

Memorandum to the Congress

National security doctrine for the Philip Agee case

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. Chairman, National Advisory Committee,
National Democratic Policy Committee

The following memorandum was issued Oct. 4 by the National Democratic Policy Committee:

Many members of Congress share my anger at the fact that the pro-terrorist former CIA employee Philip Agee has not served time in federal prison.

Instead, Agee has roamed the world like a modern Aristotle, mysteriously protected from prosecution, and most recently given immunity from prosecution by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti.

Apart from his pro-terrorist activities, Agee and his confederates have targeted U.S. operatives for assassination. The Athens murder of Richard Welch sticks in the craw. Col. Mitchell L. WerBell, my security adviser, and I have been targeted similarly by the same networks in which Agee is a part, and this targeting of WerBell and myself has been conduited into the pages of a relevant Soviet intelligence community publication, *New Times* (an internationally distributed multi-language newsweekly) in its Aug. 25, 1980 issue.

I share the righteous anger of many members of our intelligence community against both Agee's antics and those in high places who provide international protective screens of immunity from legal action to Agee and his accomplices.

The point to be emphasized to lawmakers is that Agee and his accomplices have violated *existing law*. Agee violated his employment contract. The Carter administration has prosecuted Frank Snepp on this account, but the Carter administration has extended immunity to Agee. Agee has not merely violated a contract with an agency constituted under the National Security Act, he has flagrantly advertised his willful and sometimes bloody breaches of security.

The issue properly before the Congress is inquiry into the reasons *existing law* has not been enforced.

The Agee case viewed more broadly is an aspect of the process leading into the 1977 slaughter of the intelligence-gathering capability of the Central Intelligence Agency. This correlates with a more recent stripping of antidrug intelligence capabilities including the vital Paris liaison office.

During recent weeks, a massive effort has been deployed to the effect of diverting the Congress's attention away from the relevant investigation of administration policies and policymakers responsible for misfeasances in the Agee CIA-wrecking and DEA-wrecking instances. A string of mixed fact, half-truths and barefaced "black propaganda" lying has been conduited into the ears of the Congress. This lying to Congressmen from such tainted sources is directly correlated with a proposal that instead of an appropriate congressional investigation of tainted administration policymaking, the Congress should enact a *flagrantly unconstitutional* imitation of the British Official Secrets Act.

The "black propaganda" being rumored include the following:

1. That National Security staffer David Aaron might be, in effect, a "Moscow mole."
2. That a "Moscow mole" is behind the "Trigon" case.
3. That the Carter administration's election-campaign period bragging about a "Stealth plane" project might be the work of a "mole," possibly Aaron.

Although I have never been an employee or contracted agent for the CIA or any other intelligence service, I do have special qualifications of expertise in the area of the matters identified above.

As the recent case of the cited Moscow *New Times* article merely illustrates, I have been frequently the target of operations played against me from or through the conduits of the Soviet State Security Agency (KGB). I have also been the target of similar operations either originating with or conduited through the Soviet Communist Party's foreign intelligence entity IMEMO, as well as its U.S.-Canada Institute offshoot.

This bears in important ways on the subject of "moles." The cases of KGB General "Kim" Philby and the role of his confederate Maclean, a key figure of IMEMO, are relevant. In a number of instances, including the cited article in *New Times*, the KGB or related sort of operation against me has originated in intelligence-relevant Western circles such as Anglo-Canadian "private" intelligence agencies associated with the Lon-

don *Economist*.

The ability of certain very influential Western circles to play operations through high levels of the KGB and IMEMO implies a “purchased” credibility and related forms of influence through what Moscow views as intelligence-relevant “favors” delivered by the entities exerting such influence with the KGB and IMEMO. Philby’s conduiting of highly sensitive U.S.A. information to Moscow is exemplary—as is also the failure of U.S. counterintelligence entities to follow through the investigation of Philby at a critical time.

In addition to such experience and related knowledge, my increasing repute as an economist especially since spring 1975 affords me access to privileged circles.

