The gangs—who benefits?

Reporter Roy Harvey's exposé of Ed Levi and the Blackstone Rangers

In June of 1979 journalist Roy Harvey of the Chicago Defender, Chicago's third largest daily newspaper, began an investigative series entitled, "Chicago Gangs: Who Benefits?" The series continued through 18 installments (over a month of publication) and, by its conclusion, entirely changed the face of politics in Chicago. It exposed the “people above suspicion,” Edward and Julian Levi of the University of Chicago, the University's think tanks and community and religious front organizations, to be behind the formation and deployment of the drug-and-crime controlling “street gangs” of Chicago in the 1960s—the Blackstone Rangers, the Black P. Stone Nation, and more recently the El-Rukn.

In his introduction to the series, reporter Harvey asked the crucial question behind any such investigation: “Who benefited?”

"While most of the gang leadership went to prison or were murdered ... the gang controllers—the sociologists, the preachers, the poverty pimps and the lawyers—went on to ... new ‘sociological experiments.’

"Some of them worked to further dismantle the Chicago police department, which had interfered with their experiment; others set themselves up as the nemesis of industry and the development of nuclear power; others, with their foe Mayor Daley gone, moved into City Hall."

Harvey’s series, which won for him and the Chicago Defender the Outstanding Service Award of the Illinois Anti-Drug Coalition, succeeded in answering the question, “Who benefits?” It found that the same political machine which put Mayor Jane Byrne in office and which has undertaken to dismantle Chicago as an industrial and commercial center, created the gangs in the 1960s to help carry out this process. As Harvey documents in the series, in the words of University of Chicago sociologist Irving Abraham Spergel, who headed the University's OEO-funded “gang school analysis study” and published a book on his “study” in 1969:

"Gang youths ... can be useful as the shock troops, the putchist elements, the essence of the rabble or the mob which attacks and serves to topple the existing political regime or at least to seriously threaten the existing political structure."

The Chicago gangs were used to introduce drugs, terror and “community control” to the city, starting with its Woodlawn ghetto. They were recruited, paid, and protected by the University of Chicago, the Federal Office of Equal Opportunity (OEO), and by then University of Chicago provost and president Edward Levi—later appointed to the post of U.S. Attorney General.

By the conclusion of the gangs series, the Defender was the best read newspaper at Chicago's City Hall. Several members of Chicago's City Council were heard to express their desire to “take the University of Chicago apart brick by brick.” Parents' groups, community groups, and political associations organized meetings around the series and flocked to the Defender’s offices to get copies of the articles and more information. “We didn’t have the staff to pursue all the leads,” Harvey told Executive Intelligence Review: Community people called the Defender “brave.”

Then on July 23, the first response was heard from the Byrne machine. Edward Levi, a Byrne nominee to head the Chicago Police Board, abruptly withdrew from consideration with no explanation. The entire city knew the reason, however. The Defender went to press with the headline, “Levi Withdraws: Credit Defender Gang Series.”

The method and principles which Roy Harvey used to break the Chicago gang story are the same as those which Alexander Hamilton sought to impose on American journalism, when he wrote: “It was by the press that the morals of this country have been ruined, and it is by the press that they shall be restored.” The honest use of investigative journalism exemplified in the Defender series demonstrates that, to accomplish this goal, investigative journalists must have the courage to pursue their objectives all the way to those at the top—what Harvey did in the Chicago gang series.

In contradistinction, the Institute for Policy Studies and its Fund for Investigative Journalism have besmirched the name of investigative journalism through their stable of paid liars such as Seymour Hersh, Woodward and Bernstein, Jack Anderson, et al. with
their phony “watergating” investigative frauds. At the
top, the Fund for Investigative Journalism is controlled
by the political bedfellows of the very institutions,
universities, and individuals exposed in the Chicago
gangs series.

