

to be among our most solid allies and we will not forget this. Italy showed courage in joining in the decision to modernize NATO's nuclear forces so that the disadvantage due to the increasing number of Soviet medium-range weapons aimed against Europe could be overcome. Italy, although it faces a difficult economic situation, is determined to reach the goal of 3 percent increase in defense expenditures in real terms. . . .

A large portion of the increased expenditures planned in the U.S. military budget for the next five years is to be used in Southwest Asia. In Brussels we will discuss how to implement this new division of expenditures.

Il Tempo: In plain English, Brown said not only Southwest Asia but also adjacent areas, meaning an extension of the NATO countries and Japan outside their areas of competence. This means NATO must not limit its activity to a strictly defined geographical area.

Brown: The military contribution must also include an increase in naval forces, meaning that the allies must show the flag in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea . . . The U.S. will undertake the largest part of this military increase, and this could make it necessary to move part of our forces from other theaters toward that region, for example to periodically move our aircraft carriers from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea.

treaty area in other parts of the world?

A: Let us view the current situation quite soberly. What are the reasons for our concern? We are concerned about Soviet expansion, about the improvement of the Soviet Union's strategic positions. By the way, it cannot be shaken out militarily: Afghanistan is topographically in such a location that nobody can go into action there even if he wanted to. Second, there is the concern of endangering our oil supply. Third, the hostages must be freed alive. . . .

NATO would totally overstrain itself if it wanted to solve the problems. At best, NATO can contribute if the Americans say: we are more deeply involved somewhere else, you must relieve us in Central Europe.

Q: In addition, the Army will face a special situation if and when NATO is called upon to share in worldwide responsibility, namely, the situation resulting from the partition of Germany.

A: The point at issue is not just Germany's partition. What matters is that our basic law says in no uncertain terms and without any contradictions: The Federal Republic has, and is allowed to have troops for defensive purposes, for home defense. And this makes it absolutely clear in legal terms that a Bundeswehr mission outside of Europe just cannot take place.

West Germany

A vote in the Ruhr for Schmidt and peace

by Ranier Apel

West German Chancellor Schmidt's Social Democratic Party (SPD) won a major victory in May 11 elections in the state of North Rhine Westfalia, where more than one-third of Germany's electorate lives and works. The returns are considered an important setback to the ambitions of Bavarian Franz Josef Strauss, who is scheduled to be the joint chancellor candidate of the opposition Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union parties in this October's national elections.

The victory of SPD candidates in this Ruhr industrial area represents a clear mandate for Schmidt's war-avoidance, detente-oriented foreign policy, and his government's continuing refusal to collaborate with the Carter administration's military posturing in the international arena.

Overall, the SPD gained 3.3 percentage points in the vote, raising its seats in North Rhine Westfalia's parliament to 49 percent. The Christian Democrats lost 3.9 percentage points, while the Free Democratic Party, Schmidt's coalition partner at the national level, suffered a 1.8 percent decline, failing to qualify for "major party status." Now below the minimum five percent level, the FDP must leave the state's parliament. Analysts agree that some of the SPD gains came directly at the expense of "migrant voters" formerly committed to the Christian Democrats.

Significantly, the so-called Green Party—the environmentalists and radicals—also failed to gain the minimum five percent to qualify for seats in the state parliament. A significant Green vote had been counted on by Chancellor Schmidt's enemies, including Christian Democrat leader Kurt Beidenkopf and Strauss, to weaken the chancellor's governing coalition. But the SPD suffered no net loss of votes to the greens, whose minimal gains at the expense of the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats still left them at only three percent.

In at least this key state, therefore, the policy of Strauss and Beidenkopf to build the Green Party has floundered. This policy was actually worked out for the two opposition leaders in the United States in February, when Strauss visited America for one week of top-level meetings with Carter administration officials and geopolitical specialists at the Jesuit Georgetown University.

The sole topic was how to topple Helmut Schmidt in order to reduce West Germany to a subservient vassal of Anglo-American policy within the NATO alliance. Building the environmentalist kooks of the Green Party into a "major party" in parliament at the expense of the SPD and FDP was to have been a principal tactic. But not only did the greens fail to grow significantly; Schmidt's SPD won new support from traditionally Christian Democratic Catholic workers in what were considered that party's bastions of support.

