

Chicago's gangs: who benefits?

Part 4 of reporter Roy Harvey's award-winning series

This week Executive Intelligence Review continues with part four of its publication of excerpts from Chicago Defender reporter Roy Harvey's award-winning series on Chicago gangs. Copies of the complete series may be obtained directly from the Chicago Defender, 2400 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60616.

July 3: Politician support for gangs

To many, the problem is perplexing: how could black parents, church leaders, politicians and others stand by and "watch their kids and their community be destroyed," as Winston Moore states it.

Moore, now head of security for the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), also poses an answer: "Those phony, white, bleeding-heart liberals."

To Winston Moore, it is one word: "Phonywhite-bleedingheartliberals!" He says it with as much contempt and rage as he can muster. Which is considerable.

At the top of the list, Moore places the phonywhitebleedingheartliberal politicians.

"The final insult to black people was when Senator Charles H. Percy invited Jeff Fort and the Blackstone Rangers to attend Nixon's Inaugural Ball in Washington..."

In congressional testimony before the McClellan hearings, Edward Buckney, head of the Chicago Police Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU), noted that Senator Percy had met with and said of Blackstone Ranger leader Jeff Fort: "He's a bright boy and ought to go into politics."

Buckney commented: "It is this kind of thing that gives power, status, and recognition to these fellows—and it makes our job much more difficult."

"We've been working with this problem for the last

several years," Buckney's mid-1968 testimony continued, "and we still don't feel that we have the answers, so its kind of frustrating for us to find these overnight experts."

In a recent interview with the *Defender*, former State Representative Lewis A. H. Caldwell stated: "The police were really hamstrung. They were damned if they did and damned if they didn't with all these charges of 'police brutality'—and the politicians were making some of those charges. The gangs played that stuff like a yoyo."

Among the politicians cited by Caldwell was Abner Mikva, congressman from the 2nd Congressional District in which most of the gang violence was taking place.

In defense of Rev. John R. Fry of First Presbyterian Church, Mikva was quoted as testifying before the McClellan hearings: "I have known Rev. John Fry for a number of years. His integrity and commitment to a peaceful society are impeccable."

Mikva continued: "He (Rev. Fry) has lived his religion in the best sense of the word." The statement caused one critic to comment: "Mikva apparently doesn't think much of the Christian religion."

In an *Atlantic Monthly* interview (May, 1968), Mikva had stated: "I get violent mail, more from the black community than from the white asking: 'What are you doing defending the Rangers?'"

To this, Mikva insisted he was a victim of police terror: "The police insist on using direct, terrorist, violent methods and only succeed in polarizing people. They force people like myself to come out pro-Ranger because of their tactics."

Continues Mikva: "If the Rangers had committed all the crimes they have been charged with, there would probably have to be 100,000 of them—or they would have to be some of the most energetic criminals who ever lived..."

At the end of the interview, Cong. Mikva makes this curious comment: "If they (Blackstone Rangers) weren't here, I wouldn't invent them..." Was the congressman tacitly acknowledging the fact that they were "invented"—an ersatz (phony) creation?

Senator Percy is a liberal Republican. Congressman Mikva (10th District-North Shore) is a liberal Democrat. One more thing they have in common is the University of Chicago. Percy graduated in 1941; with better connections than Mikva (he is a Rockefeller in-law), he is a university trustee. Mikva graduated 10 years later; currently he is President Carter's nominee for a position on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (the court second only to the U.S. Supreme Court).

But the University of Chicago alumni weren't the only "phonywhiteliberalbleedingheartpoliticians" involved, notes Moore.

For example, there is Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), who in May 1967 took Jeff Fort and other Blackstone Rangers gang leaders out to lunch when he (Javits) was in Chicago, as part of a probe of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) program in Chicago.

As John Fish suggests in his book, *Black Power, White Control*, with the threat of an investigation into the Chicago OEO office, Mayor Daley got the message: he accepted the OEO experimental gang project he and his advisers had opposed.

A member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Javits played a foil to the McClellan hearings investigation.

