take the initiative, and it would be most beneficial.

In the application of a struggle for an international united front, one of the most important rules is that there must be not only unity, but also struggle. Wouldn't this be a kind of contradiction? Actually, this is not contradictory, and is, in fact, Chairman Mao's greatest

invention with insuperable prowess. Notwithstanding that the science and technology of U.S. imperialism may be called the first in the world, they have no understanding of this at all. Our method is to seek unity and coalition from struggle...

Being Marxists, we would never be so stupid as to be incapable of distinguishing friend from foe. Whether it is Nixon, Ford, Carter or any future leader of U.S. imperialism, none of them can climb out of the same merry-go-round. Their purpose is to exploit the split between the Chinese and the Soviet Communist Parties to bring about the downfall of world socialism as well as to checkmate the Soviet threat to them. Then why could we not take advantage of their contradictions and the gaps between their positions of adopting a policy advantageous to us? We will not be controlled by others; we should instead control them. Excessive dependence often leads to passiveness, thus making it impossible to assume any initiative. This we must never do, and what we must do is to grasp the opportunity and bring in what we want conditionally, mainly knowhow and equipment in the scientific and technological fields which would be most beneficial to our realization of the four modernizations.

The president of two succeeding administrations of U.S. imperialism, its secretary of state, members of Congress, and a number of other influential persons in military and political circles have come to visit China. . . . At present, they have something to ask from us, and we hold the complete initiative in dealing with them. . . . It would be impossible for the Carter administration to dream about killing two birds with one stone. They are really pitifully naive. If it were not on conditions favorable to us, we would not even agree to the adoption of the "Japan formula."

Developing America's Monetarist Elite

An interview with Fritz Kraemer

Fritz Kraemer has been in the Department of Defense for 30 years — officially in a relatively insignificant post incommensurate with the influence he is known to have. It is commonly said that Kraemer spends his time reading every cable that the department receives, and formulating advice for his network of contacts.

In addition to his role as the discoverer and mentor of Henry Kissinger, Kraemer maintains close contact with many Administration officials. The following interview with Kraemer occurred earlier this month and was made available to Executive Intelligence Review by a freelance journalist.

Q: *What are your perceptions of the issue of U.S.-China relations?*

A: The damnable bourgeoisie will never understand the Chinese—China has for us only one use: to be a counterweight against the one real threat to the U.S., the Soviet Union. The Chinese are very realistic and brilliant—the

brilliance in terms of realism of a Kissinger or a Brzezinski is nothing compared to the Chinese. So the idea that we must be on good terms with China is excellent, but not at the expense of Taiwan. You know, before Vance went to China, the Chinese told us they would not even bring up Taiwan, but Vance brought it up. He offered to have a full embassy in Peking and a simple mission on Taiwan, but the Chinese rejected this—so Vance came back to the U.S. and announced that the Chinese are very "flexible"—the next day, Teng (who, by the way, is the *real* ruler of China, not Hua) denied that they are "flexible"—I know, what the Chinese meant is, "How stupid can you be—we are not really interested in Taiwan, but for public relations reasons we cannot say we are 'flexible.'" The stupid bourgeoisie thinks it is a compliment to call someone "flexible"—but people like the Chinese, and like me, we know a real man is not "flexible" but rigid—he knows what he wants and is not "flexible."

The necessity of being in cahoots with Peking against Moscow is real, but we do not have to give Peking anything. Though I do think we should give them weapons. . . .

Q: There are some people in the Administration who understand this, aren't there? I mean, Schlesinger, though I guess he doesn't say much about these things.

Kraemer: Oh, I am in constant contact with Schlesinger now—I admire him so. I have been in the Defense Department for 30 years, and of all the Secretaries of Defense, Schlesinger was the best. But he is too tactful to say things now, but I can assure you that he is aware of all this. But he will not say. Now me, I am not afraid to say anything. I am not afraid of some little bureaucrat.

