

nation "underscores the recklessness of the United States administration's course, which failed to heed his advice." Vance had tried to slow "Washington's slide into an anti-Soviet rut," the commentator said.

Again, Moscow knows more than it is letting on. The stereotyped description of "hawk" Brzezinski vs. "dove" Vance disappeared in the Soviet press several months ago, as *Pravda* declared that both are committed to a policy of confrontation against the Soviet Union. Soviet journals earlier this spring described this confrontation policy as deriving from such institutions of the "financial oligarchy" as the New York Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, and the Bilderberg Society.

Soviet analysts are now trying to piece together in more profound terms what Vance's resignation will mean. Although the Soviet press has not pointed out Vance's specifically British political ties and the fact that Great Britain is now seeking to lead Europe into a new Atlantic consensus in the aftermath of Carter's debacle an article in the government daily *Izvestia* April 26 described Britain's years-long effort to dominate continental Europe. Washington and London both hope "to strengthen the Atlantic orientation of capitalist Europe, to undermine the position of those circles in France and other countries in the European Community which have advocated an independent foreign policy," wrote London correspondent V. Skosyrev.

The article, which described Great Britain as Washington's "Trojan Horse" in the Common Market, declared that, so far, efforts to "relegate detente to the archives" have failed, since West Germany and France "are convinced of how dangerous the adventurist actions of the present Washington administration are for world peace."

Moscow is by no means viewing the prospects for a continuation of detente sanguinely, however. TASS April 25 warned Europe that "It might have been expected that the U.S. allies would try to stop the Carter administration in its reckless action, but quite the contrary happened. ...It can certainly not be ruled out that, following Atlanticist logic, the White House will demand from its allies not only applause, but also the dispatch of British, West German and other military forces to Iran..."

The leaders of the West European countries will not be able to keep silent indefinitely, they will have to determine their position."

*Pravda* April 27 linked the Iran fiasco to NATO's decision last December to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe: "Can anyone in NATO countries still hope after all that the White House would consult them if it thinks of using the missiles deployed in their territories?"

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## THE PRESS

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# Some predictions and post-mortems

The press has played a critical role in the unfolding of the Iran crisis scenario. First the press hailed Europe and Japan's capitulation on the sanctions issue to predict an indefinite postponement of any U.S. military action. On April 25 just such a military action, scheduled to take place, was aborted. Press post mortems, advertising the "madness" of the Carter administration, emphasized the necessity of rallying Europe and Japan around an alliance against the Soviet Union.

### **Times: European capitulation means no military move**

*The following is excerpted from a New York Times front page article, "U.S. hints at delay in decision to act militarily on Iran," which appeared April 24.*

The United States today welcomed the backing it has received from the European allies against Iran and indicated that the Common Market decision to invoke sanctions next month might defer into the summer or later any consideration of American military moves aimed at freeing the hostages in Teheran....

...The European Economic Community decided to reduce immediately diplomatic ties...and to ban all exports to Iran except food or medicine....

In Tokyo, the Japanese government decided to join Western Europe in imposing an initial phase of economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran....

A senior White House official said that the timing of the allied moves made it all but inevitable that the "reassessment" of American policy toward Iran, previously set for mid-May, would be postponed. Moreover, the allies, soon to be partners in sanctions against Iran, are expected to press for a delay of as much as several months in any further steps....

### **A long-term strategy to rally the allies'**

*The following is an excerpt from an OpEd "Carter's 'Fiasco' in Iran," by Stanley Hoffmann, professor of gov-*

ernment at Harvard University, appearing in the New York Times April 26.

In this country, paradoxically, the spectacular demonstration of presidential bungling will, after the ritual rallying around the flag has passed, only reinforce the chorus of simple-minded believers in force as the only solution to international problems—people whose coming to power could provoke the biggest inter-allied crisis ever and bring the world much closer to the nightmare of a new 1914.

This new crisis confirms the flaws of the foreign-policy making process in the administration. Divisions among the principle actors produce paralysis, but secret moves planned by an apparently small group of activists turn out clumsy and rash. It is not only the organization of the government that is bad—the absence of a long-term integrated strategy capable of rallying our allies and of resolving, rather than exacerbating, crises has now become a pattern. It casts a pall over almost all of our foreign policy.

### **'The madman theory of foreign policy**

*The following is excerpted from the OpEd column, " 'Where do we go now?' " by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. appearing in the April 26 New York Times.*

The best defense of the Carter adventure is Richard M. Nixon's old Madman Theory. As Mr. Nixon explained to H. R. Haldeman: "Bob, I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war." One of the few voices of approval yesterday came from Henry A. Kissinger, who seems to argue that our adversaries will behave with more circumspection if they think that the President is crazy. This argument is not likely to appeal to our allies, or even to impress the Iranians, who after all are led by a madman of their own. . . .

No one can question the need for rigorous secrecy in such an adventure, but that need does not have to exclude responsible and experienced persons who can be counted on to raise the tough question. . . . Did Mr. Carter call in Harriman, Ball, McNamara, Fulbright, Scranton, Galbraith, Kennan, Yost, and other senior figures with long experience in international crisis?

...When a leadership starts down the road of exploiting international crisis for domestic benefit, this is exactly the kind of mess in which it is likely to end. In a parliamentary regime, Mr. Carter would be finished. Responsible leadership, if any survives in Washington, would throw out the team that conceived this misbegotten adventure and bring in people whose experience and

record would command the confidence of Congress, the American people and the NATO allies.

### **Financial Times: 'Carter weakened'**

*Following are excerpts from the Financial Times's editorial of April 26.*

The failure has weakened President Carter as a President. It has caused further divisions among the Western allies and it has enhanced the image of the Soviet Union as a power that can—as it did in Afghanistan—demonstrate its strength with success. . . .

...The major task now before the European leaders at this weekend's Brussels summit must be to explore what means are most appropriate and to see how the damage to the alliance and its image in the world can be repaired. . . . The first priority must be to maintain the alliance intact.

...The U.S. preoccupation with the hostages is deflecting attention from the more important strategic issue of preventing the extension of Soviet influence in the region beyond Afghanistan. . . . The issue of the hostages must become one in which policy is set after full consultations with the allies. . . . The hostage issue thus becomes a test of U.S. willingness to submit to the discipline of an alliance.

### **London Times: 'Lawful, but not wise'**

*Following are excerpts from the London Times editorial of April 26.*

American policy has, or ought to have, two objectives. The first and inevitably more important is to maintain the independence of Iran and to keep the Soviet Union from dominating the oil supplies of the Middle East. The second is to restore the freedom of the hostages and to save their lives. . . .

In their dealings with Iran and with the other Islamic powers, European countries should make two points. The first is not to underrate the United States. . . . The second point is that the U.S. is not a threat to the Arab and Islamic culture and the Soviet Union is. . . .

During the period of danger ahead, while the hostages are still held and American confidence is convalescent, Europe should be quick to settle her own problems, including the fraternal problems between Britain and France. Europe must make herself effective in world terms. . . . The United States is the natural and inevitable leader of the alliance but this is a moment when the rest of the alliance can help her in that task.

... Now that the raid has failed, there is no course left but conciliation; it should be based on understanding. And the effort of Europe should be to improve that understanding.