

Japan Wins With Its 'China Card'

The just-signed treaty opens way for Japan's development policy

After six months of battle at the negotiating table, Japan and the People's Republic of China have finally reached a peace agreement — and Japan came out on top.

The two countries signed a long-delayed "peace and friendship" treaty in Peking last week, formally ending the state of war between them since World War II and setting the tone for future relations.

The major obstacle to the treaty was removed when Chinese leaders agreed to include in the text a statement moderating the "antihegemony" clause that Peking has identified as aimed against the Soviet Union. Japan insisted that a separate statement in the treaty make clear that the pact between the two nations was not aimed "at any third country."

The turning point in the treaty negotiations came last week, when Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda dispatched Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda to Peking, with a "now or never" message for the Chinese leaders.

Sonoda's tough-talking forced Peking to back down. He insisted that Japan has no intention of being pulled into the Sino-Soviet conflict, and sharply questioned Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua on Peking's policy toward Southeast Asia. The countries of Southeast Asia, Sonoda said, fear China may itself have aspirations to achieve hegemony in their region.

While many press reports tried to depict the treaty as a triumph of Chinese diplomacy, it is clear that in fact Japan has played its "China card" against the schemers themselves. Japanese leaders are seeking to avoid the mistakes of the past that led to war. They are responding to attempts to draw them into confrontation not by allying with Peking against Moscow, but by enveloping China in a stable relationship based on fostering industrialization and scientific modernization of that backward nation.

The Soviet Response

The Soviet Union reacted quickly to the news of the treaty, sharply denouncing it in a TASS commentary as designed to enable China "to widen its sphere of influence" in Asia. The commentary also attacked Japan for "yielding to Peking's dictates," and for "placing itself in a position from which it may be involved in China's hegemonistic policy."

Diplomatic observers have noted however, that the bulk of the commentary was aimed against China and the sections attacking Japan were relatively mild.

Moscow is reliably reported to appreciate the desire of Japan to avoid involvement in some anti-Soviet "front" in Asia, but is questioning the ability of the Fukuda government to resist the heavy pressure favoring such a policy coming from Washington and Peking. As TASS stated, "The future will show whether Japan will succeed in conducting an independent foreign policy course."

It is significant that the moderate Soviet comments toward Japan differed sharply with numerous Western (especially British) press reports that the conclusion of the Japan-China treaty marked a decision by Japan to cooperate with China and reduce relations with Moscow.

Moderated Antihegemony Clause

Japanese government officials are stating confidently that the conclusion of the treaty with China is a victory for Japan, as China acceded to all of

Japanese Official: Press Distorted Soviet Reaction

First Secretary Muri of the Japanese Embassy in Bonn was interviewed last week by the NSIPS Bonn office, on the Japan-China Treaty. The following is a portion of that interview.

Q: How does your government view the Soviet reaction to the treaty, and do you expect any reaction from the Soviets?

A: The press response to the reaction of the Soviet Union has been twisted. That is my impression and that is the opinion of our Foreign Minister. We do not expect any retaliatory reactions from the Soviet Union.

Q: Do you think anyone could interpret this treaty as signifying that Japan has played the "China card" in the sense of Mr. Brzezinski's conceptions?

A: There are of course many interpretations. But my government has negotiated with the Chinese, and I believe that our interpretation, especially regarding the hegemony clause, has found expression in the text. In other words, no, I don't think that anyone could correctly interpret the treaty in this way.

their major demands. Most important, of course, was the inclusion in the treaty of the separate clause moderating the "antihegemony" clause. But the treaty also reaffirmed the principles of the United Nations charter, and stated that the relations between Japan and China will serve the cause of "peace and stability in Asia, and the world" — both Japanese formulations designed to dispel the idea that the treaty represents an anti-Soviet alliance in Asia.

Moreover, the Japanese wrested from Peking a verbal agreement never to repeat the attempted forcible seizure earlier this year of the disputed Senkaku islands held by Japan. Japanese government officials said they interpreted this to be a subtle Chinese declaration of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkakus. One official has been quoted as saying the treaty was a reaffirmation of Japan's traditional policy of maintaining friendly relations with all countries and "equidistance" between the two giant communist countries.

