General Singlaub aired in New York
LaRouche on U.S. military perceptions and realities


General Singlaub first came into public prominence through a crisis created by a Washington Post report­er early last year. The reporter published key remarks from an off-the-record background briefing by the General, then chief of staff for U.S. forces in Korea. The remarks emphasized the war risk in withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. The publication of the remarks prompted the White House to flip out, ordering the General to Washington by the next plane.

Singlaub’s induced early resignation earlier this year was precipitated by another journalist-leak of a private, internal military discussion session. Following Singlaub’s resignation, he was initially scheduled for extensive news coverage, including nationwide TV appearances. Overnight, the media gates were slammed down. Apart from a series of interviews published in the Atlanta Journal a few weeks after the General’s resignation, he has been relegated to odd speaking engagements and other local appearances.

Even the Oct. 8 prerecorded interview on New York TV was not without hazard. Through what was announced with apologies as a technical error, the Singlaub interview did not begin at the prescheduled 11:30 pm slot. Instead, an earlier “Ruff House” program was begun. After a time, the mistaken programming was corrected, and the scheduled WOR-TV program began.

Who Singlaub represents

Best information corroborates Jack Singlaub’s characterization of his views as coinciding with the estimates of most leading military ranks among both serving and retired officers. Furthermore, it is the general view among appropriate circles that Jack Singlaub is the General officer who has been informally adopted as the man laying himself on the line to get views widely shared among leading ranks out before the general public.

Although Singlaub’s political-strategic assessments are often badly informed, or, more exactly, disin­formed, his views on military aspects as such are emi­nently competent, and are in contradiction to the non­sense which passes for official estimates pouring out of tightly controlled Pentagon and national intelligence sources. In that respect, gagging Singlaub is nothing less than a fraud upon the U.S. electorate — a fraud both by elements of the Carter Administration and by those curious little folk who set the style for “newsworthiness” in most of the national news media.

If you don’t know what Jack Singlaub is saying, you don’t know what the majority of our nation’s leading military ranks are thinking.

What Singlaub says

Singlaub summarized the principal points of his military-strategic judgment during the too-brief half-hour interview on “Ruff House.”

1. Taking total strategic capabilities, “across the board,” the Warsaw Pact forces now enjoy a marginal strategic, war-winning advantage over the NATO forces.

2. Although there are different estimates of the size of the Soviet margin among leading U.S. ranks, there is virtually no disagreement on the fact of the existence of some such margin.

3. A crucial element of Soviet war-winning advantage is the post-1962 Soviet Civil Defense program. Singlaub indicated an 80 percent Soviet population survival. (He did not mention official U.S. estimates that
upwards of 150 million U.S. citizens would die in thermonuclear war.)

4. The growing margin of strategic Soviet military advantage provides Moscow with an emerging option for bullying the weaker NATO forces into step-by-step "backdown" in selected points of strategic relevance.

5. There is virtually no likelihood of a Soviet provocation in Europe, but rather in various portions of the developing sector.

6. The "China Card" is exaggerated. It exists, whether or not the U.S. does anything or nothing to promote it. However, Peking is in no sense a reliable ally of the USA, and is generally a problematic case.

7. The Carter Administration’s strategic posture is permeated with ignorance and even willful fraud, with the complicating feature that leading military ranks are used by the Administration to play back Administration views contrary to independent military-professional judgments.

On all these negative points, Jack Singlaub is on the button. He errs, in point of commission and omission combined, where he attempts to develop positive alternatives to the wretched conditions on which he reports. In this respect, he reflects the same errors and inadequacies permeating leading military ranks generally.

Nonetheless, although Singlaub’s points are generally negative in their best features, any U.S. strategic estimate or policy which does not take this matter into account is prima facie incompetent or even disastrous by implications.

