unquestionable importance for the world. We are conscious of this reality; it involves no mystery; we will solve our problems with our own resources.

I promise you, representatives of the Republic, thus will we maintain our economic independence and political independence. Let us have no fear of contact. We know what we want. Mexico today knows where it came from, where it is now, and where it wants to go.

You have heard, from among yourselves and from my collaborators, about the current situation of our Republic. We have ideas, ideas and plans. Consistent and structured plans capable of responding to the problems we confront.

And here before you, Governors, I want to declare that the use of our resources — and here I'm referring exclusively to our oil resources — will only be made for the purposes of the national interest; only that which serves the country; never distortions due to bilateral greed. Mexico will use its resources as it sees fit: exclusively for its own benefit. I am sure national unity will support this goal.

Only a higher, collective and generally observed reason could cause Mexico to deviate from or add to its oil production program. World opinion allows us to consider energy as the patrimony of humanity — to the extent we are all obliged and committed to consider it so by a new economic order — from the production process, through distribution to consumption. What we cannot allow is that specific interests disfigure systems of production. These systems belong to, and are at the service of, their respective nations. To the degree that we establish a higher order, we will try to agree on solutions to the energy supply needs of all countries, strong or weak. To us there is no difference between the needs of one or the other group. (But) only to the extent that a new system establishes these principles for everyone will we allow ourselves to participate in higher systems of production. This is my commitment to you.

...We of this generation have before us a great historic responsibility: to build a better Mexico. We are at a watershed. I call on the whole Republic to stand steadfast behind its institutions, its convictions and its actions.

It was like today governors and representatives of the legislative and judicial powers, that on the 5th of February (1917) our Republic met together. May it always remain united!

Carter’s record on United States-Mexico relations under the Carter Administration have been marked by steady deterioration. The reason: in contrast to oil-rich Mexico’s own industrial goals, Carter policymakers such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and James Schlesinger view Mexico as a southern neighbor which must be kept in subservient backwardness as the United States’ backyard.

Mexico’s “friend” in an apparent bid for Mexican-American votes in 1980 — is promoting U.S. efforts to channel Mexico’s oil wealth into labor-intensive “appropriate technologies” while absorbing the greater part of Mexican oil into the U.S. strategic reserve.

Given Mexico’s commitment to industrialization, how do these deindustrializers hope to win? There are, of course, many pressure tactics. But the major one is the plans for sealing the U.S.-Mexico border. The pretext will be stopping the “hordes” of Mexicans looking for jobs in the U.S. — jobs made scarce in Mexico precisely by the anti-industry policies of Schlesinger, Brzezinski and Kennedy.

Sealing the border — a measure borrowed straight from Nazi Germany — would indeed create great social pressures within Mexico.

But if Schlesinger and Co. believe that this would guarantee their “Iran” scenario in Mexico, they are quite mistaken.

For one thing, unlike Iran, Mexico has a deeply rooted tradition of popular republican government which makes destabilizations of the present government far less possible than of the authoritarian Shah.

And Mexico has a major international alternative to the U.S. for cooperation in its development plans. When French President Giscard d’Estaing arrives in Mexico Feb. 28, two weeks after Carter, he comes as head of the EEC and top representative of the European Monetary System (EMS). Unlike Carter, who has yet to dispatch any ranking official to Mexico to prepare economic accords in advance of his trip, Giscard has sent his Industries Minister, the head of the Latin American division of the French nuclear program, and his Foreign Trade Minister, Jean Deniau (twice), to prepare his. Deniau is well-known as the sponsor of a proposal to create a $100 billion fund, linked to EMS facilities, for financing European and Third World development projects involving advanced technology.

Below, we review step by step the downward slide in U.S.-Mexico relations since Jimmy Carter’s election in 1976.

1976-1977

December 1976: A preview of Carter Administration policy toward Mexico is provided by Harvard University professor and Carter advisor, Daniel Bell. In an interview with the French weekly L’Express, Bell states: “Mexico is a country with a formidable demographic explosion. The U.S. cannot absorb illegal immigrants anymore. An explosion can appear on our southern border which would force Carter to pull back certain units from Europe.”

The same theme is also sounded by F. Ray Marshall in his
Mexico policy

first policy statement after nomination by Carter as Labor Secretary: “Maintaining illegal foreigners out of the U.S. Market” is “a prerequisite for reducing unemployment.”

Feb. 1, 1977: In the midst of the U.S. winter gas shortage, President López Portillo offers Mexican natural gas to help relieve the U.S. shortage. Although the amount of gas exported over an existing pipeline which had previously been used to import gas from the U.S. is very small, it is a gesture of good will by the Mexican government.