For almost a decade, I have been a regular participant in daily evaluations sessions for what has become a significant specialist variety of international news service. This newsgathering activity, combined with daily executive responsibilities for related strategic and tactical evaluations of important patterns of global and national developments, provides me with expertise in areas bearing on intelligence and counterintelligence evaluations.

In recent years, my principal areas of topical concern have included anti-terrorist and anti-drug intelligence. These two matters are highly interconnected in several respects. As has been proven by successful actions of Italian and French security services, illegal drug traffic and the infrastructure of terrorist logistics have a significant overlap.

The distinctive feature of my special expertise in economics and my related involvement in promoting high energy flux density modes of energy technologies, provides me with relevant resources for evaluating the science-technology side of logistics, and access to knowledge of the relative state of the art and the economic side of such capabilities of various countries. This bears on matters of national security policy, including matters directly pertinent to the subject of this briefing.

With aid of those and related advantages, I provide this report to members of Congress and to relevant other persons and institutions.

I. Congress’s first task

The first task of a competent congressional investigation is an inquiry into the crucial features of the process leading into the mid-1977 gutting of intelligence-gathering capabilities of the CIA.

The crucial points include the following:

1) The conduiting of the assault upon the CIA through the Yuppies, and the past and present links of the Yuppies to intelligence organizations, including foreign intelligence organizations deployed inside the United States.

2) The continuing role of the Institute for Policy Studies and its associated entities in this project, including the Agee-linked Counterspy entity, and the substan-

tial funding of Counterspy by so curious a choice of backers of a nominally “left-wing” project as the Lilly Endowment.

3) The continuing role of a former close National Security Council associate of Henry Kissinger, Morton Halperin.

4) The weakening of the CIA, accomplished with aid of the shift in emphasis of administration of the national security community with Henry Kissinger’s appointment as National Security Adviser.

5) What influence upon and within government afforded Philip Agee de facto immunity from prosecution under successive administrations, including the recent action of Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti in this matter? What is the explanation of the coherence among the related actions of Civiletti in (a) recommending the pardon of four unrepentant terrorist assassins, (b) granting Agee immunity from prosecution, (c) dropping prosecution against the Weathermen terrorists?

6) An in-depth inquiry into the actions launched during 1977 which, in effect, gutted the CIA’s intelligence-gathering capabilities.

7) The increased dependency upon foreign intelligence entities resulting from the 1977 slaughter of CIA capabilities, and the consequently increased subceptibility of U.S. policymaking to be misled into directions defined by foreign owners.

8) The loss of vital CIA counteroperations capabilities for dealing with foreign based illegal drug and terrorist operations, deployed against the United States, our nationals, and points of vital national interest including embassies and consulates.

9) The sources of the decision to destroy the United States’ most vital element of anti-drug intelligence capabilities under conditions of a massive increase in the international drug traffic.

The Congress must refuse to be diverted from this crucial, principal doorway into the matters of the Congress’s legislative and related oversight powers and responsibilities.

II. Damage evaluation

The first outlined phase of investigation must proceed to an estimation of the damage to national security caused by the 1977 gutting of the CIA and by related measures.

From my information respecting the Middle East, I conclude that years of accumulated in-place assets of the CIA were “shopped out,” “hung out to dry,” and so forth, during or immediately following the 1977 Admiral Stansfield Turner purge.

One example of this is outstanding. According to former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar, a former Attorney General visited him carrying credentials of an agent of the Carter administration. This confirms corroborating information gathered from a

number of other documentary and other highly worthy sources. While carrying such credentials, Ramsey Clark was featured at a street rally in Teheran at which he demanded the overthrow of the Bakhtiar government of Iran, in favor of the Ayatollah Khomeini. He has publicly persistently supported the Khomeini dictatorship which subsequently avowed itself an enemy of the United States and which assaulted our embassy and still holds kidnapped the U.S. diplomatic and other hostages.

