

Will the Soviet Union occupy Sinkiang next?

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Contributing Editor

Over the weekend of April 12-13, Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, angrily compared the current world situation to that of 1914. He reported to large public gatherings that, then as now, current developments are impelling the principal powers witlessly toward the kind of war neither presumably desires.

It is for that reason, a view shared among most informed leading circles outside the United States, that Washington's allies are showing increasingly open resistance to the cacophony of "decisions" spurting from the mouth of the mentally unbalanced puppet-president, Jimmy Carter.

Unless World War III is triggered by a breakaway Israeli military adventure, or by Carter's military intervention into the Persian Gulf Region, the likely next escalation in the global situation is a Soviet military occupation of the Western, desert region of Communist China.

Soviets shift to "hard" war avoidance policy

Since sometime around Christmas 1979, the Soviet operational war-avoidance policy shifted qualitatively. In response to what Moscow saw and reported as lunacy in the Carter administration itself, the Soviet leadership adopted a "hard" form of war avoidance policy, which dictates a series of operational shocks to the United States. These measured risks of strategic deployment are intended, hopefully, to prevent thermonuclear war, by

communicating to sane elements of the U.S. command the imminence of such a war.

The Soviet deployment into Afghanistan was such a shock. Moscow notified Carter of that intended deployment approximately a week before it occurred. When Carter refused to negotiate that matter, and made no public statement on this information until after the deployment had occurred, the deployment proceeded.

This deployment had three prominent strategic implications. First, short of thermonuclear war, Washington could do nothing militarily to reverse it. Second, it underlined the more general virtual impotence of U.S. capabilities on the Soviet Union's southwestern borders. Third, it prepared a potentially ensuing occupation of the western, Sinkiang region of Communist China. Although the deployment had substantial strategic significance for possible World War III, its principal strategic significance was that of attempted war avoidance. It was primarily an attempt to communicate with Washington by actions, under conditions where effective direct negotiations, and also those mediated through Western European leaders, had been repulsed by Washington.

The gist of the "hard" signal is: "You do not have the capability to conduct a war-winning general war deployment against Moscow. Unless you alter your present geopolitical course that war will occur very soon."

The current "hard" Moscow war-avoidance posture might be viewed as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in reverse. "Stop now, to avoid World War III."

Just as I predicted this change in policy during the



spring of 1979, and indicated Soviet deployment into Afghanistan as the expression of such a change, so I now indicate Moscow's deployment into Sinkiang as the most probable next such deployment.

How the assessment is made

I have no crystal ball. I am no Jeanne Dixon. I predict nothing in the sense of prediction associated with professed access to the confidence of Providence. I merely indicate now, as in similar connections in the past, what the probable outcome of certain policies must tend to be.

In a half-hour nationwide NBC-TV broadcast on election eve 1976, I warned that the election of Jimmy Carter as president would lead the United States toward thermonuclear war. I summarized the Carter policy toward the developing nations' sector, and outlined the way in which this would lead to the brink of war. That has occurred just as I warned. I also warned that a war could occur under Carter as early as the summer of 1977. We actually reached that state of affairs during 1979, not 1977.

The combination of those two points illustrates the difference between a soothsayer and a scientist. I presented an accurate, fully vindicated analysis of the consequences of the predetermined policies of a Carter administration. I indicated the earliest point at which such policies would lead to the brink of war. When the Carter administration slowed down the tempo of its geopolitical thrusts for a period during 1977, after Moscow's brutal

rejection of Vance's initial demands, the tempo of developments leading toward war was slowed accordingly.

The kind of "prediction" I offered to a nationwide viewing audience on Nov. 1, 1976 is exemplary of the best "predictions" scientific analysis can offer, up to the arrival of a condition of "singularity" in the elaboration of a political-strategic process.

My "prediction" of a Soviet move into Afghanistan, made in spring of 1979, is of the same character.

My "prediction" of a Soviet deployment into Sinkiang has the same scientific character.

In assessing the Sinkiang option, the weight of analysis lies within the domain of the kind of military-strategic analysis associated with von Schlieffen.