It is during this same period that López Portillo and his cabinet meet with a delegation of U.S. businessmen, a meeting which calls for establishing “a new era in relations,” with U.S. businessmen assuring Mexico a “strong flow of U.S. capital to Mexico.”


The New York Times covers the visit in an editorial calling on Mexico to “channel oil money to labor intensive projects.”

Washington sources close to the López Portillo-Carter meeting report that National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski demanded that Mexico (1) give U.S. oil corporations drilling rights for the offshore oil deposits; (2) that Mexico reduce its public spending (as demanded at the time by the International Monetary Fund), and (3) that Mexico implement measures to reduce its population growth and the flow of undocumented aliens to the U.S. In return, the U.S. would offer to help Mexico renegotiate its foreign debt — one of Mexico’s most urgent short-term problems.


May 1977: Mexico’s Industrial Minister Jose Andres de Oteyza responds to the U.S. pressure: “Mexico will not yield to any international pressures regarding the sale of its oil.... Mexico is not willing to commit its oil to the U.S. in exchange for financing received through the good graces of that country.”

June 1977: On a more positive note, the joint communiqué issued by the yearly U.S.-Mexico interparliamentary meeting calls for a “war on drugs.”

At the same time, the head of Mexico’s national oil company, Jorge Díaz Serrano, announces that Mexico “is eager to sell much more of its oil to the U.S.” and proposes the construction of a gas pipeline from the oil regions to the U.S. border.

Aug. 6, 1977: President Carter, nevertheless, proceeds to formally present his program for stopping the flow of “illegal” aliens into the U.S. from Mexico. His proposal, to be presented to Congress, calls for intensified policing of the border, penalties on employers hiring illegals, and a limited amnesty program for illegal aliens already in the U.S. This would create a new status for workers who have been in the U.S. for the past five years, allowing them to remain temporarily, while limiting their access to public services.

The ruling party in Mexico, the PRI, delivers the government’s response to the Carter “illegal aliens” plan with a strong denunciation calling Carter’s program a “flagrant attack on the universal policy of human rights.”

Aug. 10, 1977: In an interview with Mexican daily Excélsior, the Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Leonel Castillo, warns that the deportation of “illegals would destabilize Mexico — provoking a revolution.” The same day the New York Post reports that the White House office of Drug Abuse directed by Peter Bourne proposes the establishment of a “superagency for policing the border” with Mexico which would coordinate the efforts of all border-related agencies.

In his first State of the Union address, President López Portillo responds sharply to the Carter illegal aliens plan, stressing that the solution must be economic, “not a police solution.”

October 1977: A spokesman for the Ku Klux Klan in San Diego announces that the KKK will begin to patrol the border to stop the immigration of Mexican workers into the U.S.

Oct. 22, 1977: Illinois Senator Adlai Stevenson III, calls on Congress to veto a $500 million dollar credit package for Mexico arranged through the Export-Import Bank. $360 million of which has been slated for the construction of the U.S.-Mexico gas pipeline.

In an interview with the Executive Intelligence Review, a spokesman for the office of Senator Stevenson reveals that the Senator’s objection to the Eximbank credit for Mexico — allegedly over Mexico’s asking gas price — was prepared “solely” in coordination with the Department of Energy “to give Schlesinger more leverage” in forcing Mexico to lower the price.

Oct. 29: Pemex Director Díaz Serrano blasts the U.S. Energy Secretary James Schlesinger for his threat of deploying a “mobile intervention force” into oil producing nations. Diaz warns that such an action would lead to “interference in Mexico’s oil resources.”

November 1977: Schlesinger sends his Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Walt McDonald, to Mexico to sabotage ongoing gas negotiations between Pemex and six U.S. gas companies. Since by law the Energy Department is only empowered to review energy import contracts after they are signed, Schlesinger arranges for State Department representatives to be included in the delegation.

The head negotiator for the gas companies, Tenneco’s Jack Ray, sends immediate telegrams of protest to both Schlesinger and Secretary of State Vance, indicating that until the contract is signed, the government has no role in the negotiations.

The following week, the State Department summons representatives of the gas companies to Washington which, according to reports, are bluntly told “Why do you want to sign a contract which the government is going to reject?” When the companies insist they would not break their understanding with Mexico, the State Department official pressures the gas companies to prolong the negotiations beyond the cut-off date of Dec. 31, which is the deadline Pemex set for a contract.
Despite this, the gas companies and Pemex proceed to complete their negotiations. By Dec. 12, a contract is ready to be signed.

Schlesinger responds by summoning Foreign Minister Santiago Roel and Pemex director Diaz Serrano to Washington for a face-to-face meeting, Dec. 21. In this meeting, Schlesinger adds insult to injury by putting pressure on the Mexican officials on other bilateral issues such as the illegal aliens question.

