

# Chicago's gangs: who benefits?

*The conclusion of reporter Roy Harvey's award-winning series*

*With this issue, Executive Intelligence Review concludes its serialization of Chicago Defender reporter Roy Harvey's award-winning series on Chicago gangs. Full copies of the series may be obtained directly from the Chicago Defender, 2400 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60616.*

---

## **July 9: Woodlawn educator charges Justice Dept. with gang investigation cover-up**

---

"The Justice Department investigation of the OEO gang project was a coverup! A whitewash job! There should have been more to it. I would like to know who put the muscle on to kill the investigation."

That is the view of Yakir W. Korey, principal of Wadsworth Upper Grade center in Woodlawn, from 1966 through 1968.

Korey is a man who knows about the "coverup." Wadsworth school was in the center of the gang violence; many of Korey's students were shot in the gang fighting; some were killed; others were destroyed as creative, productive human beings, by the promotion of the gang, he said.

Korey's school was used as a drop-off point for drugs; guns would be found whenever the teachers made a sweep.

Wadsworth was in Disciple gang turf, but Korey had managed to contain much of the in-school-violence—until the OEO gang project was approved.

On top of that project came a second University of Chicago-TWO experiment: the Woodlawn Experimental School Project (WESP). This "experiment" eventually drove many of the teachers out of Woodlawn, including Korey.

In an interview with the *Defender*, Korey did not remember the era with dispassionate calm. Like so many others who lived through the experimentation, Korey's reflections stirred again the feeling of rage.

"The University of Chicago wanted to expand [in the early 60s] to 63rd. It was obvious. They wanted a South Campus. And a buffer zone. Once they made it south of the Midway, they gobbled up everything up to 61st. They had to be in cahoots with somebody, to get those people out and those apartments wrecked."

"Julian Levi! I remember him at a Model Cities Meeting at TWO. He got up and made a speech: 'We're going to tear down the L tracks on 63rd street and make it a beautiful thing. ...' I couldn't believe my ears! Then one old lady gets up in the audience: 'That's wonderful, Mr. Levi. That's wonderful. You're going to get rid of the L. How am I going to get to work?'"

"The University bigshots had merged all this crap together—but one old lady was wondering how she was going to get downtown to work when they took away her L. That's the kind of planning they did."

Calmly, Korey reflected: "Woodlawn was a viable community in 1966. The gangs had scared the hell out of people, but it was still a viable community."

"Then [Police Superintendent] O.W. Wilson invited the gang leaders to his office. It was phony! They all shook hands and five minutes later the gangs are out shooting one another again."

"But the moment that happened," continued Korey, "and the publicity hit the newspapers, and [Daily News reporter] Lois Wille started writing her sobsister stuff—her damned articles—all hell broke loose! Until that, it wasn't a city-wide problem."

"From that point on, how are you going to stop it? You've got the publicity. Bang!"

"In the morning, I used to have television cameras sitting outside the [school] building practically every day. Then the OEO project hit," Korey stated, shaking

his head. "The way I found out about it—one morning, at the beginning of the school year [1967], I was walking toward 63rd Street, and here comes some Rangers, some Disciples—and they're carrying attaché cases. I knew the fellas."

"What the hell's going on? Businessmen?" he asked.

"They responded: 'We're going to collect our money!'"

"What money?" he questioned.

"We're each gonna get \$300,000 and we're gonna put that money into these suitcases!" Korey remembered.

"And that's how I learned about the famous gang project," Korey told the *Defender*.

"The kids didn't know the money wasn't going to be paid in cash. They would have to hustle for it. And that's when they started taking kids out of my school."

"They recruited for the gang project right out of school—at \$5 per head for the gang members—for the program that was supposed to be for high school dropouts, 16 and over," Korey stated.

"I lost about 30 or more kids; I talked to some of them, kids under 16. They told me they were getting paid to go to school, so why should they come to public school! I couldn't believe it! And that's when they produced the paystubs."

Korey collected the evidence. He visited the school and found it closed when it was supposed to be in session. He wrote to OEO director Sargent Shriver for a copy of the project. Shriver's office responded: "We can't find a copy. Check the Chicago office."