People used to tell me, you know, Kissinger is out to get you. And I would say, how? Where are his tanks, where are his concentration camps? Why should I be afraid? You know, I was a soldier in the war. I am not afraid of bureaucrats.

Q: What about Vance—what does he think he's doing?

Kraemer: Vance—you ask me, what does a man who does not understand, understand? He is a very gentle man, and he's a gentleman. But he is not in central charge of the China policy. He asked friends of mine, Why did the Chinese obviously hate me so much? Now, that's the question of a naive man. The Chinese see the Moscow danger so clearly and then they see Vance. . . . ah, well.

Q: And Brzezinski?

Kraemer: He's a professor. Vance is an innocent. He truly does not understand. He's a lawyer. Now, I'm a lawyer too, but I understand. Brzezinski—he's a professor.

Q: And that's better than a lawyer?!

Kraemer: Ah, well, Brzezinski is brilliant, but he has become accustomed to write brilliant articles that are totally consistent. But, he has come to recognize that somehow his whole idea on the Trilateral world has broken down, that we must talk to China—it is the recognition by a theoretician that he has to *probe*—sees that China can be a very important pawn. So he is going there to probe.

We in the U.S. are living for the last 15 years strategically on the rift between China and the Soviet Union. Brzezinski has probably seen that—but the true reality is that both do not understand, but Brzezinski has obviously a more alive brain and feels that something is going terribly wrong.

I have the feeling that even our giving Taiwan to China would not help our relations with Peking. They would then see the U.S. as so weak that they could not trust us. Rapprochement? My nightmare! From our strategic point of view, it would have been better had the Gang of Four remained in power. These were wild revolutionaries. Moscow was heresy, and they would never have gone for rapprochement. Of course, it would have been a terrible thing for the Chinese population if they had stayed in power, but from our point of view. . . . Now, Teng, however, is a pragmatist. If they see that we

are not an effective counterweight, they may accommodate to Moscow. And this idea would not even be stupid for them. They could buy time. Join with the Soviets against the U.S., and in 12-15 years, they would have such a large population and would build up technologically, that they could take on the Soviet Union. But the irrational Gang of Four would not have thought so pragmatically.

Q: You said you favor giving them arms. I assume you don't mean strategic arms?

Kraemer: I would give them some arms because that is what they really want—they do not want Taiwan—they want arms. So we should give them arms that are not secret, but arms that they need. We would not have to give them weapons if we were showing strength around the world—if we were standing up to the Soviets in the Horn, in Asia, Afghanistan, in Jamaica (oh yes, people don't realize that's becoming another Cuba.) But since we aren't, they need arms to defend against the Soviets.

I don't like the term "normalize" relations with China. We would better use the word "cooperation" than "normalization" — the Chinese don't want "normalization" because they could not accept this unless we gave up Taiwan, and they really do not want us to do that, since that would show us to be very weak and undependable.

I knew that Kissinger was going to China several months before he went. Only I, and Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig knew at that time.

But I was not in favor of his going to China. My fear was that we would give too much, as we did. I told Henry afterwards that the Shanghai Communiqué was wrong. He said, "Yes, you are right." It was not a Kissinger idea to go to China, but Nixon's idea. Kissinger had doubts, which is why he discussed it with me, because I am an objective man—rigid, but objective. So Kissinger went and was intellectually seduced by the Chinese. They are terribly intellectually seductive.

Q: Did that happen to George Bush, too?

Kraemer: Madame, you cannot intellectually seduce someone without an intellect. I, too, have been somewhat intellectually seduced by the Chinese—they are intellectuals, they can discuss the whole world. Not like these small bourgeois in the West, who only know about one little thing. But that does not prevent a man of my type from fighting and even shooting them, if necessary—but they are very seductive.

You know, people say Kissinger is arrogant. That is not true. Kissinger is not arrogant; Kissinger is not sure of himself. It is known that I created Kissinger, because I am sure of myself and I am a very eloquent man. I knew he was brilliant, but not self-assured. When I discovered him, he was a private, just out of high school, and he wanted to be an accountant. I was 16 years older than him. Unfortunately, Dr. Kissinger is not arrogant. If he were, he would not have to look to others for approval so much. If you want to see someone arrogant, look at me. I do not need any particular approval. I know who I am. He did not. But I don't want to be too hard on him. If I had to go through what Dr. Kissinger went through from 5 to 10 years old, perhaps I would not be so self-assured either.

