

Suzuki also found Reagan's view on the China Card different from Haig's. Japan is very concerned that good U.S.-China ties be maintained, and Suzuki urged Reagan not to disturb those ties. Suzuki also commented in his Washington press conference that China should be kept part of the "Western alliance." However, the Japanese, particularly Fukuda, are concerned that the U.S. not excessively build up China militarily—partly because Tokyo does not want to provoke Moscow too much, and partly because Tokyo does not trust Peking's ambitions. Reagan has opposed the Haig/Weinberger push for arms sales to China.

When Suzuki realized that Reagan did not agree with Haig's pressure on Japan on regional defense and the China Card—a politically untenable proposition in Japan—Suzuki felt he had maneuvering room to respond to internal Japanese political reality. Ito was out.

On May 9, one day after the summit, one of the top U.S. backers of Ohira and then Ito, former U.S. ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer gave an interview to the *Mainichi Shimbun* in which he revealed a fact that could destabilize any Japanese regime. In a country still mindful of Hiroshima, Reischauer stated that under a secret 1960 understanding, the U.S. was bringing nuclear missiles into Japanese ports when its ships landed there, in violation of the public treaty prohibiting this without prior consultation. Japan does not make, use, or allow entry of nuclear weapons on its territory.

Published by *Mainichi* a couple days following Ito's resignation, the Reischauer interview made headlines throughout Japan and was used in the U.S. press to speculate on the possible downfall of Suzuki himself. Typical was the May 20 *Christian Science Monitor*, which commented, "The U.S. may have to revise its expectations of greater military cooperation from Japan. For one thing it may not be able to rely on Suzuki to deliver the goods—in view of mutterings within the corridors of power that his government may not survive the current furor over defense."

The Reischauer revelation is being used by the JSP to destabilize Suzuki at the same time that it is stepping up a campaign to shut down all nuclear plants in Japan—the same scenario used by the JSP's Socialist International affiliates against Schmidt and Giscard.

There are two theories about Ohira-backer Reischauer's motivations. One view is that many people in Japan genuinely agree with Haig and Weinberger rather than Reagan, but have been afraid to challenge public opinion in Japan. Reischauer, according to this view, wanted to force the issue presuming the pro-buildup forces would eventually win.

Another view holds that Reischauer was aghast that the formerly Ito-controlled Suzuki was coming under the influence of Fukuda, and that Reischauer made the statement deliberately to destabilize Suzuki.

Why U.S. aid to the Zia will destroy the nation

by Daniel Sneider, Asia Editor

This writer recently returned from a two-week visit to Europe where I had extended discussions with numerous exiled Pakistani political leaders. Each of them expressed dark fears about the future of his nation, doubts about its continued existence as a country under the current military regime of General Zia Ul-Haq. People who looked on America as a friend, they asked me how the American government could possibly consider giving massive arms aid—\$2.5 billion over five years—to a regime that has pitted itself so completely against its own population.

This is a question Congress must ask itself before acting further. The arms package is being sold as a measure to assure the security of Pakistan, a country supposedly vital to defense of the Persian Gulf-Southwest Asia region facing the threat of Soviet aggression, and useful as a back-door ally of China.

In reality, this program will undermine security and destabilize this vital region. It is not an astrological feat to predict that before the termination of this five-year plan, South Asia will have witnessed one or more of the following events: the breakup of Pakistan into several different entities; a war between India and Pakistan, possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons, that could trigger a wider conflict involving China, the Soviet Union, and the United States; chaos, famine, epidemics throughout South Asia, and resulting depopulation along the lines of the Carter administration's Global 2000 neo-Malthusian policy.

These predictions are based on several clear facts. The first is that the aid given will never be used for the purpose claimed, that is, for defense against a primarily Soviet-based threat to Pakistan's security. The second is that the Zia regime is itself so unstable and insecure that it is just as likely to provoke conflict to preserve itself as anything else. And third, in the unlikely case that such arms aid were actually used in an engagement with Soviet forces, the outcome of such a conflict is guaranteed no matter what the scale of aid, unless the United States is prepared to enter the conflict directly.