Our military problem

Jack Singlaub’s blunders all belong to the domain of political analysis and strategy. The military professional usually justifies his or her ignorance of political-strategic matters in reference to the rule that the military profession must be apolitical, a military instrument of the President and Congress. However, in fact, our military professionals are by no means apolitical; they are deeply dedicated to the definition of “state interest” laid down by anglophile Jimmy Brynes’ shallow-minded little puppet, Harry S. Truman — who was, therefore, in turn, Winston Churchill’s dupe. They adhere to the simplistic doctrine that the Soviet Union is ipso facto the USA’s primary adversary, and shape all judgments according to that axiomatic premise.

For related reasons, most military professionals are all-day suckers for such Kissinger-Brzezinski-London myths as those Singlaub regurgitated on the “Ruff House” interview. For example: the recent coup in Afghanistan is allegedly a Soviet geopolitical plot. For example: the Soviet-Cuban role in Ethiopia is part of the same Soviet geopolitical plot. For example: SALT is a Soviet plot. Although a childish misinterpretation of some of the evidence might appear to substantiate the nonsense-conclusions which Singlaub, among many others, has swallowed, no competent political-intelligence estimate indicates anything of the sort.

It is true, in a very special sense, that the developments in the Horn, Afghanistan and SALT might prove to be of marginal strategic advantage to the Soviet Union in case of sharpened NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontations. That aspect is true. However, whenever Singlaub and others attempt to work backward from that secondary implication of the developments to the assumption that these were initiated as part of a Soviet geopolitical thrust, a wild fallacy of composition has been introduced — potentially, if continued too far, a fatal fallacy of composition.

A professedly “apolitical” military professional excuses himself from examining the complicated way in which the Horn of Africa crisis was created, with accompanying miscalculations by London, Kissinger and Brzezinski. Moscow, which had rejected the Podgorny policy in favor of Fidel Castro’s alternative policy, acted to restabilize a region which London, Kissinger, and Brzezinski worked to destabilize. In that sense, London, Kissinger, and Brzezinski pushed the Horn of Africa into the configuration which Brzezinski so bitterly resents. Soviet-Cuban policy has not aimed at creating “puppets,” but enhancing a war-avoidance potential through putting their power on the side of the balance in favor of political stabilization and economic development of Third World nations and regions.

This war-avoidance policy does produce a potential, if marginal, Soviet strategic advantage under the condition London and its Washington dupes might push a confrontationalist policy. However, Moscow’s and Havana’s current main strategic policy is a determination to seek detente with the NATO powers, and not to fight a general war.

The Afghanistan case is parallel. The stable Afghanistan regime was destabilized as part of what was known generically as London’s “Baluchistan” project against the entire subcontinent and Middle East. The forces involved were identical to those involved in the coup against Pakistan’s Bhutto. Sri Lanka’s Bandaranaike, and India’s Indira Gandhi: London, the Socialist International, the “Black International,” Kissinger, Israeli intelligence, and Peking’s hero-funded intelligence operations. This Afghanistan operation was integral to the projected destabilization of the Shah of Iran and other Bernard Lewis-type wrecking operations throughout the region. A group of officers of the Afghanistan military, acting to save their own hides — and also their nation — pulled a coup, aborting the London-Jerusalem-Peking operation. There were open blessings after the fact from Moscow, and veiled blessings from the Shah of Iran.

The de facto alliance among Vietnam, Thailand, and other Southeast Asian nations against the Cambodian horror show and Peking’s “imperialist designs”
generally is another illustration of the same point. 
Also illustrative is the folly of many leading military 
ranks in conditionally praising Rhodesia's Ian Smith. 
Smith, a London puppet, is the key piece in a projected 
general race-war throughout southern Africa. The al­
ternative is not Moscow, but the Ponto Plan, named 
after its author, Dresdner Bank's Baader-Meinhof-
murdered Jürgen Ponto. Ponto created the seed-
crystal for a regional development bank for all of 
southern Africa. West German policy is broadly sup­
ported by France, and enjoys effective, if tacit support 
from both Moscow and Havana, and implicit support 
from Japan. Thus, do our military professionals make 
public fools of themselves in political-strategic 
matters.

