

the transport of some 200 million tons of coal annually from mines to power stations and ports.

A look at what happened last winter illustrates the problem: Coal trains were snarled by the winter "freeze" and power generation plummeted for lack of fuel. Moreover, coal stocks mainly for export mounted at the pithead in the principal hard-coal mining area around Katowice, estimated to total some 5 million tons, because the railways couldn't transport it.

Another blundering course was adopted by the special March 1979 Politburo meeting, where a decision was taken to raise production of the cheaper, less efficient brown coal (lignite) as a "solution" to the energy problem. A larger share of the "more caloric" hard coal, it was thought, would also be available for export by this avenue. Hard-coal exports currently account for 19 percent of all foreign exchange earnings. Lignite involves surface mining and is therefore cheaper to extract, and because power plants using lignite are

usually located proximate to the mines, it avoids transport costs. The revised 1990 economic plan now targets a goal for brown coal production of 140 million tons, against a current production of 41 million tons.

In fact, the advantages of the coal program are illusory. The decision is a step backward, especially in light of the decisions which have revised nuclear power-use goals.

In a recent lecture to the Polish Electrical Association, Professor Kazmierz Kopecki, an energy expert and chairman of the Polish Academy of Sciences' Energy Committee, correctly blamed the energy shortfall on delay and inadequate investment in nuclear power. Poland, he said, is also faced with delay in construction of other power stations. He pointed out that the quality of coal-burning power station equipment is low and there are shortages of manpower, equipment and spare parts for repairs and overhauls. The power stations were designed to use better quality coal and not the

Behind Poland's 'Bukharinites'

The decisions that have been reached by Polish leaders on energy and trade policy reflect not only financial pressures from the West, but the existence of significant British "Bukharinite" influences within the leadership

are pure and simple British agents-of-influence—typified by the case of Sewryn Bialer, the former Polish Central Committee member who now serves as Zbigniew Brzezinski's chief deputy at Columbia University—within the Polish party and government circles. The major international institutions that have been coordinating such influences on economic policy, and a corresponding rise of a "dissident" movement, are: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Aspen Institute, and the Bertrand Russell Foundation.

It is more than noteworthy that Poland is the *only* Comecon country that maintains an International Affairs Institute officially affiliated as a "sister institute" to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA). Similarly, Poland is also the only East bloc country that maintains close contact with the Aspen Institute, which has several members prominent in the Polish part, such as Jan Scjepanski. The RIIA-run Bertrand Russell Foundation, headquartered in London, announced at the beginning of this year at a Chatham House (RIIA) meeting, a campaign to beef up the "rehabilitation of Bukharin." Poland was named a prime target.

Unquestionably, Poland is susceptible to a "Bukharinite" revival, as recent economic policy blunders indicate.

Nikolai Bukharin, a leading Soviet economic policy influence until his arrest and execution in 1936, was closely linked throughout his adult life with intelligence networks of Royal Dutch Shell and Britain's Hill-Samuel banking interests. Bukharin studied at the Vienna School with Friedrich von Hayek, an official economist of the Hapsburg organization, the Pan-European Union, and the teacher of U.S. monetarist Milton Friedman. The PEU, with British intelligence resources, helped organize the core of the Nazi movement in the 1920s. Bukharin's "industrialization at a snail's pace" conformed exactly to von Hayek's doctrines, and almost destroyed the Soviet economy in the 1929 "Scissors Crisis"—so named because of the gap between low prices for farm products and extremely high prices for manufactured goods—a direct result of Bukharin's successful deemphasizing of heavy industry and technology-based manufacturing and agriculture.

The British subsequently excoriated the Soviet government for the brute-force measures sometimes required to undo the problems created by their agent-of-influence, Bukharin.

The same policy was pursued by Wladislaw Gomulka, a member of the Bukharin faction in the Comintern through the 1940s, when he came to power in Poland in 1956 after the Poznan riots. Gomulka's ouster in 1970 by Edward Gierek has been responsible for most of Poland's recent economic development. Gomulka, however, clearly retains supporters in the Polish party and government.