

Congress. The alleged evidence on which this abrupt shift was based has never been made public, was denied to the relevant foreign relations committees of Congress, and claims based upon it have been greeted with widespread skepticism both here and abroad. Indeed, the government of West Germany, in an official reply to a parliamentary question on this very issue, declared that no evidence existed to show Cuban involvement in the invasion.

Turner's role in this coup is explicit. The CIA representative at the May 19 White House meeting claimed that his agency had the evidence to prove that the "Cubans have recently insurgents," even though President Castro publicly and privately has emphatically stated that the Cubans broke off relations with the Katangese in 1976, to the point of denying them medical supplies.

In subsequent testimony Turner has attempted to embellish claims of Cuban links to the Katangese with alleged eyewitness accounts, maps that purport to show Cuban training grounds for the rebels, and even hints of the existence of aerial photos. But in the words of Senator McGovern, "none of this would stand up in court."

Turner's only response is to claim that intelligence evidence does not have to meet the requirements of the rules of evidence.

Despite the clear evidence of the perfidious role of his CIA chief and his NSC Director, President Carter still foolishly inflicts upon himself responsibility for those lies. Therefore the relevant Senate and House committees will have to expose two glaring features of this critical situation.

The first is Turner's role, and the second is Brzezinski's in charging into this mess and turning it into as East-West confrontation of global proportions. The role of these two men will demonstrate the breakdown of availability to the White House of political intelligence evaluation that adequately reflects the national interest.

The mandate for a searching investigation by Congress into this situation exists, as evidenced by the communication of the American Committee of East-West Accord signed by 60 prominent Americans. The Committee delivered their warning of the threat to detente and SALT to Brzezinski personally. But the White House did not learn of their communication until it had appeared in Pravda several days later.

— Stephen Pepper

Castro: Brzezinski Lied To Carter On Cuba

Cuban President Fidel Castro this week denounced as lies U.S. Administration allegations that his government aided last month's rebel invasion of Zaire's Shaba province. The Cuban head of state offered to meet with President Carter to clear the air on this issue. Below are excerpts from a New York Times News Service interview with Castro by reporter Jon Nordheimer, which was printed in the June 10 edition of the Chicago Tribune:

Havana-President Fidel Castro charged Tuesday that President Carter has been "manipulated and deceived" by elements in his own Administration concerning last month's invasion of Zaire's Shaba province by Katangan troops. He blamed Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's advisor on national security.

He said he would be willing to meet with Carter to sort out the tangled circumstances behind the invasion and the allegations that flowed from it.

Castro denied with great passion charges that Cuba had supplied the Katangan rebels and trained them before the invasion last month, and said that it has been the policy of his government to avoid "encouragement" of the Katangans since the cessation of the civil war in Angola in early 1976.

"It is not a half-lie," he said with regard to the charges in Washington that Cubans were involved in the Shaba invasion. "It is an absolute, total, complete lie."

He was careful to avoid suggesting that Carter personally had taken a hand in producing what he called a "gross fabrication" about the Cuban role in Africa.

"It was a manufactured lie — manufactured in Brzezinski's office," Castro said. "I think Mr. Carter has

been confused and deceived, but I do not think Mr. Carter has deliberately resorted to this himself."

"Without doubt," Castro said, "People in his administration want to manufacture their own Gulf of Tonkin in order to intervene in Africa."

He said that before Washington charged that Cuban troops were involved in the Shaba incident, he had supplied the United States Government with information about rumors that Katangan Rebels were preparing to invade Shaba. He added that this was "the first time in my career" that he had given Washington such information.

He also gave this account of his exchanges with Washington in mid May:

"Between the 11th and 12th of May, the first news was released of the Shaba events," he said. "Between the 12th and 15th of May, two statements were released by the U.S. Government that contained the truth saying there was no evidence Cubans were involved in this operation.

"On the 15th, through the U.S. interests sections here, we received a message coming from officials of the U.S. Government on the highest level. In our opinion that was the message on Africa that was constructive and positive."