The Fund’s frameups, coverups, and other assorted
lying techniques carry out a “deception operation”
against the population on two general levels. The first
is the direct political purpose of the specific lying
operation involved—the answer to the question, “Who
benefits?” The second is the deception involved in the
broader misrepresentation of investigative journalism
as an “objective,” “safe” and glamorous Hollywood
career. On the deepest level, the welfare of American
society demands that reporters such as Roy Harvey and
the Chicago Defender dedicate themselves to the moral
standards that made this country great.

With this issue of Executive Intelligence Review, we
begin an extensive reprinting of sections of Mr. Harv­
ey’s articles. For the full series, send to the Chicago
Defender, 2400 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60616.

—Fay Sober

Chicago Defender: ‘cui bono?’

This is the story of a sociological experiment called
variously the Blackstone Rangers, the Black P. Stone
Nation, and most recently, El-Rukn.

Dozens of books have been written about the Chicago
gangs of the late 60s; a myriad of Ph.Ds and other
degrees were issued; and hundreds of youth and other
Southside residents were murdered; policemen were
maimed and killed; whole communities were destroyed.
Who benefited?

While most of the gang leadership went to prison, or
were murdered by rival gangs, or fled Chicago, the gang
controllers—the sociologists, the preachers, the poverty
pimps and the lawyers—went on to write their books, or
up the academic ladder, or on to new “sociological
experiments.”

Some of them worked to further dismantle the Chicago
police department, which had interfered with their exper­
iment; others set themselves up as the nemesis of industry
and the development of nuclear power; others, with their
foe Mayor Richard Daley gone, moved into City Hall.

In working to solve a crime—such as the creation of
the Blackstone Nation and the other street gangs, it is
first necessary to pose the question: cuis bono? Who
benefits?

June 18: The P. Stones—a university
creation

This is the story of a sociological experiment called the
Blackstone Rangers, the Black P. Stone Nation, and
most recently, El-Rukn—the story of the gang that was
created.

Not by a university alone, by itself, but with help:
help from Presbyterians and Jesuits and other priests
and preachers, by federal officials, urban planners,
freelance sociologists, behavior modification psycholo­
gists, and philanthropic foundations.

The 60s were crazy years: the era of the Vietnam
war and assassinations. People said—and did—crazy
things.

It was the era of the Black Liberation Army: the era
that spawned the Symbionese Liberation Army and
other terrorist organizations and pseudo-religious cults
that foundations and government agencies played an
overt part in creating.

It was an era that watched its own social disintegra­
tion: a breakdown of authority in political organization,
law, education, culture.

The genocide in Vietnam provided the moral stand­
ard—the backdrop—by which to judge one’s behavior:
What did hard work and discipline ever get anyone?
reasoned the youth and the liberal. “Genocide,” they
answered. Therefore, do-your-own-thing: hedonism and
permissiveness predominated; “alternative” education,
culture. ... Youth was hailed as untainted, creative.

The national hysteria was reflected in Chicago in the
creation of the gangs.

While, on a national level behavior modification
psychologists were experimenting with their rewards
and punishments, in Chicago the experiment went one
step further: Award the bad behavior, award hooligan­
ism, gangsterism.

This national anti-authority hysteria (conservatives
were generally driven further to the right, into a des­
perate defense of the genocide in South East Asia) was
intersected in Chicago by the University of Chicago,
which had a problem, and found such hysteria useful.

The University did not want to be swallowed up by
a ghetto; further, it wanted to expand southward—it
wanted the land.

The University had the problem before. As writer
John Gunther noted in a series of lectures he gave at
the University of Chicago (published as “Chicago Re­
national impulse for urban renewal ... the University
has acquired 26.5 acres of additional land from a
reclaimed slum area so that it can expand its South
Campus....”
The sentence contains no glimmer of the violence and tragedy involved in that simple expansion south. The story begins with the creation of the University, founded in 1890 by a grant from John D. Rockefeller (who was to donate over $35 million) and monies from Marshall Field.