This is not to assert that the United States has lost all "in-place" intelligence resources in the Middle East. It is to emphasize that the CIA's capabilities were gutted to the effect that the scandalous implications of the Clark affair could be covered up, and U.S. national policy for the Middle East led down the pathway into the current mess, so menacing to the most vital interests of our nation and its friends and allies. A U.S. policy which fosters the preconditions for blowing up the vital petroleum supplies from the region of the Persian Gulf is certainly conclusive proof of a monstrous breakdown in both intelligence and policymaking functions.

During the same period, from 1977 onward, many "bridges" between Washington and Moscow were burned down. The "bridge-burning" initiated by the Carter administration thus created the opportunity for the "bridge-burners" on the Moscow side to push their policies through leading Soviet circles. Although I have no direct knowledge of the purported "Trigon" case, the reported version of the case, whether fictional or factual, is paradigmatic for the situation created by the Turner purge of the CIA.

I do not assume the Congress's privileged duty and authority to assess the damage done to the CIA in the course of the "bridge-burning" orgy of 1977. I state the overview of the matter which ought to inform the judgment of members of Congress conducting this inquiry.

Modern crisis management between principal potential adversaries requires special auxiliary instruments apart from direct diplomatic channels. These instruments include controlled conduits of interface, for transmission of "white intelligence" back and forth between the two powers. This is effectively managed under the auspices of cultural, scientific and commercial relationships, most of which are a process of spontaneous exchanges and business affairs between private entities and individuals of the United States (in particular) and Moscow (in particular). This is properly complemented by direct and indirect channels for interfacing intelligence and other elements of the policymaking infrastructure of the two entities.

Thus, under the screen of cultural, scientific and commercial relationships, the two governments agree to set up channels of direct and indirect liaison between their respective military and intelligence entities.

The rules of the game for such direct and indirect liaison are "white intelligence only." Each communicates as much of the truth as the opposite side is authorized to know. The principal crisis-management function of this arrangement is the minimization of tactical miscalculation by either side, and minimizing the risk of a cumulative pattern of tactical miscalculation leading to strategic miscalculation.

This arrangement does not involve "betraying" of national security intelligence of either party. It is a leaking of "white information" to the opposition, chiefly either to prevent a misinterpretation of our own, or their own actions, or to arrange for them to allow us a clear field in dealing with matters of our vital interests, which do not properly affect their vital interests.

This accredited "white intelligence" exchange complements covert intelligence by both sides. It is also, unavoidably, an environment in which each side may be tempted to cultivate potential assets from the other side.

One such arrangement is the creation of the U.S.-Canada Institute as that part of the interface between Soviet and Anglo-Canadian intelligence which specifically interfaces U.S. intelligence along the track of the war-time SOE configurations. The "mother" agency for the U.S.-Canada Institute is IMEMO, which is principally a direct interface between the British secret intelligence service and Soviet intelligence. IMEMO was developed into this role using "former" SIS operatives Maclean as IMEMO's key adviser, at the time H. "Kim" Philby went over to Moscow to assume his official career within the Soviet KGB.

So, until Turner's purge of 1977, the United States had two avenues of crisis-management intersection with the Soviet command. One was the U.S. link through the British SIS-controlled Anglo-Canadian intelligence tracks for which the U.S.-Canada Institute links to David Rockefeller et al. are only the most obvious illustration, among many channels of this class. The other was the system of cultural, scientific and commercial channels accessible to direct exploitation by the CIA. Turner's 1977 purge destroyed most of the latter category, making the United States relatively dependent upon the same British SIS which earlier fed us Maclean, Burgess and Philby.

I am not in a position to assess directly the personnel of the CIA generally. However, my contacts, directly and indirectly, with former CIA officials and related elements of the intelligence community is that the intelligence-gathering side of the CIA, whatever it did rightly or wrongly, was dominated by a certain quality of patriotism.

