

on Aug. 25, 1977. The inventor of this doctrine was James Schlesinger, the former Defense Secretary, Falin said. He pointed out that plans for "modernization" of NATO forces were devised as far back as 1975, before the Soviet SS-20 missiles were ever deployed in the western part of the U.S.S.R.

Writing in the Soviet military daily *Red Star* Nov. 14, commentator Z. Mirskii quoted a West German magazine that the U.S. "believes its NATO partners must 'decouple' from the American nuclear deterrent, since it is possible to limit nuclear war to the boundaries of Europe." Mirskii added: "There you can see what tree the dog is barking up. ... The Pentagon does not want to defend Western Europe but to turn it into the target for a nuclear response strike to turn it into a theater for 'limited nuclear war'."

### Gromyko warns Schmidt

There is no question that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany rejects this limited nuclear war doctrine as a threat of thermonuclear annihilation of the Federal Republic. However, the issue on which world peace now hangs is whether Schmidt's efforts to slalom through the Dec. 12 NATO ministerial meeting, okaying the missile modernization program and still keeping detente intact, can succeed.

This is the question that Gromyko raised in his surprisingly strong remarks during the Nov. 23 press

conference. If NATO goes ahead with the modernization program and "if our proposal for immediate negotiations is rejected, the basis for negotiations would be destroyed. It would cease to exist," he said. Gromyko said that he first thought that West Germany's call for negotiations would help break the deadlock, "but a clarification followed which showed that the negotiations which we propose and the negotiations which are proposed to us are completely different. We propose to begin negotiations immediately. ... But we were told: no, first we will take the decision on producing this missile and on its deployment. And only then will we begin negotiations with you. ... We declared openly that such a posing of the issue means a political condition. This destroys the basis for negotiations. I repeat, such a position of certain NATO countries destroys the basis for negotiations.

"If anyone contends that this is not the case, that there are de facto no differences between our proposal for negotiations and that proposal, then don't believe this. These are different concepts of negotiations."

Gromyko traced the impulse for the NATO missile program to "the Pentagon or circles close to it." But in an unusual afterthought he noted that "however, if someone proves that these impulses came from different sources, and if he finds convincing arguments, we will agree with this."

Gromyko countered Western accusations that the

## Gromyko communiqué

*Following is the text of the official communiqué released by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at the conclusion of his visit to Bonn, West Germany.*

In the course of the meetings and discussions, there occurred a thoroughgoing exchange of views on questions of further cooperation, on the basis of documents agreed upon during the visit of the General Secretary of the CPUSSR and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., L. I. Brezhnev, to the Federal Republic in May 1978.

At the center of discussions on problems of today stood the necessity to make peace and security in Europe and the world more firm. Both sides affirmed anew that they see no reasonable alternative to the policy of detente. They expressed their resolve to develop the process of detente, to deepen it and

assure it progress and lasting character.

... The importance of the section of the joint declaration of May 6, 1978 was stressed wherein it is stated that no one should strive for military superiority, that approximate equality and parity suffice for defense, and the appropriate measures in disarmament and arms limitation in the nuclear and conventional areas which correspond to this principle would be of great importance.

The ministers expressed their conviction that the treaty signed between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. on limitation of strategic offensive weapons represents an important step in efforts for securing peace. The ministers discussed the state of negotiations on reduction of armed forces and armaments and measures connected with that in Central Europe. They both expressed their desire that the efforts for effective solutions in Vienna be continued, corresponding to the goal of achieving stability at a lower military level than today on the basis of the unreduced security of the participants. The ministers affirmed the importance of the final act of the CSCE conference of Helsinki. They promote further concrete

Soviet Union is using its unilateral disarmament offers, such as those made by Soviet President Brezhnev in Berlin on Oct. 6, to "Finlandize" West Germany. "We do not want to drive a wedge between the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO," he said. "We do not have such a wedge in our arsenal even if we wanted to use it."

Instead, the Soviet Union insists that a situation of approximate military parity now exists between the Warsaw Pact and NATO globally, and that for NATO to begin production of missiles which for the first time could reach Soviet territory from West Germany represents a serious upset in the balance of power. This would require a Soviet response, he said, which would set off a new spiral in the arms race and make progress at the Vienna troop reduction talks more difficult.

Gromyko's warnings to Schmidt cap a process of marked hardening of the Soviet line since Brezhnev's Oct. 6 speech announcing Soviet readiness to begin negotiations on medium-range missiles and a unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops and tanks from the German Democratic Republic. Central Committee official Vadim Zagladin warned in an Oct. 23 interview to the Italian Communist Party daily *L'Unità* that a NATO decision to station the new missiles would substantially change the U.S.-Soviet weapons balance and thereby circumvent the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). The Soviet press denounced the fact that

Brezhnev's offers were dismissed in Washington and London as "a propaganda ploy" and a "clever maneuver to split NATO."

Chancellor Schmidt sharply differentiated his own views from those of the Carter administration in the United States and the Thatcher government in Britain. He repeatedly welcomed Brezhnev's speech as an impulse to new negotiations and an embodiment of the spirit of the historic May 1978 Schmidt-Brezhnev agreements that were signed in Bonn. Those accords recognized the principle that neither side would seek military superiority, and instead would seek to further economic, political and cultural-scientific cooperation for the next 25 years, to the end that never again would Germany and the Soviet Union find themselves at war with one another.

From this standpoint, Schmidt has insisted that NATO adopt at its Dec. 12 meeting a two-pronged resolution to begin the production of the Pershing II and cruise missiles for deployment in Europe some three to four years hence, and to also put forward an arms control offer to the Warsaw Pact. "In the ideal case," Schmidt has said on many occasions, successful arms negotiations could make it unnecessary actually to produce or deploy the new missiles. He has urged that NATO adopt a decision for the United States to unilaterally withdraw 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe as a gesture of good faith, and that NATO

measures toward realization of all the principles and determinations of the final act as a unified whole. In this connection, questions relating to the meeting of participant states of the CSCE November 1980 in Madrid were discussed.

There also occurred an exchange of views on a series of other present problems, among others concerning the situation in the Middle East, certain areas in Africa and Asia. The ministers also dealt with questions presently being considered in the context of the United Nations.

In the course of the discussions, both sides stressed as they have done previously the importance of the strict adherence and full application of the four power agreement of Sept. 3, 1971.

In the course of discussions, the present standpoint and perspectives of bilateral cooperation on the two nations in various areas was discussed. Both sides are for the further development on the basis of the treaty of Moscow (Aug. 12, 1970) and other treaties and agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the U.S.S.R. The ministers also spoke about the economic relations so important for

both nations, and noted with satisfaction the positive developments. They praise the useful work of the Commission of the Federal Republic of Germany and work of the U.S.S.R. on economic and economic-technological cooperation, and noted that the working out of the long-term program is proceeding for the chief focal points of that cooperation.

The ministers expressed their satisfaction over the positive development of cultural exchange of views on humanitarian questions also occurred. The ministers proposed that meeting at high political levels between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic be continued. They are convinced that such contact is of high importance for the development of relations between the two countries, and represent an important instrument for deepening these relations. This holds especially for summit meetings.

A. A. Gromyko confirmed the invitation made earlier to Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to make an official visit to the Soviet Union. An invitation to Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher was also extended, the invitations were accepted with open spirit and were termed useful by both sides.