Irving Kristol, who can hardly be accused of being pro-Soviet, made some of these points in an April 29 *Wall Street Journal* commentary terming the Pakistan

government of Pakistan

aid package “an indefensible blunder.” Kristol argues that “the only possible use that Pakistan can make of those arms is in a war against its [by now] hereditary enemy: India,” a war he says that “is definitely not in our interests.” The “whispers” that we will get Pakistani military assistance to Afghan rebels and U.S. naval facilities in return, Kristol notes, are “not to be taken too seriously.” Kristol concludes, “In view of the fact that the Zia dictatorship is generally conceded to be unpopular, those port facilities are more likely to be imaginary than real.”

The problem of General Zia

The key to the situation lies in the nature of the Zia regime itself, a problem that defines its own solution, one that would actually further American interests in Pakistan and the region. All those who have argued in favor of this aid program have papered over this problem or simply ignored it. The implicit assumption underlying current U.S. policy—which must be understood as a mere continuation, on a grander scale perhaps, of Brzezinski’s infamous “Arc of Crisis” policy—is that only the army can rule Pakistan, and General Zia, so long as he retains the confidence and support of the army, is the only horse the United States has to ride in Pakistan. The long-standing role of the Pakistan army in providing security assistance to states of the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia and Oman, is seen to enhance its importance from the standpoint of Pakistan as a “guardianship” of the eastern approaches to the Persian Gulf.

Such an argument betrays a willful ignorance of Pakistani politics. The Zia regime, of course, is not the first military government in Pakistan (it is the third), but it has scant resemblance to the 1958-68 regime of General Ayub Khan, which many Americans recall fondly. The Zia regime is distinguished by a degree of political repression beyond any previous military/authoritarian regime, as expressed in the judicial murder of overthrown Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Zia has eliminated the avenues of political opposition in unprecedented fashion, and burned his political bridges in a way which makes his exit necessarily bloody. Moreover,

he has placed the army itself in the position of acting as an instrument of internal repression, threatening the ability of that institution to play a unifying role in the country. (See the interview with Pakistani political leader Mustapha Khar accompanying this article).

However, the most important feature of the Zia regime demonstrating its departure from the previous history of Pakistan’s somewhat turbulent politics is its espousal of a doctrine of militant Islamic fundamentalism, a doctrine in fact alien to the historical and cultural tradition of Islam in this Muslim state. Zia’s fundamentalism, now used to justify a range of actions from abrogation of the constitution to use of whippings as punishment and abolition of political parties, is a product of the tiny radical extremist party of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate. Zia’s uncle heads this group, which never received more than a few percentage points in any Pakistani election. Zia himself is a known follower of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the only group that still supports his regime, which has otherwise been deserted even by the right-wing parties complicit in the coup against Bhutto. Zia is a military Khomeini, as demonstrated by the incident (so decisively swept under the State Department’s rug) when Jamaat-organized thugs, with the clear complicity of the regime, assaulted and burned the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, resulting in the deaths of two Americans.

Thus the Zia regime holds power by the grace of the repressive power of the military with an ever-narrowing political base. Eventually it must fall, and because it has alienated the entire population, it will likely take the country’s nationhood with it.

The army rule of Zia has dramatically increased the antinational sentiments of people in the three “minority” provinces of Baluchistan, the Northwest Frontier province, and the Sind, against the Punjabi “majority,” identified with the army and who make up the vast majority of its officer corps. The murder of Bhutto, the one man who revived the nationalist identities of all Pakistanis following the breakup created by the formation of Bangladesh, has served to weaken what has always been a fragile sense of unity in a country defined by the partition of British India.