So, he is not a good negotiator with hard-willed people.

What he found remarkable about the Soviets was their raw power, that they were so hard-willed and willing to use their power. However, in the end, the real problem is that Kissinger was not so attracted by the Soviets as he was by the Chinese, but he had invested so much in détente and SALT that I could say to him, Henry, there is just one small difference between us: you would rather have a bad agreement than no agreement, but I would rather have no agreement than a bad agreement.

Q: What do you think of Senator Jackson's role?

Kraemer: Ah, without Jackson we would already be lost. He is a fine Norwegian, a decent Scandinavian—not very strong, but without him, we would already be standing naked with a SALT agreement. He has been the only obstacle on the road to a very bad SALT agreement.

But you know, Scoop Jackson is really personally weak. If he were negotiating with the Soviets, he too would give away too much. He could not stand up to them. But what he has been doing from his position has been crucial. . . .

Schlesinger is a highly unusual man — a bird watcher. Going forward, he can be very good, but only if he has the position to. Sitting in a little room at SAIS, he got bored. He is not a born missionary, as I am. He is very taciturn in private. I am a missionary. If I tell you your house is burning and you ignore me, I will keep telling you. But not Schlesinger. He's not a missionary.

Q: So, did Henry arrange to have Schlesinger removed 'cause he opposed SALT?

Kraemer: No, no. Kissinger called me also that same Monday, and we spoke for two hours. His first words to me were: "You do not believe that I did that — Schlesinger was my only equal in the cabinet. We disagreed about some things, but I would not have done this." My own personal analysis of the firing is that Ford really did feel ill at ease with Schlesinger, and so Rumsfeld, who realized this, told Ford it was time to get rid of him, and, "by the way, why not put me in his place?" Rumsfeld has ambitions that are still not entirely played out, you know.

Q: I have heard some disturbing rumors that Schlesinger may be ousted again. Have you heard such things?

Kraemer: No — but Carter — well, fortunately, I have never seen him — but he is obviously *not* a man who would through anybody out. Look at what he did with Burt Lance — why, Burt is someone I would not touch with a prong! And Carter did not even throw him out. Mondale, if he gets in, he may kick out Schlesinger, but not Carter, who clearly is not a man who could throw anyone out... I am, frankly, terribly afraid that this great national asset, Dr. Schlesinger, may be ground to shreds in his present position....

You know, for the bourgeois world, reality is receding. I see our cables from Kabul, and they finally see what is happening, but people sitting a few countries away treat it as an event of little reality. Oh, the incapability of affluent people to deal with very hard-nose people. I am not a bourgeois, so I am obviously dangerous... But it is difficult for us to negotiate because we are not awe-inspiring. We seem to lack a national will. Why did the North Vietnamese win? Because they had a national will, their soldiers had will. A Prussian general once said, "Prostitutes and professors can be bought on any street corner, but a soldier of courage cannot be bought." I understand that.

...Look, a liberal is a person who does not understand reality. They think that people can sit around, discuss, and come to agreement on anything rationally. If two men want to marry the same woman, should they be so old-fashioned as to want to marry her, a liberal thinks you can go to a judge and have him decide. But this is not a juridical question, not a question of logic. It was better when they used to decide such questions with a duel. The real answer to everything is raw power.

I have seen to it that I am never promoted. And I never answer things written about me. My staff tells me that a silly MIT professor wrote that Kissinger was programmed by me. But I would not respond. You know, the secret is *that any society needs an elite*. I understand that.

Ah, I must go now. What a conversation. But I must ask you, do not quote me directly. I do not mind for myself. I am not afraid. But my superiors would shudder down their spines to hear all this — if, indeed, they had spines.