

Press Debates U.S. 'China Card' Option

Zbigniew Brzezinski's efforts to entangle the United States in a dangerous military alliance with China against the Soviet Union has provoked a battle in the press over the issue of "playing the China Card" Drawing fire is the Carter Administration's decision, recommended by Brzezinski, to sell China high-technology equipment with potential military application. The same equipment is to be denied to the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the British-inspired U.S. press is using the opening by Brzezinski to push for full normalization of diplomatic relations with China by early 1979.

Doubts About the 'Han Nationalists'

Baltimore News American, "*Zbig's Chinese Card*" by John Roche, June 12:

Ever since President Carter's national Security Advisor Zbig Brzezinski returned from Peking amidst rumors of glad tidings from the East I have been meditating on what is called "playing the chinese card." Operating on the conventional wisdom that my enemy's enemy is my friend, the theory postulates that it is in the American interest to build up the Chinese People's Republic against the Soviets. . . .

In cold analytical terms, the People's Republic is the biggest concentration camp on earth, run by a military junta. Its major problems are domestic, notably maintaining the unity that has existed since 1950 against "mountain-topism" that is, regional communist warlords. Han nationalism, which could be called belief in the Chinese "Master Race," is the most effective instrument for achieving internal cohesion. This in turn requires an external threat, provided in spades by Moscow's overreaction to Peking's impotent claims to huge chunks of Soviet turf. . . .

This leaves the present regime with a mini-max strategy towards the United States. The minimum is to persuade the Americans to contribute substantially to China's modernization; the maximum is to stimulate a central nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This is not a Roche fantasy. The late Chairman Mao openly stated on numerous occasions, in slightly varying formulations, that if there were a general nuclear war, the Americans, Europeans, and Russians would be exterminated, but there would still be 200 or 300 million Chinese.

Those who think this nightmare vision vanished with its prophet should read the blood-curdling speech Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua made to the United Nations Disarmament session. Long-run Chinese communist strategy is clearly posted on limited Armageddon rephrased as "Let's you and him have a nuclear war."

Thus when I hear the manipulative optimists in the administration talk about "playing the Chinese card," I get nervous. How, except in some meaningless juridical sense, can you talk of "normalizing" relations with a regime that pleasantly anticipates your radioactivation?

Atlanta Journal, *Editorial*, June 12:

. . .The report that the Carter Administration is to approve the sale of military-related equipment to the People's Republic of China can only be regarded as a calculated risk . . . (it) would only further erode the deteriorating relations between Washington and Moscow. It amounts to a public slap in the face of the Soviet Union. . . .But Peking remains something of an enigma itself. . . .The situation in China could change overnight. . . .There is no guarantee in such a situation (of contiuing factional strife) that the current rulers will remain there for a specific period of time. They could suddenly be replaced by others who regard the U.S. as the arch-enemy and the Soviet Union as a friend. . . .

Christian Science Monitor, "*China's Dream Wars*," by Joseph C. Harsch, June 13:

. . . That Moscow would actually take a deliberate step to start a big war (as China asserts) is, I think, not rational. . . .But of course, Moscow might be pulled unintentionally into war by some crisis which got out of hand. Or it could be panicked into war. A formal alliance between NATO and China could well cause the men in Moscow to think that they had no choice but to take 'preventive action.' That possibility may be the most serious danger to peace which exists today. . . .The most likely cause of a war involving the Soviet Union would seem to be a Middle East crisis which got out of hand or a territorial war between the Soviets and China. Naturally, the Chinese would hope that it would be the former rather than the latter. In Western Europe in 1939 many a political leader hoped that Hitler would attack Russia, allowing the West to sit on the sidelines while Germany and Russia fought it out.

Endorsements for Peking

The Baltimore Sun, "*Full Ties With Peking*," June 12:

. . . Does it mean Mr. Carter's relations with both Communist giant powers become a shambles? No. Rather, such a move would be a master stroke that could consolidate a natural Washington-Moscow relationship and position the United States nicely in the superpower triangle.