Scenario for the breakup

Scenarios for the breakup of Pakistan are not new. Particularly following the events in Afghanistan and Iran, attention has focused on Baluchistan, which has a history of separatist activity; its thinly populated territory includes a long stretch of the Pakistani coastline from the straits of Hormuz east, including two excellent natural harbors, ideal for naval bases that could control the entrance to the Gulf. Numerous commentators have pointed out that an “independent” Baluchistan is a prize the Soviet Union, for one, would covet. Consider-



An incident in Ravalpindi: Zia is now en route to war against India or chaos in the provinces.

able evidence of Soviet KGB links to leftist Baluchi nationalists adds credibility to this idea.

Certain geopolitical planners, particularly in London, where there is a depth of experience in this region, are thinking along the same lines from the standpoint of the establishment of an Anglo-American base of operations for the Rapid Deployment Force. London sources point out that the Baluchi nationalist leadership looks for support from any quarter, and their loyalty is buyable by any power that offers financial and arms aid. The two Baluchi leaders, Mengal and Maurri, tribal chiefs long active in Baluchi and Pakistani politics, now live in London. About a month ago they attended a meeting of Baluchi exiles that formed the worldwide Organization of Overseas Baluchis committed to the independence of the province.

Pakistani sources in London close to these circles report rumors of American backing for the Baluchis in the hope of securing future U.S. naval bases there. Recent travelers to the largest port, Gwadar, report active construction work to transform what is now a fishing village into a port and that American technicians were seen at work there. British officers in charge of the Oman army go every year to Baluchistan to recruit soldiers from there for the Omani army, and units of Baluchi soldiers are available in Oman that could be deployed back in support of some kind of "independence struggle."

Sources in London also report active efforts and

talks to link the Baluchi exiles with leaders of the so-called Sindhu Desh movement, also based in London. This movement, led by Dr. Hamida Khuro, has been active for more than 10 years for the independence of the Sind, which neighbors Baluchistan and occupies the rest of the coastline. There are also previous links, though less active today, between the Baluchis and the separatist tendencies among Pathans of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), joined together at one time in Wali Khan's National Awami Party, which was banned during Bhutto's rule for its antinational activities. Khan is a frequent visitor to London where he enjoys the counsel of Sir Olaf Caroe, the former British governor of the NWFP and the "godfather" of the Pathans.

All this defines a gathering potential for the breakup of Pakistan, under conditions of the chaos which would surely follow Zia's downfall.

A chaotic breakup creates, first of all, the conditions for superpower intervention and confrontation, including conditions of regional war. Second, the breakup of Pakistan will undoubtedly spread beyond its former borders, threatening the integrity of neighboring India and Iran.

The geopolitics of Pakistan

The current U.S. policy is based on a geopolitical doctrine which is misconceived. As Selig Harrison, a leading American authority on this region has pointed out, the American policy toward Pakistan is historically shaped in the postwar period by British geopoliticians like Sir Olaf Caroe who have argued that Pakistan's geostrategic significance lies in its relationship to the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia (the Middle East). Caroe was the architect of the Baghdad Pact and CENTO alliances, which sought to institutionalize this alignment of Pakistan as part of a NATO-linked defense/security structure for the Middle East.

The accurate view of Pakistan's national identity is not in terms of relations to the Muslim Middle East, but as a historic, cultural and political part of the South Asian subcontinent. The South Asian region—Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and the smaller states—has been one coherent region for many thousands of years. Any attempt to divorce Pakistan from that region ultimately has a destabilizing impact on the South Asian region. Caroe and others like him do not conceal their anti-Hindu bias or their view that India is of no consequence to the interests of the West.

That geopolitical outlook, accompanied by crude equations of India with the Soviet Union, is clearly present among the framers of the current U.S. policy and among many of its supporters in Congress. Implicitly, the idea that Pakistan under Zia will use the U.S.-

supplied arms against India is accepted without concern for the effect on actual U.S. interests.