In Schlieffen's procedure, one's own military staff is divided into two teams. One team plays the part of one's own forces-command in a simulation of conflict, the other team plays the part of opposing command. This merely requires that, unlike the Pentagon's incompetently designed "Delta Project," the team one deploys to simulate the probable adversary be competent to play that part.

So Germany devised what became known as the "Schlieffen Plan." Schlieffen, representing republican, pro-France currents of the German command, focused on the problem of military methods aimed at breaking France away from the alliance with Britain in event of war. The Schlieffen thrust, as developed into World War I, aimed primarily at destruction of the British Expeditionary Force on the northern shores of the continent,

while rapidly gutting France's railway net to the effect of blocking French military deployment. This would have succeeded militarily—and possibly also politically during that war. A delay in execution of part of the prescribed deployment, occurring for nonmilitary reasons, enabled French forces to be deployed to block the final execution of the operation.

This succeeded militarily during World War II. But Nazi policy and character precluded the securing of the peace in the way intended by the Lazare Carnot-oriented Schlieffen.

Since the case of the Schlieffen design illustrates the combined political and military strategic considerations intertwined in such a method of analysis, we should examine summarily what actual German republican interests were during the first decade of this century.

Since the conspiracy including Benjamin Franklin, General Lafayette and Lazare Carnot of the 18th century, the basic strategy of the transatlantic, anti-Britain American faction has been to unite continental Europe in an entente against Britain. That was the policy of the 1794-1797 leader of the First French Republic, Lazare Carnot. That was the policy of Carnot's political heir, Gabriel Hanotaux, a century later.

Had German republicans been in political command of Germany during World War I, the military crushing of the British Expeditionary forces would have been followed by an immediate German-French peace negotiation explicitly premised on the Hanotaux-Witte doctrine of the beginning of that century. German military forces in the East would have demanded the czarist government's adoption of the policies of Czar Alexander and Count Witte as the condition for peace.

Separated from that perspective, the Schlieffen strategy is degraded to a mere parody of itself.

Whatever the Soviet leadership perceives to be the determinants of its strategic interest, the actual strategic self-interest of Russia as an industrial nation (communism to one side) is identical with that of Witte's Russia on principle. The anti-British Carnot policy of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" is the only policy which leads to the possibility of war avoidance during this century.

If the United States command were not under British control, but under the leadership of a nationalist, republican command in the tradition of Benjamin Franklin and Abraham Lincoln (for example), that Carnot-modeled perspective would be the reference model for the European policy of the United States today.

War, and related potential application of military means, must be used either to secure peace on terms expressing a convergence of respective strategic self-interests, or deployment of the threat of military means by one power against the other must proceed until the

government of one is destroyed either by military defeat or internal transformation.

In analyzing the military and related vectors of powers today, one must go beyond the surface, conscious professions of policy and perspectives, to adduce the actually determining characteristics of perception and decision-making. One must adduce this in such a way as to define opposing tendencies, opposing such characteristics within the commands. The one characteristic is momentarily predominant. The other might be brought to the fore under appropriate circumstances.

Such interacting, underlying characteristics of decision-making may be variously unconscious or inadequately conscious. Such considerations may modify the results in a secondary sense, but not in a primary sense. The qualified strategic analyst treats the adducible characteristics as primary, and takes into account the effect of more superficial beliefs as a mere refinement of the analysis.

"In response to what Moscow saw and reported as lunacy in the Carter administration itself, the Soviet leadership adopted a 'hard' form of war avoidance policy, ... a series of operational shocks to the United States.... Afghanistan was such a shock."

It is from that vantage-point that the case of the Sinkiang option is considered here.

The Anglo-American Axis

The adversary relationship relevant to World War III is not *primarily* a conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO alliance. It is primarily a conflict between the supranational "One World-Utopian" and industrializing factions.

The former, "One World-Utopian," or *oligarchical* faction is centered in the ruling alliance of Great Britain—e.g. the Cecils, Barings, Rothschilds, and Britain's allies in the ruling circles of the United States. Hence, although the oligarchical faction is distributed as a potent influence within numerous nations, including the neo-Bukharinist currents of the Soviet leadership, its formal strategic power is concentrated in what is called the Anglo-American forces.

The control of Britain and the United States by this oligarchical Anglo-American cabal is otherwise expressed as alliances of states as a four-power axis includ-

ing the present governments of Britain, the United States, Israel and Communist China.