"I called the Chicago office, and they said they didn't know what I was talking about! I knew right then it was a set-up."

Korey continued to collect evidence on the gang project fraud.

He remembered the fear of those days: "I gave the evidence to my wife, and told her, 'Lock this up, because if anything happens to me, I want you to get it to the police. It was that frightening.'"

Korey had prepared to turn the tapes, paystubs, and other evidence over to the press. "But the School Board told me to sit on it!"

"Curtis Melnick, the district superintendent, told me to sit on it—and when Winston Moore had gone to the *Tribune* with the story, Melnick accused me of leaking the story to the press...."

The McClellan committee learned of the existence of Korey's evidence—Korey had called on the city council in January 1968 to demand a halt to the gang

violence—and subpoenaed his documents, which played a crucial part in the investigations.

"The ironic thing about this whole gang experiment was the University of Chicago. A beautiful thing! It did its own evaluation! You're in cahoots with an organization (TWO) and you're going to evaluate the damned project you wrote? You can't bring in an outside agency? Now what kind of an organization is this? And the University took the money—the \$80,000!"

"The University had its fingers in everything! And they weren't ashamed!"

During this period, when Korey fought the experimental projects, it was Korey—not the OEO experiment—that was referred to in the press as "controversial."

Concludes Korey: "I blame the federal government and the University of Chicago for not coming out and telling the truth about what went on in these things. Not the McClellan committee—McClellan turned the documents, the whole proceedings [several thousands of pages of sworn testimony and documents] over to the Justice Department. And they killed it!"

---

## July 9; An experiment in 'deschooling'

---

The gang project was not the only experiment the University of Chicago and its allies ran in Woodlawn in the mid- and late 60s. There were at least three major social experiments.

The second was the Woodlawn Experimental School Project (WESP).

It was an experiment that had a devastating effect on education in Chicago, according to Yakir Korey, the single school administrator who had opposed the project in 1967.

"The school chosen for this noble experiment was to be my school—Wadsworth," Korey told the *Defender*. "What the project meant was that the Chicago Board of Education would give up its power—and responsibility—for the education of students at Wadsworth."

WESP eventually was to include three schools in Woodlawn, and was funded with at least \$1.3 million in federal monies. "Staff members for the project were PhD's and PhD candidates at the University of Chicago," Korey said, adding, "and they became the evaluators of the project—just like in the gang study."

---

---

Korey took a demotion, a salary cut, and an assignment to an elementary school, rather than stay with the experiment. "I fought it. 'Under no conditions can the Board of Education relinquish its responsibility as sole control of any school,' I had insisted. But it did. In an area principal's meeting, I was outvoted 21 to 1."

The experiment was to be controlled by the University of Chicago, the Woodlawn Organization (TWO), and the Board of Education. In effect, the University ran the program, Korey recalled: "At no time did I ever see anybody other than Curtis Melnick [district superintendent] at the University of Chicago meetings—and I attended religiously for two years [before the project was implemented]."

"Willard Congreve was pulled out of the University of Chicago lab school to head the thing, along with Anthony Gibbs of TWO."

"It was more than just community control, this experiment. Woodlawn was undergoing hell and fire and brimstone at the time. Why in the hell have such an experiment in a place like this if you want to succeed with it? It was going to be funded for three years, and after that, it was to be exported to other places!"

"Teachers came to me, complaining bitterly, that TWO was taking over. I couldn't help them. TWO was political muscle for the University. It was obvious that when the University would blow its nose, TWO would wipe it."

The project was an experiment in "cultural pluralism," or cultural relativism. As Barbara Sizemore, who was eventually to take over the project, stated, the idea was to develop a "separate cultural ... and national Zionism for blacks."

Of Sizemore, Winston Moore comments: "She was programmed by the University of Chicago, where she was a PhD student. Programmed? You know. Taught to think like they think."

WESP curriculum deemphasized the culture of the Western world, calling such culture the "forcing of white, Western cultural values on others...."

Translated by gang leader Jeff Fort, it came out like this: "This is an unfair thing. This is what they've been doing to black people all the time, you dig?" That was Fort's comment to the Washington press after he had refused to testify before the McClellan hearings.

