

ADL's corporate, intelligence hit list

Report ties all U.S. links to Arab nations, firms, to 'Jew-baiters'

On Nov. 18, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith released a report — by their own admission "the first of several" — on "The Arab 'Lobby' in the U.S.: Friends and Agents."

The report was accompanied by a press release issued by ADL general counsel Arnold Forster, who is otherwise widely known for the incident in which he is alleged to have participated in painting swastikas on synagogues to heighten Jewish fears of anti-semitism. Typical of the legal lying employed by Forster and the ADL in constructing the report is the concluding section. In that section, the relationships of all U.S. citizens with Arab nations and firms is compared with the case of Nazi crackpot William N. Grimstad.

The irony of the ADL call for greater Congressional control over the "Arab Lobby" is the virtual free rein enjoyed by the U.S. Zionist lobby in Washington and their wildly subversive influence on American institutions and strategic interests.

According to the press release accompanying the report:

The report, issued in conjunction with ADL's four-day national commission meeting at the New York Hilton Hotel through November 20, is the first in a series being prepared by the agency on various aspects of what it calls "the Middle East connection" in order to understand the extent and impact of Arab influence in the U.S.

According to Arnold Forster, ADL's general counsel, the Arabs are insinuating themselves into U.S. government, political and business circles with the help of former top American government officials....

The ADL report acknowledges the new "Ethics in Government Act of 1978," enacted by Congress and signed into law by President Carter on October 26, but says the section on conflicts of interest does not go far enough, in view of the record of activity by former U.S. officials on behalf of Arab governments and private Arab clients. The law, which becomes effective July 1, 1979, imposes certain prohibitions and restrictions, including time bars, on some activities by former officers or employees of Executive Branch departments and independent agencies of the U.S. government.

The League cited the following as "gaps and weaknesses" which should be remedied; — The law does not apply to former members of the Senate and the House, to their administrative aides and staff, or to other former employees of the Legislative Branch, such as counsel and staff members of Congressional

committees and subcommittees; — The law's provision of one and two year waiting periods, aimed at preventing conflicts of interest, before former officials of U.S. departments and agencies may work for foreign principals or governments is too short to protect the public interest adequately; — In the case of former officials of the CIA, U.S. intelligence, security and defense agencies, the law should impose even longer waiting periods than for the others

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Below are excerpts from the report itself, with each section labeled using the report's original subtitles:

Introduction

Who are the principal influence peddlers, contact men, lobbyists, lawyers, publicists and consultants working as Arab emissaries in this country? The "Middle East Connection" — is it a euphemism for conducting big business, or influencing American foreign policy, or a bit of both? And why do the Arab states recruit — offering eyepopping retainers — from an elite roster of former U.S. Government and military officials?

The answers to these questions are to be found in the activities of Americans who make up the Arab lobby in Washington, New York, Atlanta, Houston and other key political and economic centers in America

The intense lobbying and "public relations" activities by Saudi Arabia and its American representatives in the spring of 1978 raised fundamental questions about the goals, depth and methods of Arab influence in the U.S. This was particularly noticeable during the weeks of debate on the proposed U.S. sale of highly sophisticated F-15 warplanes to Saudi Arabia as well as to Israel which had prior U.S. commitment for the planes

To understand what has been happening, the Anti-Defamation League is conducting a study of the sources and uses of such power and the over-all extent and impact of Arab influence in the U.S. ADL has completed the initial phase of this project.

This report is the first of several on ADL's findings.

The Arab Thrust

When the Saudi Arabian campaign was launched to win approval by the U.S. Congress of the sale of the F-15s, the Saudi Embassy in Washington issued a secret seven-page memorandum of instructions to its American lobbyists suggesting that the "economic advantages of the Saudi-American relationship" be stressed in their efforts

'High Level Personalities'

The Saudis ... have a startling array of registered agents in Washington Their main man in the capital is Frederick G. Dutton He was recommended to the Saudis by former Sen. J. William Fulbright

Also lobbying for the sale by the U.S. of the F-15s to Saudi Arabia was J. Crawford Cook, Inc. . . .

Cook is a close friend of former Governor John C. West of South Carolina, now U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Two former Presidential Cabinet members have been working for the oil interests of Algeria — Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General under President Nixon, and Clark Clifford, Secretary of Defense in the Johnson Administration

(The section goes on to target other "Arab agents": Henry Kearns of Kearns International; Raymond H. Close and Stephen Conner of Manara Ltd.; Kermit Roosevelt; John O'Connell of the Connole and O'Connell law firm; Patrick J. Caddell of Cambridge Reports, Inc., George H. Hearn of the U.S. Maritime Commission; Najeeb Halaby of Arabair Services Corp.; and Willis C. Armstrong, adviser to Saudi investor Adnan Khashoggi.)

Money and Politics

(This section fingers Gerald Parsky, head of the Washington office of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher; Petra Capital Corp.; the Wall Street firm of Smith Barney, Harris Upham; the Houston law firm of John B. Connally, Vinson and Elkins; Bert Lance; and Spiro Agnew, for cultivating business interests with prominent Arabs such as Ghaith R. Pharaon and Khaled Ben Mahfouz.)

Know-How — and 'Political Influence'

(This section attempts to document how the Arabs secure "know-how" and "political clout" to build their image and influence in U.S. government and corporate circles.)

Agents — and 'Services Rendered'

(This section "reveals" how a "financial and economic consultant ... conceded to ADL that he does handle political and propaganda assignments for his client.")

'Image Builders' and Opinion Molders

(This section targets advertising and public relations

firms such as Doremus and Co.; Jones, Brakely and Rockwell, Inc.; Moss International; and others for shaping U.S. public opinion favorably toward the Arabs.)

Other Registered Agents

(In this section, numerous other individuals and firms, among them White Power editor William N. Grimstad, are cited for their links to the Arab world.)

Conclusion

The registration of the Nazi, Grimstad, as an agent for the Saudis was, in a sense, a throwback to the days of the 1950s and the early 1960s when Arab efforts to influence American public opinion in their struggle against Israel were frequently crude and primitive and when their trafficking with domestic Jew-baiters of the Grimstad stripe was far more frequent.

Today, the Arab penetration of the U.S. scene, already well along, is carried on in the corridors of Congress and in the top banks and boardrooms of Corporate America, or in the paneled libraries of leading law offices

In the U.S. Government today it seems clear that we need stricter safeguards to protect the public interest in the case of former government officials eager to sell their know-how — and their influence — to private clients, both American and foreign, and to foreign governments or their arms and agencies.

Federal law has for some time imposed certain prohibitions and restrictions on some such activities by former officers or employees of Executive Branch departments and independent agencies of the U.S. Government

... The experience of the recent Arab "petrodollar years" and the record of activity by former U.S. officials on behalf of Arab governments and private Arab clients suggests certain gaps and weaknesses in the law

... The public interest of the American people requires special protection both from private domestic interests and from foreign governments and foreign principals whose interests may not be the same as the national interests of the United States. The U.S. Congress has recognized — if not for itself — the need for special safeguards and has enacted limited restrictions, prohibitions and requirements to serve the American interest.

Congress, however, has not gone far enough.