... His original message had been conveyed to Cyrus Vance who in turn gave it to Carter.

Within hours, the Cuban leader charged, the content of his messages to Washington had been leaked to the American press.

"Not all of it was leaked," he said, "but part of it that

Le Matin: Cuba Tried To Stop Zaire Invasion

The Cubans and the Angolans knew about the plan for the rebel invasion of Zaire's Shaba province last month — and tried to stop it. According to a French radio report this week by Jean-Francois Kahn, Cuba and Angola moved to discourage the action, and Nathanael Mbumba, the leader of the rebels, was in close contact with Belgian, not Cuban or Angolan, circles before the invasion. The substance of Kahn's report, first heard on France's Antenne 2 television, was printed in the Paris daily Le Matin of June 13. Excerpts appear below:

According to Jean-François Kahn, who cites firm sources, Nathanael Mbumba informed Angolan President Agostinho Neto and a Cuban official his plans to attack the Shaba province and take over the city of Kolwesi. During a stormy meeting, the Angolans and Cubans then tried to convince Nathanael Mbumba to make an alliance with the progressive and Lumumbaist forces in Zaire, notably with Guzenga, former faithful of Patrice Lumumba. Mbumba did not give in to these pressures and there occurred a quasi-break between the Katangans on one side and the Angolans and Cubans on the other.

...Jean-François Kahn gives more details. According to his information, Nathanael Mbumba has stayed in contact with several officials from Gecamines, inheritor of the old Union Minière of

Upper-Katanga, where he was once a militia chief. During a meeting which took place several weeks before the attack on Kolwesi, Mbumba told his interlocutors that he would, out of necessity, and out of necessity only, rely on Cuban logistics, but that his fight remained the same as that of Moise Tshombe who, during the early 1960s, tried to obtain the secession of Katanga to the benefit of Western capitalist firms.

Still according to Jean-François Kahn, Nathanael Mbumba would have had contacts with conservative (Christian Democrat) political circles in Belgium to whom he explained that "Mobutu is France's man" and that Belgium's interests were thus being undercut. The leader of the rebellion explained that when Katanga would be invaded and Mobutu's regime overthrown, Belgium would be able to recoup its interests in Zaire, notably in Katanga.

These revelations prove: first, that the grafting of Marxist intellectuals didn't take in the FLNC (Front for the National Liberation of Congo) and that it has remained above all a reactionary organization sold out to foreign interests; second and most important, that the responsibility of the Soviet Union and of Cuba is not engaged in this affair, even if the Cubans have trained some of Nathanael Mbumba's men in the hope that they would serve their projects in a revolutionary perspective.

we had given assurances to the U.S. government that we had no role in Shaba."

By that evening, a State Department spokesman in Washington made the accusation that Cuba had a role in the Katanga invasion.

"It was a brutal way, a really gross and offending way that had no consideration at all for us," Castro stated. "It was something really strange. If the U.S. had any doubts it could have conveyed those doubts to us through Mr. Lane, but it all happened within hours."

Regarding Brzezinski, the Cuban leader said that "in my personal view he had used blackmail as an instrument against us," to worsen Cuban-American relations as in the case of the senate debate earlier this year over the package sale of jet fighter planes to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, "someone within the Administration" used the presence of the Cuban advisors in South Yemen to "convince the senate on the advisability on the sale of the planes."

"All of this gives me the impression someone inside the administration is making use of lies to manipulate congress and the president," he concluded.

His voice rising with emotion, he reiterated his assertion that Cuba had not supplied arms, training or advisors to the Katangans, and in fact had deliberately avoided contact with them because Havana feared that an attack on Zaire would divert world attention from the

struggle against the governments of Rhodesia and South Africa.

"We assist liberation movements in South Africa and Rhodesia, and we do not deny that," he said.

African Front-Line States Blast Brzezinski

On June 7, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere convened an extraordinary meeting of all foreign diplomats in Tanzania to single out U.S. National Security Council Chief Zbigniew Brzezinski as the provocateur responsible for the anti-Soviet furor over the destabilization of Zaire.