Concomitant with the fostering of an ideology of "black Zionism" was the heightening of the antagonism between the teacher and the student.

"The big push was to get the community involved," Korey told the *Defender*. "But there are positive ways

to do that. And not by exacerbating confrontation."

"Because of that experiment, in large part, people in Chicago—parents and students—look on school administrators and teachers as being opposed to them! The feeling is, 'rather than teach you, they're going to beat you down. ...' Schools have always meant a means to upward mobility. But that experiment destroyed further the ability of teachers to teach!"

A second outcome, Korey observed, was the process of decentralization, under the guise of "community control."

"The tragedy of it is that the ultimate responsibility that resides in the board of education under the school code is not taken, on the ground that the community has a right...."

"That notion became a wedge—allowing people downtown [the Board of Education] the excuse of relinquishing their responsibility, under the guise of 'bowing to the dictates of the community.'"

"But what is 'the community'?" asked Korey. "When you're looking at TWO, for example, who calls the tunes?"

The process of decentralization and downgrading education could be implemented, under the guise of "community control."

In the face of such experimentation, parents in Woodlawn fled, Korey stated: "Just because they're poor and uneducated, it doesn't mean they can't think. Confronted with all this, parents—like the teachers—could either commit moral suicide and submit. Or they could fight. Or they could run."

---

## July 10: P Stone gang leaders to prison; Edward Levi to Justice Department

---

Edward Hirsch Levi is even more of a creation of the University of Chicago than the Blackstone Rangers.

Edward Levi, 68, was president of the University of Chicago in 1968—through the most intense period of the South Side gang activity—and remained there until he was nominated to head the Justice Department in 1975.

By all accounts, however, Edward Levi ran the University much earlier. John Gunther, in his book

---

*Chicago Revisited*, asked the question: "Who runs the University?" "From trustees, faculty, students, and outsiders, [Gunther] got the same answer: Under Beadle, Levi."

As provost of the University from 1962 through 1968, Levi is consistently described as the man who ran the U. of C.

"It is said," wrote Victor S. Navasky, a Russell Sage Foundation scholar, "that Ed runs the University and Julian [Levi] runs the neighborhood."

That fact that Navasky was Russell Sage-approved is of note. Edward Levi does not grant interviews to just anybody.

Noted a 1975 article (not an interview), "Levi has a highly internalized sense of privacy, even secrecy. ... [He] is not readily available to the press, and when he is, he guards his words like a losing poker player."

Like Saul Alinsky (chief organizer for TWO during its formative years), Edward Levi was a protégé of U. of C. president Robert Maynard Hutchins.

After discussing the University's "urban development plan" with Levi, Russell Sage scholar Navasky reported: Rather than let the University go, "under Julian's direction, the University collaborated with the city to preserve and upgrade Hyde Park as an integrated, upper-middle-class neighborhood. The cost, say the critics, was black removal."

That was only the first experiment. And of that period, Mike Nichols (who got his start in comedy with Elaine May at the Compass Players, near the U. of C.) had remarked: "Well, here we are in Hyde Park, black and white together, working shoulder to shoulder against the poor."

Edward Levi had entered the University lab school at age 5. Nineteen years later he was a professor of law at the University; by 1950 he was dean of the law school; by 1962, provost; by 1966, trustee; by 1968, president.

When the McClellan Committee turned its thousands of pages of sworn testimony on the Blackstone Rangers and the OEO gang project, they had turned the materials over to one of Edward Levi's students, Ramsey Clark, head of the Justice Department.

And like gang-defender Congressman Abner Mikva (D-10), virtually all the lawyers who provided legal counsel for the gangs—until the money ran out—were students of Edward Hirsch Levi.

During the University's long involvement in the South Side gang and education experiments, Edward Levi worked at a higher level: in 1964 he was a member

of the White House central group on domestic affairs; in 1966, a member of the White House Task Force on Education.

Julian Levi, head of the Southeast Chicago Commission and the University's Urban Studies Department, had more than one insider in the federal government to assist in getting the Woodlawn experimentation monies.

