

succession, a succession in which Lin had already been formally designated the heir-apparent. (Chen is one of the 10 trial defendants.)

Some sources believe there were differences between Lin and Chou even before the Ninth Party Congress. Specifically, these involved, or were articulated, as differences over the manner and extent to which the purge of the party was to be carried out. What it comes down to is who was to be axed and by whom. The outcome of the struggle between the “radicals/Reds,” and “moderates/experts” would determine the post-Cultural Revolution power structure.

Mao and Chou first attempted to undercut Lin by initiating a low-key rectification campaign against Lin’s power base in the military apparatus.

Also at this time, the “Central Cultural Revolution Group” headed by Chen Boda was abolished, and he was relegated to an unimportant post.

Lin’s increasingly precarious position was manifested dramatically in March 1970, when Mao deleted the office of chairman of the state from the new draft constitution. This decision, which confirmed Premier Chou En-lai as de facto head of government, thus outranking Lin in both his government position of vice-premier and minister of national defense, indicated that Mao had abrogated his plan for a single successor, Lin.

At the Lushan Plenum of the CP Central Committee in August 1970, Lin and Chen openly challenged Mao’s authority on fundamental questions concerning the power structure and the correct line. The subsequent charges against Lin and his military supporters—that they had practiced “revisionism, splittism, and conspiracy”—refer to this challenge to Mao’s leadership at Lushan.

The aftermath of the August plenum was characterized by a subtle undercutting of Lin’s power base in the PLA. Once Lin’s power base had been dissipated, it would be relatively simple to render him harmless.

The principal charges in the indictment against Lin Piao were: that he plotted a coup d’état; that he attempted to assassinate Mao Tse-tung; and that when these efforts failed, he attempted to defect to the Soviet Union (with which he had had “illicit” relations not further specified).

Sources here say that following the Second Plenum, the struggle had reached a stalemate. Confronted by a powerful coalition of PLA leaders, the Chou element, using Mao as their ideological front man, were compelled to move cautiously and indirectly. Presumably they were constrained from taking direct action against Lin until serious proof of conspiracy was at hand. The party documents characterized the situation as one in which both sides “were riding the tiger and finding it difficult to dismount,” and that they were involved in a “superficial equilibrium which cannot last long.”

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## SECURITY APPARATUS

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# Discredited and dysfunctional

China’s security and intelligence apparatus is rarely a subject of public discussion in either China or the West—yet it is one of the most important power centers in China, one which has held power equal perhaps to that of the much-discussed Soviet KGB. In the recent period, however, the Chinese security apparatus has come to bear little resemblance to its Western counterparts, including the Soviet, in form, content or direction. In earlier years it was under the command of the shadowy powerful Kang Sheng, once trained in the Soviet Union but a known architect of the anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from its inception.

Kang Sheng is now the subject of intense attack in the Chinese media as the architect of the personality cult of Mao and the perpetrator of various crimes, through the security apparatus, against those cadres who were purged various times over the past 20 years. Once head of the “Social Affairs Department” of the CCP (an intelligence bureau whose continued formal existence is uncertain), toward the end of his life Kang had reached the highest ranks of the Chinese Communist leadership. His status as a member of the Politburo of the CCP and fifth-ranking vice-chairman of the party, remained intact at the time of his death in 1975.

Kang Sheng has since had the unusual status of being purged from the CCP after his death, along with another top figure in the security/intelligence apparatus. There have been numerous indications that his “crimes” will be a part of the trial of the Gang of Four and that he will be posthumously tried with them, as their “godfather.” It is important to note that as late as the Eleventh Party Congress in 1977, Chairman Hua listed him among the most venerated of the departed CCP leaders.

### The departed chiefs

A quick review reveals that every known top leader of the security/intelligence apparatus (leaving aside foreign intelligence operations, particularly those under Chou En-lai’s command) has suffered a grim fate. The minister of public security (formally the state apparatus

responsible for internal security) at the beginning of the 1970s, Xie Fuzhi (Hsieh Fu-chih), an ally of Lin Piao, disappeared, and, according to some sources, was assassinated by a member of his own staff. He was recently posthumously purged along with Kang. Li Zhen (Li Chen), who became minister of public security in 1972, disappeared without a trace in 1973. Some sources say that he too did not die a natural death.