Two days later, Angolan President Agostinho Neto opened the door wide for a reconciliation between Angola and Zaire, the necessary precondition for stabilizing this region of central Africa. Neto's initiative discredits claims that the Angolans are trying to topple the Zairean government of Joseph Mobutu.

The following is excerpted from Angolan President Agostinho Neto's June 9th speech, which was his first official statement on the Shaba affair:

Compatriots and comrades:

...Following the outbreak of what has come to be called the Second War of Shaba — to which the PRA (People's Republic of Angola) contributed nothing, except perhaps

the historical happenstance that found Zairean refugees in our territory — certain preventive measures were taken by us against the gratuitous accusations made against our country.

The Angolan state has not trained, has not armed any army, nor organized any expedition against Zaire.

Our Soviet and Cuban allies have not intervened in any way whatsoever in Angolan territory to provoke a rebellion.

This fact, however, did not prevent the steps taken from serving to demonstrate the desire that has always led us to maintain normal relations of friendship with our neighbors. Thus, to all those who solicited us, formal guarantees of protection were given — to Belgian, French citizens or whatever other nationality that may have ventured to seek the route of Angola to return to their countries....

Other measures were taken as well....it was decided — and long before the rebellion in Zaire — to transfer close to 250,000 refugees located in the provinces of Lunda and Moxico away from the areas bordering on Shaba....

Those who arrive from Zaire with arms will be systematically disarmed and taken to refugee camps....We believe we can thus alleviate the apprehensions of the Zairean government concerning the possibilities of attacks launched from Angola.

I also take this opportunity to make an appeal to Zaire to withdraw to the other side of the border the bands of the FNLA, FLEC, and UNITA as well as the mercenaries, who carry out constant attacks against our territory, undoubtedly with the knowledge of the authorities of that neighboring country.

The People's Republic of Angola does not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries, whether their regime appeals to us or not. We therefore seek relations of friendship and cooperation particularly with those adjacent to us. And if good relations between Angola and Zaire are necessary for the peace and development of this region of Africa, it is necessary to eliminate the causes of tension....

Nyerere: Brzezinski "the New Kissinger"

Below is a summary of the June 8 presentation by President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania to the diplomatic corps in his country's capital:

"If Carter wants to turn around and listen to the new Kissinger in his Administration...he should not be surprised if we change our views, because then he's saying he doesn't care about one-man one-vote in Africa. He only cares about confrontation with the Soviet Union, and defense of capitalism in Africa...."

"I'm still hopeful," Nyerere added, that a "progressive" voice would be heard in the Carter Administration. "Let that (be the) voice which is still

speaking to Africa, not this hysterical voice about Africa being taken over by Cuba. It is an absurdity. I don't think it becomes a powerful country like the U.S."

President Nyerere stated that the Soviet Union and Cuba were heavily involved only in Ethiopia and Angola, and "...in both cases at the request of legitimate governments concerned, for reasons which are well known and completely understandable by all reasonable people."

On the idea of a NATO-related Security Force for Africa, he added: "...those who seek to initiate such a force are not interested in the freedom of Africa. They are interested in domination of Africa...."

Nyerere warned that, "Recent developments have shown that the immediate danger to Africa comes from countries in the Western bloc."

House Committee Demands Clarification of U.S. Foreign Policy

Following Jimmy Carter's markedly anti-Soviet foreign policy address of June 7, the House International Relations Committee dispatched a letter to the President requesting clarification of U.S. foreign policy. Among the Congressmen who signed the letter were Dante Fascell (D-Fla.), Charles Diggs (D-Mich.), Steven Solarz (D-N.Y.), Larry Winn (R-Kan.), Donald Fraser (D-Minn.), Donald Pease (D-Ohio), Jonathan Bingham (D-N.Y.), Charles Whalen (R-Ohio), Don Bonkers (D-Wash.), Ed Derwinski (R-Ill.), and Gerry Studds (R-Mass.). Excerpts follow:

