

## Europe: In the vise of the superpowers

by Vivian Freyre Zoakos

Europe is in the vise of the superpowers. Exerting all the muscle at its disposal, the United States is attempting to force Western Europe and particularly West Germany—the core of the Atlantic Alliance—to participate in the American shift to a Cold War posture. West Germany especially is being asked to increase its military budget and expand the Bundeswehr in order to supplement U.S. and British troops which may be deployed to the Indian Ocean, as part of a general strengthening of American military presence in the area.

From the other side, the sudden Soviet action respecting dissident scientist Alexei Sakharov, also carries a clear demand to Western Europe that it choose sides. This also represents a level of pressure which the European “middle powers”—as a high ranking West German military official termed his country—find difficult to deal with. Whatever be the undoubted message to Carter in stripping Sakharov of his titles and honors, the timing of the action during an important state visit to Moscow by French Gaullist Chaban Delmas indicated a message to Western Europe.

The Soviets' lack of regard for the sensibilities of the French president's unofficial envoy reflects one simple fact: The world does not face a diplomatic situation, but a political-military situation. Moscow offers Europe no easy middle road any longer; either break with the dangerous Anglo-American cold war policy, or face the rapid deterioration of detente.

The following reports from Soviet and Italian Communist Party press and spokesmen provide the Soviet

point of view. Henry Kissinger then speaks out on what he fears is the impending Euro-Soviet cooperation. Next week the *Executive Intelligence Review* will present a comprehensive picture of the way combined Soviet and American pressures are impinging on the West European allies.

### From the Soviets:

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#### *Mikhailov: U.S. pressures are heavy on Europe*

*V. Mikhailov, the Bonn correspondent of Pravda, analyzed strategic thinking in West Germany in a Jan. 17 article entitled “A Blow in the Back,” which we excerpt here. Mikhailov's assessment of Bonn's capacity for independent action to prevent war marks a turn from Pravda's sharp criticism of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's government six weeks ago, when he backed a NATO missile development associated with plans for a “limited nuclear war” in Europe.*

A characteristic feature of the political situation on the Rhine is putting uppermost “Western European joint foreign policy actions, which, while not anti-American, carry their own weight.”...

The actions of the enemies of detente are also paralyzed by views which have taken hold among a significant

part of the country's business community. These circles are especially alarmed by Washington's attempts to force upon its Western European allies the same political and economic actions against the U.S.S.R. which the United States is resorting to. The shock experienced by West Germany when, yielding to NATO pressure, Bonn imposed an embargo on the export of wide-diameter pipe to the U.S.S.R. [in the 1960s—ed.] is well remembered here. That concession did nothing for West Germany except undermine its foreign policy and give it the dubious distinction of breaking international agreements....

West German business circles, like those of other Western European countries, consider Washington's demands for them to exhibit "solidarity" with the U.S. as a direct threat against the development of economic ties with the socialist countries....

Federal Chancellor H. Schmidt, speaking before the parliamentary group of his party, warned insistently against "the danger of allowing oneself to make rash decisions in a situation of deteriorating relations between Washington and Moscow." The Chancellor said that, "the federal government will not permit everything achieved in East-West relations over the last 10 years to be put at stake because of the events in Afghanistan."

The open opposition of the West German government to American military plans in the Middle East, on the eve of Undersecretary of State Warren Christopher's arrival in Bonn, reflects to some extent the uneasiness which has seized various layers of West German society over whether following Washington's course will ultimately lead to a weakening of West Germany's ties not only with the socialist countries, but with the developing sector as well.

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## *Zagladin: The new importance of the Europeans and Japan*

*Following are excerpts from an interview with Vadim Zagladin, a foreign policy spokesman for the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., conducted by Sandro Viola and published in the Italian daily La Repubblica on Jan. 20.*

**Viola:** Were the Soviet leadership's forecasts of international reactions and the political risks connected to the intervention in Afghanistan on target, or have you found more severe reaction than was foreseen?

**Zagladin:** I think Brezhnev already answered this question. He said, in fact, that the hostile reaction by the imperialist forces to the events in Afghanistan did not surprise us. On the other hand, for us, what was essential was to prevent the American plan from succeeding: the

plan to make Afghanistan into a country dependent on them; to recover the loss of the Shah's Iran with Afghanistan. This plan has failed. As to the reactions, Brezhnev was very clear: if Afghanistan hadn't existed, the Americans would have invented it.

What's going on at this point is not essentially a reaction to Afghanistan, but an attempt to distract the attention of the world from other extremely serious problems. And above all, to mask the change of policy put into effect by the U.S.

**Viola:** What do you mean by a "change of policy" on the part of Washington?

**Zagladin:** It is a very serious turn. Above all, a monstrous spiral in the arms race. Then, a real explosion, never seen before, of American hegemonism. Think about Brzezinski's latest declarations, according to which there are three strategic zones that are fundamental for the interests of the U.S.: Western Europe and the Atlantic; the Far East; and the Middle East and Persian Gulf. In these three zones—which represent an enormous chunk of the world—the Americans say they are ready for any action, including military intervention. I must say that we haven't heard such shameless declarations in a long time.