Like law-enforcement professionals, that community of CIA intelligence-gathering professionals deploys its capabilities as directed by law. The law-enforcement professional deploys against the lawbreakers. The intelligence operative deploys against the opposition as that

opposition is defined for him by the kind of criteria of law and command otherwise associated with the practice of the military professional.

Like the law-enforcement professional, the patriotic intelligence officer is not merely an instrument of policy, but a citizen who judges what is or is not action consistent with his conscience, according to his perception of law or according to his perception of national interest—as may be the case. The professional may be fallible in his judgment of such matters, but behind the fallibility there is a higher conscience which will correct errors of judgment or earlier error.

We cannot do better. We can only inform the professionals in both general categories.

In that sense, I advance the judgment that, whatever particular errors of judgment or practice the CIA may have made in the past, my impression of the professionals generally is that most of them have been patriots. If they perceived a grave danger to national interest in current policy or policy omissions, they would find a proper channel to communicate urgent information to authorities able to correct the danger.

What I have seen done to the most vital interests of the United States over recent years appalls and enrages me. I am also persuaded that much of this disaster would not have developed had we proper intelligence functioning, using patriotic professionals of the sort I view as broadly representative of the CIA's intelligence-gathering cadres.

I correlate this with the evidence that, except for channels of intelligence controlled by other nations, including the cited dependence upon SIS-controlled channels, the United States' policymaking has been blinded by the correlatives of the 1977 purge of the CIA's intelligence-gathering capabilities.

Furthermore, by Zbigniew Brzezinski's orgy of "bridge-burning," the present administration has played into the hands of the "bridge-burners" of the Moscow side. We have been maneuvered into a worsening strategic situation, largely by the scrapping of the combined intelligence and crisis-management capabilities we had prior to the 1977 Turner purge.

I supplement that policy overview of the point with the following, reenforcing observation.

In my encounters with relevant officials of various nations during the recent period, I have not infrequently discovered such a person sitting in dismay. The recurring situation has been that such friends of the United States had reason to believe that within the Western intelligence community one scarcely knew at times who the opposition was. The former quotient of back-stabbing of an intelligence service, by that of an allied nation or even a brother service of one's own nation, has been surpassed to the point that more damage is being done by allies than by the nominal opposition. Sometimes, the situation among allies reaches "wet

weather" conditions.

If the Congress inquires adequately into this matter, it will discover a situation beyond the belief of even most political figures. There are nominally friendly agencies of nominally friendly governments who would readily "shop out" an asset of the CIA to the KGB. The replay of the London *Economist's* conducting of a libel against Colonel WerBell and myself into *New Times* illustrates the kind of immorality typical of our nominal allies in that particular compartment of SIS.

I do not know whether "Trigon" is fact or fiction. If it is fact, I would know what parts of our own intelligence community I would look at for the leaking of Trigon's connections. I would not suspect a Soviet "mole." I would suspect some highly placed wellspring of intramural homicide, along the general lines exhibited in the London *Economist's* planting of a denunciation of Colonel WerBell and myself in a Soviet intelligence publication.

III. The 'Stealth' bomber

The principle that permits the possible development of an antiradar design, e.g. the "Stealth" bomber, has been known for decades. There is no secret involved.

Yet any intelligence entity of a major power should have assumed long ago that the development of such a capability was being considered and possibly implemented by the other. Therefore, there is no secret to this second part of the analysis of the matter.

The only "secret" is the actual commitment to deploy such a capability. That is the "secret"—the only secret—which the Carter administration leaked, and that under the pressures of an ongoing election campaign. Since it is a legal impossibility to illicitly leak information to the President of the United States, no one can be charged with "mole-like" qualities of formal impropriety as a result.

There is another aspect to this business of militarily relevant scientific intelligence. It is this other aspect which ought to occupy the interest of a congressional inquiry.