Clausewitz's aphorism is relevant — up to a point. 
War is the instrument of politics. Foolish conceptions 
of military policy assume that the politics of war is 
axiomatically defined by the role of episodic electoral 
majorities in placing into the White House and Con­
gress persons who arbitrarily determine the political 
interest of the United States. This cited nonsense-
doctrine is the doctrine of state interest, which con­
fuses the kaleidoscopic postures of mere governments 
with the fundamental interests of nations and peoples. 
The reality of war mocks such foolish self-deceptions. 
The meatgrinder of war rips away the ephemeral sur­
face posturings of governments, bringing to the sur­
face the in-depth resources and political capacities of 
nations and their populations. Competent military 
strategy is not represented in the surface appearances 
of Napoleon's battles, but in the creation of in-depth 
instruments of warfare by Lazare Carnot. The military 
professional who proceeds from the folly of apolitical 
service of state interest is consequently incompetent 
to design military strategy appropriate to wars which 
become meatgrinders.

General Singlaub has not yet understood the lessons 
of Vietnam. Hence, he understands very well the prob­
lem posed in Korea, and also understands to a certain 
degree the follies of the NATO European posture, but 
does not understand strategy and warfare for the 
more complex political realities posed by a Vietnam. 
The leading military ranks do not yet understand why 
it was a betrayal of the most vital U.S. strategic inter­
ests to become engaged in that CIA operation in Viet­
nam which escalated into the Vietnam War. It is 
generally beyond their present, manifest comprehen­
sion to understand that the USA's vital strategic error 
in Southeast Asia was our betrayal of our ally and sup­
porter Ho Chi Minh at the close of World War II.

The "Camp David" fiasco

Let us look at the Camp David fiasco through the eyes of an hypothetical leading strategist in Moscow.

Moscow's current policy is centrally directed to­
ward freeing the U.S. government from the combined 
grip of the British-Canadian intelligence services and 
the Zionist lobby. Since, as the British now tearfully 
concede, the European Monetary Fund is about to be­
come the dominant monetary and economic reality of 
the world, this also signifies, to Moscow, the virtual 
certainty of durable world peace over decades to come 
— on condition that the U.S. does not go psychotic dur­
ing the short run. The only risk of general war, during 
either the short term or the medium term, arises 
through control of the Carter Administration by the 
combined forces of British intelligence and the Zionist 
lobby.

This means that the "Munich II" of Camp David 
must be wrecked quickly — a view shared by leading 
forces of Western continental Europe, Japan, the Arab 
world, and the developing sector pretty generally.

This requires a sophisticated, differentiated polit­
cal, economic, monetary and military deployment by 
Moscow. The Soviets view the consequences of failure 
as general thermonuclear war during either the short 
term or during the medium term. There are two prin­
cipal scenarios involved. An Israeli strike against Syr­
ian forces represents the short-term danger of war. A 
defeat of the European Monetary Fund represents the 
scenarios leading into virtual certainty of general war 
during the medium term.

This means, taken all together, an absolutely ruth­
less, warlike, and very sophisticated — and risky — 
war-avoidance deployment by Soviet forces. In this, 
the fact that the Soviets do command a marginal war­
winning capability is an included feature of the overall 
deployment.

Soviet policy is to crush Camp David without war — 
if possible, thus gaining time for the consolidation of 
the European Monetary Fund. The latter is the funda­
mental war-avoidance policy of Moscow; the former 
is the unavoidable near-term deployments required to 
give breathing-space to the development of the EMF.

"Munich II" at Camp David gave London, Kissin­
ger, Schlesinger and Brzezinski a range of options, 
which we shall designate here as strategic salients. 
One is the Chamounists' fascist rag-tag in Lebanon, 
another is the prospect of a Libyan thrust by Egyptian 
forces. The ultimate option is the gamble of an Israeli 
military adventure against its Arab and Lebanese 
neighbors.

The short-term options for Moscow are thus defined 
as follows.