Another politician was a part of that investigation: Sen. Robert Kennedy. "Kennedy hated Daley and the Daley machine," Charles Livermore (who in 1968 was the executive director of the Chicago Commission on Youth Welfare), told the *Defender*. "Bobby Kennedy called Daley 'a Neanderthal', to which Daley responded: 'I thought I was a member of the new breed'."

Yet another Kennedy in-law played a part in the Blackstone Ranger development: Sargent Shriver, a man with presidential ambitions in 1968, was head of OEO.

In sworn testimony, James Houtsma (then deputy warden of Cook County jail), told the Senate hearings that chief OEO investigator Marvin Fulmer told him, when in Chicago during an OEO investigation of the federal government gang project, that in spite of evidence of corruption and illegality within the project presented by Houtsma (et al.), "nothing would be done because OEO was firmly committed to the grants...and

as long as he (Fulmer) worked for them, he would see that nothing was done to embarrass them—in particular, he did not want to, he said, embarrass (OEO director) Sargent Shriver."

Detectives James Doyle and Richard Peck corroborated that testimony. Fulmer denied the conversation had occurred.

Midway through the McClellan hearings, he resigned from OEO to accept a position as ambassador to France.

There were other liberal politicians that supported the gangs, but by 1970 they had backed away. The experiment was complete.

Black political leaders such as Rep. Lewis Caldwell and the late Cong. Ralph Metcalfe (who had been forcibly thrown out of his office by Jeff Fort and other Blackstone Rangers) moved forward to hold investigations, drafting a 1970 report called *Crime in the Black Community*.

"The phony white bleeding heart politicians—they moved on to other things. As for black-on-black crime, it was given tacit approval. That's part of what the university experiment was about. As long as you don't do it against whites, nobody gives a damn," concluded Winston Moore.

Street gangs as troops

Among university professors, the watchword is "publish or perish." But the University of Chicago, with its own publishing house, has a different watchword: perish the public.

Readability is not one of the requirements of books published by the University of Chicago. But they're not meant for the general public, anyway.

This is not to say that the books are not purposeful. They are hardly ivory tower creations. Like the university, they have their own purpose, their own coherence.

Take, for example, University of Chicago sociologist Irving Abraham Spergel's book, *Community Problem Solving: The Delinquency Example*.

Spergel, head of the 1967-1968 University of Chicago \$80,000 OEO-financed gang school analysis study, published his *Delinquency Example* book in 1969.

The sociological analysis seems to have been derived

from the Blackstone Ranger experimentation.

In the book, a hypothetical gang called the "Nobles," for example, had "attempted to increase their political bargaining power (in an attempt) by its parent organization, in this case a Presbyterian church, through a 'black paper'."

The 'black paper' Spergel refers to is, of course, Rev. John Fry's of the First Presbyterian Church of Chicago. (*Defender* sources report, however, that it was in fact the U. of C. (Theological Seminary) that drafted the political "black paper.")

Buried within a style that would repulse most of his readers, author Spergel gets finally to the point: "Gang youths ... can be useful as the shock troops, the putschist elements, the essence of the rabble or the mob which attacks and serves to topple the existing political regime or at least to seriously threaten the existing political structure."

Spergel continues: "Extremist groups may see gangs as a useful means of influencing and controlling low-income populations in an urban area."

The author describes "the new (urban) politician"—(He) "is usually an executive of a gang control agency, community action group, or neighborhood organization who uses his connections with the delinquency problem for his own political advancement..."

"They think of themselves," Spergel continues, "as directly or indirectly heading a youth or young adult movement whose object is to ... drive out incumbent councilmen, assemblymen, or congressmen who are opposed to civil rights or progressive social legislation..."

Gang controllers could simply eliminate their political opposition. This scenario was acted out in the Blackstone Ranger experiment.

Spergel's book indicates a much more sophisticated—and political—objective contributed to the university's interest in gangs.

The Blackstone Rangers was not a simple real estate operation.

Community Problem Solving: The Delinquency Example states:

"Recent experience in...Chicago and elsewhere suggests that hard-core delinquents have considerable interest and skill in the organization and manipulation of positive community programs. They are deeply concerned with the problems of the ghetto and are no longer alienated from its dominant life style. They can act out its central fears, anxieties, and hostilities."