What Congress might ask, in connection with the Carter administration's "blowing" of the "Stealth" business, is how the principle of the "Stealth" aircraft is defeated. By what sort of countermeasures? Some panicked advisers of President Carter may wish to copy Josef Goebbels' wartime propaganda cult of "miracle weapons." In fact, no "miracle weapons" exist, but only, at worst, terrifying ones. Nor is there an "ultimate weapon," but only weapons whose mere existence increases spending for the development and deployment of countermeasures. What are U.S. and Soviet capabilities for countermeasures against such a device? Does our intelligence community have, presently, the capability to provide a competent answer?

All this falls under the heading of evaluations of the

categorical capabilities of Soviet and U.S. science. In this dimension, the Carter administration and its intelligence institutions have been lately fostering some dangerous falsehoods.

The congressional inquiry should focus on the implications of the Wirszup Report. The inquiry should proceed from that to examine both the quantitative and qualitative sides of the implied strategic problem.

Essentially, during the period 1966-67, the U.S.A. adopted opposite policies for development of science and technology.

A branch of the British secret intelligence service, the London Tavistock Institute, developed a policy recommendation, nominally on behalf of NASA. The report authored by Anatol Rapoport is exemplary of this policy recommendation. The utopian policy statement *Technetronic Society*, authored by Zbigniew Brzezinski, reflects the same Tavistock dogma. From approximately 1967 onwards, the perspective reported by Rapoport has been increasingly U.S. policy. NASA was phased down, as Tavistock demanded, and governmental and other policies phased down U.S. basic industry and whole categories of research and development, along the lines of Brzezinski's H. G. Wells variety of "technetronic" cultism.

During the same period, the Soviet Union qualitatively increased the emphasis upon science, both in educational programs and in emphasis on employment of scientists. Despite the softening effects achieved by smuggling the "systems philosophy" Trojan Horse into Moscow by way of Vienna, the Soviet Union has achieved a massive human-resources advantage over the collapsing capabilities of the U.S. population, in respect to scientific employment and advanced skills potentials of the younger sections of the labor force.

Is Zbigniew Brzezinski therefore to be suspected of being a "Soviet mole"? Or, the avowed, neo-Malthusian James R. Schlesinger? In this dimension, the greatest enemy of the United States has and continues to be ourselves. As long as we tolerate such disastrous weakening of our economy and our strategic potentials for the future, it is our own folly which is to be blamed. Let us not compound our own follies by foolishly placing Brzezinski under suspicion as a "Soviet mole."

It is the qualitative side of this matter which is most poorly grasped among policymakers today.

The hierarchy of bottlenecks in the Soviet economy, especially the poor productivity of its agricultural sector, restricts the Soviets presently to a rather limited capacity to transform advanced scientific capabilities into new products on a large scale. This, as any congressional inquiry could determine for itself, is concentrated in the advanced military-development production capabilities. Thus, careless inspection of Soviet output must tend to greatly underestimate the nature of progress in Soviet basic science.

Since Congress's inquiry will be aided by relevant members of our scientific community, I shall summarily identify here the visible aspect of Soviet advanced work which I presently identify as most crucial.

If we place the emphasis of inquiry initially on the side of theoretical physics matters, as we should, then emphasis must be focused on the relatively superior grasp certain key Soviet scientific circles have shown into the proper appreciation of Bernhard Riemann's treatment of Abelian functions. This permits, implicitly, amazing tricks, so to speak, with computers whose capacities are relatively more limited than our own. More generally, the proper grasp of Riemann's work is crucial to breakthroughs in relativistic physics.

If one were obliged to single out one area as the most important point of relative Soviet strength of scientific potential, this is the point at which to proceed.

Together with my associates who have investigated this specific matter extensively, I report that this point of advanced Soviet progress is the point on which the orientation of education of our young scientists is most deficient.

The implementation of the fusion bill most recently enacted will save the U.S. advanced physics community from what would otherwise have been a disaster. That is excellent, but not yet sufficient. Take as an example the small group of scientists associated with Dr. Edward Teller. This is one of a relative handful of leading research groups on which our nation's entire scientific capability in the new physics depends. The implementation of the fusion bill will keep that sort of capability from being starved out of existence. Has our nation presently the potential for reproducing a new generation of leading scientific workers to follow the circles associated typically with Dr. Teller? It would be most hazardous to answer that question with so confident a reply as "Possibly." The infrastructure to produce the new generations is being destroyed.

