

to London's Foreign Office. According to the *Washington Post*, the Iranian government considers the BBC "public enemy number one," and the military government has reportedly resumed jamming of the BBC.

Among the declarations which Khomeini has made are a call for the Iranian people to die in battles with the military in order to succeed in the overthrow of the Shah. The Paris daily *Le Figaro* reports that Khomeini's followers are planning a massive demonstration in which the protesters will wrap themselves in white shrouds — traditionally used within the Moslem faith for burial of the dead. The demonstrators plan to defy the troops and be shot down, says *Le Figaro*, in a tactic calculated to put maximum pressure on the military to break with the Shah and join the dissidents. At the same time that Khomeini told the London *Financial Times* that Iranians must be prepared to die, a band of well-armed terrorists known as the "suicide squad" was uncovered in Meshed in eastern Iran.

According to European press sources, the first few days of Moharram, which began Dec. 2, did not produce the anti-government violence that Khomeini had hoped for. *Le Figaro* reports that as a result, the extremist Shi'ite leaders have placed loudspeakers outside the mosques playing tapes of gun battle and screams after curfew hours. In turn various press, including the BBC, would then report the "sounds of violence" throughout the cities.

There has been a marked increase of terrorist provocations against Westerners in Iran. Many foreigners have received threatening phone calls and three homes of U.S. nationals were firebombed last week. These developments coincide with the reemergence of the Mujaheddine ("the people's strugglers"), which was ousted from Iran in 1975. The Mujaheddine interfaces with international terror networks which in turn connect into various Arab terrorist groups. The Mujaheddine was named as responsible for a bloody machinegun attack on a Tehran police station this week which left one officer dead. It is these terrorist networks that will be provoking the participants of the emotional Dec. 11 religious processions into mayhem.

Economic disaster

The net economic toll of Iran's crisis runs into the billions. Following last month's strike which nearly brought Iran's oil output to a near halt, the military government was able to force the workers back to work in party through considerable pay raises and other increased benefits so that Iran's output of crude reach its near 6 million barrels a day average. This was reversed this week by new labor strikes bringing oil output down to less than 4 million barrels a day.

This figures heavily into the Shah's furious diplomatic efforts to reach an agreement with moderate opposition figures to form a civilian pro-

visional government that would rule until elections in June 1979.

It is widely agreed that many figures associated with the National Front — founded by the revolutionary Mossadegh in 1953 — are willing to create a new coalition government. But the precondition will be the silencing of Khomeini, who still wields sufficient power within Iran to threaten and blackmail many figure amenable to a new government. Even the more moderate Shi'ite religious leaders such as the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari recognize this fact and have kept their own discreet channels open to the Shah.

Azhari at his Dec. 6 press conference invited Khomeini to return from his exile in Paris. What prompted the offer is not entirely clear. Whether this means that the Shah has succeeded in putting together a coalition which leaves Khomeini out in the cold is too early to say. If the Shah survives through the December days of mourning and still holds his absolute rule, his next step will almost have to be the formation of a new civilian government.

— Judith Wyer

The Soviets warn of U.S. military intervention

Novosti, the Soviet press agency, dispatched the article excerpted here to NSIPS on Dec. 6. It was titled "American interests in Iran."

According to Soviet officials, the danger of an American military intervention into the situation in Iran is not to be ignored. Corroboration of this appraisal is not lacking either in Iran or the United States.

Soviet experts in military-political problems point not only to the number of Americans now in Iran — over 50,000 — but also to the U.S. Army's military equipment now stationed in that country. . . .

The USA's efforts to influence developments there are also indicated by other facts. The Americans not long ago opened an "information center" in Tehran, which American citizens can call at any time. This measure would seem at first glance to be an effort to maintain closer contact with the United States' fellow countrymen in Iran. It should be noted in this connection, as Soviet experts have confirmed, that recently about 400 CIA agents have come to Iran, and not to help American citizens there, but to support the military regime by fighting the opposition to the Shah. It is obviously not easy to maintain a dependable link-up with such a quantity of secret service agents.

Therefore a special information center was necessary.