In terms of domestic U.S. politics, recognition of Peking would no longer draw unified denunciations from conservatives. Indeed, a friendly attitude toward Peking is now considered strong evidence of anti-Sovietism in

many political circles, from left to right. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Administration's strongest Kremlin critic, has emerged as its most ardent exponent of normalization with China. Senator Henry Jackson, the Capital's best informed critic of SALT, has called for full diplomatic relations with Peking. He and others could well interpret a bold Carter move toward Peking as evidence of a no-nonsense attitude toward Moscow. Such an attitude could help SALT II ratification.

... The President's national security advisor briefed his Chinese hosts thoroughly on the details of SALT, listened sympathetically to their complaints about Vietnam and found common ground in opposing the Soviet adventuring in Africa.

New York Times, "Inching Toward China," by James Reston, June 14:

The relations between the U.S. and the PRC move with glacial slowness, but recently there have been a couple of vague indications that the Carter Administration is trying by indirect means to find a formula for normalizing diplomatic relations with Peking. . . The hope in official quarters here is that practical steps, such as improved U.S.-Chinese trade, including dual purpose technology, and the shipment of allied arms to China, with U.S. approval, will lead Peking to indicate on its own, without any demands or requests from Washington, that it will settle the Taiwan problem by peaceful means.

LaRouche: The Urgent Launching Of A Counterpole

The following statement was issued on June 11, by U.S. Labor Party Chairman, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Over the months since early 1974 the U.S. Labor Party has gained accelerating credibility and marginal influence as a source of political intelligence and policy options among numerous circles, both inside and outside the United States.

POLICY STATEMENT

For political reasons, including threats of reprisals and even outright blackmail from London-centered elements inside and outside the U.S., leading circles collaborating or conducting policy discussions with the U.S. Labor Party have been generally most cautious to date in avoiding public identification with the party.

The time has come to bring a representative selection of the forces involved in these discussions out into the public view.

The foremost reason this must now be done is that time is running out on the possibility for instituting the drastic reshaping of U.S. basic policy conceptions needed to get the nation — and the world — safely through the years immediately ahead. The poker game between London and Peking, the effort of these two to outfox one another on the setting up of the alternatives of either an Atlantic-centered or Pacific-centered thermonuclear war, leaves no margin for the sort of silliness on basic policy issues which has dominated the White House and much of the Congress during the past year and a half. The effort we must make involves a complete replacement for the "American Century" doctrine developed during the 1930s and 1940s. We must mobilize the forces capable of formulating such policies without delay.

This challenge would be difficult enough in any case. We have other important difficulties.

The most conspicuous such difficulty is the White House. We have a President of the United States whose most notable virtue is that he represents a first line of defense against such menaces as Vice President Walter F. Mondale, Senator Ted Kennedy, Joe Rauh, Jr., California's Governor Jerry Brown, and kindred embodiments of evil. President Carter's fatal flaw and ironic virtue is that he is essentially a chameleon, who assumes whichever policy colorations he perceives the background configurations of power to require. He desires to be President, and desires to cut the appearance of a President who makes "difficult decisions" and is obeyed. Apart from that, he has little political content but a sense of this present proprietorship over the office. He will hold to that office tenaciously despite all assaults, clinging to his property of the moment not with wisdom, but with the stubborn tenacity of a rural landlord.

Carter will make good decisions if the configuration of power prompts him to perceive such decisions as a proper, chameleon-like posture. In this respect, Carter will be as good or bad as we make him.

The second major difficulty is the presently wretched moral and intellectual condition of the Kissinger-tainted Republican National Committee. As long as the Republican Party tolerates this disgusting exhibition of whorish "consensus politicking" by would-be 1980 presidential nominees, the Republican Party does not function as the element of parliamentary "loyal opposition" it might otherwise contribute to the policymaking process.

The third, related difficulty centers around the destruction of the United States government's independent political-intelligence capabilities by a cabal of Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Walter