The Bhutto factor

The Zia problem is not insoluble, provided there is a political force with the capacity to form a government that can command the loyalties of the population and counter the fissiparous tendencies rampant in the country. That force does exist: it is the Pakistan People's Party founded by Z. A. Bhutto and led today by his wife Begum Nusrat Bhutto, and his daughter Benazir Bhutto. As exiled PPP leader Khar points out below, Zia's plan to destroy the PPP by murdering its leader and founder failed, and the PPP is more popular than ever. The reason for this is basically the continuing appeal of Bhutto in the minds of the population as the nationalist who restored a sense of pride and identity following the splitoff of Bangladesh. It is the Bhutto legacy of nationalism, institutionalized in the PPP and in the family's role, which is the most important asset to be preserved if Pakistan is to survive as a nation and play a stabilizing role in the region.

The PPP leads the nine-party alliance of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which includes virtually every political party in the country, including some that supported the coup against Bhutto. The MRD favors an end to martial law followed by free elections. However, in the past two months the Zia regime has placed thousands of political activists and leaders in jail, including Mrs. Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto, without recourse to the courts and with a distinct danger to their lives. Any move by the Reagan administration and Congress to put through the aid package for Zia at this point will amount to a reward for these activities and an endorsement of the regime's destructive policies.

Bhutto was committed to a long-term policy of stabilization and cooperation with India and among the nations of South Asia. The rivalry remained, but Bhutto was clearly committed, as is Mrs. Gandhi, to establishing normal relations and solving the outstanding issues between the two nations. The continued adherence of PPP leaders to such a peace and stability policy, reinforced by the admiration among wide circles of Pakistanis for Mrs. Gandhi's defense of Bhutto's life against Zia, is an asset for any sound American policy.

The fundamental point is this: the Zia regime will destroy Pakistan as a nation and destabilize the entire South Asian region. Any policy which bolsters Zia in the short term, no matter what the motives, will further this process in the longer term. American policy, if it is truly committed to the defense of stable allied nation-states, cannot follow such a path with Pakistan. And there is no need for it to do so.

Interview

People's Party leader speaks out on Zia

The following interview with Ghulam Mustapha Khar was conducted by Asia Editor Daniel Sneider on May 4 in West Germany. Mr. Khar is the head of the Pakistan People's Party (Overseas), the former governor and chief minister of the Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province and at one time a close aide and associate of the late Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the founder of the PPP. He is living now in exile in London where he is organizing among Pakistanis outside the country against the military regime of General Zia Ul-Haq.

Sneider: What is the current political situation in Pakistan at this time, according to your information?

Khar: The current political situation in Pakistan, according to our point of view, and according to the majority of the people inside Pakistan or outside Pakistan, is very bad. As a matter of fact from the Pakistani point of view or the nationalistic point of view, it's disastrous. Of course, General Zia, since he came into power, tried his best to destroy most of the political institutions. The People's Party [PPP] was a major political factor and he tried to counter that by suppression. . . .

The most important factor is that you have to have some unifying force in the country and that today, unfortunately, he is trying his best to destroy whatever is left. The political frustration in the country is that for the first time we have a real tyrant and a real dictator. And not a dictator who is interested in the national unity. He's only interested in saving his own neck and that of some of the generals and some of the people who are very closely associated with him.

For that reason, after Mr. Bhutto's murder, he thinks he is being left with no choice than to use maximum force against the people of Pakistan. He has come out with these funny statements saying that the people of Pakistan are not fit to go to the polls, that the people of Pakistan

are not fit to have democracy.

That destroys the concept of Pakistan, because if 35 years ago, the people of Pakistan were capable under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam [Mohammed Ali Jinnah] to create Pakistan and to vote to have an independent country; if their verdict was accepted at that time; if at that time they could think for their nation and for their independent state; if that verdict was accepted, then it is funny to think that after 35 years, no matter whatever they have gone through—sometimes dictatorship, or democracy, but still people have been politically educated, they have gone forward, they have not gone back—to think that the people of Pakistan are not capable of going to the polls.

