

Fuentes (whose recent predictions of a Bukharinite revival appear on p. 51). Numbers of "British communists" — both in the Communist Party of Great Britain and in the Italian and French parties — are avowed supporters of Bukharin. The Italian Communist Party daily *Unita* recently claimed that the coherence of Marxism and Russellism have been known to "communists" for a long time!

Inside the USSR, Bukharinism is not a question of open endorsement of Bukharin. As Fuentes observes, chances for an official rehabilitation of Bukharin rose only during the free-for-all unleashed by Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 "destalinization." In 1977, Bukharin's son Yuri Larin was rebuffed in an appeal to have Bukharin reinstated to membership in the Soviet Communist Party.

Bukharinism, however, does exist in the USSR. It is the outlook of a Soviet leadership current based on the carried-forward influence of Bukharin and his collaborators, amplified by the acceptance of "British communists" like Kim Philby and Donald Maclean — both spawned in the "Children of the Sun" circles of the British aristocracy — into Soviet intelligence and advisory positions as bona fide defectors from British intelligence. The Bukharinite profile combines an advocacy of "class struggle" militancy and destabilization for the Third World and the industrialized capitalist sector, with "liberalizing" preferences for modifying the domestic Soviet economy through "market" innovations. It is fundamentally opposed to the Brezhnev leadership's perspective — like Lenin and Chicherin's — of seeking both international stability and the perfection of the Soviet Union's planned industrial development through trade and scientific cooperation with Western nations;

it has a chance against Brezhnev when Western, particularly the United States', leaderships threaten to break off the detente and move rapidly towards confrontation.

### The Stalin campaign

A 1979 calendar of events, issued by the Politizdat publishing house in Moscow, marks Stalin's birthday with a portrait and 38-line biography. The entry not only praises Stalin's role in Russia's World War II victory, but turns to his prewar contributions. Stalin "contributed to the preparation and realization" of the Great October Revolution of 1917, it states, and "applied the ideas of Lenin in the field of foreign policy as well as in collectivization." The calendar upholds Stalin in his faction fights against "Trotskyists, right oppositionists (Bukharin — ed.) and bourgeois nationalists."

On Dec. 24 of last year, *Pravda* devoted a lengthy review, by the noted political commentator Yuri Zhukov, to Part I of a new political novel, Aleksandr Chakovskii's "Victory," in which Stalin's "rehabilitation" is furthered by a portrait of his leadership in 1945.

A Stalin revival proceeding on the lines set by these two examples is going to cause more than a headache for Bukharinists — in the West and in the East. Neither "British communists" nor British strategists like to see the Stalin era recalled in terms of how the USSR was industrialized, how Stalin hoped to revive the Lenin-Chicherin prodevelopment foreign policy, how Stalin hated the British and their efforts to destroy the Soviet Union (as Chakovskii makes clear in "Victory") — instead of its being remembered only for the great purges.

— Rachel Berthoff and Susan Welsh

## New 'Stalinist' Soviet novel features 1945 Potsdam Conference

Aleksandr Chakovskii's "Victory" was serialized in the popular Soviet literary monthly "Znamya" at the end of last year. The author, who for over 15 years has been editor of the prestigious "Literaturnaya Gazeta," had already consolidated his reputation as a leading "neo-Stalinist" by making Stalin a leading character in his earlier novel, "Blockade," a five-volume work on World War II.

"Victory" continues in the same vein, portraying Stalin as the hero of the 1945 Potsdam conference. In dealing with this watershed between the Alliance and the Cold War, Chakovskii now delves into Stalin's perception of British and American policy at that time.

Chakovskii does not give as clear and unequivocal a statement as could be wished for on the decisive development of the late World War II and early postwar period: Britain's subversion of a potential Soviet-United States entente. But he approaches the question, making an effort to cut through the mental habits of 30 years of Cold War mythology about eternal and inevitable hostility between the United States and the USSR

in order to recreate the wartime climate of friendship that did exist between the two countries.

Chakovskii does this most effectively through a second set of protagonists on another level of the novel than the "Big Three," Stalin, Churchill, and Truman. These are the journalists — again, Soviet, American and British — assigned to cover the Potsdam conference. The uneasy friendship between the Soviet journalist, Voronov, and an American, Bright, is intended to symbolize the relations between the "common people" of the two nations. This literary vehicle lends itself to all imaginable cliches, but does provide the opportunity for honest portrayals of relations between Americans, British and Russians.