By 1971, after the University had washed its hands of the gang experiment, Edward Levi was brought on board the Russell Sage Foundation, as a trustee.

Three years earlier, Russell Sage had been instrumental in founding Julian Levi's counterpart institution at Northwestern University, the Center for Urban Affairs (CUA). Other monies came chiefly from the Ford Foundation, an organization with which the Levis had close ties.

CUA's director, Louis Masotti, was to become Jane Byrne's mayoral transition chief, and the man who advised Byrne to appoint Edward Levi to head up the Police Board. And it was Masotti who selected Patrick V. Murphy (former head of the Ford Foundation's Police Foundation) as the mayor's choice for Chicago's Superintendent of Police.

But that is jumping ahead of our story by a few years.

With Ramsey Clark as Attorney General, the University was not particularly alarmed at the fact that the McClellan Committee had turned its thousands of pages of sworn testimony on the gang experiment over to the Justice Department.

There was probably not even a sigh of relief at the University of Chicago when the Justice Department returned its indictments. A few Black P Stone Nation gang leaders were shipped off to Leavenworth.

Before the gang leaders had served their four year sentences, Edward Levi had been sworn in as head of the Justice Department, so untainted was his record in the Woodlawn gang experiment.

And in a more sophisticated fashion, Edward Levi continued on a national level the kind of work his students—the legal counsel for the Blackstone Rangers—had conducted on a local, Chicago level.

In an October 13, 1976 *Chicago Tribune* article, a Justice Department official was quoted as saying, "Under the pretext of cleaning up the FBI, [Levi] damned near destroyed it."

July 26, 1976, columnists Evans and Novak noted that Levi's legal rulings on intelligence were more in keeping with "a Teddy Kennedy administration than

---

---

with Gerald Ford's."

The columnists noted the general Ford administration cabinet hostility for Levi's imposition of "dangerous curbs" on the intelligence community. "[Levi] has crippled our intelligence effort," one high ranking official told the columnists.

According to the Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, Levi's rulings had put President Ford's life in jeopardy. Simon wrote President Ford: "The restrictions imposed by Attorney General Levi had impaired your protection by the Secret Service."

With a crippled intelligence community, counter-gangs such as the Legion of Justice, the Blackstone Rangers, the Black Liberation Army and the Symphonese Liberation Army could have a virtual field day.

---

## July 11: Money and good lawyers available to members of local street gangs

---

The supply of money available to the gangs for bail bond and "the best criminal defense lawyers in the Chicago area" was virtually unlimited.

Like First Presbyterian Rev. John Fry, and the University of Chicago's Theological Seminary, lawyers played the role of gang controllers.

In sworn testimony before the McClellan committee, Mrs. Annabelle Martin, a mother of eight Blackstone Rangers, told of gang lawyers—appointed by Rev. Fry—offering her money to change her testimony in a murder case, and of offering her money to leave town, and of passing on threats against her and her children if she testified against gang leaders.

Martin's testimony concerning the lawyers was corroborated—before the McClellan committee—by Chicago policeman Det. Stephen Cooner, who had posed as Martin's deranged husband after Martin had decided to break from Fry's lawyers.

The money for the lawyers was supplied by the Kettering Foundation, an agency which also acted as a money conduit for other, more mysterious "philanthropic" agencies.

Two lawyers were particularly important: Marshall Patner and Kenneth L. Gillis. Gillis took over legal defense when Patner left in 1969.

"Patner is paid by the Kettering Foundation to provide legal counsel for the Rangers in general and Jeff Fort in particular," a May 1969 *Atlantic Monthly* article noted.

"A 1956 University of Chicago Law School graduate, Patner quit his job as head of the appellate and test case division of the Legal Aid Bureau of Chicago to help William Brackett, who served as counsel for the Rev. John Fry...."

Asked by the magazine writer if he did not feel he [Patner] was contributing to gang crime, Patner responded: "As a lawyer, I don't see my function as looking over a client to see what he's doing."

During this period of intense gang activity, Patner brought four suits against the police department—on behalf of the Black P Stone Nation—against Mayor Daley, Captain Edward Buckney (head of the Gang Intelligence Unit), and Winston Moore (warden of Cook County jail).