The Japanese "victory" has also greatly increased the domestic political strength of Prime Minister Fukuda. The millions of Japanese citizens who watched the signing of the treaty on television now see Fukuda as having skillfully negotiated with the leaders of Peking, gaining for Japan the benefits of the treaty, such as increased trade with China, but not falling in Peking's anti-Soviet trap.

Further, Fukuda's position within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been solidified. The Prime Minister's political base, comprised primarily of the conservative wing of the LDP which is traditionally hostile to Peking, would not have tolerated a treaty with China on Peking's terms.

Fukuda will now be under pressure to prove to Moscow that the treaty with China is not aimed against the Soviet Union. Fukuda stressed numerous times before the treaty was signed that he intended to make overtures to the Soviet Union for a Japan-Soviet peace treaty, following the signing with Peking. Japan's new envoy to Moscow has already met with the Soviet Foreign Ministry to "explain" his country's position on the treaty, and Tokyo is reported to be planning to dispatch a delegation to Moscow.

Moscow may be skeptical of such efforts from Japan, at least in the short term, and will want firm guarantees that the Fukuda government has friendly intentions.

One way to proceed in expanding relations has already been suggested by the Soviets, through the visit to Japan of Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister, who is also President Brezhnev's son, Yuri Brezhnev, in mid-July. At that time, the Soviets offered a series of proposals for joint Soviet-Japan economic cooperation on the magnitude of the accord signed last May between the Soviets and West Germany. A favorable Japanese response to these offers, which will be publicly discussed in October, would expand on a massive scale Japan's role in the development of Siberia.

The Text of the China-Japan Treaty

The Chinese government press service Hsinhua released this official text of the China-Japan peace and friendship treaty on Aug. 12:

The People's Republic of China and Japan, recalling with satisfaction that since the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of Japan issued a joint statement in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis,

Confirming that the above-mentioned joint statement constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the joint statement should be strictly observed,

Confirming that the principles of the charter of the United Nations should be fully respected, hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and the world, for the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries,

Have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The People's Republic of China:
Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Japan: Sunao Sonoda,
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. The contracting parties shall develop durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

2. In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles of the United Nations charter, the contracting parties affirm that in their mutual relations, all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of force.

Article II

The contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

Article III

The contracting parties shall, in a good-neighbourly and friendly spirit and in conformity with

the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavour to further develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.

Article IV

The present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries.

Article V

1. The present treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until ter-

minated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article.

2. Either contracting party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other contracting party, terminate the present treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in the Chinese and Japanese languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August, 1978.

For the People's Republic
of China:

Huang Hua
(Signed)

For Japan:

Sunao Sonoda
(Signed)

The Press Coverage Of The Treaty

From Britain's Press

FINANCIAL TIMES, London, "Japan and China: An Inscrutable Alliance of Historical Proportions," Aug. 14:

The growing relationship between Japan and China symbolised by the signing of a peace and friendship treaty between them on Saturday is the first modern alliance between two powerful countries outside the western framework . . . For the Japanese, dealing with China is the most emotionally satisfying part of foreign relations. Dealing with western countries is painful and confusing . . . Japan seeks friendship and trade with both Communist superpowers. However, relations with the USSR are complicated by several factors which have convinced most Japanese citizens that Moscow is a bullying tyrant . . . Toward China, on the other hand, the Japanese feel a deep cultural debt . . . The agreement has raised speculation of a developing U.S.-Japan-China axis opposed to the Soviet Union.

LONDON TIMES, "China and Japan Sign Peace and Friendship Treaty in Face of Soviet Fury Over Hegemony Clause," Aug. 14:

China and Japan have signed a treaty of peace and friendship which is likely to herald in a new era of geopolitical equations in Asia and further isolate the Soviet Union in the region . . . Much to the chagrin of the Soviet Union, Japan appears to have capitulated to Chinese demands and has endorsed the treaty containing a so-called "anti-hegemony clause."

LONDON TIMES, guest editorial by Lord Gladwyn, formerly top official in British Foreign Office and Foreign Affairs spokesman for Liberal Party, "China: The Long March Towards a Technological Goal," Aug. 14:

The present Government of China is pledged to achieve, by 1980, "an advanced and reasonably comprehensive industrial society" . . . While fully sympathizing with this ambitious decision, friends of China must still hope that it will not result in industrialization on Japanese lines . . .