Dec. 22, 1977: By instructions of López Portillo, Pemex notifies the U.S. government and the six gas companies that Mexico is withdrawing from negotiations and will not extend discussions beyond the Dec. 31 deadline.

1978

Jan. 21, 1978: The Department of Energy threatens to embargo uranium purchased by Mexico from France and sent to the U.S. for enrichment. It is to be used in Mexico’s first nuclear plant built with General Electric technology in Veracruz.

Jan. 25, 1978: Vice-President Walter Mondale makes a visit to Mexico in efforts to reopen discussion of the gas pipeline, and is told by López Portillo that the price “is not negotiable.” While in Mexico, Mondale proposes that credits be funneled through the World Bank for labor intensive agriculture projects, as the sole focus of Mexico’s development effort.

In an interview with Executive Intelligence Review, Ana Gutierrez, assistant director of the White House Domestic Council under Mondale responds that, “The illegals program is not negotiable…. There are some things they (Mexico) may not like but that’s too bad.”

March 8, 1978: Mexican Foreign Minister Santiago Roel presents a formal protest to the State Department over a blockade of the border by members of the miniscule “American Agricultural Movement” (AAM) protesting exports of Mexican food items to the U.S. For several days the AAM successfully blocks several border bridges with several demonstrations ending in mass arrests and scuffles with the police.

March 17, 1978: Another fringe lobbyist group joins the attack on Mexico. The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) begins a campaign to force Mexico to stop the use of paraquat for the eradication of drug cultivation.

April 29, 1978: López Portillo delivers an unequivocal statement on the natural gas negotiations, stating that “Mexico has decided to use all its natural gas in the development of our country and if we export anything at all, it will be the fuel oil which we will substitute with the natural gas itself.”

May 5, 1978: U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance begins a two-day visit to Mexico, but no substantive discussion or official statements are reported in the press. Vance does not respond to proposal made prior to his visit by Mexican Finance Minister David Ibarra that a $15 billion fund for financing transfer of technology and capital goods to the Third World be established.

July 1978: Senator Edward Kennedy and the U.S. Zionist lobby begin a campaign demanding that the Carter Administration reverse its position on the gas pipeline negotiations so that Mexican oil could be used to “bust OPEC.” Kennedy introduces into the Congressional Record an editorial page feature from the Washington Post which calls for precisely this strategy. This is clearly reflected in a number of statements from top Zionist lobby spokesmen — like the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee.

Late August 1978: The Kennedy crew, through an article in the New Republic, proposes the elaboration of a Presidential Review Memorandum on Mexico and appointment of a “special negotiator” with Mexico in order to line up Mexican oil in a “bust OPEC” strategy.

Sept. 1, 1978: To answer Kennedy, Mexican President López Portillo announces during his State of the Union address: “We are not now, nor will we be, scabs against OPEC.”

Oct. 7, 1978: Sources confirm that the National Security Council has begun work on such a memorandum with the selection of a team to work as a task force.

In an address to United Press International editors, López Portillo again calls on the U.S. to join in the fight for establishing a new international economic order.

Oct. 25, 1978: López Portillo begins an important trip to China and Japan; the Immigration and Naturalization Service announces the construction of an “impenetrable fence” along key sections of the U.S.-Mexican border. The Mexican press says it “will be very much like the Berlin Wall.”

Oct. 28, 1978: President López Portillo responds to this threat, from China, when he says, “I hope this discourtesy is not implemented.”

Late November 1978: Carter is asked in a press conference about the furor caused by plans to build new fences at various points in the border. The President surprises the audience by asking, “What fences?”

Dec. 7, 1978: Carter tells an astonished press conference that in his February trip to Mexico he expects “to conclude, hopefully, these continuing negotiations” on Mexican gas imports which Schlesinger had stopped more than a year before.

Dec. 15, 1978: The Washington Post discloses sections of the Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM)-41, which calls for using Mexico to bust up OPEC, working out an “oil for aliens” deal, and in Canada-U.S.-Mexico common market. The Brzezinski-authored document openly discusses the fact that “there is little danger that Mexico will become overtly hostile… unless we attempt to seal the border.”

The publication of the PRM-41 is met with a flurry of articles in the U.S. press praising the document as Brzezinski’s soft-line approach to Mexico.


Jan. 17, 1979: At a press conference Carter endorses Schlesinger’s “hard-line” position on the question of Mexican gas imports, since “in the immediate future, there is no urgency about acquiring Mexican natural gas.”

Jan. 22, 1979: At Joint Economic Committee hearings. Schlesinger tells Mexico to go slow with its energy development since “we have seen what happens with too rapid development in Iran.”

— Pablo Silva