I think it's something that has really made the people feel that they have to do something which is not normal. And that could be bad for the country. You see some of the groups and some of the things happening which have never happened in Pakistan before. We have had dictators, we have had army rulers, but they left some sort of scope for political activity, and for the people to take out their frustration or anger against the rulers at that time. That's why there were no such actions as we are seeing today. This is only the beginning. It is not the end.

We generally believe that if this sort of situation continues for some time then the national unity is becoming weaker and weaker, especially the way he is using the armed forces of Pakistan. As a matter of fact, the armed forces of Pakistan have always been respected in our country. . . .

But for the first time, in order to achieve Zia's own aims and objectives, he has brought the entire institution of the army against the people and that's a disastrous thing to do. For his own political objectives he's using the army and that's an institution which, if it's destroyed, it will take on complications. . . .

But the time factor is very important and if this situation continues I think it will be very bad for the people of Pakistan and for the country as a whole.

Sneider: There is an impression created in the West that the situation is stable, that despite the opposition, General Zia is more stable than he ever was before. Do you think that is a misimpression of the situation?

Khar: I think that is a misimpression, but I'm surprised that the people in the Western countries believe this kind of propaganda. . . . Why should they believe that today, in our country, when we have a person—I say that the person is hated by a majority of the people. I can prove that by the point that General Zia tried his best to get some sort of vote of confidence from the people which he has not been able to get. Even to the extent that he had to go that far to get rid of Mr. Bhutto and kill Mr. Bhutto because he was told that once Mr. Bhutto was killed,

then his opposition will not be that strong and that he would either be able to win a referendum or have some sort of election where he could get people elected whom he liked.

In the basic elections in Pakistan which were held [the local body elections in 1979] it was quite obvious and evident that all the people who were supposed to be the supporters of General Zia lost. It became quite apparent that people overwhelmingly hated General Zia and they didn't want him.

Relative stability? Yes. If you call this a kind of stability, then I can only say that this is the lull before the storm. The people of Pakistan were not used to lashes; the people of Pakistan were not used to public hangings; the people of Pakistan were not used to these kind of summary trials which they are doing now; since the creation of Pakistan, the people of Pakistan have never lost so much property, and the confiscation and everything that has gone with it. So that's true that immediately they have created a fear and people were frightened. But once you introduce certain measures, then people always find ways and means, and people have started finding those ways and means. This is no stability and nobody should have doubt in their minds. This is going to be such an explosive situation. This will become such an unstable country, it will have repercussions on the entire region.

Sneider: You have mentioned the danger of the disintegration of the country. Do you see that there are circumstances developing even now where the result of this kind of rule can bring about the actual physical breakup of Pakistan as a unified nation?

Khar: I am very frightened about this situation. I don't want to talk too much about this subject, but I think the policies of General Zia are heading toward the disintegration of Pakistan. Nobody can deny the fact that no country can be kept united under any force or any military. The biggest problem which he is creating for Pakistan is that he is using the armed forces of Pakistan to put down his enemies, and most of the army unfortunately comes from the biggest province of Pakistan, which is Punjab. They are in charge of all this repression, and lashes, and summary trials which is creating a lot of hatred in the smaller provinces. . . .

Unfortunately the biggest damage Zia has done is the way he is treating Bhutto's family, the way he is treating [Bhutto's wife and daughter] Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir.

Recently, according to my information, Benazir was mishandled, or she was beaten and dragged to her prison cell. From that she had some sort of hemorrhage, and she was brought to the hospital, treated for a little while, and then taken right back to prison. Under the conditions under which these two ladies are living, this is a

deliberate attempt to create more hatred, and people of the smaller provinces will resent the situation even more.

Sneider: Do you think there is a danger to the lives of Mrs. Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto?