It was Patner who advised Jeff Fort to remain silent before the McClellan hearings, for which Fort went to prison on a contempt of Congress charge.

Patner provided Fort the legal rationale: he would not allow his client to answer any questions unless he [Patner] were given the right to cross examine all witnesses who had "defamed" Fort in previous testimony.

Confronted with this, McClellan said he would "take the request into consideration," then proceeded with the questioning, to which Patner responded: "I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. I cannot permit my client to answer without the right to cross examine...."

McClellan: Just a minute. We want to ask your client about a federal program in which he participated. I'm going to insist that he answer.

Patner: It is our position that the hearing cannot be a fair one without the right to cross examine....

McClellan: If you advise your client to place himself in contempt of Congress, that is up to you. [To Fort] What is your place of residence?

Patner: I'm sorry we cannot answer that question (The lawyer and his client then left the room).

McClellan: (shouting) Under these circumstances, both of you are in contempt [of Congress]!

But, of course, only Fort would be charged; Fort was expendable.

Outside the courtroom, the gang leader told the press: "This is an unfair thing. This is what they've been doing to black people all the time, you dig?"

Fort was right, in a way—if he could only define

---

---

who 'they' was—but he didn't have the foggiest notion of what was going on.

The "Atlantic Monthly" article had noted: "Jeff Fort preferred Marshall Patner over a black lawyer."

But by the 1979, the gang experiment was over—or rather, it had moved into a new phase, wrecked as it was by the McClellan hearings—and Charles Kettering had pulled out.

Patner moved on to other projects; by late 1971 he had linked up with the Center for Urban Affairs (CUA) at Northwestern University and the CUA-based Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group (CLESG).

Funded by some of the same foundations which had poured money into the various gang projects (the Wieboldt Foundation, the Field Foundation, the Community Renewal Society, and with help from the Ford Foundation and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), CLESG pursued a new attack on the police, issuing highly publicized reports charging police brutality and their use of fatal force in Chicago.

Responded the Chicago Patrolmen's Association: "The reports leave no room for the real truth behind the deaths—failing to point out how many of the deaths were due to aggravated felonies...."

"Sure, there was police brutality," a GIU member told the Defender. "And the guys who created the conditions for it were the same foundations that attacked the police. Their idea was to bring in the LEAA—a federal police!"

---

## July 12: Gang leaders as pulpit orators

---

Many people saw the Blackstone Rangers as a force that could be exploited for their own purposes, noble or otherwise.

Criticized for his relationship with the Blackstone Rangers Rev. Jesse Jackson (then of Operation Breadbasket) said: "Yes, I am an opportunist—for justice—because I seize every opportunity to try to right a wrong, whether it's in the schools, stores, or anywhere black people are being disrespected...."

At issue—in 1969—was the Red Rooster hamburger chain, which was a target of Operation Breadbasket and the Blackstone Rangers—for serving inferior food and price gouging.

Red Rooster was finally driven out of business; one of the factors which bankrupted the fast food chain was the padding of salaries. Twenty-two members of the Blackstone Rangers were given sinecure—phony—jobs with the chain; 15 of those jobs went to Main 21 members.

Notes Barbara Reynolds in her book, "Jesse Jackson the Man, the Movement, and the Myth," the Rangers had forced their way into the hamburger business under the auspices of Operation Breadbasket and the Coalition for United Community Action.

Reynolds notes that gang leaders often addressed audiences from Operation Breadbasket's pulpit.

Likewise, Rev. Jesse Jackson addressed the Rangers from Jeff Fort's pulpit at First Presbyterian Church.

Such were the times.

But it was the University of Chicago's Theological Seminary that was most in the thick of things.

Quick at spotting potential leaders, the Chicago Theological Seminary had accepted young sociologist Jesse Jackson as a Seminary graduate student—backed by a Rockefeller Foundation scholarship—at a time when it was also providing safehouses and writing position papers for the Blackstone Rangers.