The analysis continues: "Either they (the gangs) will

serve as the destructive shock troops of the bloody revolts that have and may again occur, or they will perform as the vital agents for the human and physical rehabilitation of ghetto communities."

July 5: Gangs only 1 of 3 projects

Millions of dollars were poured into the South Side gangs, in three stages.

Initial monies came from the churches, quasi-religious organizations, private donations, and the University of Chicago.

The Blackstone Rangers was only one of many experiments being conducted in Woodlawn.

Imagine several clinicians experimenting on one caged rat at the same time. That's what you had in poor Woodlawn. And then the experimentors yelled "police interference" with their experimentation.

They called it a "programmatic but not a political success." Funny business.

What was it all for? Where did all the money go?

We have examined briefly the destruction of Woodlawn; if it was "for" anything, that is what it was for: Woodlawn's destruction.

And the money? Cars, clothing and high living for the gang leadership—for a while. But mostly, the money went to the lawyers.

Many of the lawyers who intersected the gang money are now judges. One of those lawyers, a judge today, was "paid in advance to defend the Rangers for future crimes they would commit," notes a *Defender* source.

Much of the money came early: seed money. Cash really began to flow after the University of Chicago formally made peace with its countergang: money from the Schwartzhaupt Foundation (\$69,000), the Archdiocese (\$50,000), Citizens Crusade Against Poverty (\$22,500), Center for Community Change (\$68,000), Ford Foundation (\$102,000), University of Chicago (more than \$100,000, for housing for the gangs), W. Clement Stone (undisclosed amount), the Wieboldt Foundation (undisclosed), Charles E. Merrill, Jr. (\$23,000), Sammy Davis, Jr. (\$160,000 plus), the Charles Kettering Foundation \$50,000 plus), the Field Foundation (an undisclosed amount).

As Pierre de Vise notes, "Woodlawn became the recipient of about \$35 million of federal, university, and foundation support for experimental programs in housing, education, employment, youth, law enforcement, health, and welfare. Probably no other neighborhood in the nation had as much money and brainpower lavished upon it in the last 10 years."

"It's the same old money angle," Edward Buckney of Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU) noted in 1968. "If the gangs can get enough members and consolidate them, they think they can lure grants from the various private and public agencies..."

And they were right. They could.

Earlier, GIU had stated to the press: "The big money (keeps) the older individuals in the gangs longer—otherwise they will have gone on other things—to jobs in their late teens. But now they don't work. They're professional street gang leaders and poverty pimps. They have to keep the organization going so they can suck the blood of the younger members."

In late 1967 the gang leadership of the Disciples and the Rangers were drawing salaries between \$5,500 to \$6,000—well publicized federal salaries—at a time when the median income for an employed family of four in Woodlawn was around \$4,000.

Even after the OEO \$1 million gang "on-the-job-training" school was shown to be a disaster, the money to the gangs—and gang-related projects—did not stop.

The Wieboldt Foundation, the Ryerson Foundation, the Ford Foundation, along with Sears, Bell Telephone and Community Renewal Society poured a half million dollars into new projects which hired Black P Stone Nation gang leaders as "area wide coordinators," and "organizing directors."

The money was still flowing—even at a time when the gang as the police reported, were committing six murders a month and an additional 30 shooting victims per month.

"Money was available for bail bond—and for the best criminal defense lawyers in the Chicago area," notes a *Defender* source. "It was no longer a matter of kids with zip guns, but .38s, .45s and shotguns."

But by 1970, the foundations, like the politicians and the University, had backed off. The money dried up. A mafia link-up was tried in 1970, but it fizzled.

The gangs stepped up their extortion business, but without the foundation money, they had no legal defense.

The gang experiment was complete. Like a Frankenstein monster created by a mad social scientist, the

gang hustlers wandered about—cut loose from their creators—until new hustles landed them in jail, or until they hooked into new social experiments.

West side gangs funded too

The South Side gangs were not the only ones into which big foundation money was pumped.