For instance, besides the fact that Bright likes the Russians and Voronov is basically sympathetic to Americans, Bright can't stand the British. Chakovskii has Bright refer to Stalin as "Uncle Joe," to Truman rather indifferently as "the Boss," and to Churchill simply as "Fat Boy."

At another point, Voronov converses with a hard-boiled and skeptical comrade, General Karpov, deputy to Marshal

Zhukov's Chief of Staff. When Voronov tells Karpov that he is in Berlin to write about "cooperation among the Allies," Karpov mumbles, "you mean, that there ought to be cooperation among the Allies."

### Portrait of Stalin

The reasons for the collapse of the Alliance unfold through the eyes of Chakovskii's Stalin, musing as he travels by train to Potsdam.

"Stalin had had an agreement with Roosevelt on (reconstruction) aid. But Roosevelt was gone now. And the new president of the U.S., Truman, had begun by 'temporarily' halting Lend-Lease deliveries.

"That blatantly unfriendly step of Truman's made Stalin suspicious, although he nevertheless genuinely believed that the military alliance which had been built up during the years of struggle against Hitlerism could develop into peaceful postwar cooperation...

"Yes, Stalin did on more than one occasion commit serious mistakes and violate laws laid down by the Party and worked out by Lenin. But the Leninist conception of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems remained a firm principle for Stalin...

"Of course, England's intention to play the dominant role in Europe after the war as well was something he had been aware of from earlier. Stalin also understood that the only way the decrepit British Empire would be able to play that role was with the active support of the United States... Everything (however) pointed to the fact that Roosevelt actually believed in the possibility of a postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union.

"But subsequent events, and especially one of them — Dulles' separate talks with Wolff in Berne — put Stalin into a rage... Admittedly, Roosevelt, answering Stalin's indignant protest, had in the message before his death assured Stalin again and again of his... readiness to carry on the joint struggle against the common enemy to full victory. All the same, the suspicions in Stalin's mind did not subside."

Turning to Britain, Chakovskii accuses Winston Churchill of standing behind the Dulles talks, which Stalin viewed as Anglo-American treachery. He explicitly characterizes Churchill, "that true servant of the British Empire," as a man born and raised to become a member of a "hereditary aristocratic elite which was firmly convinced that it was eternally destined to rule England and to extend the influence of its power throughout the world." He accuses Churchill of delaying the Second Front in order to "let Russia and Germany bleed one another to death."

"In contrast to Churchill, Roosevelt never suffered from an anti-Soviet complex. Of course, the American president was no less distant from Communism than his English colleague. Still, it was under Roosevelt that the U.S. recognized Soviet Russia... Americans might rightly regard (Roosevelt's April 12, 1945 reply to Stalin's protest announcing his firm intention to strengthen the cooperation between the U.S. and USSR) ... as the last will and testament of one of their great presidents: on the next day, Franklin Delano Roosevelt died..."

In sum, Chakovskii is aware of the clear differences between the U.S. and England. He is also aware of the basic impulse towards cooperation and friendship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But in posing or answering the question of "what might have been," Chakovskii has more difficulty. A certain orthodox "Marxist-Leninist objectivism" intervenes to prevent him from doing so; his unstated argument runs that history is "objective" — and, no matter what we might have liked to see, the Cold War did occur and it only remains to discover the "objective laws" whose iron necessity determined that course of events.

His explanation boils down to a stock "class" analysis of Churchill and Truman: Truman is the representative of a younger, more vigorous capitalist form of imperialism which must lawfully oust Churchill's old and outdated variant. Chakovskii thus obscures what he elsewhere emphasizes, namely that Truman became the tool Churchill needed to overcome Roosevelt's idea of continuing an entente with the USSR!

The lowest irony of Chakovskii's flawed argument is not just that it brings us back to the same old myth about the origins of the Cold War that Chakovskii in effect struck out to overcome. It allows Churchill and his elite — the people prepared to start World War III for the sake of fulfilling their "destiny" of eternally ruling the world — to scamper off scot-free. And what Chakovskii apparently considers his most damning characterization of Churchill is precisely what lets him off the hook. Chakovskii writes that Churchill's fundamental problem was being born too late for the age of British imperialism.

But to allow that is to allow that there must have been a "right" time for Churchill. And any conception of history that concedes to Winston Churchill and the British Empire, or others of the antihumanist elite, a "lawful" time in the past thousands of years of human civilization suffers from a flaw of historical relativism that is out of place with the hopes for world development which, deeply ingrained in the Soviet policy-outlook, characterize the basic policies of the Brezhnev leadership today.

— Clifford Gaddy, Stockholm