I shall be only slightly technical for another moment here.

If I were to outline the broad specifications of the kind of science track we require to match and exceed Soviet advances in the critical areas of physics research, I would report these results of my own and my associates' investigations on both sides of the Atlantic.

I would base the training of future scientists on the model of Gaspard Monge's and Lazare Carnot's specifically Leibnizian approach to the notion of a physical geometry—in place of the axiomatic, counterproductive emphasis on models of so-called Euclidian and anti-Euclidian geometries. I would use that developed point of conceptual reference to guide the student through Leibniz's seminal attack on Descartes' misconception of momentum. Through the Ecole Polytechnique, and by way of Fourier and Legendre into the work of Göttingen and Berlin, especially the transformation, beyond

Gauss's work, by Karl Weierstrass, Bernhard Riemann, Georg Cantor, and their scientific-factional allies.

With one eye on the work of the Soviet Academician Novikov and others, I would insist that it is not sufficient to know that Riemann's 1859 treatise on acoustical shock waves is the basis for designing terrifying weaponry, or for helping Erwin Schrödinger to open wider the window on falsely so-called "fundamental particles." I would wish no graduate to be considered qualified for this sort of physics unless he understood Riemann's habilitation dissertation on hypothesis. Then the graduate would have the groundings for conceptualizing the physics of Legendre's and Riemann's successive establishment of the methodological bedrock for today's new physics.

Today, these two essential text sources are out of print, and most reports of their significance bowdlerized. We confront a barrier in scientific progress which is chiefly the consequence of the efforts of Cambridge University, England, and allied factions, to extirpate from scientific practice and education what those circles declared philosophically objectionable in such opponents of Cauchy and Maxwell as Riemann. The Soviet scientists have avoided that conceptual barrier—albeit with some howls of philosophical protest from some among their "Marxist-Leninist" fellow citizens.

Our predicament in this matter is not absolute. If Congress inquires, it will be able to discover that a few circles in our nation are, happily, working in the direction I recommend. The ongoing work of my associates on this point has not been entirely neglected among some of our best scientific circles. Unfortunately, those exceptions are, for the moment, merely exceptions.

National policy must support the efforts of our best scientific workers, not merely with tax incentives and grants, but by adopting a new national consensus, reversing the hideous damage to our nation and its defense potential done by Zbigniew Brzezinski and his utopian co-thinkers back in the late 1960s. We must restore the emphasis on scientific achievement which Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy fostered by such means as the development of NASA. We must also create the kind of scientist from new generations which we borrowed as émigrés from the orbit of Riemann's Göttingen to aid us crucially in the Manhattan Project, and in our close race with Soviet scientists to create a deployable thermonuclear weapon.

Our old science education was passable, but not truly adequate. The philosophical bias against the central methodological principles of Leibniz, Carnot, Riemann, and Cantor was dominant, even among instructors who did not suspect such a prejudice in themselves. For the new physics, merely to resurrect the old science education approaches would be worse than inadequate.

Unfortunately, I fear, judging from the incompetent

official evaluations of Soviet science I have heard from the administration recently, Congress might find that our intelligence community has not yet understood what this problem is all about.

IV. The conceptual problem of intelligence

If members of Congress proceed effectively with the lines of inquiry I have outlined here, the deeper they inquire into the demimonde of intelligence, the clearer it must become to them that the world as ordinary opinion and commonplace slogans describe it is relatively a mere theatrical performance. The world of the news media reports is a surface charade, which distracts the mind from the operative reality, the reality that shapes most of the events.

Reality is directed as if from backstage. The audience sees only the actors, the props, the lines. Sometimes there is a script. Sometimes the world as daily misrepresented to the credulous by our news media has no script, but represents actors in a "living theater" scenario.

