

Israeli-China connection. In June, top U.S.-based Zionist policymaker — and British subject — Edward Luttwak of Johns Hopkins University traveled to Hong Kong and Israel.

Weeks later, Eugene Rostow, founder of the Committee on the Present Danger and top pro-Israel, anti-Soviet hawk, made a trip to China. On return, Rostow told a reporter that “the Chinese were well aware of my connection to Israeli circles and were very eager to talk about it.” According to Rostow, the Chinese have adopted a “dual policy,” or a “policy of both hands,” toward the Middle East by which they will maintain channels to both the Arabs and Israel.

On the way home, Rostow stopped in Iran to encourage Iranian-Chinese relations. This detour exposes the true story behind an Aug. 18 national French radio analysis on the late-August trip to Iran of Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng. According to the French government media, “the Chinese are intending to pressure the Iranians to adopt closer cooperation with Israel,” especially through Iran increasing “oil deliveries and financial help” to Israel.

An “Israel-Iran axis” to contain the Soviets is a keystone of British strategy toward the Middle East.

On an official plane, Israeli and Chinese meetings have already taken place. According to both French press and United Nations journalist sources, Israeli ambassador to the United Nations Chaim Herzog held at least one meeting earlier this year with Chinese U.N. officials in New York.

Soviets Warn of Chinese Intentions

In an Aug. 30 analysis carried by the Soviet Union’s Radio Peace and Progress network, the Soviets attacked Chinese intentions to build an anti-Soviet alliance throughout the Mideast.

“Peking wants relations with Israel,” Radio Peace and Progress charged. “In 1957, Chou En-lai letter to (U.S. senator) Henry Jackson that Peking wishes a strong, powerful Israel. This message was taken with delight in Tel Aviv.” Citing an account in the Arabic language paper *An Nahar Al Arabi*, Radio Peace and Progress stated, “Peking is ready to support relations with Israel. Its aim is to keep the Middle East region alive as a powder-keg.”

Rep. Montgomery Tells Why U.S. Should Resume Relations With Vietnam

An exclusive interview with the House MIA Subcttee Chairman

The following is the text of an interview by EIR Asia desk chief Daniel Sneider with Rep. G.V. “Sonny” Montgomery (D-Miss), chairman of the House Veterans’ Affairs subcommittee dealing with the soldiers missing in action (MIA) issue, who recently returned from a trip to Vietnam.

The Montgomery mission included the whole MIA subcommittee and traveled widely throughout Vietnam. Discussions were held with Vietnam’s highest officials, including Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. Since their return, numerous members of the mission have urged the Carter Administration to revive stalled talks with Hanoi about normalizing relations.

Rep. Montgomery, who was a strong supporter of United States intervention in Vietnam during the war, has become one of the most outspoken members of Congress favoring United States resumption of relations. The Congressman’s recent trip was his second to Vietnam concerning the MIA issue.

Q. Could you summarize the results of your trip to Vietnam?

A. I think that the trip was a historic one in that we found out a lot of things going on in that part of the world which we will take to the State Department and take to President Carter who will be interested in this area.

We brought back the bodies of 11 MIA’s and in Laos,

for the first time — it was a breakthrough — the Laotians are going to go out to look for American MIAs. The Vietnamese have done this, but Laos hasn’t done anything before this.

We found out that the attitude (of the Vietnamese —ed) has changed toward the U.S.; they would like to have diplomatic relations, with no preconditions. They are having their problems with a shooting war on the Cambodian border and their problems with China . . . They told us that no Russian ships have moved into Cam Ranh Bay and Haiphong. . . The Vietnamese kept stressing to us that they are an independent and sovereign nation, and they don’t intend to be dominated by anybody.

Q. Are you convinced of that?

A. I am convinced there are no Russians there now.

Q. The Vietnamese have indicated previously their willingness to restart negotiations on normalization of relations without preconditions on U.S. reparations, but the State Department has not moved on that, saying that they have not been told directly of any change in the Vietnamese position. Do you think that will now change?

A. We said, in the report we made, that the State Department should consider resumption of talks again with the Vietnamese on normalization of relations.

The Committee feels that whatever the State Department does, most of us will support their action. The State Department now knows what the Vietnamese think. Eight congressmen have told them.

Q. Do you think they will respond?

A. Well it is an election year . . . and there is the question of the effect on China to start normal relations.

Q. There has been some suggestion here, reported in the press, that there is a linkage between normalization of relations with Vietnam and with China — that relations with China take precedence over those with Vietnam. What do you think about that?

A. I would personally think that they should be considered separately, they shouldn't wait on Vietnam . . . If it is in the best interest of our country to normalize relations with Vietnam, it wouldn't make sense to hold up relations with Vietnam because of troubles with China. The U.S. would move into that area, with industrial, trading, and economic relations with the area, and I don't see how that hurts China.

Q. You took with you on this trip a number of Congressmen who have either served in Vietnam during the war or were supporters of the war effort. How would you describe the effect of the trip on their views of Vietnam?

A. Well I was a strong supporter of the war also . . . I took a pretty conservative group over there, and our report is a rather balanced report.

Q. What I'm trying to get at is your personal impressions of the Vietnamese. One could make a comparison between what is happening in Cambodia, which seems to be rather horrible, and what is happening in Vietnam. Whether or not one agrees with a socialist system which the Vietnamese have adopted, nevertheless there seems to be a certain commitment to the development of the country and a certain standard of morality which is roughly equivalent to ours in the way they carry that out. Is that something you would roughly agree with in terms of your impressions of the Vietnamese?

A. I think that they are sincere in that they want to stay an independent nation and that they were flush with victory after the war, and now they've got more problems than they ever expected. I don't really know how to assess their form of government. I know they'd be a lot better off if there was a democracy . . . but I don't really want to say what's best for the country.