The well-defined adversary of this axis-alliance is those forces which are currently allied with the Giscard-Schmidt leadership of forces committed to establishing high-technology cooperation among industrial and developing nations. The Soviet Union is not viewed by the Anglo-Americans as the primary adversary of the moment.

However, because of the Soviet Union's combined military potency and its continued dedication to high-technology industrial progress, Moscow is the decisive strategic flank for the Giscard-Schmidt-led efforts to establish a high-technology global order of combined East-West, North-South cooperation. Therefore, forcing a state of intensified NATO-versus-Moscow conflict and also vastly weakening the Soviet Union have become the immediately primary forms of *action* adopted by the Anglo-Americans.

It is in the war-avoidance interest of Moscow to attempt to neutralize this by seeking extended economic cooperation with Western continental Europe and Japan. To the extent Western continental Europe capitulates strategically to Anglo-American pressure vis-à-vis Moscow, Moscow's policy shifts toward accelerated preparations for emphasis on war-avoidance by spoiling the military bluff of the Anglo-American forces.

This has been the gist of British policy since the 1890s, when its Russian policy was so defined "geopolitically" for the case of czarist Russia. That policy has never been altered. Furthermore, it has been Anglo-American policy throughout the postwar period, most emphatically since the 1947-1949 period. Hence, the "Soviet adversary" doctrine has been embedded in the entire institutionalized U.S. policy from then on to the present date. All but a handful of U.S. policy-makers are totally ignorant of the true motive for postwar "Soviet adversary" doctrine, but they are committed to that doctrine all the same.

The present intensification of that policy is chiefly a byproduct of the successful institutionalization of the "Aquarian" policies of the oligarchists in "Western" institutions, especially during the 1970s. The Anglo-Americans have committed themselves almost totally to the "zero technological growth" policies of the Club of Rome, to the point they could not undo those commitments without demolishing massively the presently institutionalized, mass-based expressions of that "neo-Malthusian" doctrine.

The implementation of that policy runs foul of resistance to the "New Dark Ages" degree of global economic depression the oligarchical doctrine demands. With the monetary collapse already far advanced, to take the obvious measures for halting the depression would mean not only abandoning the Club of Rome-typified policies,

but giving great, institutionalized strength to policies directly contrary to the "neo-Malthusian" policies' emergence in the future.

So, the tempo of the monetary crisis makes intolerable to the "One-World Utopians" the resistance to neo-Malthusian policies by the Soviet Union, by some developing nations, and among some leading forces of the capitalist industrialized nations.

Thus, the largely brainwashed military and political institutions of the United States are committed to the perception of the neo-Malthusian policy as a fundamental interest of the United States.

The war-avoidance policy of the Anglo-Americans is a gradual erosion of the Warsaw Pact, under which conditions Moscow, the Anglo-Americans presume, can be induced to adopt policies of "zero technological growth" and thus be weakened at least at the same rate that the "New Dark Age's" onset is weakening the combined economic and military capabilities of the "Western allies." Kissinger's and Brzezinski's expressed determination to use the Catholic Church as a vehicle for revolts in Eastern Europe, and to spread "Islamic fundamentalism" into the Islamic population of Central Asia are exemplary of this.

This aggressiveness, stated publicly by Kissinger, Brzezinski and others, combined with ongoing efforts to impose an IMF-World Bank supranational control over the developing sector, represents the immediate, "geopolitical" trigger of World War III.

Whether or not the Soviet command views this matter with adequate comprehension, the correlatives of the oligarchists' present "geopolitical" deployment constitute a rapid approach to the objective conditions for World War III in Soviet perceptions.

Soviet policy characteristics

The Soviet state is, and is committed to remaining, an industrial society committed to continued basic scientific and technological progress. It is also committed, strategically to the integrity of the Warsaw Pact, and to a degree of military neutrality in the Southern Hemisphere which approximates what Moscow views as an adequate offset to geopolitical containment. Furthermore, since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Moscow has been and will continue to be committed to maintaining a war-winning advantage for the contingency of general war.

Any effort to alter those parameters means a Soviet countermeasure in the direction of willfully risking World War III.