For example, there is David Dawley, and the Vice Lords.

But the West Side Vice Lords had no university; there was little interest in using them for urban renewal purposes.

But Dawley tried. He was able to raise more than \$300,000.

David Dawley, described as "the only white member of the Vice Lords," had been in 1967 dispatched into Chicago from Washington, D.C. by a curious organization called the "TransCentury Corporation." TransCentury was conducting an evaluation of the attitudes of youth in 11 cities toward federally funded summer programs for the President's Council on Youth Opportunity.

The Vice Lords, based in Lawndale, had been formed 10 years earlier—it was a traditional street gang.

Dawley saw their political potential. The politics, if anything, were anti-machine, anti-Daley.

With degrees from Dartmouth College and the University of Michigan, Dawley was able to hook the Vice Lords into the money. And the lawyers.

Police Commander Edward Buckney, in 1967 head of the Gang Intelligence Unit, remembers Dawley as "the John Fry of the West Side."

Dawley wrote up his two years experimentation in a book (published by Anchor books) called *An Autobiography of the Vice Lords*.

With an introduction by Andrew Kopkind, the first part of Dawley's book is an obscene glorification of violence, bestiality and crime. The second part details the politicization of the Vice Lords. And the money.

W. Clement Stone gave the Vice Lords \$60,000; the Department of Labor, \$36,000; the Ford Foundation, \$130,000; the Field Foundation, \$25,000; the Rockefeller Foundation, \$15,000; Operation Bootstrap, \$15,000.

By mid-1968, Dawley was going for big time money: An OEO project of \$750,000. But the OEO backed

away after McClellan had intervened in their Blackstone Ranger gang project.

Dawley states: "...Joe Califano (currently head of the Health, Education and Welfare department) backed away." The McClellan committee had generated too much heat.

Not even Senator Charles Percy would talk to the Vice Lords, after the McClellan hearings had occurred.

So Dawley—the only white member of the Vice Lords—packed his bags and went off to write his book.

In 1970, the President had appointed him to the National Advisory Council of the Peace Corps. At the time the book was published, Dawley was an assistant to the Governor of Massachusetts.

And the Vice Lord gang leadership? Dead, or in jail, or on drugs, or hustling...

July 6: Moore wages long fight against S.S. gang blight

The story of the gangs is one which reveals how the University of Chicago and its allies in the press were able to create the "leaders" for the black community.

It is also a story which tells how—at a crucial juncture in this city's (and nation's) history—the University and its allies and countergangs were able to cut the black community off from its leadership.

Winston Moore, if the credit could go to any single individual, was the man who stopped the gangs.

Moore, a psychologist, first became aware of the seriousness of the gangs in 1964 while working at the research and diagnostic center at the State Correctional Institute in Joliet.

"I had worked with kids there who were running away from home, stealing autos and so forth—but then I began getting a series of kids charged with murder. I talked with these kids—some of whom I knew because they had lived in the same building I lived in—and they told me they had to kill, in order to get membership in the Rangers."

"I felt at that time that the only way to break up the gangs was to put Jeff Fort—who controlled the little kids—in the penitentiary. It became an obsession with me."

But Moore ran into the University of Chicago, and the experimenters, and the foundations, and an ambi-

valent press, and the "phony, white liberals in the churches..."

A psychologist with the Chicago Youth Opportunities Center in 1965, Moore had initially assumed that the University was consciously using the gangs to "turn Woodlawn into a blighted area."

"Gangs by nature are anti-social. The University decided to make them a political force. This was an era when social experimentation was coming out of various universities."

Moore continued: "When the University wanted to expand south of the Midway, TWO (The Woodlawn Organization) stood in their way. If they hadn't already created it, they more or less bought up TWO (in 1963)."

Julian Levi's (head of the University's Urban Studies Dept.) objective was simple, Moore stated: "Julian Levi just wants to control the land around the University of Chicago. That's all there is to it. And any way he can. Any way he can."

It was Moore who provided the information for a series of Chicago Tribune articles which were critical of the gangs.