As Gunther notes, the U. of C. has always been a pioneer in theoretical and practical sociology. The University is home for the School of Social Service Administration (just south of the Midway), a greensward often referred to in the heyday of urban renewal and the Blackstone Rangers as the DMZ (demilitarized zone).

Gunther boasts that the U. of C. sociologists are capable of "the most extensive empirical investigation of the social characteristics of modern cities" imaginable.

Comments Gunther: "Demographers in the department can practically tell you what the population of Indianapolis will be at 10:05 a.m. on July 17, in the year 2093...."

The statement reportedly caused some residents of Indianapolis to worry: is the University of Chicago expanding eastward?

The University is celebrated for its "Chicago School of Economics" which among other things is famed for putting together the economic program of Pinochet's Chile.

The University is also home for the Chicago Theological Seminary, which like the sociology and economic departments, hardly confines itself to ecclesiastical matters.

The University—located on some 200 acres on Chicago's South Side—was plagued with "its greatest crisis," notes Gunther: "the neighborhood problem."

During World War II, a massive wave of southern immigrants, black and white, moved into Chicago. The whites largely dispersed to other neighborhoods.

Comments Gunther: "The University found itself beleaguered. It was hemmed in. It was cut off by an atrocious slum. ... The problem was not a 'Negro' problem per se, but rather one of Negroes on a miserably poor level of subsistence." Poor Negroes.

Not to worry. What had the University of Chicago trained all those sociologists and urban planners and demographers for?

The war to "stabilize" the Hyde Park-Kenwood area was turned over to the "indefatigable, tough-minded lawyer, Julian Levi, Gunther observes: "If Edward is a poniard (dagger), Julian is a sledgehammer...."

For the purposes of the northward expansion, Julian Levi founded the South East Chicago Commission. "It came close to being a vigilante organization ... every pertinent law on the books, municipal, state and federal was utilized ...." to assume control of Hyde Park-Kenwood.

What good was a Law School if it couldn't be useful to the University?

Forty-eight acres of Hyde Park were bought up; buildings were demolished; the land was cleared. And then another 101 acres was bought up, and cleared. Marshall Field III had donated $100,000 to the project. The total cost in rehabilitating and buying up Hyde Park had cost $250 million. Expensive, but the University had only put out about $30 million.

Chicago has provided the cultural relativist University of Chicago with a social laboratory since the university was founded. A 1929 book entitled "Chicago—An Experiment in Social Research" (U. of C. Press), reveals the university's fascination with its convenient pool of urban guinea pigs. By 1923, the University's social research department was formalized.

The Hyde Park experiment was appraised this way by urban affairs specialist (and publisher of "The Chicago Reporter") John McDermott: "I am familiar with the criticisms of renewal in Hyde Park from Rossi and Dentler (The Politics of Urban Renewal) and Msgr. John Egan. God knows the urban renewal plan was far from perfect (but) frankly, I'm getting a little bored with this tired argument over the past. ... It was a crude and unsophisticated approach, perhaps, but not an evil conspiracy."

For crudity and evil, it was nothing compared to the Blackstone Ranger-Woodlawn experiment.

In his book, "The Closed Corporation, American Universities in Crisis," James Ridgeway called the experiment "urban-counterinsurgency (Urbcoin)."

Ridgeway quotes a Harvard urban planner on Julian Levi's methods: "When Levi wants to empty a place, he'll get an insurance company to cancel its policy, then turn around and get the city to condemn the place because it doesn't have any insurance."

By the mid-50s, Hyde Park had been pacified, or as real estate developer Dempsey Travis calls it, "regentrified."

It wasn't but five years later, however, and the war was on again: the University of Chicago planned to expand south, into Woodlawn.

July 18, 1960, the University laid its expansion plans before the Chicago Land Clearance Commission.

The University realized quickly, however, that their plans would run into opposition unless there was a community organization that leaned in their direction.

The U. of C. has never had any problems creating gangs, or countergangs.

Enter counter-insurgency expert Saul Alinsky.

—to be continued