From the U.S. Press

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, "Tokyo-Peking Friendship Pact — A Watershed," Aug. 14:

(The treaty) draws Japan one step closer into a network of both communist and noncommunist nations concerned about the growing military and political power of the Soviet Union. The treaty opens the way for growing Japanese economic and political cooperation with China at a time when Peking is persistently seeking to build an anti-Soviet "containment" network surrounding the Soviet Union and extending from the United States through Western Europe to Japan.

JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, New York, Aug. 14:

(The treaty was) favored by President Carter but bitterly opposed by the Soviet Union. Diplomats in Tokyo said the treaty . . . could speed up the normalization of ties between the U.S. and China.

WALL STREET JOURNAL, "Leaders See Treaty as Landmark," Aug. 14:

The treaty doesn't change much about the relationship between the two Asian powers. It does, however, raise questions about the two countries' future relations with the Soviet Union . . . Japanese diplomats have maintained that Japan's policy of equidistance between China and Russia won't change because of the treaty . . . they took pains to assure the Soviets . . .

From the Soviets

PRAVDA, Tass commentary by M. Demchenko, "Against the Interests of Peace and Detente," Aug. 13:

... Now the Japanese government is trying to convince the people of Japan and the peace-loving public of other states that the dangerous character of the treaty is supposedly neutralized by the article saying that it "does not harm the independent positions of the signatory countries in their relations with third countries."

The future will show whether Japan will succeed in

conducting an independent foreign policy course, on the basis of the shaky formulations which, in the opinion of its government, are called upon to "weaken" the dangerous character of the document signed in Peking. It is already perfectly clear now, however, that this treaty has been concluded against the interests of peace and detente. It contains a huge danger above all for the peoples of Southeast Asia, who have for a long time been the object of the aggressive aims of the Peking leaders. Japan too may be drawn into this adventure, with the help of the treaty signed in Peking.

Brzezinski Plays 'Balkan Card'

Chairman Hua's trip intended to raise Soviet ire

National Security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and other advocates of playing the "China card" against the Soviet Union, faced with the possible backfiring of the just-signed Japan-China peace and friendship treaty, are nevertheless eagerly pushing "the Balkan option". They hope to use the current trip of China's Chairman Hua Kuo-feng to Romania and Yugoslavia—a trip timed to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia — to drive the Soviet Union into a paranoid isolation mode, and to block its participation in the Grand Design.

THE GUARDIAN; London, "Romania plays Chinese checkers with Brezhnev", Aug. 16:

A good fairy tells President Ceausescu, or Marshal Tito, or Janos Kadar of Hungary, Edward Gierak of Poland, or even Bulgaria's Todor Jivkov and Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husak that they can have three wishes that will be fulfilled. The answer is always the same. In each case they ask for three visits from the Chinese. Why, asks the surprised fairy? "Because it means that Chinese forces must cross the Soviet Union six times."

This apochryphal story crops up constantly, all over Eastern Europe, even in parts normally considered devoted to the Kremlin. Now that Chairman Hua Kuo-feng is visiting Romania and Yugoslavia. . . the fairy tale is partly coming true. . . The timing of his visit is as significant as the mere fact that Chairman Hua has

ventured to Eastern Europe. It was obviously not a casual decision to interrupt the traditional holiday period in this part of the world. It is a deliberate gesture to coincide with the tenth anniversary of the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia. . .

DAILY TELEGRAPH, "Ceausescu Greets Hua with Attack on Moscow", by Clare Hollingsworth, Aug. 15:

Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, now hailed in Romania as the most powerful man in the world, will land in Bucharest tomorrow on the first trip outside Asia by a Chinese Communist Party Chairman for more than 20 years.

He will be welcomed by a triumphant President Ceausescu, who recently accused the Russians, without naming them, of using military means to promote their political interests, owing to the "limited economic means at their disposal." . . .

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR; "Behind Hua's Trip to East Europe," Aug. 14:

Peking's diplomatic offensive moves to East Europe as Chinese Chairman Hua Kuo-feng begins state visits to Romania and Yugoslavia.

Significantly, the Chinese leader's visit to the two Communist Balkan states, which have been asserting their independence from the Soviet Union, comes at a time when the rift between Peking and Moscow is widening without letup. . .