And it was Moore who spirited defecting gang leader George Rose out of Chicago. The tapes made by Rose and Moore were then sent to the Senate investigations subcommittee, resulting in the formation of the McClellan \$1 million OEO "on-the-job-training" gang project investigation.

Again, it was Winston Moore who provided the McClellan committee with some of the most damaging evidence concerning the gang's controllers.

"One of the sad commentaries," Moore told the Defender, "is that it took a Southerner—Arkansas Senator John McClellan—to try and right the wrongs done by the social experimenting phony, white liberals."

"The Presbyterians and the people with the Community Renewal Society admired Fry (Rev. of the First Presbyterian Church, based in Woodlawn) for doing missionary work with those 'heathens in the black community.'"

"So he was a hero. They thought that anybody who would 'go out to the jungles' needed help. So they poured money at him, and attacked anybody that stood in his way."

"It was Fry who created their mysticism. If you ever look at that old Blackstone emblem, it was a pyramid circumscribed by a circle. They were to rule the world. The green represented fertility. Blacks have been pretty vulnerable to mysticism—and Fry played on that."

In the days before the hearings, gang leader Jeff

Fort visited Moore, then warden of Cook County jail. "Fort told me," remembered Moore, "you been leaning on our boys too hard."

"Then Fort stated, 'You still live at 34th and Rose?' I said, 'Yeah, Jeff, I still live there'."

"Fort said, 'Is your wife still teaching at 38th and Cottage Grove?' I answered yes. Fort said, 'She still drive that blue Thunderbird?' I said yes."

"Then I said, 'Jeff, you listen to me well. She's not going to transfer and I'm not going to move. But if you say anything to her, I'll come in your house and bury you'."

"Then Fort told me, 'I don't mean it that way. You know, I don't control my boys'."

"'Well, you get control of them,' Moore responded to the gang leader."

The University had not done its homework as well as Jeff Fort, apparently. After the McClellan hearings, a man identifying himself as Ed Levi (president of the University of Chicago) called him, to ask: "Do you want a scholarship for your son?" Moore told the *Defender*.

"I had been accusing the University of perpetuating the gangs to get the land. They wanted me to lay off," explained Moore.

What did you tell the caller? the *Defender* asked.

"I have no son," responded Moore. "I told him I didn't have any children."

Moore returned to the subject of the gangs: "They got out of control because they were supported by a bunch of phony bleeding-heart liberals. It was black-on-black crime. They (the gangs) were given tacit approval to commit crimes against blacks. That's part of what the University experiment was about. As long as you don't do it to whites, nobody gives a damn."

"Cornell Steele for example," continued Moore, "he was one of Jeff Fort's assassins. I was with him when the jury read the verdict: 'We the jury find the defendant

guilty of murder as charged; we the jury find the defendant to be 21 years of age; we the jury recommend death'."

"While the lawyers were arguing pre-trial and post-trial motions, I took Cornell back to the bullpen. He said to me, 'What did they say?' I told him, 'They said you must die in the electric chair'."

"Then he said to me, with no emotion, '(Rev.) Fry told me that as long as we kill just black people, this would never happen to us'."

"I asked him, 'Cornell, how many men did you shoot?' He answered, 'Fifty.' 'How many did you kill?' He answered, 'Twenty-one'."

To the press and to the McClellan hearings, Moore had told the story: the University (Chicago Theological Seminary) had written the OEO \$1 million gang proposal) which they would then 'evaluate' for the federal government.

And the University provided legal counsel, and housing and psychiatrists...

Then indictments came down, after McClellan turned the investigation over to Ramsey Clark and the Justice Department.

And only four or five of the Blackstone Rangers went to prison, for fraud.

That's another story.

And it wasn't too long before Edward H. Levi, president of the University of Chicago, was sworn in as head of the Department of Justice.

And that is another story.

And Winston Moore? As the warden of Cook County jail he was prosecuted for mistreating prisoners—he was acquitted of all charges—by the very lawyer who had provided most of the legal counsel, with foundation money, for the Blackstone Rangers.

And that is yet another story.

Next issue: Gang opponent Charles Livermore remembers era he'd like to forget.