Khar: I think there is a danger to their lives because this is what we had been telling the Western world at that time when Mr. Bhutto was in jail. We had told the world that Mr. Bhutto was going to be killed, and nobody was prepared to believe us. I repeat the same thing again that you will only believe us when they are killed and that will be no use to us. As a matter of fact we will lose our leaders and we will lose our country.

Sneider: Would you want to see an effort made to get Mrs. Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto out of jail, and if necessary, get them out of the country for medical treatment?

Khar: I think this is absolutely necessary. As you know, for the last two years Miss Benazir Bhutto has been asking to come out for medical treatment for a serious ear problem, which everybody knows that she has, and this has not been allowed. I have been in touch with Benazir Bhutto and Nusrat Bhutto. Mrs. Bhutto also is in a very bad state. If you had seen her latest interview with BBC-TV, she looks about 80 years old and she is physically very, very weak. She has always been unwell, even during the time of Mr. Bhutto's life.

I think it's absolutely essential that we, as Pakistanis living abroad, and all the people who care for humanity or who care for Pakistan, or who think that Pakistan should survive as one country, and they're friends of Pakistan or friends of democracy, should help us put maximum pressure on this regime to allow them at least to come out and receive medical treatment. I think as human beings they have every right to do this.

Sneider: The other major issue that is being discussed, as you know, is the question of major arms supplies to the Zia regime. Foreign Minister Aga Shahi was in Washington discussing this and apparently some kind of major arms and aid package is being put together, principally by the United States but also by the British and others. As a Pakistani, as someone who is concerned about the country and the effects of General Zia's continued rule, what would your comments be on the question of giving this kind of arms aid to Pakistan?

Khar: Well, I think at this time giving any aid to General Zia especially this arms aid, this is not being friendly to Pakistan. The people of Pakistan, the majority of the people of Pakistan, would not consider this a friendly gesture because they think that strengthening General Zia's hand is something which is going against their interest. We believe that is against our national interest

because the arms which Pakistan government is going to get are not going to be used against anybody else except the people of Pakistan, which has been proved. Especially an unpopular army, an unpopular dictator is of no use to anybody except for repression inside the country.

I am surprised that why doesn't the U.S. government, the people of the United States, consider that the people of Pakistan have always been friendly and they still want and need their friendship. They want that the United States should be friendly to the people of Pakistan but not to an individual. It is a short-sighted policy. They might be able to strengthen him for some time, but they will not be able to keep him for long. Once he's gone, the people of Pakistan will never forget that, at the worst time, when people were beaten up, when their leader was murdered, when all the repression was at its peak, at that time the person who has hated the most was supported the most by the United States government.

Sneider: Do you also fear that the consequences of such aid could bring about increased tension and even conflict between India and Pakistan?

Khar: That you can see already—the reaction in both the countries have started this kind of war propaganda. The Pakistani government is saying that India is going to attack Pakistan and the Indian government is saying that Pakistan is going to attack India. Ultimately we have our problems, and this kind of arms aid could bring the situation to where there is a conflict. In that conflict I am absolutely sure and convinced Pakistan will be the loser and nobody else.

Sneider: Is there an alternative to that in terms of the kind of relationship that could exist between India and Pakistan?

Khar: Yes, I think that is absolutely necessary. In the past we have learned a lesson. We have always believed and Mr. Bhutto always believed in one thing—that we should try our best to have friendly relations with our neighbors, whether the big powers or small countries because we have to live with them. With India I think it is absolutely necessary that we should start thinking realistically for the peace and stability of this region.

The people of India and the people of Pakistan must come to some sort of understanding which is in their national interest because we are concerned about developing our countries and doing something for the common man, for the poor people, who are the majority in India and in Pakistan. I think if we have a representative government in Pakistan we can achieve that and that would be the greatest contribution toward the stability of that region.

Sneider: Thank you very much.