Overall, the included objective is to set into motion a 
series of developments which oblige Washington to re­
vote the Geneva Conference policy. This is to be ac­
complished by such means as forcing Washington into 
the UNO, where a political ambush awaits the Kissin­
ger-Brzezinski Camp David policy. Once Washington 
goes into the UNO, it is forced either to continue back 
to the Geneva agreement, or to be strategically 
discredited.

The whole operation depends upon the fact that the
Soviets have a military alliance with Syria, which they will honor under all circumstances. (However, in each instance, they prefer Western European preemption of problematic developments, so that Soviet Intervention becomes unnecessary.) Since the Soviets command a marginal strategic advantage, by making clear their determination to honor in full the Syrian alliance, they thus place Israel under massive containment.

Will the Soviets risk war over the Middle East? The only rational estimate is "Yes." If they were to back off from a Middle East confrontation, general war during the short term or medium term would be inevitable. It is less risky, therefore, to go to the limit in honoring the Syrian treaty than to back off from a confrontation with the USA over Israel. How they would handle a confrontation — in respect of details of their deployment — is, of course, an open question. They would undoubtedly maneuver politically to gain whatever appeared to them the maximum advantage — but would not avoid confrontation in such a manner as to decrease the credibility of their willingness to act or to honor treaty-agreements.

Under conditions of containment of Israeli threats against Syrian forces, the treatment of the strategic salients embedded in "Munich II" is broadly predeterminable.

The first such action has already occurred. The facts of the matter have been acknowledged — at some tearful length — in the British press, but the reality is so far denied by the leading U.S. press and by both national media and by the U.S. Administration. The Chamounist salient in Lebanon has been virtually neutralized. An examination of this operation indicates how the Libya salient would be exploited.

A glance at the principal points shows why the Camp David "Peace in Our Time" is as monstrous a concoction as the 1938 Munich affair it echoes.

**Lebanon operation**

In keeping with a war-avoidance policy, the Soviet posture is not one of aggressive initiatives, but of politically, strategically counterpunching with an eye to the most vulnerable features of the Camp David configuration.

Israel (i.e., London, Kissinger) activated its Chamounist puppets with the bloodiest sort of threats and massive Israeli logistical support. To this, the Sarkis government of Lebanon counterpunched in cooperation with its Syrian allies, all with the support of Moscow. Syrian forces reacted to an assault with a sophisticated military operation, aimed at concentrating Chamounist forces in a narrow perimeter within which the Chamounists were denied freedom of maneuver and offered an enhanced quality of artillery target. This operation was completed at the point the

UNO Security Council summarily adopted a ceasefire policy.

Washington was faced with two alternatives. Either permit the Israelis to intervene militarily against Soviet military ally Syria, and thus go either to a backdown or a strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union, or go to the Security Council seeking a ceasefire agreement. In the latter case, it was indispensable to seek a ceasefire on Soviet terms. The latter course was followed, to the effect that the issue is now situated within the UNO. Further efforts in that line must go to Geneva.

Since the Camp David agreements violate UNO agreements binding upon the USA, a Geneva process supersedes and largely nullifies existing U.S.-Israeli agreements concerning the West Bank and related issues. Soviet objective is in the process of being achieved on that front.

**Libya operation**

The Coptic coup d'état forced upon Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat has placed his government in the vulnerable position of declaring Egypt an anti-Arab, anti-Islamic state. There are two considerations which contribute to giving temporary stability to this quasi-legal coup d'état. First, the Egyptian population does wish to avoid war, and will tolerate much to the purpose of avoiding a new military conflict. Second, the command of military and other governmental command by a minority does neutralize to a large degree the potential for counter-coups by Arab factions within Egypt. Both elements of temporary stabilization of the Coptic coup operate only as long as Egypt is not engulfed in war by either its own forces or a general warfare situation in the region.

The question is, therefore, how to realize the countercoup potential represented by the majority of the Egyptian population and its military forces? A proper response to an Egyptian incursion into the Libyan desert is a means for realizing the counter-coup potential.