Q. What do you think about the prospects for U.S. economic cooperation with Vietnam? If you look at the Japanese involvement in Vietnam, the Vietnamese are doing a lot of work with Japan, involving capital investment, trade, and so forth. Do you think the United States is being shut out of a potential market because of the restrictions?

A. You're talking about the trade embargo. Our major oil companies have the best knowhow to drill offshore. And the trade embargo completely eliminates any chance of our companies getting involved. It seems to me the State Department has to take into consideration whether the trade embargo should be lifted. We can't afford to wait a year when other companies (from other countries —ed) are coming in and taking all the major oil advantages . . . I don't see any problems with lifting the trade embargo, seeing as how we already have trade with Russia and China and we're trading with other communist countries.

Q. Doesn't Congress itself have to take action to lift the trade embargo? That's not a decision of the State Department alone?

A. The President has the authority to lift the trade embargo . . .

Q. The reports in the press here on your trip emphasized that the Vietnamese talked to you at great length about the situation with China and what they consider to be the danger from the Chinese and the Chinese-backed government in Cambodia. Could you describe to me how the Vietnamese presented that to you and what your own impressions, if any, are of that situation?

A. I think one of the committee said they were surprised at how strong the statements the Vietnamese made were, how concerned they were about Chinese relations . . . I don't think the Vietnamese want to start a fight, but they want to protect their independence and sovereignty. They're pretty adamant against the actions the Chinese have taken and rumors the Chinese have spread about Vietnam, and I just don't see those two countries getting together for a long time.

Q. When you look at that situation, and you look back at the long history of our involvement in Vietnam, there are some who say that in 1945 — when there were Americans working in the jungles with Ho Chi Minh who were working with the OSS at that time — that at that time those people were suggesting that Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese communists were very much nationalists and were very much concerned with the independence of their country. These were people who thought, as President Roosevelt apparently did, that the U.S. policy in the area should be to promote the independence of those countries against the French and the other colonial powers. We sort of missed an opportunity at that time which, if we had gone with that sort of policy, we would have avoided a lot of things which have followed. Do you get a sense now that we did miss that opportunity?

A. We got the impression from the Vietnamese that by having been dominated over the years by the and other countries, they're proud of their independence and sovereignty . . .

Q. Senator McGovern suggested that the U.S. should sponsor in the UN Security Council a discussion of a multinational intervention into Cambodia because of the wholesale violation of human rights and the barbarous character of the regime there. Would you consider such a thing yourself?

A. No, because there's no question in anything like that that the U.S. would have to be involved, and that would mean more Americans would be getting killed in that part of the world. We make any suggestion like that, and we're going to have to support it not only with money and material but with personnel, and I'm just not willing to send any more of my constituents over there to fight. There is an ongoing war. My opinion is that the Vietnamese can handle it themselves. They'll take care of the situation on their border.

Q. Can you give me any indication of any future

actions you will take or is this it for now?

A. We're going to meet with Secretary of State Vance and with President Carter and tell them what we found out. I really didn't take the group over there to make policy or come back with any great decisions for the State Department. It was kind of an indirect invite — I got a card from the Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien inviting me to take the delegation over there to take a look at Vietnam and Laos, and this is what developed out of it. We brought this information back and it really attracted more interest than I thought it would, which may be good. I think that if we're going to be a world leader, we're going to have to look at Southeast Asia again.

Q. You mean in some form other than we have in the past?

A. Yes.

Schlesinger Is Geopolitician, Not Energy Secretary

As President Carter returns from his western vacation, a national wire service survey estimates that less than a third of the U.S. Senate is prepared to back the natural gas "compromise" bill worked out under the thumb of Energy Secretary James Schlesinger. Schlesinger's crude oil equalization tax, the onetime "centerpiece" of the Carter Administration's energy bill, has been dead in the Senate Finance Committee for more than a year. Schlesinger has warned that his "usefulness to the Administration will be ended" if Congress refuses to pass this legislation, and his long-overdue resignation is thought to be imminent.

In fact Schlesinger has never discharged the responsibilities of the office of Secretary of Energy, nor has he been concerned to produce a responsible energy policy for the U.S. In alliance with White House Special Assistant on National Security, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash), Schlesinger's primary objective has always been "geopolitical" — to place an energy-dependent U.S. in an "economic warfare" mode against Western Europe and the Soviet Union by implementing some variety of "Crash of 79" depression scenario — while, at the same time, building a U.S. alliance with China.

Upon first joining the Carter Administration, Schlesinger justified his energy "conservation" policy by "predicting," in concert with the CIA, an early 1980s oil shortage in the Soviet Union which would impel the Soviets to take military action to gain

control of oil in the Persian Gulf. Now that the Soviet oil shortage hoax has been widely discredited, Schlesinger has mobilized to block State and Commerce Department approval of the Dresser Industries sale of oil-drilling technology to the Soviets. Schlesinger is currently scheduled to visit the Peoples Republic of China in October for the ostensible purpose of promoting U.S. development of Chinese oil reserves. DOE officials admit, however, that the primary purpose of the trip is "political."

Schlesinger has persistently sought to sabotage U.S. breeder reactor and fusion development, and to block joint U.S.-Soviet energy collaboration, as well as consistently opposing congressional efforts to orient U.S. energy policy to increasing U.S. production of oil and gas.

Lately, Schlesinger has also been concerned to prevent the completion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty between the U.S. and USSR, using his department's nominal authority over the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear stockpile to interfere in issues previously resolved by the Defense and State Departments.

So entrenched has Schlesinger become in the Brzezinski-Jackson combine, that some Washington observers are predicting that even if he is forced to resign his Energy Department post, President Carter will be forced to appoint him to some other White House or Cabinet position.