And it was the Seminary that provided Rev. Martin Luther King its facilities in 1967 to hold a national conference of clergymen—a factor which conservative Chicago clergy insist further isolated King from middle class blacks in Chicago.

That Operation Breadbasket would cozy up to the Blackstone Rangers—in the effort to realize justice—should come as no surprise.

As we have seen, the Chicago Theological Seminary had played a key role in the development of the Blackstone Rangers. And they also played a key role in the development of Operation Breadbasket.

As Reynolds' book reveals, the staff for Breadbasket consisted—from the outset—of Chicago Theological Seminary students or professors: Gary Massoni, Dr. Alvin Pitcher, Jesse Jackson, and David Wallace (Wallace, along with Don Rose, was to serve as a speech writer for Rev. Jackson until 1973).

---

Commented one South Side observer: "It warms the cockles of your heart to know that so much good—so much justice— can come from one place."

Commented another, a *Defender* source in City Hall, "The folds at the Chicago Theological Seminary must be vary familiar with Brig. Gen. Frank Kitson's book, "Gangs, and Countergangs: Low Intensity Warfare."

---

### July 13: Levi withdraws: Credit Defender gang series

---

Edward H. Levi, president of the University of Chicago from 1968 until he was tapped to become U.S. attorney general, has asked Mayor Byrne to withdraw his name as a candidate for chairman of the Chicago Police Board.

Levi was a target of an 18-part *Chicago Defender* series on the creation of the South Side gangs.

The series had alleged that with Levi's apparent approval, the University of Chicago had played a key role in the development of the Blackstone Rangers.

The series noted also that while many of the gang members went to prison following the gang experimentation, Edward Levi was promoted and selected to head the Justice Dept. where one of his key activities was to impose strictures on the U.S. intelligence agencies (strictures which prevented them from monitoring the growth of gangs and cults.)

Recently, Levi was tapped by Mayor Jane Byrne to head the Police Board. The University of Chicago professor has refused to discuss the reasons for his resignation, though a spokesman for the mayor confirmed that Levi withdrew his name for the Police Board position in a letter to the mayor's office.

Bill Griffin, the mayor's press secretary, has stated that he could not remember Levi's stated reasons for withdrawing.

Commented State Rep. Douglas Huff Jr. [D-20], "The *Defender* series (on the gangs) really demystified who and what put the Blackstone Rangers together."

According to *Defender* sources, Levi, especially sen-

sitive to criticism, withdrew his name as a candidate because of the *Defender's* exposure of the University's participation in the gang and other social experimentation on the South Side.

Levi's associates reportedly insist that Levi backed away from the Police Board position because of the "shabby treatment" of his brother, Julian Levi, by Mayor Byrne.

Since 1973, Julian Levi had been chairman of the Chicago Plan Commission, until he was dropped July 11 by Mayor Byrne. Responding to that action, Julian Levi stated: "I bitterly deplore the manner in which this was done. It is totally lacking in consideration or courtesy or any degree of class and breeding."

Reluctant to approve the mayor's choice of former Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) head, Patrick V. Murphy, as Chicago's Superintendent of Police, the City Council's Police Committee, headed by Ald. Edward M. Burke (14th) has moved slowly on the Police Board confirmations.

With the withdrawal of Edward Levi, a second University of Chicago nomination, that of Norval Morris, dean of the Law School, is also in doubt.

Currently teaching at the University's Aspen Institute in Colorado, Morris told reporters that he will consult with Edward Levi before making a decision regarding his nomination on the Police Board.

Morris, a nationally known advocate of the legalization of so-called "victimless crimes" (including the sale of drugs, prostitution, statutory rape, pornography, incest between consenting adults, etc.), also came under the scrutiny of the *Chicago Defender's* series on gangs.

Morris, a native of New Zealand, was recommended by Professor Levi in 1968 to head up the LEAA, though was rejected during Senate confirmation hearings. At those hearings, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) had stated that the promulgation of Morris's views would "destroy the LEAA."

Stated Sen. Hatch: "Outside of some of the economic difficulties that this country is presently undergoing, I do not think that there is any other area that could cause more discontent and more distress than some of your personally-held views."

To this statement, Prof. Morris responded: "I think that is right."