The Afghanistan case

All of the reasons given for the year-end deployment into Afghanistan so far are truthful, but do not add up as

a whole to the whole truth. Truthful statements and truth (in the scientific sense) seldom adequately agree.

It is probable, almost certain, that no Soviet official knows the underlying reason for the deployment into Afghanistan.

That was a decision taken in response to a number of accumulated developments, including the implications of the deteriorating internal situation in Afghanistan itself. The capitulation of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to the deployment of Pershing II missiles significantly tipped the balance in favor of Soviet demonstrative action. The U.S. commitments to equip Peking with modern boosters and targeting capabilities was a more immediate pressure for such demonstrative action. Peking deployments for a new invasion of Southeast Asia were also immediate considerations. The Carter administration's successive actions, in putting Khomeini in power, and in then "orchestrating" the taking of U.S. citizens hostage by Khomeini, was also most relevant.

None of these reasons, nor all of them combined, caused the deployment. The deployment was caused by a qualitative shift in the geometry of the strategic situation, from detente to imminent actions against points of hard-core Soviet interests.

This situation demanded measured action of a demonstrative sort. It must be, preferably, a measured action which would not trigger military confrontation with U.S. forces, and yet it must produce a qualitative enhancement of Soviet deployment against China and U.S. actions in the Middle East.

In view of the strategic advantage which Soviet forces have over the military capabilities of the "Western allies," the move also had the character of calling "Carter's and Brzezinski's bluff," thus pressuring realists toward negotiating a resumption of detente.

In other words, the Soviet action was not a single-objective "specific response," but a "characteristic" strategic response to the changed geometry of the overall strategic situation.

The Sinkiang option

A modern Schlieffen, looking at the Sinkiang option through the borrowed eyes of the Soviet command, would select a Soviet deployment into occupation of China's western desert regions as an action of "great strategic beauty."

The operation is ideal for Soviet military capabilities, permitting armored mechanized forces and supporting arms to conduct the desert equivalent of "naval warfare" in a sparsely populated region where "nonmilitary complications" of logistics and security are at a relative minimum.

Such a deployment immediately neutralizes Peking

as a strategic element in the force-equation. So to speak, it "tears up the China card."

It does bring the possibility of World War III. However, Brezhnev was already disposed to give Carter "30 minutes to decide" on such succor to Peking during the month of January of this year, and the strategic situation has deteriorated qualitatively since then. The imminent unleashing of an Israeli "breakaway ally" operation against Syria, and threat of U.S. military operations in the Gulf region already constitute more likely triggers of World War III than the Sinkiang deployment. Whereas, a Sinkiang deployment which did not trigger World War III would change the world situation qualitatively, to about the same effect as the 1962 resolution of the Cuban missile crisis.

It is unnecessary to list the contingencies of present developments, in addition to the Israeli and Gulf situation, which contribute to motivating a Sinkiang decision. The Southeast Asia and Assam situations are leading among such typical contributing considerations. We are very close to the circumstances in which a Sinkiang operation would become a "characteristic" action.

How it hangs in the balance

At this moment, we are in the order of a fortnight at most away from the moment of truth. This could be changed, but it is the situation since Carter's actions of this weekend. (The new Cossiga government in Italy is the mediating cause for the present deterioration of the situation. Those, including Dorothean Piccoli, who capitulated to U.S. pressure to prevent a new Andreotti government, will bear an awful moral burden for their corrupt actions, if war erupts because of the current developments.)

There is a balance, at this moment, between Western continental Europe's willingness to push the Carter administration into an internal crisis, and the Carter administration's capability of exploding the Gulf region to shut off the petroleum supplies of continental Europe and Japan. If Europe acts to bring Carter's administration into immediate "lame duck" status, and prevents both the Gulf and Israeli operations afoot, there will be a cooling off of the strategic situation.

Otherwise, the Middle East already qualifies as the 1914 Balkans of 1980.

Unless forces led by Giscard and Schmidt have the temerity to denounce the Carter administration openly as "lunatic," the matter is left entirely in the hands of the Soviets, giving Moscow no choice but to hope that calling the bluff of Carter, et al. will prove the last choice of successful options for preventing war. In that geometry, such operations as preemptive action into Sinkiang become "characteristic" responses.