Beidenkopf, who became Christian Democratic chief in North Rhine Westfalia upon the death of Heinrich Koepler in the middle of the election campaign period, and proceeded to suffer the past week's defeats, is one of Strauss's most prominent supporters at the federal level. It is widely recognized, moreover, that the defeat was due to Beidenkopf's "American way of politics" (i.e., support for the Carter administration) in the eyes of Ruhr voters. In Germany, there is no one more "American" in that distasteful sense than Franz Josef Strauss.

Is Strauss viable?

The defeat of the Strauss forces has raised public questions about whether Strauss's own ambitions for the chancellorship might be at an end. Questions about the viability of the Strauss candidacy were reportedly raised at the presidium meeting of the Christian Democrats on May 12 in Bonn. They were immediately shoved aside, however, by the CDU's leadership group, dominated by such tools of Georgetown as Leisler Kiep, Ernst Albrecht and Philipp von Bismarck, who conjured up "the need for inner party solidarity."

Similarly, at a press conference held jointly by the CDU leadership and Strauss's Christian Social Union (Bavarian), it was announced that there would be no change in the party's "new policy"—unquestioning solidarity with the foreign policy of the Carter administration, increased military expenditures as per NATO request, and a domestic policy centered around "the problems of the young"—that is, building the Green Party—as well as a populist tax policy, etc.

The policy is considered "new" because, traditionally, the Christian Democrats have been the party of industry and economic growth. The Strauss supporters at the CDU's helm, however, are as totally committed to Club of Rome-NATO economic policies of zero-growth as to NATO-Carter foreign policy postures.

With a strong base oriented to industrial growth and East-West detente still remaining in the Christian Democratic ranks, the Strauss-allied leadership must avoid any concessions to the anti-Strauss ferment, for fear of encouraging a revolt. All the more after the Ruhr electoral defeat, Strauss's main objective is to crush the traditional Christian Democratic policy orientation.

This Georgetown faction in the CDU is evidently not confining its campaign against Chancellor Schmidt to mere parliamentary and electoral opposition. The Green Party is being used as shock-troops in the streets to destabilize and split the "left" environmentalist wing of the SPD out from under the Chancellor. Exemplary were street riots in the city of Bremen May 6 on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of West Germany's membership in NATO. What started as a "peaceful demonstration" sponsored by the Lutheran Church—in which a powerful influence is the "black noble" von Bismarck family, whose Philipp heads the CDU Economic Council—erupted into violent clashes with the Green Party in the lead, leaving 25 policemen injured.

As the newspaper *Die Zeit* wrote even several months ago, it is very possible that Strauss intends to base his electoral campaign not on industry or labor support, but on public riots, tax revolts, and youth protests organized by his own "Green Party" team centered around Beidenkopf and the von Bismarcks.

One pressing question after the North Rhine Westfalia elections is that of the future of the Free Democratic Party. The party's importance, despite its size, is that its support has given Schmidt the margin in the Bundestag (federal parliament) required to rule.

The "party crisis" created by the North Rhine Westfalia defeat, however, may be used by some forces to attempt a transformation of the Free Democrats in a populist, Green Party direction—and in fact, pro-Strauss currents in the FDP came out of the Ruhr defeat with warnings that it should now distance itself from the Chancellor's SPD.

In fact, although allied with Schmidt, the zero-growth policy thinking of such agencies as Georgetown and NATO's Club of Rome has had a significant impact in Free Democratic Party ranks—enough to make it part of the drug legalization movement in West Germany, for example. If such policy orientations become strengthened in the wake of the Ruhr elections, the FDP could be on its way out of Schmidt's coalition and into an alliance with Strauss.

However, that appears to be a fragile prospect, if Schmidt's party does what now appears well within its capability. A majority of the West German electorate is showing that it identifies with the German Chancellor. Schmidt is moving into a position in which he will be able to conduct a head-on political fight with the "green" wing of his own party around former chancellor Willy Brandt, now party chairman. In that event, the move of the Catholic labor vote into his camp which provided the SPD with 49 percent in North Rhine Westfalia, could be accelerated, giving Schmidt even an absolute majority at the federal level come October. What need then of labile Free Democrats, always the government's weak flank?