**Viola:** And as for your direct relations?

**Zagladin:** The change toward the U.S.S.R. on the American side is also profound, enough to make us understand that we can no longer have faith in the U.S. But beyond this, there is another change, which has to do with the relations between America and its allies. In fact, we are watching a new attempt to control European policy... and force the Europeans into an exclusive relationship with the U.S.

Finally there is the military sphere: the decision to deploy the new missiles in Europe, and the pressures on the allies to support U.S. actions against Iran, show that Washington is trying to involve the allies in its own new political-military strategy... We don't think detente is dead at all, despite the great difficulties of this moment. Brezhnev said that detente will go forward, because there are many countries in the world, many political forces, that do not intend to renounce it.... We are convinced that Europe, Japan, the great states of Latin America and Asia, will succeed not only in stopping the deterioration of detente, but even in renewing it.

**Viola:** What initiatives can Moscow take, to re-establish an atmosphere of faith in Europe?

**Zagladin:** We think that both sides must reflect, study possible initiatives, conduct a dialogue. I should say that,

up to now, we have not received from Europe any sign of this sort...

**Viola:** Does this mean that you might change your position on the problem of the "European theater" missiles?

**Zagladin:** No, we do not intend to conduct negotiations on medium-range missiles under conditions of pressure created by the West . . . . The idea of calling a conference on military detente in Europe, put forward in two different versions by the Warsaw Pact and by French President Giscard d'Estaing, seems positive and could produce results. However, it would be useful for the Europeans to study other initiatives as well.

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### *Berlinguer: Cooperation for Third World development*

*Following are excerpts from a speech given by Italian Communist Party General Secretary Berlinguer at Terni on Jan. 19 during the 59th anniversary of the PCI.*

We must head toward a new equilibrium.... For example, Italy and other European countries can put themselves in a position... to furnish industrial plants, advanced technology and finished goods to the countries that export oil. And at the same time they can establish agreements with these same countries, to work together—investing their currency reserves—for the development of the zones of the Third World that are poor in raw materials; those zones called the fourth world.

Analogous to our position, is that of other forces which refuse to line up with one or the other great power, but speak, and seek to act, to reconstruct the conditions of dialogue between those two, to stop things from getting worse.

At Strasbourg, during the recent debate, two tendencies manifested themselves. We saw states and political forces that passively line up with the U.S., in trying to exacerbate tension for domestic and international ends; others because of ancient hatred of the U.S.S.R., as the country that realized the first revolution to herald the end of capitalist domination over the world. The extreme end of this formation is the conservative English government and the German Christian Democrats of Strauss.

However, there are in Europe other parties which with varying resoluteness, resist the logic of the aggravation of tensions and seek the road of dialogue and detente ... (for instance) the Scandinavian countries, in some aspects France, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and many Socialist and Social Democratic parties.

## **From the U.S.A.**

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### *Kissinger: The threat of a Soviet peace offensive in Europe*

*On Jan. 21, the Wall Street Journal published excerpts from its interview with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. We present selections from that interview.*

**WSJ:** What was the Soviet motivation for the invasion of Afghanistan?

**Kissinger:** ... The more interesting question is whatever made them establish a Communist government in Kabul in April 1978. We should then have made clear that this was incompatible with rules of coexistence. We cannot accept the principle that any Communist coup entitles the Soviet Union to back it up with the Red Army . . . .

**WSJ:** What can we do to shore up Pakistan?

**Kissinger:** We first have to define the problem. It is extremely unlikely that the Soviet Union would attack Pakistan over the opposition of India. The real threat will develop if the Soviet Union and India cooperate. We must of course do our best to prevent this from occurring . . . . We need a Churchillian posture. We didn't get into this position overnight and we can't get out of it with a few quick fixes in an election year.

But such a doctrine must also make provisions for eventual negotiations with our enemies . . . .

**WSJ:** What do you think the Soviets will do next?

**Kissinger:** ... They are likely to begin a peace offensive. This could take the form of attempting to appeal to the growing European conviction that European interests outside of Europe are not parallel with those of the U.S. or that Europe should not be drawn into conflict with the Soviets as a result of American confrontation outside Europe. . . .

**WSJ:** Zbigniew Brzezinski said in an interview on this page a few days ago that he thought a Soviet peace offensive, though it should be taken seriously, would ultimately fail to split us from our allies. Do you agree?

**Kissinger:** It will probably fail in a formal sense. I don't believe that the Europeans will conspicuously disassociate from the U.S. It may not fail in terms of the pressures that the Europeans will exercise on us and in the sense of reluctance by the Europeans to go along with American initiative. So it may have the practical result either of watering down our policy to the point of ineffectualness or forcing us to take isolated action.