Without going into details here, the combined military and intelligence operations required to effect such a counterpunch operation under conditions of an incursion into Libya ought to be obvious. An Egyptian government and military command in exile appears, calling upon the Egyptian troops and population to rid themselves of the Coptic dictatorship — and so on and so forth. Desert warfare helps to realize this process.

The buncombe issuing from various British conduits, to the effect that the Soviets and Arabs are in the process of "accepting the reality of Camp David," is just that.

The deployment of a Coptic, anti-Arab coup d'état in Egypt has the effect of unifying most Arab forces to the extent that they have not been unified since the
Mongol invasions. Arab governments, aware of the Bernard Lewis "particularist" scenarios embedded in the "Munich II" policies, will exploit the "Holy War" potentials of the Islamic population against the Coptic insult. Egypt itself has been Arab in language, religion and culture since the Fatimid creation of the "new city" of Cairo. The effort to assert a Ptolemaic-Pharaonic Isis-cult traditional "roots" is the most ill-conceived "black operation" in postwar history.

The Soviets, fully aware of the implications, will subordinate every other consideration in the region to the cause of Arab-Islamic unity, defense of the honest (anti-Chamounist) Maronite Christians' rights, and stability and integrity of sovereignty of every government of the region, including the government of Lebanon.

No doubt, if all this must occur before Washington deigns to acknowledge the backfiring of Camp David, many of Jack Singlaub's brother officers will howl that all this, too, is another instance of Soviet aggressive geopolitical designs.

The crucial included flaw in that line of argument among leading ranks (and other circles) is that the Soviet leadership has never adopted the cult of Isis. To accuse the Soviet leadership of geopolitical designs is like accusing a lion of designs to eat up the contents of a farmer's corn-crib. It ain't their nature.

The correlative flaw in Singlaub's thinking is that the perception of the U.S.-Soviet adversary situation is premised on an entirely mythical reading of the nature and motivations of various currents of the Soviet leadership and population. By misjudging the actual and perceived interests of the Soviet Union, every estimate by our military professionals is imbued with a potentially fatal strategic miscalculation.

Soviet policies

The Soviet leadership is composed of currents whose differentiation occasionally surfaces once again in a factional form. The dominant thrust from Lenin into Brezhnev is represented by Lenin's Rapallo policy, a policy formulated in a more-advanced form in the May 1978 agreements between Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Leonid Brezhnev. At present, the Soviet leadership is committed to the success of the European Monetary Fund, and to the emergence of a new world monetary system built around the EMF, Arab Monetary Fund, Tokyo capital market and related agreements and institutions. The Soviet leadership is committed to participation in the new monetary system through the aid of a gold-based arm's-length connection and economic cooperation. This cooperation is viewed by the Soviet leadership as the industrialized economies' base-line for massive, high-technology industrial agricultural and infrastructural development of the Third World's nations.

Every feature of this policy is perceived as corresponding to the most vital national interests of the combined Comecon nations. It is viewed as the only durable basis for general peace, and as the optimal approach to more rapid economic development of Comecon nations.

There are currents in and around the Soviet leadership which have different policy-impulses and perceptions. Included are the "Bukharinites" associated with Imemo, and certain strata of "hard-liners" who define the issue as axiomatically a struggle between socialist and capitalist nations. If the Brezhnev policy for detente is nullified through Carter Administration policies and actions, then an adversary posture comes fully into place, with key roles by the ultra-hard-liner-posture forces.

This is broadly the perception of the leading Soviet circles at this time. If the USA adopts an anti-EMF posture, then war becomes probable during either the short term or the medium term. If war occurs under and anti-EMF policy, under the policies of Brzezinski, Kissinger, Schlesinger, et al., then the USA will be conquered during World War II — or, what is left of the USA.

It is because Jack Singlaub and others refuse to face the kind of realities I have indicated, that they are incompetent — thus far — to define a positive correction of U.S. military posture. It is only negatively that they are essentially correct. Nonetheless, I respect their competence and would not act — as President — in such defiance of their competence as the Carter Administration has done to date. To fail to give a broader hearing to such professionals as General Singlaub is sheer lunacy — suicidal lunacy.

—Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.