The subsequent minister to fill that post was none other than Hua Guofeng, currently chairman of the CCP, and it seems clear that the attacks on Kang also strike indirectly at Hua. One of Hua's allies was Wang Dongxing (Wang Tung-hsing), another senior figure in the security apparatus who was purged at the Fifth Party Plenum in February from his position in the Politburo and as vice-chairman of the CCP. Wang had been head of the special security and intelligence unit assigned to protect Mao and the top Chinese leadership—the 8341 Unit, as it was called, a unit likened by some observers to a Praetorian Guard. (This unit has been disbanded and a similar force reconstituted as the 570001 Unit.)

The purge of Wang had been systematically pursued by Deng, including getting Wang removed from the command of the general office of the Central Committee (since taken over by Yao Yilin) and from responsibility for carrying out the investigation of the crimes of the Gang of Four. Clearly Wang's role in carrying out the arrest of the Gang of Four on Oct. 10, 1976 has not absolved him from being a close colleague of Kang, and thus held partially responsible for the implementation of the Cultural Revolution and the purges and deprivations that resulted.

### Functioning impaired

The current minister of public security is Zhao Cangbi (Chao Tsang-pi). His security background goes back to his services as director of public security in Deng's native Sichuan province, indicating his close ties to Deng. Zhao recently held a work conference of some 145 security officials to criticize the "work style" of these cadre of the public safety bureaus. While repeatedly praising the "fine work style" of these cadre, Zhao noted that the "pernicious influence" of Lin Piao and the Gang of Four still existed. He indicated it would take some six months to overcome this influence.

From this and similar references in the Chinese media it is apparent that the functioning of the security apparatus has been significantly impaired and its ability to faithfully carry out the orders of the Peking leadership is somewhat in doubt. This is supported by the reported re-entry of the People's Liberation Army into the role of providing security functions as it did in the Cultural Revolution. At a meeting in Peking early this year a vice-minister of public security, Xi Guoguang

(Hsi Kuo-kuang) found it necessary to thank the PLA for having given assistance in the maintenance of public order.

### The Chinese resistance

The problems besetting the battered security organs are not confined to those in the political arena alone. In addition to the antisocial, criminal activity which require the assistance of the PLA to handle, there is also the matter of "underground activities." This fascinating and minimally discussed problem was recently highlighted in an obscure journal, *News Frontline*, No. 4, 1980. This journal carried a speech to journalists by Hu Qiaomu (Hu Chiao-mu), a member of the Central Committee Secretariat and head of the Academy of Social Sciences, on the matter of "secret organizations."

Hu cited two types of antiregime, underground organizations—"remnants of the Gang of Four" and others described as "small factions which are not the remnants of the Gang of Four," evidently a reference to elements from groups formed during the Cultural Revolution. There was a third group alluded to as opposing "proletarian dictatorship, but who want to continue the revolution." This may refer to underground groups who want "radical changes but not party dictatorship," i.e., individuals who want rapid changes to continue until they achieve the status in society to which they believe they are entitled.

Strikingly, Hu described these "secret organizations" as "in mutual liaison all over the country," indicating they are located in many regions of China, and that they are in communication with one another. Though their ideological affiliations and programs may not be identical, they evidently have many objectives in common. The article notes that the Gang of Four "in some regions . . . still have considerable power, menacing our stability and unity."

Deng is quoted as stressing that the strength of these secret organizations should not be underestimated. Noted are their capacity for organization, secretiveness, communication, flexible strategy, and ability to adjust to changing circumstances. It would appear these particular elements have learned from Mao all too well, and have been "corrupted by their tradecraft."

As the continuing tension in Shanxi Province would indicate, and as Deng and Hu have complained, some of these secret organizations are receiving support from cadres who still hold their posts. In this connection one old China hand notes that because of the long tradition of secret societies in China, resistance does not take the form of such "naive" activities as those in East European countries where dissidents organize human rights groups and monitor the Helsinki agreements in public. "Resistance is much more subtle, invisible, all-penetrating."