...We are concerned over what appears to be a change in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Specific expressions of concern were voiced over press reports on apparently conflicting statements made by members of your administration on the possible relationship of recent Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa and the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. For instance, we do not understand the meaning or intent of the recent strong statements by the Director of the National Security Council (Zbigniew Brzezinski) with respect to the Soviet Union, nor do we know the motivations for this development. Is this to suggest a relationship between the SALT talks and Soviet involvement in Africa, in the Persian Gulf, or in Afghanistan?...There is concern in the committee whether it is in our own national security interest to permit developments in Africa to adversely affect our relations with the Soviet Union...

We would appreciate hearing from the Secretary of State, or whoever you determine is better able to articulate the significance of these developments and whether there has been a change in U.S. policy or whether any change is contemplated....Many members of Congress are embarrassed by their current inability to answer questions from their constituents as to what is U.S. policy on such issues as Soviet American relations and Africa.

Kraft: Vance Should Run U.S. Foreign Policy

The following are excerpts from a column by syndicated journalist Joseph Kraft, which appeared in the Washington Post June 13.

President Carter's Annapolis speech may not have ended the fight for influence between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and White House aide Zbigniew Brzezinski. But it settled one point decisively.

It proved that the President himself is a tyro in foreign policy, not only unpracticed in diplomacy but also without even a good working knowledge of recent history. Indeed his personal inexperience is the main reason why the tilting back and forth between advisors has generated serious misgivings in a capital that normally takes rivalry near the top for granted.

...Korea is not generally regarded as an example of a proxy war. All the leading experts in the State Department, including Carter's own appointees, concur in the judgment that the war was started and largely maintained on the motion of the North Korean strongman Kim Il Sung. Whatever the Soviet role, moreover, Korea came at the high point of cold war, not in a period of detente. To put Korea, a major conflict that nearly touched off World War III, on the same plane as Angola, denotes, in itself, a staggering lack of historical understanding.

(Carter) does not put together a strong policy by balancing off one high official against another. Neither does he, by that tactic, communicate the policy to the Russians with clarity. All he does is keep U.S. officials off balance, thus making himself the constant arbiter of choice.

The intimate involvement in day to day foreign policy by a President with so little experience and grasp is dangerous. So the sensible thing for Carter would be to follow two previous Presidents not overly versed in foreign policy — Truman and Eisenhower — who placed prime reliance on the Secretary of State. The more so as Brzezinski has managed to make himself a red flag to Moscow, and has — besides the Carter connection — only the frailest ties to the rest of the U.S. government.

Soviets Reply to Carter's Annapolis Speech

This statement was issued by the Soviet news agency Tass on June 8, the day after Carter's foreign policy address at Annapolis, Md.:

...Despite the fact that the President spoke at the very moment that the special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament was going on — at which, as is well known, the USSR and several other countries came out with concrete proposals on deepening detente, extending it to the military sphere, containing the dangerous arms race — J. Carter totally by-passed these questions....

As more and more states are realizing, it is precisely the policies of the USA which are the main obstacle in the path of detente and peaceful coexistence, of progress in disarmament. Ignoring all this, the U.S. President stated: "The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is prepared for either one."

This statement sounds strange, to say the least. Carter knows very well that it is precisely the Soviet Union which long ago and irrevocably chose the road of peaceful coexistence, the road of deepening detente, and advocates these goals consistently and undeviatingly. But evidently in the leading circles of Washington the choice has not yet been made.

The Pravda June 11, "International Week" column by Vladimir Bol'shakov said this:

...Granted, in the President's speech there were positive moments....(But) Carter's Annapolis speech was essentially a whole series of ultimata to the Soviet Union...Americans and the European public are concerned by the fact that the basically aggressive, tough line of Brzezinski, who is widely known for his anticommunism, is getting the upper hand in the White House. This policy is not only fraught with the danger of a return to the "cold war" — which has essentially been revived already by American propaganda, inflaming anti-Soviet hysteria — but also ultimately a turn to confrontation....