It is the essential function of intelligence to get behind stage.

The intelligence institution competently trained and deployed for its work is not plunged into some eerie other world. It is the intelligence function whose attention is focused in the real world, whereas—at least up to this point—the ordinary citizen, credulously believing that the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* report "the news," sees only an illusion, a theatrical quality of charade. This may not be the case in the small, personal things of life. It is so on all matters bearing upon major developments dominating national policy.

The intelligence operative is seen as a "spook," because the back stage, where the play is controlled, is spooky to the audience credulously focused on the illusion of the drama being enacted.

The member of Congress, although he or she may have had no exposure to the policymaking levels of intelligence work, has resources of personal political experience which aid members of Congress conducting such inquiries to grasp the essentials.

Is there a Congressman who has not been privy to a decision enacted, in which case the reason for the decision was one matter, whereas the explanations given for the decision to the public were quite a different matter? Did not the national press, perhaps, solemnly chew over in print for days thereafter the explanation given? Was this willful deception, this explanation wholly irrelevant to the substance and implications of the decision, not the focus of whatever heated debates arose?

If we take account of the extent of such practices, in most of the decisions affecting public life, must we not therefore accept the proposition that the news the media reports is chiefly charade, theater, illusion? As our

citizenry attempts to interpret the real consequences of such decisions overall, it is impelled to explain the consequences in terms of the deliberately deceptive rationalization which the news media solemnly regurgitated as "fact."

It is by understanding that such is, alas, the presently prevailing state of affairs in the world that a member of Congress inquiring into the domain of intelligence policy can grasp what is most essential. The intelligence operative, if he or she is competent, is operating in the domain of backstage reality, as the eyes and ears, and occasionally also the arm, of national policymaking.

Once that is understood, the member of Congress will overcome susceptibility to the paranoid chatter about "moles" emanating from the likes of Robert Moss.

I don't like David Aaron myself. I would never let that dislike impel me to circulate the sort of dangerous, false, defamatory fairy tales against him which I have found circulating around the Congress recently. If I go after David Aaron's political scalp, it will be for what he is, not what he is not.

Ladies and gentlemen, let us resolve that we shall tolerate no longer the practice of British intelligence playing games with our national security policies in such a manner.

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INTERVIEW

How fusion bill became U.S. law

Dr. Morris Levitt, Executive Director of the Fusion Energy Foundation in New York, granted the following interview to EIR on Oct. 8, one day after President Carter signed Cong. Mike McCormack's fusion energy bill into law. The legislation, the Magnetic Fusion Engineering Act of 1980, commits the United States to building a prototype magnetic confinement fusion reactor by the year 2000.

EIR: Dr. Levitt, your organization has been given a great deal of the credit for making passage of this bill possible. What made success possible?

Dr. Levitt: There were two closely intertwined lines of development, political and scientific, that went into the McCormack bill—political and scientific developments spurring each other on, so to speak.

Politically, the combination of Carter administration economic and energy policies was creating a strategic situation in which an open field was being given to the Soviet Union for both world industrial dominance and dominance in the field of nuclear technology, in particular. For example, the Soviets were generally known to be pursuing advanced lines of research that could lead to major weapons breakthroughs. Meanwhile, there was increasingly open discussion, which we helped provoke, about the scandalous state of the U.S. military. And through the Wirszup report [a study of Soviet education by Chicago Prof. Isaak Wirszup—ed.] which we publicized widely, it became generally known that levels of scientific education in the Soviet Union had rapidly risen in the same period that the U.S. was winding down the NASA space program; and U.S. education in the sciences, in engineering and mathematics had accordingly fallen to woefully inadequate levels.

Among capable political figures, senior research people, and scientific personnel associated with the national laboratories, a strategic focal point was needed to mobilize the forces to reverse this situation.

Fusion energy became that focus. Fusion is strategic militarily. It is strategic as far as energy is concerned. Recent research in the field had been highly successful. The program was well managed. The program involved the national laboratories and major universities. And it