As for the evacuation of 50,000 Americans, there are also, as the American press says, special plans worked out for the deployment of the armed forces of the USA. Not coincidentally, a special team is working day and night in the U.S. State Department, registering every slightest change in the situation. This heightened "watchfulness" is to be explained not only by the investment which runs to 12 billions in arming the army of the Shah, and the 10 percent contribution that Iran makes to the USA's oil imports, but also by the wide-reaching political-strategic plans in which the Pentagon and NATO are interested.

The *Washington Post* remarked at the beginning of November in its commentary on events in Iran that the President's advisors regretted that the CIA had such a bad reputation. In this connection, Soviet experts underline the fact that the secret agency's "FM 30-31" plan, which is still in effect today, provides for an entire series of special operations in a "friendly country" in case the danger should arise there of a radical change in the political situation.

The goal of the above-mentioned measures to "destabilize" or "stabilize" a country's regime, according to its political and social orientation, is to keep in power, at any price, that circle which is acceptable to the USA and which follows policies friendly to

America. The plan also provides for an active and illegal intervention by the U.S. Army into that country's secret service, its police, and armed forces as well as into its civil and administrative organs, with the goal of influencing the policies of the host country's government.

The Soviet experts emphasized that the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force have their representatives in Iran and that there is also an extensive group of CIA operatives there. Only the naive would assume that this contingent is staying off to the side of those events that have developed in Iran in the last couple of months. In President Carter's message to the Shah, which Brzezinski passed on by telephone, Carter guaranteed the Shah his total support. When he received the Crown Prince Reza Cyrus, the President of the USA affirmed that "our friendship and our alliance with Iran is one of the most important points, on which our entire foreign policy is based."

When one takes into consideration that, according to the agreement signed between the USA and Iran in Ankara in 1959, the U.S. is allowed to march its troops into Iran in order to protect American citizens, then it is understandable that the Soviet Union's warning is totally well-founded, stating that an arbitrary intervention into the affairs of Iran, and even more, a military intervention, affects the security interests of the USSR as one of the states bordering on Iran.

Kissinger demands a showdown

In his interview with Newsweek's Arnaud de Borchgrave, Henry Kissinger pushed hard for a confrontation with the Soviets and all but accused the Carter Administration of a policy of "appeasement." The following is excerpted from that interview, which appeared in Newsweek's most recent issue.

The Iranian situation is a tragedy for the West. The Shah is a leader who on every critical foreign-policy issue has been totally on the side of the West and who has been a stabilizing factor in every crisis in the area. . . . (But) the Shah is paying the price of modernization: he is being attacked by those who think he moves too fast and by those for whom he is not moving fast enough. Brezhnev's statement occurred when there had been no

U.S. military move of any kind. It was gratuitous and provocative.

In this context, our own answer was not very strong. I don't think it came across as a ringing affirmation of a commitment to a country that is so vital to us or as a warning to the Soviets not to meddle in Iranian affairs. It almost sounded as if we were declaring Iran an area of neutrality. . . .

In the context of (U.S.) weakness, some challenge was inevitable. It happened in Angola. That could and should have been contained. When it was not, Ethiopia followed as the next step. That sequence shook confidence in us not only in Africa but also in the Middle East. So I think the Soviet Union will certainly press to the limits of its geopolitical strength. That is its nature as a great power and as a Communist power. It's our responsibility to create the necessary counterweights. . . .

For the greater part of the post-World War II period we could defend most threatened areas by our nuclear superiority. . . . For a

variety of reasons, that superiority has eroded. . . . That means that we and our allies must have a capacity for regional defense inside and outside the NATO area. If we don't develop this, then in the '80s we're going to pay a very serious price. The first installments are already visible. . . .

There is to me inexplicable self-hatred (in some Carter Administration officials) that denigrates everything we attempt and despises those who associate with us. This was compounded by the President's Notre Dame speech, for example, when he said he would free our policy from the inordinate fear of Communism which had characterized it in the past. What were allies of the U.S., who had worked with us for a generation, to think? Had they become dispensable? Did our new attitude toward Communism weaken our previous commitment? These uncertainties account for some of the strains of the past year. . . .